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l)DEAF EFFECT FOR RISK WARNINGS
A CAUSAL EXAMINATION APPLIED TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROJECTS
Escalation of commitment to a chosen course of action is a phenomenon that shows for
example when failing strategic Information Systems (IS) projects are continued for much
too long. With this study we contribute to the explanation of why managers (Project
Owners) respond with the Deaf Effect to Risk Warnings, even when these warnings are
provided by a credible messenger, such as an internal auditor. 
We examine whether the IS Project Owner’s Perceived Control is of influence on the
Deaf Effect. We also examine whether the Deaf Effect for the risk warning is affected by
the relationship with the messenger:  is the messenger seen as a collaborative partner
who is of help or is the messenger seen as an opponent who is exposing the Project
Owner’s failures. Furthermore, we assess whether the Deaf Effect is affected by the
presentation (framing) of the message in terms of Gains or in terms of Losses. Based on
experiments we analyze the main effects and the interaction effects of those three factors
to the Deaf Effect. In a multi-case study we explore other factors that can affect the Deaf
Effect and could be interesting for further study. We discuss the contribution of our study
to literature on escalating IS projects and to literature on internal auditing. Finally we
discuss the implications of our study to the practice of IS Projects and Internal Auditing
and to management practice in general.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The three figures on the title-page are named Mizaru (who covers his eyes), Kikazaru (who 
covers the ears) and Iwazaru (covering his mouth). They find their origin in the tenets of 
the philosopher Confucius who lived 2500 years ago in China. The figures represent the 
so-called Three Wise Monkeys. Monkeys were chosen because of their importance in 
China and Japan in the period these tenets were distributed. The meaning that was ascribed 
to these figures has developed over time and differs across cultures. In the ancient China 
and Japan they symbolized the proverbial principle to ³VHHQRHYLO´, ³KHDUQRHYLO´ and 
³VSHDNQRHYLO´and thus be good of mind, speech and action. In the Western world the 
phrase is often used to refer to those who deal with impropriety by looking the other way, 
refusing to acknowledge it, or feigning ignorance. It is interesting to notice that in the 
history of these tenets, a fourth ape has been faded away. This 4th ape, named Shizaru,, 
originally ascribed ³GRQRHYLO´ which would have developed to ³QRWWDNLQJDFWLRQ´ in the 
western interpretation. 
   
The topic of deafness for obtrusive signals apparently has a long history and has widely 
been shared across cultures. Even to date it is relevant when we consider numerous, often 
prestigious, Information Systems (IS) projects that are no longer approaching their goals 
and to which continued investments are no longer justified. For reasons not well 
understood, executives may either consciously or unconsciously ignore, reject or not hear 
warnings, even when those who provided it were bold enough to transmit the message. 
Keil and Robey (2001) SURYLGHGWKHQRWLRQWKDWH[HFXWLYHV¶UHIXVDOWRKHDUEDd news might 
be one of the causes of the so-FDOOHG³HVFDODWLRQ´RI,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHPV,6SURMHFWV 
 
The escalation phenomenon refers to a failure to withdraw from a failing course of action. 
In this entrapment, people appear to stick to choices in which they already invested time or 
money, even when continuation is no longer rational. Staw (1976) used the metaphor of 
³.QHH-'HHS LQ WKH %LJ 0XGG\´ IRU VXFK HQWUDSment situations, referring to the US-
entrapment in their involvement in the Vietnam war. The momentum to withdraw has been 
lost and decision makers escalate their commitment to a risky though failing course of 
action. Simon (1997), p105 described this commitment to a once chosen course of action 
DV DQ DFW RI ERXQGHG UDWLRQDOLW\ ³7KH DFWLRQ LWVHOI FUHDWHV VWLPXOL WKDW GLUHFW DWWHQWLRQ
towards its continuance and completion - /LNHDJRRGERRN LI LW¶VZHOOZULWWHQ WHQGV WR
hold attention to the limits of its covers - DQG ZLOO DFWXDOO\ GHFUHDVH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V
VHQVLWLYLW\WRH[WHUQDOVWLPXOL´3HRSOHDSSDUHQWO\PLJKWEHFRPHGHDIWRZDUQLQJVZKHQD
chosen course of action has caught them, even if this course of action has lost its 
justification and should be stopped or redirected. They remain committed, or even further 
escalate their commitment to continuation, despite the warning signals.   
 
Many prestigious IS-projects have been prone to escalation of commitment mechanisms. 
Even worse: a remarkably large number of case-studies use IS-projects as an example for 
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escalation (Drummond, 1999; Guah, 2008; Mähring & Keil, 2008; Montealegre & Keil, 
2000; Pan, Pan, Newman, & Flynn, 2006). The upside of this is that more and more has 
become  known about the mechanisms that fuel escalation of IS-projects, thanks to over 15 
years of research. This includes studies about why IS-projects typically bear characteristics 
that might promote escalation of commitment. Unfortunately, even to date, too many 
prestigious IS-projects fail, despite the methods, tools and skills of IS professionals 
involved. At the time of writing these lines, the Dutch parliament announced an 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQRQ³IDLOLQJJRYHUQPHQWDO IS-projectV´WREHKHOGLQ012.  
 
Our study will focus on the so called Deaf Effect, since there is room to contribute with 
research on this topic (Cuellar, 2009). This Deaf Effect could be one of the causes of 
escalation of IS Projects (Cuellar, 2009; Keil & Robey, 2001).  The main Research 
Objective of our study is to: 
 
³&RQWULEXWH WR WKH H[SODQDWLRQ of Why the Deaf Effect occurs in the applied field of 
escalating IS-projectV´ 
  
In order to elaborate our Research Objective, we first clarify some positions and 
assumptions that we take throughout this thesis on escalating IS-projects. 
 
Not all  IS-projects fail and not all failing IS-projects escalate. 
 
Information Systems are of strategic value to many organizations. Investments in IS-
projects are often surrounded by well developed instruments to support rational decision 
making, allocation of resources and monitoring. Recent figures on IS-project rates of 
success and failure still raise concerns. Ernst&Young (2009) reported that 48% of all 
started IS-projects end successfully. Most of the 52% failing IS-projects partially achieve 
their prior expectations. Four percent of all projects fail completely, according to their 
GHILQLRQ RI µIDLOLQJ FRPSOHWHO\¶. In their CHAOS report, the Standish Group (2009) 
reported IS-project success rates of 32 percent in 2008 in the US. This refers to IS-projects 
coming in on budget and on time and meeting all the user requirements. This is an 
improvement, compared to the IS-project success rates of 16 percent in 1994 (Standish, 
1995). The Standish Group reported that in 2008 44 percent of the IS-projects were 
seriously challenged by budget overruns, missed deadlines or features set that did not meet 
user requirements (53 percent in 1994). The Standish Group revealed that still 24 percent 
of the IS-projects ended in outright failure in 2008 compared to the 31 percent they 
reported on 1994.       
 
Not every IS-project that fails to meet its objectives in terms of functionality, time span, 
costs or benefits could be labeled as Escalating.  Escalation has been defined as continued 
commitment in the face of negative information about prior resource allocations coupled 
with uncertainty of goal attainment (Keil, 1995). This escalation of commitment can lead 
to IS-projectVZKLFKVHHPWR³WDNHRQDOLIHRIWKHLURZQ´FRQWLQXLQJWRDEVRUEYDOXDEOH
resources without ever reaching its objectives. Like a runaway train, these runaway 
projects hurtle out of control, are difficult to stop, yet are in need of redirection or 
termination (Keil, Mann, & Rai, 2000a). While it is true that most runaways are eventually 
terminated or significantly redirected, there is evidence that suggests that these projects are 
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allowed to continue for too long before appropriate action is taken (Keil & Mann, 1997; 
Nulden, 1996). The escalating IS-projects are just a fraction of all IS-projects, but they are 
responsible for much negative attention and exposure. Or, as Keil and Mähring (2010) 
recently phrased it, these projects are recognized as the Black Holes  LQ RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶
project portfolios, pulling away lots of valuable resources that could have been assigned to 
other strategic improvements to serve their organizations.    
 
Based upon the various definitions of Escalating IS-projects (Keil, 1995; Keil et al., 2000a; 
Nulden, 1996), we phrased the following definition that we will use throughout this thesis: 
 
Escalating IS-projects receive a stable or even increasing amount of resources from 
decision makers even when strong signals indicate that goal attainment of the project is no 
longer viable, since one or both of following  conditions occur:  
x  tKHSURMHFW¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQDOJRDOs are QRORQJHUYLDEOHLHSURMHFW¶VUDWLRQDOHLQ
terms of a positive business case that contributes to organizational goals); 
x  the project activities are no longer approaching the SURMHFW¶V organizational 
goals. 
Not all escalating IS-projects suffer the Deaf Effect 
 
Central to the concept of escalation is the notion of negative project status (Brockner, 
1992). For a variety of reasons, the negative signals may or may not be visible to the key 
decision maker responsible for the decision of whether or not to continue the project. In 
some cases, negative project status is present, but may not be available to those in a 
position to terminate or redirect the project. One reason for this is that individuals in the 
organization may conceal negative information from their superiors, thereby promoting the 
escalation process through what has been referred to as the Mum Effect. In other cases, 
superiors are aware of negative information but choose to ignore it (or discount it heavily) 
due to certain cognitive biases, thereby promoting escalation through what has been 
referred to as the Deaf Effect (Keil and Robey, 1999). Escalation can occur either because 
the project status information is biased, or is not available, or because it is not attended to 
and interpreted correctly.     
 
The upside and downside of commitment 
 
A seemingly contradictory position in our study is that commitment to IS-projects might be 
undesirable. From empirical research we know that commitment  to an IS-project has 
proven to be an important factor to its successful completion (Newman & Sabherwal, 
1996). IS Project Managers and developers must be committed to the process and believe 
that the project is valuable to the organization. However, escalation of commitment is no 
longer in the best interest of the firm. Organizations that continue to put resources in an 
escalating IS-project are likely making a mistake since the additional money spent does not 
provide the business effect that the project was intended to accomplish. The organization is 
wasting valuable resources, which could probably be better invested somewhere else. In 
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these cases, the IS-project team appears to act no longer consistent with the RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶s 
interests in terms of risk-appetite and cost-effectiveness. 
 
The Project Owner as key decision maker 
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of project teams and project managers in decision making, 
we are are interested in the deafness of the business executive who has been labeled as IS 
Project Owner (Andersen, 2010; Bentley & Weber, 2009). The role of Project Owner as 
described by Van Der Merwe (1997), is identified across various established project 
management methods, and KDV EHHQ ODEHOHG DV ³([HFXWLYH´ in Prince2 (OGC, 2002) or 
³3URMHFW6SRQVRU´ in PMBOK (PMI, 2008). This IS Project Owner is considered to be the 
executive that is finally responsible for ensuring that a project achieves its organization 
objectives1. This person should ensure that 1. the project retains its business focus, 2. that 
there are clear responsibilities and 3. that the work, including the risks, is actively 
managed. This executive is chairman of the project board. He or she represents the 
business and is responsible for the business case (Bentley & Weber, 2009). The IS Project 
Owner is responsible for the ultimate product the IS-project has to deliver and is finally 
responsible for taking strategic go/no-go decisions. Where the IS Project Manager is more 
tied to its own project, the Project Owner is mainly representing the organizDWLRQ¶V
interests and is seen as the link between the project and its stakeholders (Andersen, 2010; 
OGC, 2002; PMI, 2008). Turner (Turner & Müller, 2004) contrasts the interests of Project 
Owners and Project Managers. The Project Owner provides financial resources and gives 
approval at the end of different stages, while the Project MDQDJHU³PDQDJHVWKHSURMHct on 
a day-to-GD\EDVLV´7KH3URMHFW2ZQHULVWKHSHUVRQZKRLVWKH³Principal´ZKRKLUHVWhe 
Project MDQDJHUWKH³Agent´7KHProject Manager is managing a project that the Project 
Owner sees as important for his organization. These Principal-Agent positions have been 
followed in many studies on escalating IS-projects as well (Keil et al., 2000a; Mahaney & 
Lederer, 2003). In these studies, the executive who acts as Project Owner is considered to 
behDYHDVD UDWLRQDOSULQFLSDOZKRJXDUGV WKH LQWHUHVWVRI WKH ILUP¶V VWDNHKROGHUV ZKLFK
could be shareholders, citizens or other ± depending on the nature of the organization). He 
or she should prevent the IS-project team from acting in a way that is inconsistent with the 
organization¶s interests in terms of risk-appetite and cost-effectiveness2.  
 
 
                                                          
 
1 Not all IS projects have the Project Ownership concentrated in one Executive. For example Governmental 
projects may have Project Ownership distributed across multiple executives. Olsson, N. O. E., Johansen, A., 
Langlo, J. A., & Torp, O. 2008. Project Ownership: implications on success measurement. Measuring Business 
Excellence, 12(1): 39-46. 
2 :HSUHIHUWKHWHUPµRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLQWHUHVW¶RYHUWKHPRUHUHILQHGWHUPRIµstakehROGHUV¶LQWHUHVW¶. Refined 
chains of Principal-Agent relationships could exist at the level of stakeholders, shareholders, boards of directors, 
supervisory boards and internal audit commitees. These chains of responsibilities and roles vary across countries 
in multi-tier structures of corporate governance depending on legal requirements and on ownership structures that 
are sometimes diffuse. Although very relevant for research in corporate governance at country-level and at firm-
level, we have chosen not to include these refinements in our study, since we focus on an individual IS project at 
micro level.   
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Bounded Rationality of Project Owners 
 
A problem would arise if the assumption that the Project Owner always acts as a rational 
representative of the stakeholders does not hold. A Project Owner that shows risk-seeking 
behavior and escalation of commitment to the project, would no longer act as guardian of 
the organizDWLRQ¶V interests (as a Principal). Similar to the studies on the commitment of 
project teams, empirical studies from the field also report that early involvement and 
commitment of the IS Project Owner to his or her IS-project is key for project success 
(Andersen, 2010; Bryde, 2008; Helm & Remington, 2005). Here, the benefit of 
commitment might also lead to escalation when managers - who often also made the initial 
decisions to start and continue - further increase their commitment when faced with 
substantial setbacks (Sabherwal, Sein, & Marakas, 2003). Korzaan and Morris (2009) 
suggests that escalation of commitment could be promoted by theVHPDQDJHUV¶EHKDYLRUDO
characteristics. Korzaan and Morris (2009) refer to these management characteristics as 
both individual personality traits and variant psychological states that consist of beliefs, 
attitudes and heuristics which could interact with organizational, social and project 
characteristics. So where IS Project Owners are expected to act as rational principals, they 
might be subject to heuristics, beliefs and biases in their decision making, which are 
developed by former experiences with IS-projects and the circumstances (such as pressure, 
need for achievement) of the decisions they face. The most important and strategic IS-
projectVPD\EHUHZDUGHGZLWKWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VPRVWH[SHULHQFHGDQGLQYROYHG3URMHFW
Owners, which inevitably come with their own heuristics, beliefs and biases as well. 
Although their success with previous projects might be considered a benefit, it can nurture 
bounded rationality in their decision making as well, especially when it comes to risk-
taking. In a large scale study with 656 executives from American and Israel, March and 
Shapira (1987) found that most managers see risk-taking as an endeavor where they can 
use skills, exert control and beat the odds, further described later by Shapira (1995), p49. 
March & Shapira assessed that  managers appeared to ignore parts of risk warnings, since 
they assume that they doQ¶WDSSO\WRWKHPSHUVRQDOO\Shapira (1995), p63-64 reported that 
negative feedback information might encourage managers to persist in taking risks even 
more than in case they received positive feedback information. This can make Project 
Owners deaf for risk warnings, even if a credible source blows the whistle that 
FRQWLQXDWLRQRIDSURMHFWLVQRORQJHULQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLQWHUHVW  
 
Deaf Effect of Project Owners as reported by Internal Auditors 
 
Based on interviews with internal IS auditors, Keil and Robey (2001) described the Deaf 
Effect as a failure to respond to messages of impeding IS-project failure. The auditors 
recalled instances in which they had reported bad news about projects only to find that 
their concerns were ignored by executive management. Several auditors underscored the 
importance of developing relationships with managers in the organization. The following 
account of a whistle blowing incident by an IS auditor illustrates this point. "I think," the 
auditor said, "the way we handled it made a difference. We suggested they really look at 
these issues. We have got some major problems, and I think just the way we came about it, 
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as a team player instead of a policeman. And that 'We want to help you; we see that this 
project's out of control; we can see that maybe some things you're not getting the truth on 
because you're so close to it; but this is what we see.' Even though we are an independent 
appraisal organization, we are still part of the same corporate team, and our goals are 
their goals basically. We all want the company to do well." (Case #182).  
Keil and Robey (2001) concluded that effective whistle blowing may depend on 
organizational factors, like organizational size, the historical commitment by executive 
management to the internal audit function and the independence of auditing from 
management authority. As the quotation suggests, the effectiveness of whistle blowing  
could be influenced by the presentation of the message and a partnership relation between 
the bad news messenger and the Project Owner as well.  
 
Further Insights from Empirical Research on Deaf Effect of IS Project Owners  
 
Cuellar (2009) defined the Deaf Effect phenomenon DVRFFXUULQJ³ZKHQDGHFLVLRQPDNer 
GRHVQ¶W KHDU LJQRUHV or overrules a report of bad news to continue a failing course of 
DFWLRQ´ 7KLV VFRSH DVVXPHV WKDW WKHUH LV D ZHOO-informed and objective messenger that 
sends a risk warning to the executive. So we exclude messengers who withhold or 
attenuate their message, which is referred to as the Mum Effect. This has been subject to 
other studies that contributed to an explanatory model for keeping mum based on Whistle 
Blowing Theory (Keil, Smith, Pawlowski, & Jin, 2004; Miceli & Near, 2002; Near & 
Miceli, 1995; Park, Im, & Keil, 2008; Park & Keil, 2009; Ramingwong & Sajeev, 2007; 
Ramingwong, Sajeev, & Inchaiwong, 2009; Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Smith, Keil, & 
Depledge., 2001).       
 
Few studies have explored the Deaf Effect of executives as reported by the internal IS 
auditors interviewed by Keil and Robey (2001). Based upon a laboratory experiment with 
student subjects, Cuellar, Keil, and Johnson (2006) found the Bad News MHVVHQJHU¶V
LQWHUQDODXGLWRU¶VSHUFHLYHG credibility, and the decision mDNHU¶Vgender, age  and years 
of experience influenced Deaf Effect (Cuellar et al., 2006). Credibility of the source was 
composed of two dimensions: expertise and the extent to which the messenger could be 
relied upon to make true assertions, operationalized by Cuellar as labeling the internal 
DXGLWRU DV ³FU\ZROI´ (Cuellar et al., 2006). In a second study, Cuellar (2009) could 
partially confirm that the Deaf Effect was influenced by the Role Prescription of the Bad 
News Messenger (does WKH PHVVHQJHU¶V role include reporting to executives on this 
project). Furthermore, Cuellar found that male and female decision takers differed in Risk 
3HUFHSWLRQDIWHU UHFHLYLQJ WKHDXGLWRU¶VEDGQHZVPHVVDJH ,QD WKLUG VWXG\ WKHH[SHFWHG
influence of Cultural Dimensions and In-group Collectivism could partially be confirmed 
from an experiment that was replicated in US, Germany and China (Cuellar, 2009). Based 
upon a multiple case-study, Cuellar suggeVWVWKDWGHFLVLRQWDNHU¶VOptimism and Illusion of 
Control  (Staw, Barsade, & Koput, 1997) could be candidate determinants of the Deaf 
Effect. It could be hypothesized that if the IS Project Owner perceives that he has 
substantial skills and abilities and can exert control over the project outcome, it might 
cause him to perceive a report of bad news as less relevant leading him to ignore it. 
Finally, from the multiple case-study Cuellar suggested that a highly Politicized 
Environment would also be a candidate determinant of the Deaf Effect that needs further 
investigation.  
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1.2. Research Objective and Scope 
 
Based upon the factors that have been identified as determinant or candidate to be of 
influence on the Deaf Effect, we refine our Research Objective, by including three 
perspectives that we will study, as follows:  
 
³&RQWULEXWHWRWKHH[SODQDWLRQof Why the Deaf Effect occurs in the field of escalating IS-
projectV´ E\ H[DPLQLQJPDLQ FDXVDO HIIHFWV DQG LQWHUDFWLRQ HIIHFWV IURP IROORZLQJ WKUHH
perspectives: 
1. 7KH ³&ROODERUDWLYH Partner vs OSSRQHQW´ Relationship between Internal Auditor 
(Bad News Messenger) and Project Owner (Decision Maker);  
2. 3URMHFW2ZQHU¶VPerceived Control heuristic which might cause biased processing of 
WKHDXGLWRU¶VULVNZDUQLQJERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\ 
3. The presentation of the risk warning either with the focus on Gains or with the focus 
on Losses.3 
 
The UHOHYDQFHDQGPHDQLQJRIWKH³&ROODERUDWLYH3DUWQHUYV2SSRQHQW´FRQVWUXFWZLOOEH
elaborated later based upon Stewardship Theory. 
7KH ³3HUFHLYHG &RQWURO´ FRnstruct will be elaborated further based upon Illusion of 
Control Theory. At this moment we provide its definition (Thompson, Armstrong, & 
Craig, 1998) as: ´SHRSOH¶V RZQ MXGJPHQW RI WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKH\ FDQ FRQWURO DQ
RXWFRPHLQDVSHFLILFVLWXDWLRQ´  
 
The so-FDOOHG³*DLQ/RVVIUDPLQJ´FRQVWUXFWZLOOEHHODERUDWHGODWHUEDVHGXSRQProspect 
Theory. At this point it makes sense to explain that this construct does not refer to actual 
winning or losing, but refers to the presentation (framing) as gain or loss (the glass is half 
empty or half full).   
 
Furthermore we refine our scope as follows: 
x The decision maker of study (unit of analysis) is the executive who acts in the role of 
IS Project Owner; 
                                                          
 
33 In order to visualize the suggested effects of those three factors we propose the reader to imagine to be driving 
his/her car with a passenger sitting next to the driver. The passenger provides a risk warning and recommends to 
redirect or stop. Would the reader tend to show deaf if  the passenger was seen as opponent or as partner. Would 
it make a difference if  the message was framed positive or negative. And would it make a difference if  you 
consider yourself to be in control. We propose these factors could be of influence and could interact. 
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x The Bad News Messenger acts in the role of internal auditor who meets the 
professional standards of the Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004). These 
standards address the criterion of a bad news messenger who is acting as a credible 
source - i.e. who has the expertise and could be relied upon to make true assertions 
(Cuellar et al., 2006). Furthermore they address the criterion that the internal auditor 
would operate from an Auditing Function which is independent from management 
authority (Keil & Robey, 2001)4. 
 
1.3. Proposed Contribution of this Study 
 
Contribution to Research on Escalating IS-projects 
  
This study aims to contribute to research on Escalating IS-projects, by extending former 
examinations of the Deaf Effect (Cuellar, 2009; Keil & Robey, 2001) and bringing 
knowledge a step further towards a more holistic comprehension of the Deaf Effect. 
Therefore we examine three theories to explain the Deaf Effect individually and relate 
these theories to each other. We also aim to obtain insight into How they influence the 
Deaf Effect in the domain of IS-projects. We will elaborate further our contribution to 
research on Escalating IS-projects in the literature review we present in the next chapter.  
 
Contribution to Research on Internal Auditing  
 
Although our study is mainly anchored in research on Escalating IS-projects, it could  
contribute to research in the field of Internal Auditing as well. Keil and Robey (2001) used 
internal auditors as a source of information in order to explore the Deaf Effect. The 
auditors recalled instances in which they had reported bad news about IS-projects only to 
find that their concerns were ignored. Several auditors underscored the importance of them 
developing relationships with managers in the organization. As quoted earlier, one of the 
interviewed auditors mentioned that the Deaf Effect was avoided by his relationship with 
management as a Collaborative Partner vs as on Opponent: ³just the way we came about it, 
as a team player instead of a policeman´ DQG ³We all want the company to do well." 
(Case #182). So it appears that our study at interpersonal level could contribute to 
knowledge of the effectiveness of internal auditors at micro-level. Our study might as well 
contribute to research of the effectiveness of Internal Audit functions in organizations, 
which still is a relatively unexplored area (Sarens, 2009).  
 
Resuming, with our study on explaining the Deaf EIIHFWIRULQWHUQDODXGLWRUV¶ZDUQLQJVZH
aim to contribute (1) to research on escalating IS-projects, (2) to research on Internal Audit 
effectiveness and (3) to the practice of decision making on strategic IS-projects. Since our 
                                                          
 
4 The IIA professional standards on internal auditing (2004) prescribe that the internal auditor should meet 
standards on  a. proficiency (1210)- knowledge and skills, b. due professional care (1220) ± apply skills, 
prudency  and care , c. organizational independence from executive management (1110) , d. individual objectivity 
(1120) ± impartial, unbiased attitude, avoid conflicts of interest, e. both in fact and appearance (1130). 
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main research objective departs from the Deaf Effect in escalating IS-projects, we embed 
our study in that field of research. In the final chapter we will relate our research findings 
to literature and research on Internal Audit effectiveness.    
 
1.4. Structure of this Thesis 
 
Below we describe how each Chapter of this thesis contributes to our research objective.  
 
In Chapter 2 we will further refine our research objective, the contribution of our study 
and how it is related to other studies. We will first describe the entrapment phenomenon of 
Escalation of Commitment and how it has been explained in literature. Next, we will focus 
on theories and factors that affect escalation in the field of IS-projects. We proceed with a 
review of studies that could be related to the Deaf Effect. This will be followed by an 
elaboration of the three theories -  Stewardship Theory, Illusion of Control Theory and 
Prospect Theory. This provides us with a refined scope and allows us to define the research 
questions that we aim tro answer with our empirical studies. To ensure the feasibility of 
our approach for this empirical part, we review strategies, designs and instruments that 
others have developed and have applied the field of Escalating IS-projects.  
 
In Chapter 3 we will elaborate the Research Design that forms the common basis for the 
empirical chapters of our study. This defines the principles, structures and techniques we 
will use to find the answers to our research questions. We also describe how the individual 
HPSLULFDOFKDSWHUVVWUHQJWKHQHDFKRWKHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQE\PHDQVRIWULDQJXODWLRQ 
 
Within the empirical Chapter 4 we will evaluate whether the Deaf Effect could be caused 
by (1) Gain/Loss framing of the risk warning and (2) whether the messenger is seen as a  
Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent. In this Chapter we will also consider whether 
these factors could interact and through which mediating paths they may cause the Deaf 
Effect. This will be based on a laboratory experiment with 199 students with moderate 
working experience. 
 
Within the empirical Chapter 5 we will describe our second laboratory experiment on the 
'HDI (IIHFW IRU WKH LQWHUQDO DXGLWRUV¶ ULVN ZDUQLQJ:H ZLOO HYDOXDWH ZKHWKHU the Deaf 
Effect could be causHG E\  GHFLVLRQ PDNHUV¶ 3HUFHLYHG &RQWURO DQG  ZKHWKHU WKH
messenger is  seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent. We will consider whether 
these factors could interact and through which mediating paths they may cause the Deaf 
Effect. This will be based on an experiment with 134 part-time students with relevant 
working experience.  
 
In the empirical Chapter 6 we will move our study from artificial laboratory conditions to 
field conditions. In an experiment that is situated in one organization, we provide 
employees of that organization with risk warnings from internal IS-auditors according the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V UHSRUWLQJ VWDQGDUGV DQGSURFHGXUHV. We will assess whether employees in 
different roles show different sensitivity for this information as expected from Illusion of 
Control Theory. We expect that managers will be less sensitive for the probability 
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information and perceive risks differently than internal auditors. This can contribute to the 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPDQDJHUV¶'HDI(IIHFWIRULQWHUQDODXGLWRUV¶ULVNZDUQLQJV.  
 
 
In the empirical Chapter 7 we proceed on the quantitative studies of chapter 4 to 6 with an 
explorative qualitative study on the Deaf Effect for auditor warnings in the context of IS-
projects. We will describe the insights that were obtained from interviews with senior and 
executive internal audit staff on Deaf Effect situations. We include the factors of our 
quantitative studies, and we aim to obtain a more rich and refined view on how these and 
other factors might affect the Deaf Effect, what conditions could promote the Deaf Effect, 
how Deaf Effect emerges and developes over time, and how messengers tend to react. We 
specifically focus on elements that could determine whether the messenger of a risk 
warning is seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent.  
 
In Chapter 8 we integrate the findings and conclusions from the empirical Chapters 4 to 7 
in order to answer our main Research Questions. We will discuss our main findings related 
to the research objective and the scope that we described in Chapter 1. We will review  
methodological choices in the research design of our study which we described in Chapter 
3. We will also discus the contribution of our study to research in the field of Escalating 
IS-projects and in the field of Internal Auditing. We will describe some practical 
implications of our study for internal auditors, for managers and for organizations in 
general. Finally, we will suggest opportunities for further research.  
 
The overall structure of this thesis is presented in figure 1-1. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Structure of the PhD-Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 we will further refine our research objective, the contribution of our study and 
how it is related to other studies. We will first describe the entrapment phenomenon of 
Escalation of Commitment and how it has been explained in the literature. Next, we will 
focus on theories and factors that contributed to escalation in the field of IS-projects. Then 
we focus on literature related to the Deaf Effect. Departing from the Deaf Effect studies in 
the field of Escalating IS-projects we will discuss insights from Listening research, 
Warning Research and Organizational Attention. We continue with a description of 
Corporate Governance Theories and Stewardship Theory in particular. Prospect Theory 
and Illusion of Control Theory will also be introduced, as a basis for the empirical chapters 
where we will use them. The final section of this literature review takes the perspective of 
research methodology and design. This creates a point of reference for a feasible Research 
Design of our empirical studies that we will elaborate in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2. Escalation of Commitment  
 
Escalation of commitment refers to a behavioral entrapment which was first mentioned as 
The Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Effect (Rubin & Brockner, 1975). In this entrapment, 
people appear to stick to choices in which they have already invested time or money. They 
DSSDUHQWO\ FDQ¶W withdraw. An early example refers to someone who has contacted a 
service-number on the phone and is waiting in a queue. While waiting-time proceeds, 
should he or she wait any longer or rather hang-up and try again.  Another example refers 
to a man who is confronted with the choice of walking to his destination (for an important 
meeting) or waiting for the bus, which he expects will get him to his destination faster and 
in greater comfort. As time passes, the costs associated with continued waiting increases, 
but so does the presumed proximity of the goal. Hence, the greater the passage of time, the 
greater the conflict. And the greater the conflict, the greater the pressures to act decisively 
± either by withdrawing or by committing oneself to remain in the situation. 
 
Where these examples refer to the entrapment in situations of investments of time, the 
phenomenon is also found in business investment decisions (Staw, 1976). It would be 
expected that individuals would reverse decisions or change behaviors that appear to result 
in negative consequences. However, within investment decisions, negative consequences 
may actually cause decision makers to increase their commitment and undergo the risk of 
further negative consequences. Staw (1976) used WKHPHWDSKRURI³.QHH-Deep in the Big 
0XGG\´IRUWKLVHQWUDSPHQW situation, referring to the US entrapment in their involvement 
in the Vietnam war. 
 
In a sequence of experimental studies various theories have been tested in order to explain 
the escalation phenomenon. The most prominent theories will be briefly listed first, before 
we elaborate some of the theories further in the next sections of this literature review.  
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Self-Justification Theory  
 
Self-Justification Theory attributes escalation to the reluctance of individuals to admit to 
themselves or to others, that previous resource allocations were unwise. Consequently they 
may invest additional resources in an attempt, consciously or unconsciously, to 
demonstrate the correctness of those earlier decisions. The more that individuals have 
invested in the course of action, the higher is the likelihood of escalation (Brockner, 1992). 
Continuation of this cycle of investments, problems and further investments to justify 
SUHYLRXVLQYHVWPHQWVFRQVWLWXWHVHVFDODWLRQ7KLV7KHRU\LVEDVHGXSRQ)HVWLQJHU¶VWKHRU\
of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957), which explains that people tend to seek for 
consistency between behaviors and their self-esteem. If an individual has suffered a set-
EDFNEXWLW¶VQRWSRVVLEOHWRUHVWRUH WKHORVVWKHUHPD\EHDODUJHQHHGWRSURWHFWRQH¶VHJR
or self-esteem. Individuals attempt to bolster their ego through various rationalization 
devices (Staw & Ross, 1978). They may absolve themselves of any personal responsibility. 
Or they may cognitively distort the magnitude or implications of the setback by perceiving 
it as less negative or even as a blessing in disguise. However, if negative consequences 
continue to occur, the individual must eventually either suffer a large loss of self-esteem or 
lose contact with reality through continued self-justification. 
 
Expectancy Theory 
 
Expectancy Theory suggests that individuals estimate the subjective utility of allocating 
additional resources based upon an assessment of the value of goal attainment (rewards 
minus costs) as well as the probability that allocation of further resources will help attain 
the goal. If the reasons for earlier poor performance are perceived to be unstable and 
temporary, they consider the probability of goal attainment to be more favorable5. 
Therefore they will be likely to commit more resources. Escalation is more likely when 
individuals believe that they are closer to the eventual goal and when the pay-offs 
associated with the course of actions are large (Rubin & Brockner, 1975). There are 
numerous subforms of Expectancy Theory (Staw & Ross, 1978). They share the view on 
the individual as cognitively energetic in assessing the subjective utilities of alternatives 
and take action accordingly. The expectancy mechanism appears to be most relevant to 
FRPPLWPHQWZKHQWKHUHLVDSRVVLELOLW\RIUHFRXSLQJRQH¶VORVVHVWKURXJKDIXWXUHFRXUVH
of action. After suffering a setback, the individual would be predicted to focus on future 
outcomes and the probability of reaching these outcomes with future behavior. 
Commitment would show when the previous course of action has higher subjective 
expected utility than alternatives.    
 
 
 
                                                          
 
5 One could argue whether subjective expected utility could drive escalation behavior. As we show in section 2.5, 
it is considered to be a mechanism of rational decision making based upon subjective probability estimations. The 
studies we refer to here however focus on the biases of these subjective probability estimations. 
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Prospect Theory 
 
In Prospect Theory, outcomes are expressed as positive or negative deviations (gains or 
losses) from a neutral reference point, which is assigned a value of zero (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Although subjective values differ among individuals and attributes, the 
value function is commonly S-shaped, concave above the reference point and convex 
below it. The value function suggests that individuals are risk-seeking when choosing 
between two loosing options but risk averse when choosing between two winning options 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Therefore the decision may depend on the way it is framed 
(Whyte, 1986). Later in this thesis, Prospect Theory and its assumptions will be explained 
further for the purpose of this study. Within Escalation literature, Prospect Theory is 
mainly reflected in the so-called Sunk Cost Effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990). 
When deciding between canceling or continuing a failing project individuals may take 
sunk costs into account. These sunk costs represent irrevocable investments that should be 
irrelevant since the past cannot be changed (Whyte, 1991). While considering these costs 
DVORVVHV3URVSHFW7KHRU\H[SODLQVGHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶WHQGHQF\WRFKRose the risk-seeking 
option in terms of adding more resources to the troubled course of action. 
 
Decision Dilemma Theory 
 
Decision Dilemma Theory focuses on situations where information on past performance 
does not clearly indicate failure (Bowen, 1987). The tendency to escalate commitment is 
attributed to a variety of motives, including economic considerations, curiosity and a desire 
to learn more about the phenomenon (Bowen, 1987; Brockner, 1992).   
 
Self Presentation Theory 
 
According to Self Presentation Theory, the organization culture influences escalation 
decisions. Escalation is more likely when organization culture values consistency in 
behavior or makes people unwilling to admit failure (Brockner, 1992). Self Presentation 
Theory is important in examining the effects of a social opponent as well as an audience 
observing the course of action (Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981).    
 
Modeling Theory 
 
Modeling Theory explores the conditions under which individuals are more likely to 
LPLWDWH RWKHUV¶ EHKDYLRU ,W LV FORVHO\ UHODWHG WR Social Comparison Theory (Festinger, 
1954). Modeling Theory suggests that in the absence of objective standards of correctness, 
managers base their actions on the behavior of others (Brockner et al., 1984) which could 
promote escalation behavior.  
 
Agency Theory 
 
Agency Theory focuses on situations in which an individual or organization (the Principal) 
delegates tasks to another individual or organization (the Agent) (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Escalation is considered more likely when the Agent has some information that the 
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PULQFLSDOGRHVQ¶WKDYH- i.e. the conditions for adverse selection exist (Harrison & Harrell, 
1993). Furthermore, escalation is more likely when the AJHQW¶VJoals is not congruent with 
the PULQFLSDO¶VJRDO 
 
The Theories listed above have dominated escalation-literature in the ¶V DQG ¶V LQ
order to explain the phenomenon of persistence to a failing course of action. Even in the 
past 10 years still many studies have been done that tested extensions or adapted versions 
of these theories, such as Regret Theory (Ku, 2008), mental accounting of sunk time 
(Soman, 2001) or re-interpretation of self-justification effects (Schulz-Hardt, Thurow-
Kröning, & Frey, 2009). Also information-asymmetry according to Agency Theory has 
been further elaborated (Berg, Dickhaut, & Kanodia, 2009) in the context of escalation 
EHKDYLRU0DQDJHUV¶5DWLRQDO7KLQNLQJ6W\OHKDVUHFHQWO\EHHQVWXGLHGLQLWVFRQWULEXWLRQ
to Escalation Behavior (Wong, Kwong, & Ng, 2008). Another recent study investigates 
backfiring effects of warnings (Schulz-Hardt, Vogelgesang, Pfeiffer, Mojzisch, & Thurow-
Kröning, 2010).  
 
To complete the introductory purpose of this section, the following developments and sub-
streams should be mentioned with regard to this stream of literature on the escalation 
phenomenon. First, many studies refer to a typology as introduced by Ross and Staw 
(1986) that structures the factors that influence escalation of projects. The factors are 
clustered by their research discipline of origin: Psychological, Social, Organizational and 
Project factors. Secondly, it should be noted that, next to the explanatory experimental 
studies, the research stream shows a number of case-studies often describing escalated 
projects (Ross & Staw, 1986, 1993; Royer, 2003). A remarkably large number of case-
studies use IS-projects as an example for escalation (Drummond, 1999; Guah, 2008; 
Mähring & Keil, 2008; Montealegre & Keil, 2000; Pan et al., 2006). This has developed 
over the last 15 years to an applied research stream on Escalating IS-projects, next to 
applied studies in other domains, such as professional sports (Staw & Hoang, 1995), 
lending and banking (Drummond, 2002; Staw et al., 1997) or political decision making 
(Ross & Staw, 1986). The research stream on Escalating IS-projects will be described 
further in the next section.  
2.3. Escalating IS-projects 
 
In this section we provide an overview of factors that have a causal relationship with 
escalation of IS-projects. Furthermore we provide further insight into the process of 
escalation and de-escalation. In order to structure the overview of causal factors, we follow 
the four perspectives on escalation as proposed by Keil and Mann (1997) which is based 
upon the typology by Staw and Ross (1987) and presented in the figure below.  
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Figure 2-1 Four categories of factors that cause escalation of  IS-projects 
2.3.1. Project Factors 
 
Project factors are the objective features of the project itself and how it is perceived by 
management. Several project-related factors could be identified in being of influence on 
escalation of commitment. These factors include the costs and benefits associated with the 
project as well as the expected difficulty and duration of the project. Projects are more 
prone to escalation when they involve a large potential pay-off, when they are viewed as 
requiring a long-term investment in order to receive any substantial gain, and when set-
backs are perceived as temporary problems that can be overcome (Keil, 1995). Based upon 
their survey amongst IS-auditors, Keil and Mann (1997) associated inadequate project 
control mechanisms, unclear scope, unclear time and resources, changing requirements 
and lack of project monitoring by senior management with project escalation. This 
particularly applies to Information Systems projects given their large investments, the 
invisible nature of software and milestones, volatility of requirements and the intangibility 
of benefits all of which create ambiguity and may cause them to be especially susceptible 
to escalation (Keil & Flatto, 1999). Inaccuracy due to project status reporting errors and 
biases (Snow & Keil, 2001) could promote escalation.  
 
$FURVVPDQ\ VWXGLHV WKHSURMHFW¶V level of sunk cost and percentage of completion have 
proven to be of influence on project escalation (Garland & Conlon, 1998; Keil et al., 
2000a). Boonthanom (2003) found that the level of project decision unit (group vs 
individual) was relevant and that group-level decision making promoted project escalation. 
In the same study he found that explicit decision guidance was able to attenuate the 
escalation behavior, especially at the individual level. High closing costs and the 
infeasibility of alternatives were proposed to contribute to escalation (Sabherwal et al., 
2003). The absence of a de-escalation strategy also promoted escalation (Boonthanom, 
2003).  
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2.3.2. Social Factors 
 
Social factors are those factors of the environment in which the nature of social structures 
influence the decision process. Leadership norms may influence a decision to continue a 
failing course of action. There may be social rewards for persistence on a project so as to 
turn a losing project into a winner. If being consistent and successful is strongly valued in 
the society or the organization then persistence in the face of a losing project may be 
viewed as the appropriate behavior (Staw et al., 1997). Staw et al. (1997) indicate that 
External Justification WRZDUGV WKH VRFLDO HQYLURQPHQW PD\ DIIHFW GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V
behavior. There may be social costs of withdrawal in which termination or redirection of a 
project might result in losing face. Accountability to others, such as the project team, can 
overwhelm rationality of decision making. Managers may hesitate to recognize losing 
SURMHFWVZKHQ WKHLUH[WHUQDO UHSXWDWLRQ LVDW ULVNDQGZKHQ LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWDSURMHFW¶V
performance is not widely known. This indicates that commitment to a project is not an 
isolated affair. The decision maker might also be surrounded by a homogenous group of 
³\HV-PHQ´ZKRILOWHUout (Park & Keil, 2009) messages that disagree with the situation as 
perceived by the manager. When such a group of people share opinions and assess 
situations in the same manner, this so called Groupthink could promote escalation since 
EDG QHZV UHSRUWV DUH QRW DFWHG RQ 7KH GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V SHUVRQDliy type (Stumpf & 
Dunbar, 1991) FRXOGVWURQJO\EHRILQIOXHQFHRQEHLQJVXUURXQGHGE\³\HV-PHQ´Another 
form of Groupthink is called Group Polarization which does not require any strong 
SHUVRQDOLW\ GHFLVLRQ PDNHU VXUURXQGHG E\ ³\HV´-men. This Group Polarization is the 
increase in the extremity of the average response of a subject population (Myers, 1976). 
More simply phrased, people tend to make more extreme decisions when being part of a 
group, because the initial preference of individual group members is strengthened 
following group discussion (Isenberg, 1986; Jones & Roelofsma, 2000). There are two 
special cases of group polarization, risky shift and cautious shift (Jones & Roelofsma, 
2000). Groups whose means lean slightly towards risk taking become even more prone to 
take risks (Rothwell, 1986). In cautious shift, people slightly leaning towards risk-averse 
behavior will tend to be more risk-averse after group discussion. Due to risky shift, groups 
consisting of individuals leaning to escalation were even more likely to escalate after 
group discussion than before (Brockner, 1992).  
 
Furthermore, Cultural differences between countries could be of influence on social 
SUHVVXUHDQGGHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶WHQGHQF\WRHVFDODWHDVZHOO(Keil, Im, & Mähring., 2007b). 
Cultural dimensions such as Power Distance, Time Orientation and Uncertainty Avoidance 
(Hofstede, 2001) FRXOGLQIOXHQFHPDQDJHUV¶WHQGHQF\WRFRQWLQXHDIDLOLQJFRXUVHRIDFWLRQ
in order to avoid or postpone face losing.  
 
2.3.3. Organizational Factors 
 
Organizational Factors are characteristics of the organization that influence decision 
making processes and could allow or promote escalation behavior. First, organizations 
may have a particular organizational culture (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010) that 
could promote escalation due to organizational silence (Park & Keil, 2009), retaliation-
17 
culture (Keil et al., 2004) or shirking behavior (Keil et al., 2004; Mahaney & Lederer, 
2010). 
 
An organization with multiple projects, business units and scarce resources could cause 
competitive arousal (Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005) with escalation as a result. In 
situations where FRPSHWLWLYH DURXVDO RFFXUV SHRSOH¶V DWWHQWLRQ ZLOO EH UHVWULFWHG DQG LQ
striving to win the competition, people will be more willing to take risk to achieve that 
goal (Mano, 1994). Time pressure, social facilitation and rivalry can increase competitive 
arousal (Ku et al., 2005).  
 
Unclear organizational structures and values could also lead to escalation. When there is 
an unclear division of responsibilities, signals indicating problems in a project could be 
missed as managers assume that others are attending to those signals. Signals may be lost 
because of the struggling who and how should respond to them (Wissema, 2002). Unclear 
policies and standards may cause a lack of decision guidance (Boonthanom, 2003) which 
otherwise could have prevented or attenuated escalation behavior. 
 
Organizations may be prone to institutional inertia which results in imperfect sensory 
systems that make them impervious to changes. Therefore they are slow to respond to 
external stimuli, missing signals on failing projects which could cause escalation as a 
result. Similarly, political resistance to the idea of terminating or redirecting a project 
PLJKW UHVXOW LQ HVFDODWLRQ $Q RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V LGHQWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK D SURGXFW RU D SURMHFW
could also promote escalation (Staw et al., 1997).   
 
Continuation in assigning additional resources to projects is only possible as long as the 
organization has slack resources that could be allocated to this project. As this factor was 
explicitly addressed in a early case-study by Keil (1995), most (if not all) of the case-
studies listed later in this chapter share the organizational characteristic of having room for 
a decision to continue further allocation of additional resources to the project (government, 
financial institutions).  
 
The organizational characteristics as described above partially explain why governmental 
environments provide a context that could nurture escalation, as proposed by Davis and 
Bobko (1986).  
 
Many studies in the field of escalating IS-projects have proposed Agency Theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) as providing an explanation for escalation behavior. This theory 
assumes that the organizatioQ¶V 3ULQFLSDOV DQG$gents do not have congruent goals and 
withhold sharing of information. In several studies (Mahaney & Lederer, 2003; Turner & 
Muller, 2004) it has been confirmed that Agency Theory may explain escalation due to 
shirking and limited reporting between the well-informed Project Manager (as Agent) and 
senior management (in the position of Principal). Agency Theory did not prove robust 
across some situational characteristics such as country specific cultural differences (Sharp 
& Salter, 1997). 
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2.3.4. Psychological Factors 
 
Psychological factors UHIHU WR WKH W\SLFDO ELDVHV LQ GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V SHUFHSWLRQV DQG
responses to situations that might cause escalation, such as the project characteristics, the 
social characteristics and the organizational characteristics of the situation the decision 
maker finds him/herself in.  
 
Information Systems projects may typically shape conditions for these psychological 
factors to play a role in escalation behavior.  
 
The Responsibility Effect UHIHUVWRGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VELDVHVLQWKHFDVHZhen they have had 
personal responsibility for initiating the project. This personal responsibility might 
influence their observations and problem recognition in face of negative feedback and may 
cause them to persist in continuation. This could be explained by Self-Justification Theory 
or Self-Representation Theory that were described earlier and explain why people feel 
committed to the decisions they have made earlier. Schulz-Hardt et al. (2009) provided an 
alternative explanation for the Responsibility Effect, since it would express that decision 
makers show consistent preferences between alternative solutions over time (such as an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VFHQWUDOL]DWLRQGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQSUHIHUHQFHV.   
 
Even without initial personal responsibility, typical IS-project characteristics such as the 
large investments, time horizon, the intangible nature of deliverables and changing 
requirements could make decision makers prone to the Sunk Cost Effect (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985). ,I WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V DWWHQWLRQ LV FDSWXUHGE\ XQUHFRYHUDEOH ORVVHV KHVKHZLOO
likely show risk-seeking behavior according to Prospect Theory and he/she will continue 
investments to a risky course of action, the IS-project. Various ways of Framing that pull 
GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH ORVVes perspective of a decision to continue/redirect a 
project (Fagley, Coleman, & Simon, 2010; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Wong et al., 
2008), could explain his or her tendency to make risk-seeking decisions, consistent with 
Prospect Theory. 
 
The Completion Effect often accompanies the Sunk Cost effect. When people perceive that 
a project nears completion, the goal of completing the project overrides economic 
considerations and even accountability (Conlon & Garland, 1993). The Completion Effect 
might confound or interact (Moon, 2001) with the Sunk Cost Effect.  Moon (2001) found 
that at high levels of completion, the effect of sunk cost approached an exponential curve 
as the level of completion increased. Keil et al. (2000a) found that the Completion Effect 
was a better classifier of projects that escalated than models constructed from Self-
Justification, Prospect Theory and Agency Theory. 
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2.3.5. De-escalation Strategies 
 
De-escalation studies are of interest since the Deaf Effect could be considered as a failure 
to de-escalate (Cuellar, 2009) p.19. Understanding the conditions under which de-
escalation occurs may shed a light on why it might not occur despite clear warning signals 
being available that de-escalation is needed. Mähring and Keil (2008) define de-escalation 
DV ³WKH UHYHUVDO RI HVFDODWLQJ Fommitment to failing courses of action, either through 
SURMHFW WHUPLQDWLRQ RU UHGLUHFWLRQ´ )URP D SURFHVV SHUVSHFWLYH Montealegre and Keil 
(2000) proposed that de-escalation is a gradual process instead of a sudden event. The 
patterned sequence of events resulted in the de-escalation phases as presented below. 
 
 
Phase 1: 
Problem Recognition 
 
No corrective action can be taken until actors in a position of authority begin to 
acknowledge the problems and their seriousness. Often, what can appear to 
outsiders as an obvious case for withdrawal may not outweigh the accumulated 
commitment of those inside the organization, particularly those who have played 
a role in championing the project. In many cases, it appears that either internal or 
external pressure must exist before problem recognition can occur. 
 
Phase 2: 
Re-examination of Prior 
Course of Action 
 
During this phase, actors begin to question the wisdom of the previously chosen 
course of action and problems are scrutinized, but their commitment has not 
dropped so precipitously as to dictate immediate withdrawal. 
 
Phase 3: 
Searching for 
Alternative Course of 
Action 
 
In this phase, further evidence of problems is often sought and an alternative 
course of action is identified and legitimized. Consultants can sometimes help 
legitimize a new course of action and impression management can also facilitate 
the process. However, the decision to embark on a new course is still going to be 
difficult, especially if it results in loss of face for decision- makers. 
 
Phase 4: 
Implementing an Exit 
Strategy 
 
Given the political nature of escalating projects, merely identifying an alternative 
course of action is insufficient to bring about change. The alternative course must 
be legitimized and sold to various actors. Moreover, all of this needs to be done, 
if possible, in a way where impressions are managed so as to allow face-saving 
on the part of key executives who backed the failing course of action. 
Implementation of the exit strategy can be particularly challenging if certain 
actors have a vested interest in the previously chosen course of action.  
  
Figure 2-2 De-escalation Process Model  
 
In a more recent article Flynn Flynn, Pan, Keil, and Mähring (2009) proposed a de-
escalating maturity model (DMM) for trying to deal with runaway projects. This model 
identified five levels of organizational maturity, covering the steps in the figure below. 
Level 1 - Discipline to change project plan covers the capability to re-evaluate and refine 
plans (step D). Level 2 covers Discipline to detect deviations from project plan and 
prevent escalation (step A&B). Level 3 covers Discipline to execute project plan (step E). 
Level 4 covers Discipline to encourage bad news reporting and to change attitudes and 
behaviors (step B&C). Level 5 refers to Discipline to engage in organizational learning 
(step F). 
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Figure 2-3 De-Escalating Maturity Model 
 
Simonsen and Staw (1992) proposed de-escalation by reduction of self-justification and 
external justification effects. This could be achieved by 1. making negative outcomes less 
threatening, 2. setting minimum target levels that if not reached result in change of policy, 
3. evaluating decision makers on process rather than outcome. This should make decision 
makers more responsive to available evidence.  
 
Tan and Yates (1995) found that instructions regarding normative economic principles 
effectively reduced sunk cost effects. Boonthamon (Boonthanom, 2003) proposed the de-
escalation strategy of providing external stimuli promoting normative decision making.  
 
2.3.6. Consequences for our study 
 
From this review of literature in the field of Escalating IS-projects, we learn that many 
causal factors have been studied individually from psychological and organizational 
perspectives. Studying the interaction between organizational and psychological factors 
could contribute to existing literature. So there appears to be room for our proposed study 
on the interaction between the messenger-decision maker relationship (according to 
Stewardship Theory) and psychological factors (according to Illusion of Control Theory 
and Prospect Theory).   
 
Refering to the process model in figure 2-2, the Deaf Effect would be positioned as an 
attribute for failure in Phase 1 Problem Recognition. In figure 2-3  it would point at a 
deficiency of steps A and B to detect deviations and prevent from escalation. Finally, the 
de-escalation approaches as proposed by Simonsen and Staw (1992) suggest that framing 
could be of influence on the Deaf Effect. We will now further proceed with literature 
related to the Deaf Effect. 
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2.4. Deaf Effect 
2.4.1. Deaf Effect in Escalating IS-projects Research 
 
Within the extensive stream of research on escalation of IS-projects, only a few studies 
focus on the Deaf Effect. Based on a survey of internal auditors, Keil (Keil & Robey, 
2001) described the Deaf Effect as a failure to respond to messages of impeding IS-project 
failure. The auditors recalled instances in which they had reported bad news about projects 
only to find that their concerns were ignored by senior management. A few particular 
studies (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007) proceeded on this study 
and performed an examination on the Deaf Effect for bad news reporting in the field of IS-
projects. In this section we will describe the main findings from these studies and discuss 
how our study could proceed and contribute. 
 
Cuellar (2009) defined the phenomenon of Deaf EIHFW DV RFFXUULQJ ³ZKHQ D GHFLVLRQ
PDNHUGRHVQ¶WKHDULJQRUHVRYHUUXOHVDUHSRUWRIEDGQHZVWRFRQWLQXHDIDLOLQJFRXUVHRI
DFWLRQ´. In his study he refers to Whistleblowing Effectiveness Theory (Near & Miceli, 
1995).  
 
According to this theory, the whistle-blower¶V HIIHFWLYHQHVV is determined by (1) 
characteristics of the whistle-blower, (2) characteristics of the complaint receiver, (3) 
characteristics of the wrongdoer, (4) characteristics of the wrongdoing and (5) 
characteristics of the organization. The relative Credibility and Power of those actors was 
central in their model. Organization characteristics were focused on the organizDWLRQ¶V
willingness to change (and terminate wrongdoing) and whistle-blowing climate. Their 
model was strongly based upon principles of Power Theories of Minority Influence and 
whether the whistleblower or wrongdoer has authority. They refer to internal auditors who 
have - in certain situations ± roleprescribed power and authority so one would expect them 
to be effective whistle-EORZHUVDFFRUGLQJWR1HDUDQG0LFHOOL¶VPRGHO 
 
We saw earlier that ± despite these assumptions ±internal auditors regularly reported Deaf 
Effect in the field of escalating IS-projects (Keil & Robey, 2001). This suggests that there 
are other factors that could cause Deaf Effect. Cuellar found that credibility of the whistle 
blower ± DOVRLQFOXGHGLQ1HDU	0LFHOOL¶VPRGHO± was of influence on the Deaf Effect 
(Cuellar et al., 2006). Credibility was related to whether the whistle-blower could be 
expected to make true assertions. Cuellar also found partially confirmed that role-
prescription of the whistle-blower and personal characteristics (gender, age, risk 
propensity) of the receiver, were of influence on the Deaf Effect . 
 
Next to the Near&Micelli model at organizational level, Cuellar also included the 
psychological perspective of biased human information processing in order to explain the 
Deaf Effect. For that purpose the Heuristic Analytic Theory of Evans (2006) was 
introduced for explanation of the Deaf Effect. This theory is one amongst many other 
theories and models from cognitive psychology that describe human information 
processing. The Heuristic Analytic Theory assumes two levels of cognitive processing of 
information: Heuristic Processing and Decision Processing. The heuristic processing is 
based upon experiences, beliefs and heuristics and filters relevant information that will be 
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transferred to the decision processes. It thus assumes that the heuristic system provides 
³UHOHYDQW LQIRUPDWLRQ´DV LQSXW IRUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ7KH+HXULVWLF$QDO\WLc Theory was 
tested with Message Relevance as a proposed mediator for the Deaf Effect.  
 
 
Figure 2-4 Heuristic Analytic Theory, applied on Deaf Effect by Cuellar&Keil  
 
As mentioned, gender, working experience and risk propensity could contribute to the 
Deaf Effect. This could be explained by differences in prior knowledge or the mental 
model of the decision makers. Cuellar et al. (2006) found that Message Relevance acted as 
a mediator to the Deaf Effect. It partially accounted for the influence of Credibility and 
Role-prescription on the Deaf Effect. The message from a role-prescribed and credible 
whistle-blower was found more relevant and this relevance explained (partially) the 
reduction of the Deaf Effect in these conditions. Also Risk Perception of the receiver was 
found to be a  mediator in this study. These mediators proved useful to obtain insight in the 
influence of  messenger-characteristics and receiver-characteristics on the Deaf Effect. In a 
follow-up cross-cultural study (Cuellar et al., 2007), the influence of societal collectivism 
on the Deaf Effect was tested. Based on a case-study on the Deaf Effect, Cuellar (2009) 
propRVHG WKDW GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VPerceived Control could be an interesting candidate for 
further study on the Deaf Effect.. 
 
2.4.2. Deaf Effect in Cognitive Information Processing Research 
 
One extension on Deaf Effect research as described in the previous section could be found 
in the direction of more refined models that describe human information processing of 
messages and warnings. As we saw, the Heuristic Analytic Theory (Evans, 2006) used the 
heuristics system as a filtering system with a 1-direction relation to the decision processing 
system. This Theory is one amongst many other theories and models from cognitive 
psychology that describe human information processing. Several models assume a more 
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refined ± and complex ± interaction between the heuristics and the rational systems. We 
postpone our description of the System 1 and System 2 model (Stanovich & West, 2002)   
to our description of Prospect Theory, since Kahneman strongly draws upon this model in 
explaining Prospect Theory (Kahneman, 2003). In order to explore models that could be 
interesting for the Deaf Effect for risk warnings, we made a step into the direction of 
understanding Deafness (Listening Theory) and we made a step into the direction of Risk 
Warnings (Warning Research).  
 
Listening Theory focuses on the processing of any persuasive information that is intended 
to FKDQJH UHFHLYHUV¶ DWWLWXGHV (Bodie, 2009). Listening is defined as an active form of 
behavior in which individuals attempt to maximize their attention to, and comprehension 
of, what is being communicated  to them through the use of words, actions and things by 
one or more people in their immediate environment. (DeFleur, Kearney, & Plax, 1993), 
p102. Two models of cognitive information processing are dominant in Listening Theory 
in order to explain the affective (emotional) and cognitive processing and interpretations of 
messages, as well as the different levels of attitude change. These include the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model and the Heuristic-Systematic Model of information processing. 
 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) assumes different paths and 
conditions that would explain attitude change as a results of persuasive communication. It 
makes a distinction between Central Attitude Changes ± positive or negative ± and 
Peripheral Attitude Shifts. Central Attitude Changes are relative enduring, resistant and 
predictive of behavior. Peripheral Attitude Shifts are relatively temporary and unpredictive 
of behavior.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Elaborated Likelyhood Model of Listening (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) 
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The Heuristic-Systematic Model of Information Processing (Chaiken, 1980) describes two 
levels in the processing of attitude change, which includes systematic processing and 
heuristic processing. In this model, information is either processed in a high-involvement 
and high-effort systematic way, or information is processed through shortcuts known as 
heuristics. For example, emotions are affect-based heuristics, in which feelings and gut-
feeling reactions are often used as shortcuts. 
 
Next to these explanatory models from Listening Theory, the explanation of the Deaf 
Effect for risk warnings on IS-projects could also be served by insights from other  
research on the effectiveness of warnings. This research is mainly centred around models 
for the effectiveness of safety-warnings (traffic signs, radiation warnings, health 
warnings). In a review of research on the effectiveness of safety-warnings, Laughery 
(2006) points at various models of human information processing that could explain 
compliance to risk warnings. Amongst models such as described by Rogers, Lamson, and 
Rousseau (2000), a central position in this stream of research is granted to the C-HIP 
model. With C-HIP, Wogalter and Dingus (1999) combined the communications and 
human information processing (C-HIP) models into a single theoretical framework for 
warning. This communication and human-information processing framework is a stages 
model, consisting of stages through which warning information flows. At each stage the 
LQIRUPDWLRQLVSURFHVVHGDQGLIVXFFHVVIXO³IORZV´WRWKHQH[WVWDJH3URFHVVLQJIDLOXUHDW
any stage can block the flow and result in the warning not being effective. The  C-HIP 
model is presented below. On the right side we translated it to our context.  
 
 
 
 
Source = the internal auditor 
 
 
Channel = reporting lines 
 
Attention Notice = do you hear the 
warning? 
Attention Encode = can you encode the 
warning (syntax)? 
  
Comprehension = do you understand 
the warning (semantic)? 
 
Attitudes/beliefs = does the warning 
pass your attitudes and beliefs? 
 
Are you motivated to comply with the 
warning?   
Figure 2-6 The C-HIP model of compliance to Risk Warnings (Wogalter & Dingus, 1999) 
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2.4.3. Deaf Effect in Organizational Behavior Research 
 
The Deaf Effect in organizational behavior was suggested by March and Shapira (1987) 
based on their survey on managerial risk-taking in organizations. They assessed that 
managers appear to ignore parts of risk warnings, since these managers assume the 
warnings GRQ¶W apply to them personally. They point at the dominant role of perceived 
FRQWURO LQPDQDJHUV¶ ULVN-preferences, risk-taking behavior and limited attention for risk 
warnings. Shapira (1995), p63-64 shows that negative feedback information might even 
encourage managers to persist in taking risks even more than in case they received positive 
feedback information. We will proceed on Perceived Control later in this study and ± at 
this position ± focus on the Deaf Effect from an organization perspective. This perspective 
DVVLJQVDFHQWUDOUROHWRWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶Attention for warnings in the organizational 
context. 
  
Assuming that a well informed employee would be willing to report bad news, then the 
organization should allow communication channels to bring the warning to its destination. 
As Simon (Simon, 1997), p105 puts it: ³Each member of the organization requires certain 
information in order to make correctly those decisions for which he is responsible. To 
ensure that the necessary information is presented to each member, a regular system of 
records and reports is devised, which automatically directs these stimuli into the proper 
channels´. This organizational research follows 6LPRQ¶V (1997) notion of bounded 
rationality and limited attention of decision makers. 
 
Focusing on the Receptivity to Communication Simon (1997), p216 suggests that the 
attention that will be given to a communication by its recipient is not simply a matter of 
logic. The source of the communication and the way it is presented, will determine for its 
recipient how much consideration he will give it. If formal channels are maintained, 
communications flowing through these channels will have their effect enhanced by the 
DXWKRULW\ WKDW WKHLU³RIILFLDO´FKDUDFWHUJLYHV WKHP8QVROLFLWHG LQIRUPDWLRQRUDGYLFHRQ
the other hand, may be given little or no attention.  
  
The crucial point is whether or not the recipient of an order, or any other kind of 
communication, is influenced by the communication in his actions and decisions. In some 
cases formal authority may be a sufficient inducement to comply; but usually the 
communication must reason, plead and persuade, as well as order, if it is to be effective. 
For similar reasons, consideration must be given to whether the communication should be 
oral or written; and whether it should be in formal or informal language. In every case the 
state of mind of the recipient, his attitudes and motivations, must be the basic factors in 
determining the design of the communication. The function of the communication, after 
all, is not to get something off the mind of the person transmitting it, but to get something 
into the mind and actions of the person receiving it (Simon, 1997), p 216. 
 
Ocasio (1997) conducts research on organizational attention. He suggests that research on 
managerial decision making on risks might have followed the lines of bounded rationality 
too much in order to understand limited management attention on risks. He identifies 3 
levels of analysis:  1)  individual, 2) social and 3) organizational. He suggests that the 
organization perspective on management attention is overwhelmed by research on the 
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other two. He links individual information processing and behavior to the organizational 
structure through the concepts of procedural and communication channels and attention 
structures.  
 
Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) study the organizational attention, the socially structured 
pattern of attention by decision makers within an organization. They take on this 
perspective to explain how organizations distribute and regulate the attention of their 
decision-makers. This idea is based on three interrelated premises: 1) What decision 
makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on - Focus of 
Attention; 2) What issues and answers decision-makers focus on, and what they do, 
depends on the particular context or situation - Situated Attention, and 3) Structural 
distribution of attention. 
 
Ocasio (1997) further elaborates on the principle of Situated Attention in contrast with the 
Focus of Attention principle that was discussed in the cognitive information processing 
models that are focused on bounded rationality. Situated Attention  indicates that what 
decision makers focus on, and what they do, depends on the particular context that they are 
located in. According to this principle, the focus of attention of individual decision makers 
is triggered by characteristics of the situation which they confront themselves with, and 
WKLV VLWXDWHGDWWHQWLRQGLUHFWO\ VKDSHV LQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRU (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). This 
principle provides a link between how individuals think and decide in any particular 
situation, and how the organization shapes the situations that individuals find themselves 
in. From this perspective, decision making is guided by situated attention as a result of 
RUJDQL]DWLRQDO DWWHQWLRQ VWUXFWXUHV DQG LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ SDUWLFLSDQWV LQ WKH ILUP¶V
procedural and action channels. 
2.4.4. Consequences for our Study 
 
From research in the field of Escalating IS-projects we learn that the Deaf Effect is 
relevant and is relatively unexplored with regard to its interaction with organizational 
conditions. This provides room for our study. We also learned that Message Relevance and 
Perceived Risk could be of help in understanding the effect of organizational and 
psychological conditions on the Deaf Effect.. We found that the Deaf Effect for auditor 
warnings could only be partially explained by the factors Authority, Role-Prescription and 
Credibility from Whistleblowing literature. So other factors and theories might further 
contribute. From research in the field of Listening Theory we find that change of attitudes 
has a central position in predicting the Deaf Effect for persuasive messages. It would go 
too deep into psychology research to give attitude change a central position in our study. 
(VSHFLDOO\ VLQFH ZH DUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKH VSHFLILF FRQWH[W RI WKH GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V Deaf 
Effect IRU LQWHUQDODXGLWRUV¶ZDUQLQJV7KH&-HIP model from Warning Research clearly 
showed the relevance of comprehension ± both syntactically and semantically ± for the 
effectiveness of warnings. We will assume - and test - in our study that decision makers 
indeed comprehend the conditions and the warning on IS-project escalation they receive. 
The C-HIP stagemodel is very useful for further research on the Deaf Effect. From 
organizational research we learned that the organization structure and principles are 
important to explain the Deaf Effect ± mediated by management attention. The corporate 
governance structure therefore could be very fruitful for further study, since it underpins 
27 
the communication structures, roles and relations within an organization ± and thus could 
influence situated attention of decision makers. This would also suggest the factor  
Attention as a proposed mediator in our model of Deaf Effect. We included Attention in the 
early stage of developing and empirically testing our research model. We also found that 
Attention could not be measured in an unbiased way with selfreported measurements. 
However the principles of the interaction between organizational characteristics ± the 
relationship between internal auditor and Project Owner ± and psychological 
characteristics were confirmed to be interesting for further explaining the Deaf Effect. 
2.5. Stewardship Theory 
 
In our study we focus on the Deaf Effect at an inter-personal level: with the internal 
DXGLWRU LQ WKH UROH RI WKH SURYLGHU RI D 5LVN :DUQLQJ DQG ZLWK WKH 3URMHFW 2ZQHU¶V
relationship with the messenger (as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent) to be a 
determinant for escalation behavior. In this section we describe these types of relationship, 
based on Stewardship Theory, a theory of Corporate Governance. First, we describe 
Stewardship Theory amongst other theories of Corporate Governance. Next, we will focus 
on the relationships according to Stewardship Theory compared to Agency Theory. From 
this relationship perspective, we will briefly discuss the relationship between internal 
auditors and managers. We will describe studies in the field of escalating IS-projects that 
applied a corporate governance theory earlier. Finally, we will discuss the consequences to 
our study.  
2.5.1. Corporate Governance Theories 
 
7KHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWILUPV¶H[HFXWLYHVPLJKWQRWQHFHVVDULly act in a way that is consistent 
with the interests of the organization appears to be a starting point for raising the issue of 
Corporate Governance as initiated by Berle and Means (1932). They addressed the 
VHSDUDWLRQRIWKHRZQHUVKLSDQGWKHFRQWURORYHUWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHV$VGHVFULEHG
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD, 1999), ³&RUSRUDWH
*RYHUQDQFHLQYROYHVDVHWRIUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQFRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWLWVEoard, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that 
are in the interest of the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective 
PRQLWRULQJ WKHUHE\ HQFRXUDJLQJ ILUPV WR XVH UHVRXUFHV PRUH HIILFLHQWO\³ Van Manen 
(1999) defined Corporate Governance as a process whereby stakeholders try to influence 
the decision making process of an organization and its subsequent implementation.  
 
There are several corporate governance theories that provide principles to explain and 
improve an effective structure of relationships and incentives within an organization in 
RUGHU WR VHUYH WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV:H ZLOO ILUVW GLVFXVV Agency Theory, since it 
formed the roots of research into and implementation of corporate governance since many 
decades (Fama, 1980, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). We will briefly discuss three other 
theories of corporate governance. Finally, we will elaborate on Stewardship Theory (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) since it provides the theoretical basis for our research 
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questions and deviates from Agency Theory in its assumptions on effective relations and 
incentives.  
 
Agency Theory (Fama, 1980, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) focuses on the relationship 
between a Principal (the affected party) and an Agent (the individual taking action). 
Agency relationships exist between the owners of a firm and its senior management, but 
they can also exist between different levels within a firm's hierarchy. The Agency problem 
is quite general and it 'exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts ± at every 
level of management in firms' (Jensen & Meckling, 1986). Whenever one individual 
depends on the action of another, an Agency relationship arises. There are three problems 
that can occur in Agency relations: (1) goal differences, (2) risk tolerance differences, and 
(3) information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1989). The first general problem is differences in 
the goals of the Principal and the Agents. Agency theory assumes that, at least some of the 
time, organizational parties act opportunistically (i.e. on the basis of self-interest). 
Therefore, Principals must recognize that an Agent might act to maximize his or her own 
utility, rather than acting in the best interest of the Principal. Secondly, Principals and 
Agents may have different tolerances toward risk. Often it is assumed that Agents are more 
risk averse than Principals and will act in a self-serving manner when opportunities arise 
(Baiman, 1990). Third, information asymmetry is a critical component of Agency Theory. 
There are two general types of information that is not known equally by both sides: 
information that everyone would like to share and information that one or the other party 
might prefer to hide. Often discussions of information asymmetry tend to paint the Agent 
as concealing information that is potentially damaging to Principals. But Principals can 
conceal information that is potentially damaging to Agents as well (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency theory focuses heavily on incentives and rewards as a means of aligning the 
interests of both Principals and Agents (Paape, 2007). The reduction of so-called Agency 
costs is a main objective when defining organization structures, monitoring and bonding of 
contracts in order to align interests between executives and shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory however was also criticized since it would ignore 
bounded rationality of executives (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Miller, 1992), and ± 
due to the assumption of mutual lack of trust - might even promote opportunistic behavior 
of executives (Nootenboom, 1999). 
 
Before we move to Stewardship Theory, we briefly mention two other theories of 
Corporate Governance for reason of completeness. Stakeholder Theory (Freeman, 1994) 
takes into account corporate governance from a broader perspective of social responsibility 
and pays attention to a broad range of external stakeholders with multiple and divergent 
goals. Although increased societal pressure on organizations is more than relevant 
(Waddock, Bodwell, & Graves, 2002) and could certainly apply to ambitious IS-projects 
as well, this theory does not directly focus on the relation between internal auditors and 
executive management. Therefore we will not further include it in our study. Resource 
Dependency Theory (Pfeffer, 1972) posits that the ability of organizations to operate under 
an environment of complexity associated with its wider interdependencies is directly 
related to the quality and effectiveness of the directors who make up the board or its 
³ERDUG FDSLWDO´ 7KLV WKHRUy further suggests that corporate boards are governance 
mechanisms for managing such external and internal environmental influences and for 
reducing uncertainty under such an environment. This certainly applies for strategic 
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opportunities and threats in the field of information systems as well, which is confirmed in 
the role of Chief Information Officer which can be found in many executive boards 
(Kirkley, 2007). Since this WKHRU\GRHVQ¶W IRFXVRQ WKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ LQWHUQDODXGLWRUV
and executive management, we will not further  include it in our study. In our study we 
therefore we focus on Stewardship Theory and compare it with Agency Theory. 
 
Agency Theory is the dominant paradigm in corporate governance research. Researchers in 
psychology and sociology however have suggested theoretical limits of Agency Theory 
(Hirsch, Michaels, & Friedman, 1987; Perrow, 1986). In particular, assumptions made in 
Agency Theory about individualistic utility motivations resulting in Principal-Agent 
interest divergence were critized on its model of man. Where individualistic, self-serving 
executive motivation is assumed, the shareholders should implement Agency prescriptions, 
when they are desirous of minimizing the risks associated with perceived nonalignment of 
Principal-Agent utility functions. Jensen and Meckling (1994) criticized this model of man 
as being an unrealistic description of human behavior. Doucouliagos (1994) argued that 
labeling all motivation as self-serving does not explain the complexity of human action. In 
order to complement Agency Theory, Davis et al. (1997) introduced Stewardship Theory 
of Corporate Governance that is mainly based upon Collaborative and trusted relations 
between Principals and Agents. This theory regards managers as good stewards to 
FRPSDQ\¶VDVVHWV7KH6WHZDUGVKLS7KHRU\LVFRQWUDU\WR$JHQF\7KHRU\E\FULWLFL]LQJLWV
assumption of goal conflict between the shareholder and the manager (the Principal and 
the Agent) and the need for extrinsic motivation.  The theory aims to achieve that interests 
of the managers are aligned with that of the organization by facilitation,  empowerment 
and intrinsic motivation. External incentives (such as compensatory rewards to executive 
PDQDJHPHQW PLJKW QRW DOZD\V UHVXOW LQ EHKDYLRU WKDW VHUYHV WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQWHUHVW
Below you find a comparison between Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory as 
presented by Davis et al. (1997). 
   
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Model of Man  Economic Man Self-Actualizing Man 
Behavior Self-serving Collective serving 
 
Psychological Mechanisms 
  
Motivation Extrinsic Intrinsic 
Social Comparison Other Managers Principal 
Identification Low value commitment High value commitment 
Power Institutional (legitimate, 
coercive, reward) 
Personal (expert, referent) 
Situational Mechanisms   
Management Philosophy Control Oriented Involvement Oriented 
Risk Orientation Control Mechanisms Trust 
Time Frame Short Term Long Term 
Objective Cost Control Performance Enhancement 
Cultural Differences Individualism Collectivism 
 High Power Distance Low Power Distance 
Table 2-1 Comparison between Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory (Davis et al., 1997) 
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Although Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory might be considered contradictory and 
mutually exclusive, Davis et al. (1997) suggests them to be complementary. Given their 
different assumptions on situational and psychological characteristics, they both contribute 
WR DFKLHYH ³HIIHFWLYH FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH´ DFURVV Rrganizations and cultures that show 
different characteristics (such as time orientation, individualism, power distance). A 
similar approach is followed by Christopher (2010), who developed a Multi-Theory model 
of Corporate Governance that follow a contingency approach of aligning corporate 
governance principles from the different theories with the characteristics of an individual 
organization during its lifecycle. Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) even go further in 
bridging Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory: they claim that the theories need each 
other. Based upon a framework of organizational dynamics they describe the paradox 
EHWZHHQERWKPRGHOVRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH WKH ³FRQWURO-EDVHG´$JHQF\7KHRU\ DQG
WKH ³FROODERUDWLRQ-EDVHG´ 6WHZDUGVKLS 7KHRU\ 7KH\ VKRZ WKDW ERWK PRGHOV ZKHQ
isolated, can lead to reinforcing circles of dysfunctional dynamics if they are not counter-
balanced by characteristics of the other. Agency Based corporate governance organizations 
FDQVKRZVWUDWHJLFSHUVLVWHQFHLQ³FRQWURO´-rigidity, which can finally lead to dysfunctional 
cycles of greater controls, distrust, polarization, impression management, splitting-turf 
wars, finally resulting to failure. In the Stewardship Based corporate governance 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ VWUDWHJLF SHUVLVWHQFH LQ ³FROODERUDWLRQ´-rigidity can finally lead to 
dysfunctional cycles of greater collaboration, groupthink, consensus seeking, 
complacency, threat rigidity, escalating group commitment, finally resulting to failure.  
 
We conclude here that Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) suggest that both Agency Theory 
and Stewardship have their own assumptions, and show the pitfall that their 
countermeasures ± more contracts or more collaboration ± could reconfirm and strengthen 
WKHLURZQDVVXPSWLRQV7KLVFRQILUPV$UJ\ULV¶FODLPRIVHOI-fulfilling prophecies regarding 
the nature of relationships that develops in organizations (Argryis, 1973). Agency Theory 
based organizations will likely attract and behold employees that feel comfortable within 
these principles. Within the paradigm of Agency Theory such organizations would react on 
falling performance with measures to improve goal congruence and reporting, thus 
reconfirming the assumptions of information asymmetry and incongruent goals. 
Stewardship Theory based organizations would attract and behold employees that feel 
comfortable within those principles. Within the paradigm of Stewardship Theory such 
organizations would react to falling performance with measures to improve collaboration 
DQG PRWLYDWLRQ :H LQWHUSUHW 6XQGDUDPXUWK\¶V DQG /HZLV¶V  FODLP WKDW $JHQF\
Theory and Stewardship Theory are tied together since each cannot solve problems from 
the own paradigm within the assumptions of this paradigm ± and therefore needs the other.    
2.5.2. Agency and Stewardship Relations ± D3ULVRQHU¶V'LOHPPD 
 
Davis et al. (1997) suggests that there are psychological and situational factors that 
predispose individuals to Agency and Stewardship approaches to relationships. They 
suggest that the choice between Agency and Stewardship relationships is similar to a 
decision posed by the 3ULVRQHU¶V'LOHPPD. First, it is a decision made by both parties of a 
relationship. The psychological characteristics of each party predisposes each individual to 
make a particular choice. Second, the situational characteristics have an influence on the 
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choice. The management philosophy may have a significant impact on the choice by both 
parties. The cultural background (collectivism and power distance) of each party may also 
affect the choice. Finally, the expectation that each party has of the other will influence the 
choice between Agency and Stewardship. A longer history of these parties dealing with 
each other will provide more data to guide these expectations. The nature of the dilemma is 
illustrated in figure 2-7. 
 Principal¶V&KRLFH 
 Agent Steward 
 
 
 
 
Agent 
 
 
0DQDJHU¶V&KRLFH 
 
 
Steward 
 
Minimize Potential Costs 
 
Mutual Agency Relationship 
 
 
Manager acts 
Opportunistically 
 
Principal is Angry 
Principal is Betrayed 
 
Principal Acts 
Opportunistically 
 
Manager is Frustrated 
Manager is Betrayed 
 
Maximize Potential 
Performance 
 
Mutual Stewardship 
Relationship 
 
Figure 2-7 The Principal ± Manager choice model (Davis et al, 1997) 
 
Davis called for a more fine-grained analysis on Stewardship Theory vs Agency Theory 
relationships.  He proposes that researchers should further inquire into the Stewardship 
mechanisms and examine their relative performance, their interactions with psychological 
conditions and the situational contingencies that affect them. There may be an interaction 
HIIHFWEHWZHHQ WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VSKLORVRSK\DQG WKHSV\FKRORJLFDO YDULDEOHV+H IXUWKHU
points at the simplified assumption of a choice between Agency versus Stewardship 
relationships at a single point in time. Clearly, the role of a long-term relationship is 
central to the choice of Stewardship roles. One of the important implications of the theory 
of Stewardship is that if a mixed-motive choice is made and one party is betrayed, the 
inevitable progression of the relationship is toward an Agency model in which both parties 
no longer show vulnerability to the other. Researchers should explore the choice of 
Agency versus Stewardship relationships over time, incorporating variables that capture 
the dynamic nature of Principal-manager relationships. Finally, Davis suggest further 
research on interaction effects between the relationship and other organizational or 
psychological factors. Finally, Davis (1997) suggests to link Stewardship Theory to risk-
taking behavior.  
2.5.3. The relationship between Internal Auditor and Manager 
 
7KH LQWHUQDODXGLWRUVKDYH UHFHLYHGDQ LPSRUWDQWSRVLWLRQ LQ WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VFRUSRUDWH
governance framework (Paape, 2007), p77. Since their origin they have been part of the 
PRQLWRULQJ LQVWUXPHQWV WR VHUYH WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V LQWHUHVWV ZLWKLQ WKH $JHQF\ %DVHG
corporate governance framework. Therefore they are placed independently from those 
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monitored (the management board). They also need to be experts in their tasks framework 
(Paape, 2007). Their role and their relationship with management reflects the 
organizational corporate governance philosophy. For a long period, Agency Theory 
underpinned their relationship with management and determined their inspection ± 
policeman - style role until late nineties. Early work on Internal Auditing from 
SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH (Chambers, Selim, & Vinten, 1988) already discussed that a 
UHODWLRQVKLS RI ³3ROLFHPDQ YV &ROODERUDWLYH 3DUWQHU´ FDQ EH RI LQIOXHQFH RQ HIIHFWLYH
communication towards senior management. Related to this topic they reported the 
following to the practitioners: 1) Internal auditors may arrive at a role conflict (p.60) which 
is  principally a conflict of reporting on people to whom the auditor likes to be seen as an 
adviser; 2) Audit recommendations may be ignored by management (p.65). Constructive 
and participative auditing can be of help to alleviate this problem;  3)  Negative perception 
of internal auditing by managers adversely affects relationships and can blunt effective 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQS,QWHUQDODXGLWRUVSPLJKWEHVHHNLQJWREHD³FROODERUDWLYH
DGYLVHU´ but might still EHVHHQDV ³SROLFHPHQ´ UHJDUGOHVV. And 5) Managers often react 
hostile to the inspection style of auditing (p.73), in which situation the managers are  
inclined not to listen to the auditor or to benefit from his findings. These findings from 
internal audit practice suggest that an Agency-relationship to management can make the 
internal auditor  less effective in his or her communication.   
 
Since 1999, the contemporary approach of the internal audit profession extended the role 
of auditors towards both Agency Based (monitoring) and Stewardship Based 
(collaboration) in their definition of Internal Auditing, while it had been restricted to 
monitoring, inspection and assurance until then (Bou-Raad, 2000). The Institute of Internal 
Auditing currently defines internal auditing as follows (IIARF, 2011):  
 
³DQ LQGHSHQGHQW objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and 
LPSURYHDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VRSHUDWLRQV ,WKHOSVDQRUJDQL]DWLRQDFFRPSOLVK LWVREMHFWLYHV
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of 
the ULVNPDQDJHPHQWFRQWURODQGJRYHUQDQFHSURFHVVHV´. 
 
7KH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH SKLORVRSK\ LV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
internal audit charter, the internal audit standards and practices and in the (Agency or 
Stewardship) relationships that internal auditors build up with management. As suggested 
by Davis et al. (1997) the effectiveness of these relationships may depend on the 
psychological conditions of the decision makers. So the interaction between the internal 
auditor-PDQDJHUUHODWLRQVKLSDQG WKHPDQDJHU¶VSV\FKRORJLFDOFRQGLWLRQVKHXULVWLFVFDQ
EHRILQIOXHQFHRQPDQDJHUV¶'HDI(IIHFWIRULQWHUQDODXGLWRU¶VZDUQLQJVRQDQHVFDODWLQJ 
IS-project.  
2.5.4. Corporate Governance Studies in the field of Escalating IS-projects 
 
Although not directly related to Deaf Effect, several empirical studies in the field of 
Escalating IS-projects, have examined the influence of Corporate Governance on the 
escalation of IS-projects. These studies are based upon the principles and assumptions of 
Agency Theory. Relationships within organisations are defined in terms of Principals and 
Agents who have incongruent goals and information asymmetry. With a survey across 
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2200 IS-auditors, Keil et al. (2000a) tested four theories ± including Agency Theory ± to 
distinguish between escalated and non-escalated IS-projects. The model based upon the 
constructs of Goal Incongruence and Information Asymmetry performed well in 
classifying both escalated (78%) and non-escalated IS-projects (72%). Based on interviews 
with 12 IS-project managers, Mahaney and Lederer (2003) found confirmation that 
Agency Theory assumptions could explain IS-project failures and that contracts would 
likely mitigate goal conflicts and shirking.  Mahaney and Lederer (2010) performed a 
survey across 428 information systems project managers concerning their project 
monitoring, shirking by systems developers, and project success. Greater project 
monitoring via planning and meetings predicted less shirking, and they confirmed Agency 
principles.  
2.5.5. Consequences for our study 
 
We learn from this literature section that Corporate Governance can have a large impact on 
how actors within an organization define their relations, communicate and aim to achieve 
WKHLU JRDOV:H IRXQG WKDW LQWHUQDO DXGLWRUV¶ UROH VWURQJO\ UHSUHVHQWV WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
Corporate Governance model. Especially their relationship with management ± such as the 
Project Owners in our study ± is strongly determined by the Corporate Governance 
philosophy. We also found that Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory are based upon 
opposite assumptions, which can both be effective in organizational conditions that meet 
those assumptions. Furthermore, we found that neither Stewardship Theory nor Agency 
Theory could claim their assumptions to be superior and that both are needed for balance ± 
in time or in circumstances ± in order to prevent the other from reinforcing circles of 
dysfunctionality. Within the circumstances and the time pressure of delivering a strategic  
IS-project, several studies showed that Agency Theory principles can promote escalation. 
7KHVH VWXGLHV DVVXPH WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V PDQDJHPHQW WR EH UDWLRQDO 3ULQFLSDOV WKDW DUH
withheld from crucial information by project managers (Agents) ± the Mum Effect. Our 
study contributes with testing Stewardship Theory on the Deaf Effect. It takes the 
assumption that management ± Project Owners ± may not be rational Principals and can be 
driven by situated attention ± determined by the interaction between their psychological 
conditions and organizational conditions.  
2.6. Prospect Theory  
 
In this section we provide a description of Prospect Theory for the purpose of our study. 
This description is without any attempt to show the richness and the refinement of the  
research  related to this theory, as described by Wakker (2010). With this section we aim to 
provide the reader with  sufficient theoretical background to the Framing Effect that we 
include in our study. We first describe normative theories on decision making under 
uncertainty. These theories provided the basis for development of  Prospect Theory as a 
descriptive theory. We proceed with describing some of the effects that were found in 
Prospect Theory experiments. We continue with phases and identified operations that 
could explain these effects according to Prospect Theory. We proceed with a brief 
description of the typical value function and weighting of probability information. After 
having mentioned some additional notions made by Kahneman (2003) on Prospect Theory 
experiments, we conclude with the consequences for our study.  
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2.6.1 Expected Utility Theories - a basis for Prospect Theory 
 
The most commonly applied model on rational decision is Expected Utility Theory (EUT). 
EUT claims that decision makers choose from risky or uncertain alternatives by comparing 
the expected utility values of these alternatives. Weighted sums are obtained by adding the 
utility values of alternatives multiplied by their probabilities. This suggests that there is a 
certain utility function that reflects the mechanism by which preferences are assigned to 
possible alternatives.  
 
The most well-known version of EUT is described by VonNeuman and Morgenstern 
(1944) who assume that SUREDELOLWLHVDUHµREMHFWLYH¶DQGFDQWKXVQRWEHLQIOXHQFHGE\WKH
decision maker. It should be noted that VRQ1HXPDQ DQG 0RUJHQVWHUQ¶V WKHRU\ LV
normative of nature. It describes the way people assign values to possible alternatives in an 
LGHDO VLWXDWLRQ 7KH\ GHILQHG D VHW RI DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW SHRSOH¶V SUHIHUHQFHV ZKLFK LV
required before one can construct a utility function. This does not automatically imply that 
these assumptions are always met in reality. The following six axioms are typical for EUT: 
(1) Ordering of alternatives: A decision maker should be able to compare and order all 
alternatives, (2) Transitivity: If a decision maker prefers alternative A over alternative B, 
and alternative B over alternative C, the decision maker should also prefer alternative A 
over alternative C, (3) Dominance: Rational decision makers should never choose a 
strategy that is dominated by an alternative (better) strategy, (4) Continuity: Continuity of 
utility functions should exist; (5) Cancellation: The choice between two alternatives 
should depend on differences between the alternatives, not on results that are equal for 
both alternatives, (6) Invariance (or substitution)$GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VFKRLFHVKRXOGEH
indifferent of the presentation of the alternatives. 
 
Another influential version of EUT is the Subjective Expected Utility Theory (Savage, 
1954). In this version SUREDELOLWLHV DUH QRW GHILQHG µREMHFWLYH¶. Probabilities are merely 
seen as measuring the lack of knowledge and a representation of beliefs about the outcome 
and thus subjective to the decision maker. It is then theorized that the individual assigns 
subjective probabilities to the various prospects. The decision maker chooses the prospect 
with the best subjective expected utility, even though he/she does not actually make such 
an analysis or is aware that KH SRVVHVVHV VXFK µSUREDELOLW\ DVVLJQPHQWV¶The subjective 
H[SHFWHGXWLOLW\FDQGHSHQGRQWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VVWDWHRUHQYLURQPHQW 
 
2.6.2. Prospect Theory ± Effects 
 
The many common and systematic violations of rationality, as defined by the axioms of 
EUT, people routinely tend to make, have led many authors to criticize EUT. These 
critiques imply that EUT is not a good descriptive model of decision making under risk. 
With Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed an alternative model for 
decision making under uncertainty. Instead of the prescriptive approach of EUT, they 
described how people actually make decisions. They proved in many field and laboratory 
experiments that people do not always make their decisions according to rational 
mechanisms. The reason for the development of Prospect Theory was the identification of 
a number of phenomena that occur in actual decision-making: the certainty effect, the 
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reflection effect (also called the framing effect) and the isolation effect. These effects 
violate the rules of rationality. 
 
EUT states that the utility of outcomes is weighted by their probabilities. However, 
Kahneman and Tversky found that the process of weighting is not always done 
V\VWHPDWLFDOO\7KH\IRXQGWKDW³people overweight outcomes that are certain, relative to 
outcomes which are merely probable .DKQHPDQ	7YHUVN\  S´7KLV HIIHFW
what they have called the certainty effect. This certainty effect is one type of violation of 
the invariance or substitution axiom of EUT, amongst others such as people neglecting the 
actual size of probabilities when probabilities of two alternatives are very small. An 
oftenly cited finding of Kahneman and Tversky was that if prospects were formulated as 
losses instead of gains the preference order would reverse. 
 
 
  
 
Positive (Gains) Negative (Losses) 
(4,000; .80) < (3,000) (-4,000; .80) > (-3,000) 
(4,000; .20) < (3,000; .25) (-4,000; .20) > (-3,000; .25) 
(3,000; .90) < (6,000; .45) (-3,000; .90) > (-6,000; .45) 
(3,000; .002) < (6,000; .001) (-3,000; .002) > (-6,000; .001) 
Table 2-2a Preferences between positive and negative prospects  
 
Table 2-2a (adapted from Kahneman & Tversky (1979) pp. 268) shows findings of 
Kahneman and Tversky about the preferences between several both positively and 
negatively formulated prospects. It is remarkable that for all four of the listed prospects the 
preference order is reversed when the prospects are reflected around zero. Kahneman and 
Tversky called this effect the reflection effect or the  framing effect. These findings imply 
WKDW SHRSOH¶V EHKDYLRU WXUQV IURP ULVN DYHUVH LQ D SRVLWLYH GRPDLQ WR ULVN VHHNLQJ LQ D
domain of loss. Hence people prefer the prospect of a certain gain of 3,000 over a possible 
gain of 4,000 with probability .80, but prefer a possible loss of 4,000 with probability .80 
over a certain loss of -3,000. 
 
To simplify the choice between alternatives people often focus on the components that 
distinguish them. However, presenting combinations of prospects can lead to inconsistent 
preferences. Pairs of alternatives can be decomposed to common and distinctive 
components in different ways, leading to different preferences. Kahneman and Tversky 
called this phenomenon the isolation effect. Experiments showed how preferences could be 
changed by different presentations of probability and by different presentations of 
outcomes.  
 
The following example as presented in table 2-2b presents both the isolation effect and the 
framing effect. It shows  similarities with the scenario developed by Garland and Conlon 
(1998) and Wong et al. (2008) in order to test Prospect Theory as an explanation of risk 
seeking preferences in escalating projects.  
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Situation 1: In addition to whatever you own, you are given $1,000. You are then 
asked to choose between the following alternatives: 
Alternative a: a gain of $1,000 with a probability of .50 
Alternative b: a gain of $500 for sure 
 
Situation 2: In addition to whatever you own, you are given $2,000. You are then 
asked to choose between the following alternatives: 
Alternative c: a loss of $1,000 with a probability of .50 
Alternative d: a loss of $500 for sure 
Table 2-2b Example 
 
Most people choose alternative b in the first situation and alternative c in the second 
situation. When prospects are formulated in there simplest form however, it shows that 
these are inconsistent preferences. Hence both alternatives a and c are equal ($2,000, .50; 
$1,000, .50) and both alternatives b and d are also equal ($1,500). This again is a violation 
of the expected utility hypothesis. In both situations most people neglect the amount that 
was given in advance, a component that was common in both situations. This implies that 
carriers of value of utility are a change of wealth rather than the final asset positions of 
wealth or welfare. This conclusion is the cornerstone of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). 
2.6.3. Prospect Theory ± Phases and Operations  
 
Prospect theory distinguishes two subsequent phases in the decision making process: an 
editing phase and an evaluation phase. The first phase, the editing phase, consists of a 
preliminary analysis of the offered prospects while in the second phase, the evaluation 
phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and the best one is chosen. 
 
In the Editing Phase the offered prospects are organized and reformulated in order to 
simplify their evaluation and the choice of the best prospect. There are several operations 
involved in this process of organization and reformulating: (1) The first major operation is 
coding. As was shown earlier, people see prospects as gains and losses rather than as final 
states of wealth or welfare. Gains and losses are thus seen relative to a reference point, 
which most often a current asset position. However, formulation of the offered prospects 
and the expectations of the decision maker can influence this reference point, and therefore 
the coding of outcomes as gains and losses. (2) The second major operation is 
combination. Subsequent prospects can sometimes be combined into a simpler 
representation. (3) Another major operation is segregation of different components. 
Consider for example the prospect (500, .60; 200, .40), this prospect contains a risky 
component as well as a certain component. The segregation operations segregate these two 
components resulting in the following risky prospect (300, 60) and a sure gain of 200. (4) 
A fourth major operation is called cancellation. This operation involves discarding 
components that are shared by all offered prospects. (5) Simplification involves operations 
such as rounding probabilities and outcomes. For example the prospect (101, 51) will be 
simplified into (100,50). Furthermore extremely small probabilities will be round of to 
zero and thus discarded. And finally (6) the detection of dominance is an operation that  
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involves discarding prospects of which it is sure that there exists a better alternative 
prospect. Dominated prospect will be rejected without further analysis and evaluation. 
The operations in the editing phase simplify the process of evaluation and should therefore 
always be performed when possible. It is however possible that some editing operations 
determine the further course of the editing phase. The final prospect resulted from the 
editing phase can depend on the sequences of performed operations which is likely to 
depend on the format and structure of the presented set of prospects.  
 
The phase that follows after the editing phase is the Evaluation Phase. In this phase the 
decision maker evaluates all edited prospects and chooses the prospect with the highest 
value. In prospect theory the overall value of a prospect is expressed in terms of two 
scales, ʌ and ȣ. The first, ʌ, reflects the impact of a probability on the overall value of a 
prospect by assigning a weight ʌ(p) to each probability p. The second scale, ȣ, reflects the 
impact of a possible outcome on the overall value of a prospect by assigning a weight ȣ(x) 
to every possible outcome x. These scales thus represent the subjective values of both the 
probabilities and the possible outcomes associated with the probabilities. 
 
These utility functions seem mathematical simple and are not very different from the 
utility functions as developed by expected utility theories. However, the observed effects 
as described earlier (certainty effect, framing effect and isolation effect) have led to the 
assumptions that values are attached to changes rather than to final states and moreover 
that decision weights do not coincide with stated probabilities. Therefore the value 
function ȣ(x) and the weighting function ʌ (p) are included in the utility hypothesis. These 
important properties of the utility hypotheses presented above distinguish prospect theory 
from earlier expected utility theories. The anomalies that result from the assumptions made 
in prospect theory are nonetheless unacceptable from a normative point of view. Whenever 
a decision maker discovers anomalies such as inconsistencies or violations of rationality it 
is assumed that the decision maker corrects them. It is however observed that in many 
situations anomalies are not discovered. Prospect theory therefore expects violations of 
decision rules as defined by EUT to occur. 
2.6.4. Prospect Theory - Value and Weighting function 
 
One of the essential assumptions of prospect theory is that the carriers of value are changes 
in wealth or welfare. Change in wealth or welfare is defined in prospect theory as change 
from a former state, or reference point, to a new state. Prospect Theory also states that 
magnitude of change is not absolute but relative to the magnitude of the reference point. 
To clarify this statement it is probability easiest to compare this relative value of change to 
our sensory system. Our sensory system enables us to perceive magnitude of stimuli as 
well as changes. We are however better capable to detect changes than to assess actual 
magnitudes although both are relative to a certain reference point. Consider for example 
our temperature detection system. Assessment of the temperature of water in a swimming 
pool for example, is highly dependent on the air temperature to which a swimmer is 
adapted. Furthermore it is also easier to discriminate between a change of 1qC and a 
change of 6qC than it is to discriminate between changes of 11qC and 16qC. Many sensory 
and perceptual dimensions share this property, which implies that the psychological 
response can be represented by a concave function above the reference point and a convex 
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function beneath the point of reference. The same is hypothesized by Prospect Theory to 
apply to evaluation of monetary changes.  
 
The value function that assigns values to offered prospects is therefore hypothesized to be 
concave above the reference point, and convex below it. In other words, the marginal value 
of both gains and losses decrease with their magnitude. Furthermore the decrease of value 
by losing a certain amount of welfare has been found to be larger than the increase of value 
by winning the same amount of welfare. It is therefore hypothesized that the value function 
is steeper in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. A visual representation of 
such a hypothetical value function is shown below. In order to facilitate the interpretation, 
we added the right figure containing all four possible outcomes a to d from the example in 
table 2-2b and their corresponding values ȣ(a) to ȣ(d). The upper accolade shows that in 
the Gains domain the risk averse prospect b is preferred over the risk seeking prospect a, 
since ȣ(b) > 0.5 ȣ(a). The lower accolade shows that in the Losses domain the risk seeking  
prospect c is preferred over the risk averse prospect d, since 0.5 ȣ(c) > ȣ(d). Comparison 
of the size of these accolades also shows the steeper value function in the losses domain. 
  
Figure 2-8a ± A hypothetical value function in prospect theory 
 
In Prospect Theory, as can be seen in the formulation of the utility function, the relative 
values of outcomes are multiplied with decision weights. The decision weights represent 
the subjective values of probabilities. With subjective is meant that people do not always 
evaluate probabilities consistently, but tend to underweight or overweight probabilities. 
Observations have shown that people tend to overweight small probabilities, implying that 
the weighting function ʌ(p) > p, for small p. For middle and large probabilities however, 
probabilities are often underweighted, implying ʌ(p) < p. Kahneman and Tversky explain 
this by means of a phenomenon called subcertainty. Subcertainty refers to the fact that they 
found evidence that suggests that: for all 0 < p < 1, ʌ (p) + ʌ (1-p) < 1. A visual 
representation of a hypothetical weighting function is shown in figure 2-8b. Note that the 
function departs from above the virtual 45 q line for very small probabilities but is less 
steep. 
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 Figure 2-8b A hypothetical weighting function 
 
2.6.5 Prospect Theory related to System 1 and 2 information processing 
 
Based upon a review of Prospect Theory experiments, Kahneman (2003) discussed the 
Framing Effect and why this is not always confirmed in experimental studies. Below we 
list some of the principles that were mentioned by Kahneman (2003) as far as they are 
relevant to our study.  
 
The first principle that determines Framing Effects, is based upon the distinction between 
two generic modes of cognitive function: 1) an intuitive mode in which judgments and 
decisions are made automatically and 2) a controlled mode, which is deliberate and slower. 
Prospect Theory studies intuitions, thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly 
and without much reflection. Kahneman (2003) refers to the two types of cognitive 
processes who were labeled System 1 and System 2 by Stanovich and West (2002). The 
operations of System 1 are typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit and 
often emotionally charged; they are also governed by habit and therefore difficult to 
control or modify. The operations of System 2 are slower, serial, effortful, more likely to 
be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled. One of the functions of System 2 is 
to monitor mental operations of both systems. Kahneman (2003), p699 phrases that 
³6\VWHPPRQLWRUVWKHDFWLYLWLHVRI6\VWHP´DVDVKRUWKDQGIRUDK\SRWKHVLVDERXW³ZKDW
ZRXOGKDSSHQLIWKHRSHUDWLRQVRI6\VWHPZHUHGLVUXSWHG´ 
 
The second principle is based upon the general property of perceptual systems that appear 
to be designed to enhance the accessibility of changes and differences (Kahneman, 2003), 
p703. Perception is reference-dependent: The perceived attributes of a focal stimulus 
reflect the contrast between that stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli. 
The framing of risky choices as gains/losses compared to a reference point (status quo, 
former value) is an implementation of this principle. 
 
 
 
p 
 ʌ(p) 
 0   1 
 1 
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Figure 2-9 ± The System 1 and 2 model (Stanovich & West, 2002)  
 
A third principle is referred to as Narrow Framing. People are not rational-agents that 
make their choices in a comprehensively inclusive context, which incorporates all the 
relevant details of the present situation as well as expectations about all future 
opportunities and risks. Much evidence supports the contrasting FODLPWKDWSHRSOH¶VYLHZ
of decisions and outcomes are normally characterized by Narrow Framing. The prevalence 
of the gains/losses frame illustrates narrow framing (Kahneman, 2003), p706, in which 
corrective actions of System 2 (based on knowledge and experience) are eliminated. The 
fourth principle is connected to the accessibility of thoughts. It is called Attribute 
SubstitutionZKLFKVD\V WKDW³D MXGJPHQW LV VDLG WREHPediated by a heuristic when the 
individual assesses a specific target attribute of a judgment object by substituting a related 
KHXULVWLF DWWULEXWH WKDW FRPHV PRUH UHDGLO\ WR PLQG´ (Kahneman, 2003), p707. These 
principles of cognitive processing of risk information, are relevant to the design of 
Prospect Theory studies as ours.  
2.6.6. Consequences for our study 
 
Research on Prospect Theory offers insights that are much more comprehensive than the 
single Framing Effect (reflection effect) that we will include in our study. Our literature 
overview in section 2.3.4. and in table 2-5 shows that the Gain/Loss Framing has been 
implemented earlier in experimental studies on Escalating IS-projects that use Prospect 
Theory as a lens. We will follow these predecessors in the field of Escalating IS-projects 
for the reason of the availability of instruments that have been tested earlier. The 
refinement and variety of Prospect Theory elements will be considered for future research. 
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2.7. Illusion of Control Theory 
2.7.1. Perceived Control defined 
 
Based on a case-study on the Deaf Effect, Cuellar (2009) proposed that decisioQPDNHU¶V
Perceived Control could be an interesting candidate for further study on the Deaf Effect.. 
According to Illusion of Control Theory, a level of Perceived Control that would be too 
high could promote risk-seeking behavior. In this section we describe the main definitions 
related to Perceived Control and Illusion of Control. These will be elaborated further in the 
empirical chapters where we apply them.     
 
We define Perceived Control as ´SHRSOH¶VRZQMXGJPHQWRI WKHH[WHQW WRZKLFK WKH\FDQ
control DQRXWFRPH LQ D VSHFLILF VLWXDWLRQ´ (Thompson et al., 1998) ³This judgment is 
based upon their judgment of how much they intend the outcome and the degree of 
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHLUDFWLRQDQGWKHRXWFRPH´ Or phrased more simply (Thompson & 
Schlehofer, 2005) ³3HUFHLYHG&RQWURO LV WKH SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW RQH FDQ WDNH DFWLRQ WR JHW
GHVLUHGRXWFRPHV´ 
 
Since the construct of Perceived Control is defined for a specific situation ± and thus 
interacts with specific situation characteristics - it should not be confused with two other 
related constructs, self-efficacy and locus of control. 
 
³6HOI-efficacy refers to the perception that the self has the skills/abilities to enact effective 
UHVSRQVHV´ (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2005) . Self-efficacy is a term used to describe to 
what degree people believe that they are capable of taking those actions that are believed to 
be necessary to successfully manage situations like these. In relation to our research topic, 
self-HIILFDF\LQIOXHQFHVDSHUVRQ¶VIHHOLQJRIFRQILGHQFHRUFRQWURO$KLJKGHJUHHRIVHOI-
efficacy can make individuals more optimistic about their personal capabilities to perform 
the actions that are required to reach their goals or to complete a project successfully. 
 
Locus of control is a personality trait, independent from the specific task or situation. 
³/RFXVRI&RQWUROUHIHUVWRWKHEHOLHIVDERXWWKHORFXVRIUHLQIRUFHPHQWVZKHWKHURUQRW
people in general can get good outcomes and bad through their own actions (internal 
locus of control) or whether external factors control these outcomes (external locus of 
FRQWURO´ as defined by Thompson  (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2005). 
2.7.2. Perceived Control and Optimistic Bias 
 
Since Perceived Control is related to specific conditions, it could also explain irrational 
behavior in these conditions. In a sequence of so-called Illusion of Control experiments 
irrational decision making in chance conditions ± simple games ± was explained by 
Perceived Control being unrealistically high. Although Illusion of Control Theory 
originally applied to pure chance conditions (without any actual control), it has been used 
in many studies in order to explain risk-taking behavior in car-driving (Horswill & 
McKenna, 1999), health (Harris, 1996) and IS-projects. In a study on escalating IS-
SURMHFWV,OOXVLRQRI&RQWUROLVGHVFULEHGDV³DQH[SHFWDQF\RISHUVRQDOVXFFHVVSUREDELOLW\
inappropriately higher than the objectLYHSUREDELOLW\ZRXOGZDUUDQW´ (Keil, Depledge, & 
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Rai, 2007a). This phenomenon causes people to believe that statistical probabilities for 
(certain) risks do not apply to them. This belief can be caused by the development of a 
(too) high degree of confidence in their personal skills as a result of a previous history of 
success in a similar situation. If a predicted risk did not occur in past projects, people are 
OLNHO\ WR EH PRUH FRQILGHQW WKDW LW ZRQ¶W RFFXU LQ WKH QH[W SURMHFW HLWKHU Furthermore, 
people will often attribute a favourable outcome to their skills in managing a situation 
(Keil et al., 2007a). This also means that if the person has been successful as a manager 
that he/she develops (over) confidence in his/her skills to avoid failure in general. 
 
Other studies on Perceived Control in the field of Escalating IS-projects showed that 1. 
Low perceived control causes people to act in a more risk averse matter and makes them 
quick as to abandon a project (Du, Keil, Mathiassen, Shen, & Tiwana, 2007), 2. A sense of 
control could increase the expectation that risks can be avoided (Du et al., 2007), 3.  Self-
efficacy may influence the Perceived Control that Project Managers have over the project. 
If Project Managers continue to believe that the project is under their control, they may be 
more likely to continue failing projects (Whyte & Saks, 2007), 4. While executing a failing 
project, Project Managers who begin the project with high self-efficacy about successful 
completion of the project will tend to perceive a greater degree of control over the failing 
project (Jani, 2008). 
 
We conclude that Individuals with a high level of perceived control, tend to have more 
confidence in their ability to make the project a success. They usually attempt to overcome 
problems by investing additional time, effort and money into the project, instead of 
abandoning it (Whyte & Saks, 2007; Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997; Wood, Bandura, & 
Bailey, 1990). They tend to take negative feedback less seriously since they are convinced 
that the project will be successful in the end. This can cause them to ignore or react too 
slowly to potential warning signs of failure, opening the door for project escalation (Wood 
et al., 1990). 
 
Resuming, we conclude that a higher level of Perceived Control is likely to be correlated 
with lower level of estimated probability of failure. This would assume a tendency to take 
more risks and be deaf for probability information in a warning.  
2.7.3. Perceived Control and Learned Helplessness  
 
In the previous section an unrealistically high level of Perceived Control was described as 
a determinant of escalation behavior by selective perception of confirmatory positive 
feedback information, and prospective focusing. This reinforces the level of Perceived 
Control, labeled by Staw (Staw & Ross, 1978) as the Invulnerability Effect. Several 
authors (Brockner et al., 1983; Staw & Ross, 1978; Wortman & Brehm, 1975) proposed a 
similar reinforcing mechanism when individuals have an unrealistically low level of 
Perceived Control that could induce escalation behavior as well, based upon the Learned 
Helplessness Effect (Wortman & Brehm, 1975). When people perceive that outcomes are 
not controllable by them, they will show selective perception of confirmatory negative 
feedback information, will have extremely low prospective focus, will cease to use 
relevant information in decision situations and will be further confirmed that they are not 
in the position to determine outcomes by taking actions. Staw (Wortman & Brehm, 1975) 
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proposes that with the learned helplessness effect, commitment would likely remain high 
even with repeated negative consequences. People simply tend to repeat the same behavior 
even if this behavior is inappropriate for a new set of circumstances.  
2.7.4. Perceived Control and Risk Perception 
 
Other studies show that a high level of Perceived Control could result in the decision 
PDNHU¶V ORZOHYHORISHUFHLYHGULVN (Du et al., 2007; Sjöberg, 2000a), which could drive 
him or her to risk-seeking behavior. Risk Perception LV GHILQHG DV D ³GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V
DVVHVVPHQWRIWKHULVNLQKHUHQWLQDVLWXDWLRQ´(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). According to Sitkin 
and Weingart (1995), this assessment reflects the degree to which an individual perceives a 
particular situation as negative (Douglas, 1985), as a threat (Jackson & Dutton, 1988) and 
as out of control (Baird & Thomas, 1985). Perceptions of high risk would lead people to be 
PRUHULVNDYHUVHWKDQZRXOGSHUFHSWLRQVRIORZULVN$GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VRisk Perception 
in a particular situation is influenced by many of the organizational, project and social 
characteristics as presented earlier, which makes it an important mediator of escalation 
behavior. It is also largely influenced by the psychological factors as presented in this 
chapter. For example, Sitkin and Weingart (1995) showed that individuals perceived the 
risky option in a positively framed situation  to be more risky than that in a negatively 
framed situation, and hence they tended to be more risk averse in the former than in the 
latter situation.  
 
The Sitkin and Pablo (1992) model further suggests that Risk Propensity is one of the 
determinants of Risk Perception. The idea is that the relative salience of a threat or an 
opportunity varies as a function of Risk Propensity. Individuals with a high Risk 
Propensity (i.e decision makers who tend to be risk seeking in a particular domain) would 
pay more attention and give higher weight to positive than to negative outcomes. 
Individuals with low Risk Propensity (i.e. decision makers who tend to be risk averse in 
that domain) pay more attention and give higher weight to negative outcomes than to 
positive outcomes6. Empirical studies confirm that Risk Perception mediates the effects of 
Risk Propensity on risk-taking behavior (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Wong (2005) found 
that Risk Propensity also had a direct effect on decision making under escalation situations.  
2.7.5. Consequences for our Study 
 
In this section we defined Perceived Control and explained the assumptions underlying 
Illusion of Control Theory. Illusion of Control Theory is pointed at (incorrect) estimations 
of probabilities of failure or success. Managers who perceive a High level of Control could 
ignore, and show deafness for, risk information and probability information in particular. 
For our empirical studies it thus could be very interesting to study whether the Deaf Effect  
could be related to the probability information in a Risk Warning in particular.  
                                                          
 
6 As we will describe later in section 6.2,  Risk Propensity differs from Risk Attitude in the notion that it can vary 
across decision domains, while Risk Attitude is assumed to be a personality trait that is stable across decision 
domains.   
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2.8. Methodologies and Designs in Escalating IS-Projects Research 
 
In order to embed our study in the literature stream of Escalating IS-projects, we provide 
an overview of studies from methodological and design perspective.  First we will list  case 
studies in the applied research-stream of Escalating IS-projects. Next, we will provide an 
overview of theory-testing causal studies in the field of Escalating IS-projects. We list the 
following attributes of these studies:  the variables in the study, methodology, respondents, 
region and the position within the typology of escalation-studies as presented earlier. We 
also include a brief description of operationalization and measurement of the constructs 
that are related to our study. This overview from methodological perspective will provide a  
starting point for the research design as we will describe in Chapter 3. 
2.8.1. Case Studies 
 
In table 2-3 we provide an overview of case-studies in the field of Escalating IS-projects.  
It includes a description of the subject of the project, the sector and region. Furthermore, it 
lists the key-variables/theories that were dominant in the model that the author used in 
describing the case. Some non-IS projects are included that are closely linked to this 
stream of literature. These describe the escalation phenomenon within complex and 
ambitious mega-projects, which share most of the attributes with IS-projects, such as 
stakeholders, data-collection, procedures and phasing. Literature on escalating IS-projects 
draws on some of these articles.   
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Year Subject Sector Region(s) Key-variables / Theories Reference 
1986 $300 million project to 
host fair, Expo86 
Mega Project 
(non-IS), 
Government 
Vancouver Project, Social, Psychological, 
Organizational Factors, Identify 
Escalation phases 
(Ross & Staw, 
1986) 
1993 Lessons from the 
shoreham nucledar 
powerplant 
Mega Project(s) US Escalation, Commitment, Decision 
Making, Project, Psychological, 
Social, Organizational determinants, 
Social Binding, External Justification 
(Ross & Staw, 
1993) 
1995 CONFIG project Expert system 
project 
US IT Project Escalation, Project, 
Psychological, social and 
organizational factors, External 
Justification, Competitive rivalry, 
Norms for consistency, managerial 
implications 
(Keil, 1995) 
1996 ADMIN project IS Projects, mid-
sized company 
Sweden Model of Escalation, Commitment, 
Professionalism, Decision Processes 
(Nulden, 1996) 
1996 Longitudinal study, 17 
year implementation of 
Material Management 
system 
IS-projects  US, Canada Systems Development, project 
management, commitment, conflict, 
escalation, IT-projects, dynamics, 
psychological, social, project, 
structural 
(Newman & 
Sabherwal, 1996) 
1999 Taurus, £500 million 
project London Stock 
Exchange 
IS-project, 
Finance 
UK Power, politics, managerial Control 
PHFKDQLVPVµILUVWRUGHUWKLQNLQJ¶RQ
management control 
(Drummond, 
1999) 
2000 Implementation 
baggage handling 
Denver airport 
IS-project, 
Denver Airport 
Denver De-escalation (Montealegre & 
Keil, 2000) 
2004 Implementation 
baggage handling 
Denver airport 
IS Projects, 
Denver Airport 
Sweden, 
United States 
Decision-making, stages, Escalation 
Theory, Actor Network Theory, 
Information networks, Technology led 
strategy, Management failures 
(Mähring, 
Holmstrom, Keil, 
& Montealegre, 
2004) 
2005 E-procurement project IS-project,  
Borough Council 
Singapore, 
UK 
abandonment, information systems 
failure, stakeholder analysis 
 
(Pan, 2005) 
2006 E-procurement project IS-Project, 
Borough Council 
UK, 
Singapore 
Escalation, de-escalation, Project 
evaluation model, Approach 
Avoidance Theory, Sequence of 
Events 
(Pan et al., 2006) 
2007 Implementation of 2 
financial ERP modules   
large IS-projects New Zealand Stakeholder, conflict resolution, 
governance,  culture, power 
(Johnstone, Huff, 
& Hope, 2007) 
2008 Longitudinal case-study  
of implementation of  
the UK National 
Healthcare System 
 IS-project, 
Healthcare 
UK Project, Social, Psychological, 
Organizational determinants;  
Dead-line based escalation, Task 
Bypassing, Change work distribution, 
Detect-Decide- Do Approach 
(Guah, 2008) 
2008 New Deposit System in 
a mid-sized European 
bank 
IS-projects, 
Finance 
 Europe Process Model, Project management, 
Project Framing, drift, unsuccessful 
incremental adaptation, rationalized 
continuation, stages,  
(Mähring & Keil, 
2008) 
2008 VUE, administrative 
system for all Danish 
universities 
IS-projects, 
governmental 
Danmark De-escalation, roles, role interaction, 
case study, antecendent condition 
(Mähring, 
Mathiassen, Keil, 
& Pries-Heje, 
2008) 
2008 Claims processing 
system 
IS-project, 
Insurance 
company 
Unknown Rationality, business case, Icarus 
metaphor, destructive systems, de-
skilling  
(Drummond, 
2008) 
Table 2-3 Overview of Case Studies on Escalating IS-projects 
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This overview of case studies provides an extensive list of published work on escalated IS-
projects. These case studies provide descriptive models on escalation and de-escalation of 
IS-projects. These descriptive models include roles, events, stages and determinants 
(psychological, social, project and organizational). Some of these descriptive models have 
further been used to categorize causal studies in the field of Escalating IS-projects. Many 
of the IS-projects that were studied are related to public services (governmental, transport, 
healthcare) and financial services. This might suggest that IS-projects in these areas might 
be more prone to escalation than IS-projects in private companies. The IS-projects in the 
case studies indeed show characteristics (such as high complexity, very large and long 
term investments, many stakeholders) that might be found relatively more in public and 
financial services than in private companies. On the other hand, private companies might 
be less accessible and might show less willingness to exhibit their failing IS-projects with 
researchers and with the public. Finally, the table shows that US, North-West Europe and 
Australia are highly represented in the case studies of escalating IS-projects. This could be 
explained by the concentration of IS-research in these regions. It could also point at 
cultural elements in these regions that could promote escalation of IS-projects. 
Furthermore this could be explained by relatively high transparency in these regions to 
share information on escalated IS-projects with researchers and the public.  
 
2.8.2. Surveys 
 
Table 2-4 lists the descriptive studies based on surveys in the field of escalating IS-
projects. It also includes relevant surveys with a broader scope, when studies on Escalating 
IS-projects build upon them. This refers to more general surveys from the field of IS-
project risks, management risk decision making and escalation in general.  
 
This overview of surveys related to the research stream of Escalating IS-projects provides 
several findings. Many surveys have contributed to the description of clusters and rankings 
of risks and controls that apply to IS-projects. So they help project managers to pay 
DWWHQWLRQ WR  WKH LPSRUWDQW LVVXHV ,W¶V LQWHUHVWLQJ WR QRWLFH WKDW PDQ\ VXUYH\V XVHG
respondents who are considered to be experts on IS-projeFWV¶ FRQWUROV DQG ULVNV ZKLFK
provides an insider-perspective.  
 
Relatively few surveys take the outsider-perspective on IS-projects by choosing 
respondents such as internal auditors and executive management (Project Owners). The 
table shows that US and North-West Europe are largely represented in IS-project surveys. 
,W¶VQRWFOHDUWRZKDWH[WHQWUHVXOWVPLJKWEHLQIOXHQFHGE\FXOWXUDOELDVHV 
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Article Subject Respondent(s) Branche Region key-variables / Theories 
(Barki, 
Rivard, & 
Talbot, 1993) 
Risk-classification in 
IS-projects 
project-managers and 
user representatives 
of 120 running 
projects in 75 
organizations 
top 100 
companies 
and govern-
ment 
Quebec IS-project, risk, software 
metrics, software development 
risk 
(Keil et al., 
2000a) 
Why Software Projects 
Escalate: An Empirical 
Analysis and Test of 
Four Theoretical 
Models 
 
579 members of the 
ISACA in US 
Escalating IS-
projects 
US Software project management, 
Escalation, IS project failure, 
Self-Justification Theory, 
Prospect Theory, Agency 
Theory, Approach Avoidance 
Theory, Sunk Cost, Goal 
Incongruency, Information 
Asymmetry, Completion 
Effect 
 
(Ropponen & 
Lyytinen, 
2000) 
Software Development 
Risks 
83 project managers IS Projects Finland Software Risk, risk 
management, software 
development, system failures, 
process improvement, 
mitigation,  
(Miceli & 
Near, 2002) 
What makes Whistle 
Blowers effective? 
8587 employees of 15 
major federal 
agencies 
perceived 
wrong-doing 
US Organisational wrongdoing,  
Whistle blowing, power 
theory, resource dependency 
theory, minority influence 
theory, role prescribed, 
retaliation 
(Wallace, 
Keil, & Rai, 
2004) 
Software project risks 507 software project 
managers 
PMI PMI Perceived control, Perceived 
Importance of Risk, 
Risktypes, environment risk, 
execution risk, customer 
mandate risk, scope and 
requirements risk 
(Kappelman, 
McKeeman, 
& Zhang, 
2006) 
Dominant dozen early 
warning signs of IS-
project failure 
19 experts and 55 IS-
project managers 
IS projects  US early warning signs, project 
risks, IS-projects 
(Mahlendorf, 
2007) 
Reducing Escalation 
of Commitment in 
High-Risk Investment 
Projects 
550 managers and 
Internal Auditors 
Projects in 
general 
Germany Cognitive limitations,  
perception deficit, self 
justification, evaluation errors, 
confirmation bias, perception 
threshold, background noise 
(Snow, Keil, 
& Wallace, 
2007) 
Reasons for optimistic, 
pessimistic status 
reporting 
65 IS-project- 
managers,  
IS Projects US IS project, project 
management, estimation bias, 
reporting, optimistic, 
pessimistic 
Table 2-4 Overview of Surveys on Escalating IS-projects 
2.8.3. Experiments 
 
Table 2-5 lists the causal studies based upon experiments in the research field of escalating 
IS-projects. Relevant experimental studies with a more general scope of escalation 
behavior, have already been listed in section 2.2. In this table we include the characteristics 
of the experimental designs, theories, the independent and the dependent variables and the 
methods applied for statistical analysis of the results. We also include the role perspective 
(Project Manager, Project Owner) that was proposed to the participants in these 
experiments. 
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The table which lists experiments in the field of Escalating IS-projects could easily be 
extended with closely related experiments from psychology that use project-conditions in 
order to test causal relationships related to risk-seeking and escalation. The table however 
is limited to studies that were performed in the mainstream literature on Escalating IS-
projects. The overview shows that: (1) Most experimental studies in the field of Escalating 
IS-projects make use of students, with few exceptions to this rule using professionals from 
the field. Although not listed here, it should be noted that the tendency to use students is 
even stronger in studies in the field of psychology; (2) Most studies use a between-subject 
single-observation experimental design, including multiple independent variables. Few 
studies use within-subject designs that observe escalation-behavior over time. Studies in 
the field of psychology appear to be more extensive in testing various experimental 
designs with single vs repeated treatments and observations (Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; 
Gigerenzer, 1994; Keren & Wagenaar, 1987); (3) Measurement and manipulations in 
many experiments in the field of IS-projects have been adapted to this specific context. 
They show a variety of manipulation and measurement-methods across independent and 
dependent variables, from single items to multiple item scales. Scenarios are often 
replicated in other studies; (4) The decision maker is often placed in the position of IS-
project manager or responsible manager of a software company. The corresponding 
project-frame might not necessarily hold for IS-Project Owners or managers in the 
FRPSDQ\ZKRDUHWRUHDOL]HWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VJRDOVZLWKWKHUHVXOWVRf the IS-project; and 
(5) Partial Least Squares (PLS) is applied across many studies in the field of Escalating IS-
projects. Especially in experimental conditions with multiple independent variables, 
intermediate, moderating and dependent variables and in  exploratory studies. 
2.8.4. Consequences for our study  
 
From this review of literature in the field of Escalating IS-projects, we learn that our 
proposed study on the interaction between the messenger-decision maker relationship 
(according to Stewardship Theory) and psychological factors (according to Illusion of 
Control Theory and Prospect Theory) fits in the development of this research stream. We 
also find that our proposed central position of the Project Owner could provide a 
contribution to this research field, since most studies took the role of delivering Project 
Manager or Software Director as point of reference. From a methodological perspective it 
appears that valid measurement instruments are available and applied in this research 
domain. We also found that there were few mixed method studies published, although 
PhD-theses were not included in this overview. So there appears to be room for mixed 
method studies and a mixed quantitative and qualitative study could provide an interesting 
contribution to the research stream of Escalating IS-projects.  
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2.9. Refined Scope and Research Questions 
 
In Chapter 1 we phrased our Research Objective as follows:  
 
³&RQWULEXWHWRWKHH[SODQDWLRQof Why the Deaf Effect occurs in the field of escalating IS-
projectV´E\H[DPLQLQJPDLQFDXVDOHIIHFWVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQHIIHFWV  IURPIROORZLQJWKUHH
perspectives: 
x 7KH ³&ROODERUDWLYH 3DUWQHU YV 2SSRQHQW´ Relationship between Internal Auditor 
(Bad News Messenger) and Project Owner (Decision Maker) ± based on Stewardship 
Theory;  
x 3URMHFW2ZQHU¶VPerceived Control heuristic which might bring biased processing of 
WKH DXGLWRU¶V ULVN ZDUQLQJ ERXQGHG UDWLRQDOLW\ ± based on Illusion of Control 
Theory;  
x The presentation of the risk warning either with the focus on Gains or with the focus 
on Losses ± based on Prospect Theory. 
Based on our literature review we obtained more information on the predecessors and 
feasibility of this study. Therefore we will apply the following scope and assumptions: (1) 
The decision maker of study (unit of analysis) is the executive in the role of IS-Project 
Owner; (2) The study on Deaf Effect takes into consideration that someone is blowing the 
whistle or acts as Bad News Messenger. This provides a  different context (including 
interaction effects) compared to other studies on Perceived Control (Keil et al., 2007a) or 
Prospect Theory (Sharp & Salter, 1997) in this domain; (3) The Bad News Messenger acts 
in the role of internal auditor who meets the professional standards of the Institute of 
Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004). These standards address the criterion of a bad news 
messenger who is acting as a credible source - i.e. who has the expertise and could be 
relied upon to make true assertions (Cuellar et al., 2006). Furthermore they assure that the 
internal auditor would operate from an Auditing Function which is independent from 
management authority (Keil & Robey, 2001)7; (4) We aim to re-use instruments that have 
been applied earlier in the field of Escalating IS-projects; (5) Situational Attention is a 
promising mediator that could be of help to understanding the influence of organizational 
and psychological factors on Deaf Effect. For reasons of feasibility we excluded it from 
our scope8; and (6) Our set of Research Questions should allow independent empirical 
                                                          
 
7 The IIA professional standards on internal auditing (IIARF, 2011) prescribe that the internal auditor is 
considered to meet standards on  a. proficiency (1210)- knowledge and skills, b. due professional care (1220) ± 
apply skills, prudency  and care , c. organizational independence from executive management (1110) , d. 
individual objectivity (1120) ± impartial, unbiased attitude, avoid conflicts of interest, e. both in fact and 
appearance (1130). 
8 We have included Situated Attention in our initial design and pilot-tests but found that self-reported 
measurements cause ceiling effects. Valid measurement of Attention would require a research design (eye-
WUDFNLQJWKDWZDVQ¶WDSSOLHGHDUOLHULQWKLVGRPDLQDQGZRXOGKDYHGLVWXUEHGUH-use of instruments from earlier 
studies.   
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substudies ± qualitative and qualitative ± that contribute to a more holistic view on the 
Deaf Effect in escalating IS-projects.   
 
In table 2-6 we present the Research Questions that are based on our scope and 
assumptions and that will form the starting point for the research design that we will 
elaborate in Chapter 3. 
 
   Research Question Type of 
Question 
Chapter 
    
1 Could the Gain/Loss Frame of the Risk Warning and the Project 
2ZQHU¶VStewardship relation with the messenger (Collaborative 
Partner) be of influence on the Deaf Effect for a Risk Warning? 
Why 4 
 1.1 Could these influences interact? Why 4 
 1.2 Are these influences mediated by Message Relevance, Risk 
Perception and Estimated Probability to Succeed? 
How 4 
    
2 &RXOGWKH3URMHFW2ZQHU¶VPerceived Control and the Stewardship 
relation with the messenger (Collaborative Partner) be of influence 
on the Deaf Effect for a Risk Warning? 
Why 5 
 2.1 Could these influences interact? Why 5 
 2.2 Are these influences mediated by Message Relevance, Risk 
Perception and Estimated Probability to succeed? 
How 5 
    
3 Do managers and internal auditors have different perceptions of risk 
after receiving a Risk Warning, which can be related to their working 
experience? 
Why/How 6 
 3.1 Are these differences consistent with expected heuristics from 
Illusion of Control Theory ± the Actor/Observer heuristic in 
particular?  
Why/How 6 
 3.2 Are these differences related to Risk Propensity? Why/How 6 
    
4 What other factors could be proposed to be of influence on the Deaf 
Effect, taking into account the influence of Partnership/Opponent 
relationship on Deaf Effect? 
Why/How 7 
 4.1 What other factors are proposed to be of Influence on the Deaf 
Effect? 
Why/How 7 
 4.2 What other factors are proposed to interact with the 
Partner/Opponent relationship in its influence on the Deaf 
Effect? 
Why/How 7 
 4.3 What structures and attributes can we identify that can be of 
help to further explanatory studies on the Deaf Effect that will 
include those factors? 
How 7 
Table 2-6 Research Questions 
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We conclude this Chapter with table 2-7 in which we present a refined description the 
contribution of our study to existing literature.  
 
AMBITION 
 
Replicate Improve Innovate 
Concepts Deaf (Continue) 
 
Perceived Control  
(Ill. Contr. Theory) 
 
Gain/Loss Framing  
(Prospect Theory) 
 
Collab Partner/Opponent relation 
(Stewardship Theory) 
 
Contingency 
 
Prospect Theory x 
Stewarship Theory 
 
Illusion of Control 
Theory x Stewardship 
Theory 
 
Operationalize Deaf (Continue) 
Perceived Control 
Gain/Loss Framing 
 
 Collab Partner/ 
Opponent relation 
Apply Deaf (Continue) 
Perceived Control 
Gain/Loss Framing 
 
 Collab Partner/ 
Opponent relation 
Table 2-7  Contribution of this Study 
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CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter is intended to provide a bridge between the former chapters  and the 
empirical chapters 4 to 7. In this chapter we elaborate our research design (Verschuren & 
Doorewaard, 2007) which forms the common basis for the empirical chapters of our study.  
 
Since the objective of this study is to contribute to knowledge on a relatively unexplored 
phenomenon, we think it would be appropriate to study the phenomenon from various 
perspectives and use a convergent research methodology, called triangulation (Webb, 
Campbell, Schwarts, & Sechrest, 1966) 7ULDQJXODWLRQ FDQ EURDGO\ EH GHILQHG DV ³WKH
FRPELQDWLRQRIPHWKRGRORJLHV LQ WKH VWXG\RI WKH VDPHSKHQRPHQRQ´7KLVPHWDSKRU is 
from navigation and military strategy where multiple reference points are used to locate an 
REMHFW¶V H[DFW SRVLWLRQ &ROOHFWLQJ GLIIHUHQW NLQGV RI GDWD EHDULQJV RQ WKH VDPH
phenomenon could improve research accuracy in a similar way. From a validation 
perspective, Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) reflect on the idea of multi operationism 
and argue that more than one method should be used in the validation process to ensure 
that variances reflect the trait and are not artifacts of the method.  
 
Jick (Jick, 1979) suggests that triangulation, in addition to increasing validity and 
reliability, also enables researchers to capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual 
portrayal of the units under study. He promotes the idea that quantitative and qualitative 
research could be complementary. He also suggests that multi-methods could parallel 
theoretical triangulation and could contribute to synthesis or integration of theories that 
bear on a common problem.  
3.2. Conceptual Design 
 
The Research Questions, as presented in table 2-6, are dominated by Why-questions that - 
individually and combined - could provide explanations for Deaf Effect and thus would 
require causal studies. Figure 3-1 figure shows the conceptual framework of our research 
design, applied from the predictive validity model as described by Libby (Libby, 1981) for 
causal studies in behavioral decision making.  This will form the basis for the description 
of our research design in this chapter and in the empirical chapters 4 to 7. Key is that we 
aim to draw conclusions on the theoretical causal relationships at conceptual level: could 
Stewardship Theory, Illusion of Control Theory and Prospect Theory explain the Deaf 
Effect. Our research design has to provide the means to draw these conclusions based on 
observations and (statistical) analysis at operational level. The research design has to 
ensure that threats to validity (construct validity, internal validity and statistical conclusion 
validity) are ruled out, since these could provide alternative explanations for our results. 
We will discuss later in this chapter how we embed validity in our design, and we will 
show in the empirical chapters how validity is implemented and verified in the individual 
substudies. 
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Figure 3-1 Conceptual and Operational Level of Deaf Effect study 
 
   
We will first discuss the dependent variable in our study, the one that we aim to explain. 
As we saw in the literature review in Chapter 2, both Illusion of Control Theory and 
Prospect Theory have been tested in the field of Escalating IS-projects. We also found that 
the Deaf Effect for warnings was considered one of the mechanisms that could contribute 
to escalation of IS-projects. Deaf Effect assumes a context in which there is a messenger 
who provides a clear and obtrusive risk warning that continuation of the IS-project would 
no longer be viable.  In this context we aim to explain hoZVRPHRQHFDQEH³GHDIWRDULVN
ZDUQLQJ´:HRSHUDWLRQDOL]HGWKLVFRQVWUXFWLQDPDQQHUFRQVLVWHQWZLWK&XHOODU¶VVWXGLHV
on the Deaf Effect, in which the Deaf EIIHFWLVGHILQHGDV³ZKHQDGHFLVLRQPDNHUGRHVQ¶W
hear, ignores, overrules a report of bad neZV WR FRQWLQXH D IDLOLQJ FRXUVH RI DFWLRQ´
(Cuellar, 2009). Consistent with (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007) 
we make Continue the operational dependent variable of our study. We will use the 
operational variable Continue for observations on whether the Deaf Effect occurs or not. 
This implementation also reflects that the decision to Continue is considered to be a Risk 
Seeking decision, since the Risk warning that the project was no longer viable ± is rejected. 
As we could see in table 2-5, many experimental studies followed this implementation 
(Boonthanom, 2003; Keil et al., 2000c).  
 
Next, we will describe how the main Research Question (contribution) for each empirical 
Chapter was translated into a structure to answer these questions: with concepts and 
theories at the conceptual level of our research design.   
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 MAIN EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION 
 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
 
Chapter 4  
 
 
 
Stewardship 
Theory 
 
Prospect Theory  
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Stewardship 
Theory 
 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Stewardship 
Theory 
 
Systems Theory 
 
 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
 
Prospect Theory 
 
Figure 3-2 Conceptual presentation of our research questions 
 
In table 2-6 we saw that the Research Questions for each Chapter have been elaborated 
further into subquestions. The conceptual presentation of these more refined relations will 
be done LQ D VLPLODU IRUP WKURXJKRXW WKH HPSLULFDO FKDSWHUV $W WKLV SRLQW LW¶V PRVW
relevant to mention that our research questions  dictate that most relations in our design 
will be causal. In these figures, causal relations are marked with an arrow. A variable at the 
end of any arrow ± causal relation ± in these graphs is an endogenous variable. A variable 
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that only serves as startingpoint for any causal relationship in these graphs is an exogenous 
variable. The variable that we ultimately aim to explain in each chapter is the dependent 
variable Continue. The variables that we manipulate in our study (Messenger seen as a 
Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent) ± at the left side of the figures - are the 
independent variables (or treatments) of our study9.  
 
There are a few more extensions on this model that we need to clarify at this point. The 
variable Perceived Control is presented as a Moderator Variable. This variable changes the 
relationship between the Independent Variable and the Dependent Variable. The influence 
of moderation variables plays a very important role in our study. We will examine ± for 
example - whether the Deaf Effect could be reduced by a Collaborative Partnership 
relation. With moderation analysis we further examine whether this applies to decision 
makers with either a high or a low perceived control. Later in this chapter we will explain 
how we will perform statistical moderation analysis for these interaction effects. 
 
In the empirical chapters we will go one step deeper into the causal relations between 
independent variable and dependent variables. We will measure so-called Mediating 
Variables. We expect to find that a decision maker would show less Deaf Effect when the 
risk warning comes from a Collaborative Partner. Mediation Analysis would provide 
insight into whether this effect is direct or whether it is indirect by triggering a Mediating 
Variable (Perceived Risk, Message Relevance) that leads to the Deaf Effect. This 
mediation analysis brings additional understanding of the chain of causal relations that 
explains the Deaf Effect. We will explain later in this chapter how we will perform 
statistical mediation analysis in our empirical chapters.   
 
Finally, there will be numerous other extraneous variables that could be of influence on the 
causal relationships that we examine. To a certain extent we can measure them and use 
them as Control Variables in our study. For example, if we know that Female respondents 
might be more sensitive to listening to a warning than male respondents, we could measue 
and control for gender in our study. The problem, however, is that it is not reasonable to 
include extensive lists of Control Variables in a study. Therefore, we accept that such 
Confounding Variables exist in our study. The main thing that we do is to disable them 
from causing a structural relationship with our observations on Deaf Effect. Such  
structural relationship could provide a rival explanation for any conclusion that our 
observation of the Deaf Effect must have been caused by the treatments on the 
Independent Variables in our experiment. Through Random Assignment of our treatments 
to groups of respondents, the influence of these Confounding Variables will be randomized 
when we compare the Deaf Effect between treatment groups. Typical Confounding 
Variables in our study areIRUH[DPSOHSHRSOH¶VSUHFRQFHSWLRQVRIZKHWKHUWKH\FRQVLGHU
internal auditors to be Collaborative Partners or Opponents. Another Confounding 
Variable is that respondents had earlier experiences with IS-projects that influenced their 
decisions. Randomization rules out structural effects of such Confounding Variables, but 
                                                          
 
9 For a description of principles of design and variables we used here, we refer to (Blumberg,2009) chapter 1; 
(Libby, 1981) and (Stone, 1978)   
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still they could cause very high levels of random noise in our research. This requires 
powerful treatments to overcome the noise and observe effects. As we will explain in 
Chapters 4 and 5, these Confounding Variables required much attention during the 
development and testing stages of our research, mainly in order to reduce background 
noise. 
3.3. Empirical Research Strategies 
 
Research Strategies are generic classes of research for gaining knowledge about a research 
problem. The choice of a Research Strategy should take into account their strengths, 
weaknesses and feasibility. For a mixed-methods strategy it is no less important to 
consider the characteristics of each strategy in order to achieve synergy between our 
substudies.  
 
First of all, the Research Strategy should be feasible for answering our type of research 
questions. Table 3-1 (Yin, 2009) presents relevant situations for different research 
VWUDWHJLHV DQG GHVFULEHV ZKLFK VWUDWHJ\ FRXOG EH IHDVLEOH WR DQVZHU RXU ³:K\´-typed 
research questions. 
 
Method Form of Research 
Question? 
Requires Control of 
Behavioral Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary Events? 
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, Why? No No 
Case Study How, Why? No Yes 
Table 3-1 Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin, 2009) 
 
The classification and considerations of McGrath (1981) further guided our choices on 
5HVHDUFK6WUDWHJLHV7KLVFODVVLILFDWLRQRI³EHKDYLRUDO UHVHDUFKVWUDWHJLHV´ ± as presented 
in figure 3-3  - LV VKRZQ  DV HLJKW ³SLH VOLFHV´ ZLWKLQ D FLUFXPSOH[ EXW DOVR DV IRXU
quadrants, each with a related pair of strategies. The circular space is defined in terms of 
two orthogonal axis . The upper vs lower half refers to Research Strategies that use 
Obtrusive vs Unobtrusive operations: the researcher forces the participants in a particular 
VHWWLQJ WKDW LV ³FUHDWHG´ E\ WKH UHVHDUFKHU 7KH OHIW KDOI RI WKH ILJXUH LV FRQFHUQHGZLWK
universal or generic behavioral systems. The right half is concerned with particularistic or 
FRQFUHWHEHKDYLRUV\VWHPV:LWKLQ WKLV WZRGLPHQVLRQDO VSDFH WKHUHDUH WKUHH³PD[LPD´
points at which each of three mutually conflicting desiderata are realized at their highest 
values (marked A, B and C in the figure).  
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Figure 3-3 Research Strategies and Dilemmas (McGrath, 1981) 
 
It is always desirable (ceteris paribus) to maximize A. generalizability with respect to 
populations; B. Precision in control and measurement of variables related to the 
behavior(s) of interest; and C. existential realism, for the participants, of the context in 
which those behaviors are observed. In figure 3-3, the maxima for A, B and C are shown 
as widely spaced points in the strategy circle. The very choices and operations by which 
one seeks to optimize any two points will minimize on the third. Therefore, McGrath calls 
WKHFKRLFHEHWZHHQWKHVHPD[LPDD³WKUHHKRUQHGGLOHPPD´(DFK5HVHDUFK6WUDWHJ\LVD
compromise on achieving all three desiderata. This overview of Research provides us with 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each Research Strategy. For example, strategies in 
Quadrant I have natural settings. The fieldstudy is unobtrusive and provides maximum 
realism of observations (C). The Field Experiment is more obtrusive and moves a step 
closer to  Precision of Measurement (B) at the price of Context Realism (C). The Research 
Strategies in quadrant II have highly created and contrived settings, in which laboratory 
experiments maximize on precision of measurement (B). In Quadrant III,  Sample Surveys 
SURYLGHREVHUYDWLRQVRIEHKDYLRUWKDWGRQ¶WGHSHQGRQDFUHDWHGVHWWLQJ7KHUHIRUH6DPSOH
Surveys allow for high generalizability (A) of the observations across settings and 
respondents.  
 
McGrath provided us insight into the strategic strengths and weaknesses of the Research 
Strategies that can be used to answer our Research Questions and showed the price you 
pay for a choice. Triangulation on Research Strategy would require that strengths and 
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weaknesses of substudies show synergy in answering our main Research Question. 
McGrath did not include Case Study as a specific implementation of Field Study in his 
overview of research strategies. Finally, our choice of Research Strategies was refined by 
looking at their consequences -  strengths and weaknesses - at a more tactical and 
operational level. For that purpose, we used table 3-2 from Stone (1978), p116, which 
presents the dimensions on which the major Empirical Research Strategies vary.  
 
Rated Dimension Laboratory 
Experiment 
Simulation Field 
Experiment 
Field 
Study 
Sample 
Survey 
Case 
Study 
COST       
,QLWLDO³6HW-XS´ M L-H M-H M-H H L-H 
Marginal Cost per Subject L L-H M M L-M L-H 
 
VARIABLES 
      
Strength of Independent 
Variables 
L L-M M H H H 
Range of Variables L M M H H L-H 
Potential to Manipulate 
Independent Variables 
H M-H M N N N 
 
CONTROL 
      
Potential for Testing Causal 
Hypotheses 
H M-H M L L N10 
Potential for Study to Change 
Researcher 
L L M M L H 
Potential for Controlling 
Confounding Variables 
H M-H L-M L L N 
 
ARTIFACTS 
      
Potential for Experimenter 
Expectancy Effects 
H M M-H M L H 
Potential for Demand 
Characteristics 
H M M-H M L H 
Potential for Evaluation 
Apprehension 
H M-H M-H M L H 
 
SETTING 
      
Naturalness of Setting L M-H H H H H 
Degree to which Behavior is 
Setting Dependent 
H L-M H H L H 
 
GENERALIZABILITY 
      
AppliFDELOLW\RI6WXG\¶V
Results to Different 
Populations 
L-H L-H L L H N 
N None      L Low      M Moderate      H High 
Table 3-2 Comparison of Empirical Research Strategies (Stone, 1978) 
 
To answer our main (Why-typed) Research Questions of Chapter 4 and 5 we will follow 
the Research Strategy of Laboratory Experiments. Laboratory experiments take place in a 
                                                          
 
10 As we will describe later, Yin (2009) claims that explanatory case studies allow causal inferences. We will use 
an exploratory case study here.   
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setting specifically created by the researcher for the investigation of a phenomenon. With 
this research method, the researcher has control over the independent variable(s) and the 
random assignment of research participants to various treatment and non-treatment 
conditions (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001). 
This strategy allows us to maximize precision of measurement of universal behavioral 
systems (heuristics). It also allows us to test theories in an applied context by ruling out 
rival explanations.  
  
To answer our main (Why and How-typed) Research Question of Chapter 6 we will follow 
the Research Strategy of a Situated Experiment (Greenberg & Tomlinson, 2004), which 
combines characteristics of a laboratory experiment with characteristics of a field 
experiment. Field experiments involve the experimental manipulation of one or more 
variables within a naturally occurring system and the subsequent measurement of the 
impact of this manipulation on one or more dependent variables (Boudreau et al., 2001). 
The situated experiment aims to maximize Context Realism (without intervention of 
operational processes), while taking care of Precision of Measurement requirements as are 
typical to laboratory experiments. Heuristics, as (theoretically) expected to be found at 
different groups in the field, will be tested on their main and interaction effects in a 
realistic setting. This setting is not entirely controllable, making it more difficult to rule out 
all rival explanations to a Why-question. Furthermore, its strength of context realism also 
limits generalizability of the results to other settings.       
 
To answer our (Why and How-typed) Research Questions of Chapter 7 we will follow the 
Research Strategy of Case Studies. Case studies involve the intensive examination of a 
small number of entities by the researcher, where neither independent variables are 
manipulated nor are confounding variables controlled. Like field studies, case studies 
typically utilize questionnaires, coded interviews, or systematic observation as their 
preferred techniques for gathering data (Boudreau et al., 2001).  
 
We strive for synergy between the quantitative experiments and the qualitative Case Study 
in to order examine theories that could explain the Deaf Effect. Therefore, we should 
realize how we can relate findings from both without confusing the characteristics of each 
substudy. To clarify this, Yin explains that generalization of the results from case studies 
differs from generalization of the results from  experiments. In case of experiments, 
statistical generalization is applied. In case studies, analytical generalization is applied, as 
shown in figure 3-4. Statistical generalization uses level one inference and analytical 
generalization uses level two inference. Inference means how conclusions are made based 
on arguments or data. For a case study it is impossible to use level one inferences because 
there is only one or multiple cases which is not enough to use statistical generalization. In 
a case study, analytical generalization should be applied where developed theory is used as 
a template and empirical results from the case study should underpin that theory. In a 
multiple-case study design,  replication may be claimed if two or more cases support the 
same theory (Yin, 2009). 
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Figure 3-4 Making inferences: two levels (Yin, 2009) 
 
 
In the table below we present how we obtain triangulation in research methods in our study 
by combining two laboratory experiments, a situated experiment and a case study with the 
goal of gaining insight into why deaf effect for risk warnings occur (in the domain of 
escalating IS-projects). The laboratory experiments provide methodological strength in 
terms of precision of measurement and deduction by testing a set of theoretically 
determined hypotheses. The situated experiment contributes to context realism and 
considers whether deafness is related WRSHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHDQGwhether it applies to the 
probability part of a risk warning as expected from literature. The qualitative multi-case 
study provides richer insight into the conditions for deafness and feedback loops between 
the bad news messenger and the decision maker. It also provides us with an inductive 
contribution from the interviews, which delivered unexpected findings that could be 
interesting to serve as propositions for further study on the Deaf Effect. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Laboratory 
Experiment 
Chapter 5 
Laboratory 
Experiment 
Chapter 6  
Situated 
Experiment 
Chapter 7 
Case Study 
Precision of 
Measurement 
H H M M 
Context Realism L M H H 
Generalizability H H L M 
Causal Inferences H H M L/M 
Table 3-3 Triangulation of Research Strategies in our study 
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3.4. Research Designs and Validity 
 
Several classifications are relevant at the research design level. Given our choices of 
Research Strategy, we will mainly look at experimental designs and Case Study designs. 
Shadish et al. (2002) described a classification of experimental designs into (3) pre-
experimental, (3) true experimental and (17) quasi-experimental designs. Secondly, they 
described four kinds of validity ± internal, statistical conclusion, construct, and external 
validities. Thirdly, they also provided a list of major classes of threats to each of those 
types of validity: that is, they list classes of plausible rival hypotheses. Yin (2009) 
described classes of Case Study designs and also discussed choices in designs related to 
the types of validities. 
 
Therefore, we will first briefly discuss the types of validity and validity threats, before we 
will describe our main choices in the research design of our experiments and Case Studies. 
For this reason, we change figure 3-1 towards the Predictive Validity model of McGrath 
(1981) which specifically is applied to the Research Question of Chapter 5. Since we aim 
to assess causal relations, our research design requires (1) temporal precedence, (2) 
statistically significant correlations and (3) control over alternative explanations 
(Blumberg, Cooper, & Schindler, 2008), p213. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Predictive Validity model 
 
In this figure we aim to answer a WHY question. Since we cannot measure this causal 
relationship directly, we will have to ensure that we can rely on the relations 1,2 and 3. So 
we have to ensure validity in order to rule out alternative explanations other than the causal 
relationship we aim to test.  
 
Statistical Conclusion Validity is defined as the validity of inferences about the correlation 
(covariation) between treatment and outcome (Shadish et al., 2002) ± referred to in Figure 
3-5 as arrow 3. This type of validity addresses whether or not appropriate statistics were 
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used in the calculations on which the conclusions about the population of interest are based 
(Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004).  
 
Internal Validity is defined as the validity of inferences about whether observed 
covariation between the presumed treatment and the presumed outcome (Relation 3) 
reflects a causal relationship from A to B as those variables were manipulated or measured 
(Shadish et al., 2002). It refers to the establishment of causality in a research model; the 
extent to which one can predict the endogenous variable by knowing the exogenous 
variable (Straub et al., 2004). Therefore, Relation 4 should be ruled out as a rival 
explanation for the observations. Random assignment of respondents to treatment 
conditions can rule out many alternative explanations for the measured results. 
Randomization reduces such alternative factors to random background noise.   
 
External Validity is defined as the validity of inferences about whether a cause-effect 
relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables and measurement 
variables (Shadish et al., 2002). Rival explanations from relationship 5 should be 
mitigated. We will have to consider and measure whether or not results could be limited to 
this setting. 
 
Construct Validity is the validity of inferences about the higher order constructs that 
represent sampling particulars (Shadish et al., 2002). To rule out alternative explanations 
in relationship 1 and 2, measurements should prove reliable, and - in face of other 
constructs - shoud show sufficiently convergent on their own construct and should 
sufficiently discriminate from other constructs. We will have to measure Perceived Control 
using multiple measurements which will have to show results that are consistent.    
 
Content Validity also refers to relationships 1 and 2. It concerns the degree to which items 
in an instrument reflect the content universe to which the instrument will be generalized. 
This validity is generally established through literature reviews and expert judges or panels 
(Straub et al., 2004). We will have to define Perceived Control and give a meaning similar 
to meanings that other researchers have given to it before. 
 
Manipulation Validity is a measure of the extent to which treatments have been perceived 
by the subjects of an experiment (Straub et al., 2004). The treatments of Perceived Control 
should be proper and distinguish between groups with different treatments.   
 
Research Design is mainly focused on replication and grouping of observations,  as well as 
analysing relationships between and within these groups of observations. The design has to 
ensure validities as discussed above, in order to allow conclusions to be drawn on the 
observations. This applies to both experiments and Case Studies. 
 
The laboratory experiments in Chapters 4 and 5 will have a between-group experimental 
design. This  controls validity-threats by applying random assignment of treatment 
conditions to different groups of respondents. Construct validity will be ensured with 
multiple tests (cronbach alpha, exploratory factor analysis) on the appropriateness of the 
measurement model. Manipulation tests will be performed using MANOVA. The 
statistical analysis of proposed relations (main effects, moderated effects and mediated 
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effects) will be performed via Regression Analysis (Ordinary Least Squares) and Partial 
Least Squares (PLS).   
 
The situated experiment in Chapter 6 will have a mixed design. It consists of within-
subject treatments and measurements. It also compares between groups of subjects. The 
strength of this design is that all respondents receive all the treatments. This improves 
control over individual differences between respondents. Construct Validity will be 
ensured by statistical tests of reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. The 
statistical analysis will be performed using a Mixed Design ANOVA.  
 
The Case study in Chapter 7 will have a replication of observations accros Multiple Cases 
and the research design will provide the measures to deal with/expose threats to validity as 
presented in table 3-4. We will use a Case Study protocol and Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) in order to structure our observations. 
  
Test Case study tactic Phase of research in 
which tactics occur 
Construct validity - Use multiple sources of evidence 
- Establish chain of evidence 
- Have key informants review draft case study 
reports 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Composition 
Internal validity - Do pattern matching 
- Do explanation building 
- Address rival explanations 
- Use logic models 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
External validity - Use replication logic in multiple-case studies Research design 
Reliability - Use case study protocol 
- Develop case study database 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Table 3-4  Four criteria for the quality of a Case Study research design (Yin, 2009) 
 
We realized triangulation in our research design in several ways. First, we replicated the 
treatment and measurement model across multiple experiments with different groups and 
settings. We performed several different tests to assess reliability and validity within each 
substudy as well as across substudies. In addition, we used  different designs across the 
substudies (multi-case study, between-subject experiment, mixed design experiment) in 
order to strengthen validities by using multiple methods.  
3.5. Data Collection and Respondents 
 
One of the questions related to our research design referred to respondents that would be 
appropriate and available to serve our study. As shown in table 2-5, many of the 
experiments used undergraduate students. While the appropriateness of student subjects 
has been debated, there is a rich precedence for using students in studies on organizational 
decision tasks (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995), decisions associated with escalating IS-projects 
(Keil et al., 2000b; Park & Keil, 2009; Sabherwal et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2001) and the 
Deaf Effect in IS-projects in particular (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007). The 
question to what extent students could be used within this experiment comes down to how 
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much emphasis is placed on external validity: should the subjects of our experiment 
function as exact surrogates for practitioners?  Some scholars insist on having external 
validity for every study (Lynch, 1982, 1983), while others argue that external validity is 
not a requirement for rigorous testing of theory (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981; Calder, 
Phillips, & Tybout, 1982; Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1983). External validity may be 
sacrificed in order to achieve internal and construct validity. In that case homogenous 
samples, such as student subjects and laboratory experiments, are stronger. For theory 
testing, after internal validity is achieved, external validity is addressed by testing across 
multiple contexts. Cook and Campbell (1979) state that, in practice, external validity is 
often sacrificed for the greater statistical power that comes through having isolated 
settings, standardized procedures and homogenous respondent populations. For 
investigators with theoretical interests their estimate is that the types of validity, in order of 
importance, are probably internal, construct, statistical conclusion, and external validity (p. 
83). 
 
Therefore, the question in this situation is whether or not student surrogates act similar 
enough to actual practitioners in order to provide internal validity. This question is an 
empirical one (Liyanarachchi & Milne, 2005). Looking at the empirical literature,  
Birnberg and Nath (1968) indicate that student subjects are likely to differ from real world 
subjects in terms of skills, experience and personality traits. Ashton and Kramer (1980) in 
a review of the literature to that date found at least moderate support for using student 
surrogates in decision making tasks although not in studies of attitudes (such as toward 
corporate social responsibility). Ashton and Kramer report that psychological studies show 
WKDW VWXGHQWV DQG UHDO ZRUOG GHFLVLRQ PDNHUV VKRZ ³H[WUHPHO\ VLPLODU LQIRUPDWLRQ
SURFHVVLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGELDVHV´S7KH\DUJXHWKDWVWXGHQWVFDQDFWDVVXUURJDWHV
in terms of theoretical studies as opposed to application studies. In this discussion, an 
important recent study that must be considered is one by Chang and  Ho (2004) in which 
they ran an experiment comparing student and manager escalation behavior when project 
completion and market information was manipulated. The results of that experiment 
showed that managers and students had statistically the same likelihood to continue 
projects on 60% of the tests with managers having a higher likelihood on the remaining 
40%. More importantly, the direction of the responses was similar for both the managers 
and students. Both tended to have lower likelihood of completion when the project was 
less complete than when it was more complete. The managers and students had different 
responses and response patterns for the funds allocation issues. These patterns are highly 
LQIOXHQFHGE\DWWLWXGHVGHYHORSHGE\PDQDJHUV¶H[SHULHQFHLQWKHEXVLQHVVZRUOGLQZKLch 
they learn that meeting profitability targets is a key to success. Students, however, without 
that experience, have not been so conditioned and therefore have different attitudes 
towards allocation of funds. Thus we see, that in an escalation situation, students 
responded similarly to practitioners in those escalation decisions where experience was not 
a factor.  
 
For our study we will use students subjects in Chapter 4, since one of the main treatments 
is a Gain/Loss framing of risk information. As we know from Prospect Theory 
experiments, there is no experience requirement to make such treatment effective. In 
Chapter 5 we have Perceived Control as one of the main treatments. Since this treatment is 
likely to be connected to work-experience, we use subjects with relevant working 
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experience in this study. In the situated experiment of Chapter 6 we grouped subjects 
based on their working-experience, while other conditions remained unchanged and thus 
removed background noise from our experiment. In Chapter 7, we used experienced 
internal auditors who had encountered the Deaf Effect on IS-projects. No students 
surrogates would have been appropriate in this case of course. So with respect to data 
collection we triangulated by involving various groups in our substudies.  
3.6. Statistical Analysis 
3.6.1. Statistical Regression Analysis of  Moderating  Effects 
 
In section 3.2. we already introduced Moderator variables at a conceptual level. Since 
these are crucial in our Research Questions, we will further describe what translations and 
statistical tests we will perform on these variables. 
 
Types of Moderation Variables 
 
The classic validation model determines the degree of association between independent  
variables and a dependent variable. In some circumstances the classic model does not 
provide a complete understanding of the phenomenon studied. More specifically Sharma et 
al. (1981) VWDWH WKDW ³in some cases the predictive efficacy of an independent variable 
and/or the form of the relationship may vary systematically as a function of some other 
variable(s)´. For example: many behavioral models contain situational variables which are 
hypothesized to influence classical validation models. This provides an improved insight 
into the phenomenon examined. Sharma et al. (1981) defined a moderator variable as one 
which systematically modifies either the form and/or the strength of the relationship 
between an independent variable (IV), also called Predictor, and a dependent variable 
(DV), also called Critrerion. Moderator variables specify the form and/or magnitude of the 
relationship between the IV and the DV DQG DUH DOVR ODEHOHG µVSHFLILFDWLRQ YDULDEOHV¶. 
Sharma et al. (1981) developed a typology of moderator variables, using two dimensions.  
 
 Related to DV and/or IV Not related to DV and IV 
No interaction with IV 1 
Intervening 
Exogenous 
Antecedent 
Suppressor 
Additional IV 
 
2 
 
Moderator 
(Homologizer) 
Interaction with IV 3 
 
Moderator 
(Quasi Moderator) 
4 
 
Moderator 
(Pure Moderator) 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6 Types of Moderator Variables 
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If the specification variable is related to the DV and/or IV, but does not interact with the 
IV (Quadrant 1), the variable is refered to as an intervening, exogenous, antecendent, 
suppressor or an additional IV, depending on its other characteristics. These are not 
considered to be moderator variables. Variables in the other three quadrants are refered to 
as moderator variables, sccording to Sharma et al. (1981). The moderator variable in 
Quadrant 2 operates by modifying the strength of the relationship whereas those in 
Quadrants 3 and 4 influence the form of the relationship between the IV and DV. The 
homologizer has the typical characteristic of partial variance: subgroups of the 
homologizer variable show different standard errors (measurement errors) and thus 
represent different strengths of the relationship between IV and DV. As an example 
Sharma et al. (1981) refer to time-effects where people become less (or more) accurate in 
performing tasks after a period of time. A Pure Moderator (Quadrant 4) differs from a 
Quasi Moderator (Quadrant 3) since it is related neither to the IV nor to the DV. 
  
Two methods will be used in this thesis for identifying moderator variables: subgroup 
analysis and moderated regression analysis (MRA). According to Sharma et al. (1981) 
these cannot be considered to be interchangeable or equivalent procedures. Rather, in order 
to identify the presence and type of moderator variable, one must use both methods in 
tandem (Sharma et al., 1981).  
 
In the Subgroup analysis  the sample is split into subgroups on the basis of a third variable, 
the hypothesized moderator. If the variable treated as moderator already is in a discrete 
form, such as gender or Gain/Loss frame, subgroups are created for each value of such a 
dichotomous/trichotomous variable. We will follow this approach in chapter 4. Otherwise, 
respondents will be subgrouped for the number of standard deviations to the mean of the 
variable that is treated as a moderator. We will follow this approach in chapter 5. 
 
After the subgrouping of the respondents, regression analysis typically is used to 
investigatH WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH ,9¶V and the DV for each subgroup. In those 
instances in which the regression coefficients differ across subgroups, the variable is 
assumed to be a moderator variable. Without additional analysis however, one cannot 
identify whether the proposed moderator is a quasi moderator (Quadrant 3), in the case that 
the proposed moderator is also an IV itself, or whether it is a pure moderator, according to 
Sharma et al. (1981).    
 
Moderated Regression Analysis is different from subgroup analysis because it is ³an 
analytical approach which maintains the integrity of a sample yet simultaneously provides 
a basis for controlling the effects of a moderator variable´ DFFRUGLQJ WR 6KDUPD HW DO
(1981). In applying MRA to our study, with Gain/Loss framing (GainFrame) as a 
proposed moderator on the single IV Collaborative Messenger (Collab) and Continue as 
our DV, we should examine three regression equations for equality of regression 
coefficients.  
 
(1) Continue = a + b1Collab 
(2) Continue = a + b1Collab + b2 GainFrame 
(3) Continue = a + b1Collab + b2 GainFrame + b3CollabxGainFrame  
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According to Sharma et al. (1981), the following classifications are derived from these 
regression functions: If equations 1 and 2 are not significantly different (i.e., b3 = 0; b2 ് 
0), GainFrame is not a moderator variable but simply another independent variable 
(Quadrant 1) next to Collab. For GainFrame to be a pure moderator variable (Quadrant 4) 
equations 1 and 2 should not be different from each other but should be different from 
equation 3. (i.e., b2 = 0; b3 ് 0). For GainFrame to be classified as a quasi moderator 
(Quadrant 3), equations 1, 2 and 3 should all be different from each other (i.e., b2 ് 0; b3 ് 
0). 
 
As proposed by Sharma et al. (1981) we will use a mixed method framework for 
identifying moderator variables, using both MRA and subgroup analysis, both based on 
regression analysis. We will describe later how we perform a moderation analysis with 
PLS as well.  
 
Moderation and Interaction 
 
Please note that calculations for the regression functions remain unchanged when we 
exchange the moderator and the predictor variable. Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) describe that 
the moderator approach to interaction analysis requires that a theorist specifies a moderator 
variable and a so-FDOOHG IRFDO LQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH 6LWXDWLRQV DULVHZKHQ RQH WKHRULVW¶V
mRGHUDWRU YDULDEOH LV DQRWKHU WKHRULVW¶V IRFDO LQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH DQG YLFH YHUVD )RU
example, a consumer psychologist who studies product quality and product choice might 
be interested in the effect of product quality on product purchase decisions and how this is 
moderated by the pricing of products. In contrast, a marketing researcher using the same 
experimental paradigm as the consumer psychologist might be interested in the effect of 
product pricing on product purchase decisions and how this is moderated by product 
quality. In both cases, the designation of the moderator variable follows from the practical 
and theoretical orientations of the researcher. Neither specification is better than the other, 
and statistally the results of an interaction analysis will be the same in the two 
conceptualizations. The two designations simply represent different perspectives on the 
same phenomena and guide researchers to emphasize different aspects of the data. The 
moderator approach for interaction effects is commonly invoked in substantive research 
domains. Interaction effects scan be difficult to imbue with substantive meaning in an 
applied research setting. There is however nothing preventing the researcher from 
characterizing the data from both perspectives in such scenarios (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003), 
p4. 
 
We will achieve triangulation in statistical analysis of moderating effects in multiple ways. 
We analyze the interaction effects by using Moderated Regression Analysis and Subgroup 
Comparison of regressions (Aiken & West, 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003; Sharma et al., 
1981). In addition to the conventional regression analysis, we tested for interactions with 
moderated Partial Least Squares analysis (Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 1996) as well and 
compared the results. We will explain PLS later in this Chapter.  
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3.6.2. Statistical Regression Analysis of Mediation Effects 
 
In section 3.2. we already introduced Mediator variables at a conceptual level. Since these 
will be used in our empirical chapters, we will further describe what translation and 
statistical tests we will perform on hypothesized mediator variables.  
 
Mediator Variables 
 
The classic validation model determines the degree of association between an Independent 
Variable (IV), also called Predictor, and a Dependent Variable (DV), also called Criterion. 
In some circumstances, the classic model does not provide a complete understanding of the 
phenomenon studied (Sharma et al. 1981). Mediation Analysis can help us understand the 
process by which the IV causes the DV. So it helps us to analyse, for example, the 
influence of the Messenger-Decisionmaker relationship on the Deaf Effect: i.e. is this 
effect mediated by Message Relevance or Perceived Risk?  
 
Mediated Regression Analysis 
 
The classical test for mediation was offered by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, we should 
perform three regressions: 1) The predictor variable to the mediator11, 2) the predictor 
variable to the outcome variable and 3) the predictor and mediator together to the outcome 
variable. Next, we should establish that the conditions for mediation are met: which 
requires that the predictor variable should affect the mediator in the 1st regression, that the 
predictor variable should affect the outcome variable in the 2nd regression and that the 
mediator should affect the outcome variable in the 3rd regression. If these conditions hold 
in the predicted direction, then the effect of the predictor on the outcome must be less in 
the 3rd UHJUHVVLRQWKDQLQWKHVHFRQG6REHO¶VWHVW (Sobel, 1982) is used in order to assess 
the approximate significance of the indirect effect of the predictor variable on the outcome 
variable via the mediator. Below, we test whether or not Perceived Risk (PercRisk) would 
mediate the effect of Perceived Control (PercContr) on Deaf Effect (Continue). 
 
(1) PercRisk   = a1 + b1PercContr + H1 
(2) Continue  = a2 + b2PercContr + H2 
(3) Continue  = a3 + b3PercContr + c3PercRisk + H3 
 
According to the Baron and Kenny (1986) test for mediation, we should first assess that 
there is a significant effect of PercContr on PercRisk (i.e. b1 ് 0). We should also assess 
that the predictor PercContr has a significant effect on Continue (i.e. b2 ് 0).  Then, we 
should assess that the direct effect of the predictor PercContr on Continue is less when we 
take into account the role of the mediator PercRisk (i.e. b3 < b2). So the indirect path via 
                                                          
 
11 Throughout this thesis we consistently use the phrase  ³UHJUHVVLRQRI  X1 and X2 to <´in which Y is considered 
to be  the dependent or outcome variable that is observed and X1 and X2 are considered to be the independent or 
predictor variables who are manipulated. )RUPDOO\FRUUHFWWKLVVKRXOGEHSKUDVHVDV³UHJUHVVLRQRI<RQX1 and 
X2´  
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PercRisk takes away some part of the direct effect of PercContr on Continue, and 
PercRisk is called a mediator.  If  no direct effect would remain (i.e. b3 < b2 and b3 = 0) 
WKHQZHFODLP³IXOO´PHGLDWLRQ,Isome direct effects do remain (i.e. b3 < b2 and b3 ് 0) 
WKHQZHFODLP³SDUWLDO´PHGLDWLRQ$QGLI WKHGLUHFWHIIHFWLVQRWUHGXFHGDWDOOb2 = b3) 
WKHQZHFODLP³QR´PHGLDWLRQRIPercRisk on the causal relation between PercContr and 
Continue.   
  
Comparison of size between the direct effect b2 (effect of PercContr on Continue, not 
accounting for PercRisk as potential mediator) and direct effect b3 (taking into account 
PercRisk) is conducted using the Sobel z-test (Sobel, 1982). This tests the significance of 
the indirect path via mediator PercRisk (b1xc3 ് 0). 
 
We will achieve triangulation in statistical analysis of mediating effects in multiple ways. 
We analyze the mediation effects by using Mediated Regression Analysis and the Sobel z-
test. In addition to these conventional regression analysis, we test for mediation with 
Mediated Partial Least Squares analysis  (Iacobucci, 2008) as well and compare the results 
of both analysis methods. We also compare the mediation analyses beween the two 
laboratory experiments as described in Chapter 4 and 5. Will explain PLS next in this 
Chapter.  
3.6.3. Partial Least Squares Analysis vs Regression Analysis 
 
Regression Analysis is appropriate for testing Moderation Effects (Aiken & West, 1991; 
Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003; Sharma et al., 1981) and Mediation Effects (Baron & Kenny, 
1986; Iacobucci, 2008).  Not only does it provide insight into the strength and significance 
of relationships, but it also allows one to visualize and interpret these effects in various 
conditions and subgroups. Over the last decades, well developed, tested and discussed 
procedures have become available for the use of regression analysis in moderation and 
mediation analysis. For these reasons, we consider the regression analysis to provide a 
good basis for the moderation and mediation analysis in our study. 
 
Regression Analysis also has some inherent assumptions and limitations, as discussed by 
Iacobucci, which could bring Partial Least Squares (PLS) into favour for mediation 
analysis (Iacobucci, 2008) as well as moderation analysis (Chin et al., 1996). Regression 
analysis has assumptions on the underlying data (such as normality) and requires testing 
and taking care of these assumptions in order to ensure statistical conclusion validity. One 
of the main assumptions is that the independent variables are not highly correlated 
(multicollinearity). In order to serve construct validity, we had to measure the same 
construct with multiple measurement items. If the results of these measurements are very 
consistent (high reliability and convergent validity) then Construct Validty is confirmed. 
The problem however is, that we cannot use these measurements in regression analysis, 
since they are too correlated. Therefore, we average all the measures for a variable into one 
single variable which we then use in our regression analysis, and at the same time lose the 
refined underlying measurements of the measurement model. PLS uses these underlying 
measurements.  
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Compared to the regression analysis, PLS has the advantage that it assesses the 
measurement model within the context of the structural model, rather than testing in two 
separate analyses (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). Additionally, PLS is able to identify 
path loadings across the entire model in a single run as opposed to multiple runs, as is 
required when using regression techniques. This results in a more rigorous analysis than 
when using factor analysis and regression alone (Gefen, et al. 2000, p. 24). As regression 
analysis does, PLS also seeks to show rejection of a null hypothesis of independent 
variables having no effect on the dependent variable while accounting for a significant 
amount of the variance in the dependent variable (Gefen, et al. 2000, p.27). PLS 
techniques perform the analysis by iterating between confirmatory factor analysis and path 
analysis until the change in variance explained is not significant. It then uses bootstrapping 
WR HVWLPDWH WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH SDWKV ³1HLWKHU RI WKHVH 3/6 VLJQLILFDQFH HVWLPDWLRQ
PHWKRGV UHTXLUH SDUDPHWULF DVVXPSWLRQV´ (Gefen et al., 2000). Since PLS uses all 
measurements, the sample size can be smaller (Chin et al., 1996), with a standard rule of 
thumb suggesting that it be equal to ten times the largest number of structural paths 
directed at a particular construct in the structural model. For moderation analysis, these 
additional strengths of PLS could make it preferrable to the more traditional moderated 
regression analysis (Chin et al., 1996). For mediation analysis, PLS provides the advantage 
of allowing us to analyse multiple paths simulateously (Iacobucci, 2008). This gives 
insight in the direct and indirect effects of each mediator in the model, taking into account 
all the other paths of the structural model.   
 
In our use of PLS, we performed the PLS calculation to generate the basic PLS values and 
then used bootstrapping to compute the T-statistics for significance. As we could see in 
table 2-5, PLS has previously been applied in exploratory studies on the Mum Effect and 
the Deaf Effect on escalating IS-projects  (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007; Smith 
et al., 2001) and is appropriate for testing theories in the early stages of development. On 
the Deaf Effect there has been, to our knowledge, no precedence in testing interaction 
effects with moderation analysis. In this study we use smartPLS (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 
2005) version 2.0. which includes the product indicator approach for moderating effects, as 
proposed by Chin et al. (1996).  
 
For reasons of triangulation of statistical methods, we use both regression and PLS in our 
study. PLS is more robust and flexible. Regression analysis is more conservative in 
assessing moderating effects (hierarchical regression) and allows for better visual 
interpretation of the results. Cross-validation of the results contributes to validity and 
understanding of the moderating and mediating effects in our study.  
3.7. Framework Empirical Research Design  
 
We started this Chapter with our Research Questions. We proceeded with the Conceptual 
Design in which we presented the causal relations and theories. Then, we discussed 
Empirical Research Strategies that would be appropriate to test these causal relations. We 
proceeded with the characteristics of data collection and respondents. Finally, we 
discussed the statistical methods that we use. Based on these discussions - which included 
triangulation - we now conclude in table 3-5 what the main characteristics will be of the 
research design, which  we will use in our empiral chapters.   
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Conceptual 
Research Design 
Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 
 
Research Question 
 
Explanatory 
 
Explanatory 
 
Explanatory 
 
Explorative 
 
Effects 
 
Main 
Moderation 
Mediation 
 
 
Main 
Moderation 
Mediation 
 
Main 
Moderation 
 
Main 
Moderation 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Continue Continue Perceived Risk Continue 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Collaborative 
Gain/Loss Frame 
Collaborative 
Perceived Control 
Probability 
Impact 
Actor/Observer  
Collaborative 
Conditions 
Mediating 
Variable 
Message Relevance 
Perceived Risk 
Message Relevance 
Perceived Risk 
 
  
Theories Prospect Theory 
Stewardship Theory 
Heuristic Analytic 
Theory 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
Stewardship Theory 
Heuristic Analytic 
Theory 
 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
Stewardship Theory 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
Systems Theory 
Technical 
Research Design 
Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 
 
Research Strategy 
 
 
 
Laboratory 
Experiment 
 
Laboratory 
Experiment 
 
Situated 
Experiment 
 
Case Sudy 
Research Design 
 
Between Group Between Group Mixed Design Multi-Case Study 
Participants 
 
 
199 Students 134 Parttime-
Students 
70 Internal 
auditors 
32 Managers 
12 Internal Auditors 
Data Analysis 
 
 
Regression 
Partial Least 
Squares 
Regression 
Partial Least 
Squared 
Mixed Design 
ANOVA 
Iterative Coding, 
Analytic Memo 
Writing 
Data Validity 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA, Cronbach 
Alpha, AVE, 
Exploratory &  
Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis 
MANOVA, 
Cronbach Alpha, 
AVE, Exploratory 
& Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis 
Cronbach Alpha, 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis 
Case Study 
Protocol 
Case Study 
Database 
Chains of Evidence 
Tool SPSS rel 19 
smartPLS rel 2.0 
SPSS rel 19 
smartPLS rel 2.0 
SPSS rel 19 
 
nVivo rel 9 
Table 3-5 Framework Empirical Research Design 
 
75 
 
CHAPTER 4. DEAF EFFECT IN IS-PROJECTS: AN EXPERIMENT ON 
PROSPECT THEORY  AND STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to the explanation of Why the Deaf Effect 
occurs in the field of escalating IS-projects. We concluded in Chapter 2 that interaction 
EHWZHHQ GHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶ SV\FKRORJLFDO FRQGLWLRQV DQG FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH SULQFLSOHV
could explain the Deaf Effect. In this chapter we will empirically study whether or not two 
factors ± 1. The Gain/Loss Frame of the Risk Warning and 2. The Relationship with the 
messenger ± could explain the Deaf Effect. The expected influence of the Gain/Loss Frame 
is based on Prospect Theory. The expected influence of the relationship with the 
messenger ± Collaborative Partner vs Opponent ± is based on Stewardship Theory 
(elaborated in section 2.5). In table 4.0. we will first provide an outline of the research 
questions and assumptions that we make in this Chapter. 
 
   
   Research Questions Type of 
Question 
   
4 Could the Gain/Loss Frame of the Risk Warning DQGWKH3URMHFW2ZQHU¶V
Stewardship relation with the messenger (Collaborative Partner) be of 
influence on the Deaf Effect for a Risk Warning? 
Why 
 4.1 Could these influences interact? Why 
 4.2 Are these influences mediated by Message Relevance, Risk 
Perception and Estimated Probability to Succeed? 
 
How 
   Scope and Assumptions 
  
x The decision maker of study (unit of analysis) is the executive in the role of IS-Project Owner; 
x The Bad News Messenger acts in the role of internal auditor who meets the professional 
standards of the Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004). These standards address the criterion 
of a Bad News Messenger who is acting as a credible source - i.e. who has the expertise and 
could be relied upon to make true assertions (Cuellar et al., 2006). Furthermore, they assure 
that the internal auditor would operate from an Auditing Function which is independent from 
management authority (Keil & Robey, 2001)12; 
Table 4-1 Contribution of this empirical study 
Cuellar defined tKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI 'HDI (IIHFW DV RFFXUULQJ ³ZKHQ D GHFLVLRQ PDNHU
GRHVQ¶WKHDULJQRUHVRYHUUXOHVDUHSRUWRIEDGQHZVWRFRQWLQXHDIDLOLQJFRXUVHRIDFWLRQ´
(Cuellar, 2009). Based on interviews with internal IS auditors, Keil and Robey (2001) 
described the Deaf Effect as a failure to respond to messages of impeding IS-project 
                                                          
 
12 The IIA professional standards on internal auditing (IIA, 2004) prescribe that the internal auditor is considered 
to meet standards on  a. proficiency (1210)- knowledge and skills, b. due professional care (1220) ± apply skills, 
prudency  and care , c. organizational independence from executive management (1110) , d. individual objectivity 
(1120) ± impartial, unbiased attitude, avoid conflicts of interest, e. both in fact and appearance (1130). 
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failure. The auditors recalled instances in which they had reported bad news about projects 
only to find that their concerns were ignored by executive  management. Several auditors 
underscored the importance of developing relationships with other units in the 
organization. The following incident reported by an IS auditor illustrates this point. "I 
think," he said, "the way we handled it made a difference. We suggested they really look at 
these issues. We have got some major problems, and I think just the way we came about it, 
as a team player instead of a policeman. And that 'We want to help you; we see that this 
project's out of control; we can see that maybe some things you're not getting the truth on 
because you're so close to it; but this is what we see.' Even though we are an independent 
appraisal organization, we are still part of the same corporate team, and our goals are 
their goals basically. We all want the company to do well." (Case #182).In early work on 
internal auditing, Chambers et al. (1988), p.73, reported that ³the auditee's reaction to the 
inspection style of auditing was hostile. The auditee was inclined not to listen to the 
auditor or to benefit from WKHILQGLQJV´ The Deaf Effect appears to be influenced by the 
style of auditing and the corresponding relationship with management. 
 
In Chapter 2 we explained the two different roles of internal auditors, how they are related 
to corporate governance and how they are reflected in the relationship with managers. 
These will be briefly recapitulated. As parW RI RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH
frameworks, internal auditors have a formalized role to provide risk information and to 
blow the whistle when the organization takes risks that might no longer be justifiable and 
consistent with the RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLQWHUHVWV. This corporate governance framework could be 
dominated by principles and assumptions of Agency Theory (incongruent goals and 
information asymmetry) or Stewardship Theory (congruent goals and information 
sharing).This determines whether the internal auditors - as exponent of this corporate 
governance framework - are supposed to a) monitor management risk-taking and expose 
management failures and decisions that are not consistent with organization¶ LQWHUHVWVRU
b) contribute to management performance by challenging and improving decision-making. 
In the first condition (based on Agency Theory principles) the internal auditor will act as 
an Opponent to management. In the second condition (based on Stewardship Theory), the 
internal auditor will act as a Collaborative Partner to management.  
 
We expect that managers (Project Owners) are more likely to listen to the Risk Warnings 
from an auditor who is seen as a Collaborative Partner, regardless of the objectivity and 
credibility of the internal auditor to make true assertions on risks. We expect that managers 
will be less motivated intrinsically to listen to the Risk Warning, when the messenger is 
seen as an Opponent ± such an internal auditor is often labeled as a µSROLFHPDQ¶. These 
expectations are based on the Stewardship principles.   
 
Research on Stewardship Theory suggests that a Collaborative Partnership relation  
interacts with psychological heuristics (Davis et al., 1997) in its effect on decision making 
behavior. The Stewardship Theory itself even found its origin in sociology and psychology 
in relation to its principles to design corporate governance and relations within 
organizations (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). In this Chapter, we examine interaction 
with the Gain/Loss Frame of the Risk Warning according to Prospect Theory, since that is 
a widely accepted psychological heuristic. As we described in section 2.5, the Gain/Loss 
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Framing Effect is sensitive to experimental conditions (Kahneman, 2003) and thus a 
promising candidate for interaction with environmental conditions.  
 
The Framing Effect is relevant to the field of project escalation since it influences the risk 
preference of decision makers with regard to a project. Loss framing could lead to stronger 
risk seeking behavior which can affect the decision to continue or abandon a project 
(Karevold & Teigen, 2010; Sabherwal et al., 2003). One example of this is that placing 
emphasis on the amount of resources already invested in a project can increase the 
commitment to the project and the determination to keep investing in its completion. This 
LV NQRZQ DV WKH µVXQN FRVW¶ HIIHFW (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990). The article 
GHVFULEHV WKDW³The basic sunk cost finding that people will throw good money after bad 
appears to be well described by prospect theory´7KHVHVXQNFRVWVUHSUHVHQWLUUHYRFDEOH
investments that should be irrelevant since the past cannot be changed (Whyte, 1991). 
 
Study Key Findings 
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985) Level of sunk cost can influence people across a wide variety of decision contexts 
(Northcraft & Neale, 
1986) 
People fail to consider opportunity costs and frame decisions as a choice between losses. 
Showing opportunity costs can alter framing of decisions and reduce sunk cost effect. 
(Garland, 1990) There is a linear sunk cost effect based on budget already invested. Higher percentages of 
sunk cost can lead to greater willingness to continue with a course of action. 
(Garland & Newport, 
1991) 
Relative sunk cost is percentage of total budget already spent. Relative rather than absolute 
sunk cost affects people likelihood to commit additional funds to some action. 
(Simonsen & Nye, 1992) Accountability alleviates susceptibility to decision errors and reduce the sunk cost effect 
(Conlon & Garland, 
1993) 
3HRSOH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRDFRQWLQXHDSURMHFWDUHGULYHQE\WKHOHYHORISURMHFWFRPSOHWLRQ
rather than level of sunk cost per se 
(Heath, 1995) People are likely to escalate commitment when they fail to set a budget or when expenses 
are difficult to track 
(Keil et al., 1995a) Sunk cost effect can be reduced if people have an alternative project for which they can 
spend money. Finnish subjects have a smaller tendency to escalate their commitment at 
high levels of sunk cost compared to US subjects 
(Keil, Truex, & Mixon, 
1995b) 
People are more apt to justify their decisions to continue a project based upon level of sunk 
cost rather than level of completion 
(Keil et al., 2000b) Across several cultures (Singapore, Netherlands and Finland) , the level of sunk cost has a 
significant direct effect on willingness to continue a project. 
(Keil et al., 2000a) IS-auditors discriminate escalated and non-escalated projects more strongly on indicators 
of the completion effect and agency theory than on indicators of the sunk cost effect 
(Soman, 2001) Decision making on Lost Time investments does not show Sunk Cost effects unless they 
are expressed in monetary quantities  
(Wang & Keil, 2007) Meta-analysis of 20 sunk cost experiments shows that the Size of Sunk Cost Effect is 
stronger in IT-projects opposed to non-IT projects  
(Fennema & Perkins, 
2008) 
Trained and experienced subjects were less prone to the sunk cost effect than students. 
Most correct decisions were not made by ignoring sunk costs, but by attending to them 
consistently. 
(Karevold & Teigen, 
2010) 
0DQDJHUV¶VWDWHPHQWVDERXWSURMHFWSURJUHVVUHYHDOWKHLULQYHVWPHQWLQWHQWLRQV 
Table 4-2 Main findings from Sunk Cost studies related to escalating IS-projects  
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The table 4-2 is updated from Keil et al. (2000b) and presents the main findings from 
empirical research on the sunk cost effect that are relevant to research in the field of 
Escalating IS-projects: 
 
We will elaborate on our hypotheses in order to further structure our investigation of 
Gain/Loss framing and the messenger-manager relation on the Deaf Effect. We will obtain 
more insight in this relation by analyzing mediating variables that could be derived from 
earlier studies.  
4.2. Hypotheses 
4.2.1. Main Effect of Messenger seen as Collaborative Partner vs Opponent 
 
An internal audit department that is based on the principles of Stewardship Theory would 
build up a reputation of acting collaboratively with managers in the organization in order 
to make them and the organization perform better. The managers would consider these 
DXGLWRUV¶ JRDOV WR EH FRQJUXHQW ZLWK WKHLU RZQ DQG WKRVH RI the organization. The 
information on both sides would easily be shared in order to achieve the business goals. 
There would be no reason to hide information from one another (information asymmetry). 
According to this theory, managers would appear to be more receptive to (even negative 
results from) objective assessments performed by the auditors when they consider them to 
be Collaborative  Partners instead of Opponents or policemen. Following this line of 
reasoning, managers would assign more relevance to the message of an auditor who is 
considered to be a Collaborative Partner then to the message of an auditor who is 
considered to be an Opponent RUµSROLFHPDQ¶. If the auditor would provide the results of an 
assessment showing that a project should not continue, we expect that the manager is more 
likely to discontinue the course of action when the messenger is considered to be a 
Collaborative Partner instead of an Opponent.. 
 
This results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1.   Decision Makers are less likely to continue a 
course of action (respond deaf to a Risk Warning),  
when the Messenger is seen as a Collaborative 
Partner  
4.2.2. Main Effect of Gain vs Loss Framing of the Risk Warning 
 
Several laboratory experiments in the field of Prospect Theory confirmed that decision 
framing (as losses compared to gains) is of influence on decision mDNHUV¶WHQGHQF\WRWDNH
risk-seeking vs risk-averse decisions. Decision mDNHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHIRUULVN-seeking choice 
was tested as an explanation of continuation of failing courses of action, such as escalating 
IS-projects. We suggest that this preference also apply if a Risk Warning was provided and 
thus applies to the Deaf Effect. 
 
This results in the following hypothesis: 
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H2.   Decision Makers are more likely to continue a 
course of action (respond deaf to a Risk 
Warning),when the Message is Framed as Losses  
  
4.2.3. Moderating Effects 
 
As we explained in Chapter 3, moderation effects in applied fields often refer to so-called 
quasi moderators. Two factors show a direct effect on a dependent variable  and appear to 
interact on each others effect on that dependent variable. The theoretical perspective that is 
chosen determines which effect is considered to be moderating the other effect. If we take 
Stewardship Theory as a starting point, we assess whether the effect of the PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership relation on the continuation decision is changed (moderated) by 
the Gain/Loss frame of the message. If we take Prospect Theory as a starting point, we 
would assess whether the effect of the PHVVDJH¶VGain/Loss frame on the continuation 
decision is changed by a Collaborative Partnership with the messenger. Both are 
perspectives on the same interaction and both can be helpful in interpreting the interaction. 
Therefore, we do not exclude either of the positions in our analysis, both in the 
development of our hypotheses as well as in the analysis of the results13.      
 
Research on Stewardship Theory suggests that a partnership relation could interact with 
psychological heuristics (Davis et al., 1997) in its effect on decision making behavior. We 
take the psychological heuristics as confirmed in Prospect Theory as a starting point for the 
development of our hypotheses on interaction. Although Prospect Theory does not 
explicitly point at potential moderators of framing effects, Kahneman (2003) described 
several conditions that could be of influence on the relationship between Gain/Loss 
framing and Risk-SUHIHUHQFHV VXFK DV ³QDUURZ IUDPLQJ´ ³QR H[SHULHQFH´ ³IHZ
LQIRUPDWLRQ´DQG³SHUVRQDOL]DWLRQ´,QRWKHUFRQGLWLRQVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ*DLQ/RVV 
framing and Risk-preferences could be attenuated, or even reversed, as shown in an 
extensive literature review of framing experiments (Levin, 1987; Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, 
& Lauriola, 2002; Levin et al., 1998). Studies that provided results that were inconsistent 
with expectations were more or less presented as deficient experiments compared to the 
original Prospect Theory experiments. Other researchers studied decision makerV¶
perceived Winning/Losing conditions in interaction with Perceived Control or 
Positive/Negative feedback (Brockner et al., 1983; Forlani, 2002; Shapira, 1995) and 
found risk-preferences that were not consistent with Prospect Theory. Fagley et al. (2010) 
proposed an LQWHUDFWLRQRI3URVSHFW7KHRU\¶V*DLQ/RVV framing with other perspectives 
that decision makers could follow and that could guide their observation, attention and 
biases. 
 
Moderation Effects related to the Sunk Cost Effect could also be derived from a meta-
analysis of 20 experiments across IT and non-IT projects by Wang and Keil (2007). They 
found a variability of the sunk cost effect much larger than one would expect from subject-
                                                          
 
13 As we described in chapter 3, the statistical techniques test on interaction- effects and perform identical tests 
for both positions  
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level sampling errors. Part of the variability could be attributed to the context of the 
experimental scenarios. Specifically, they found that the magnitude of the sunk cost effect 
was greater in experiments involving IT-projects than in experiments involving non-IT 
projects. They call for more primary studies that investigate potential moderators of sunk 
cost effects, as well as ones that investigate why IT-projects show more sensitivity to sunk 
cost. Prior studies suggested that the sunk cost effect could be reduced by: (1) avoiding 
negative framing (2) encourage people to focus on alternatives (3) making negative 
feedback unambiguous and (4) increasing decision makers accountability (Garland, 1990; 
Keil et al., 1995b; Northcraft & Neale, 1986)). So, the effect of negative framing may be 
attenuated by such conditions.  
 
Research on Stewardship Theory suggests that a partnership relation could interact with 
psychological heuristics (Davis et al., 1997) in its effect on decision making behavior. 
Sundaramurthy (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) suggests that the effects of stewardship 
relations on decision making could differ in conditions of positive/negative performance 
and could cause reinforcing circles.   
 
We expect that the Gain/Loss frame of the message could change the effect of the 
PHVVHQJHUV¶ Collaborative Partnership on the decision to continue the course of action. We 
expect that when the message is presented as Losses, most attention of the decision maker 
(Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1997) would be drawn towards losing and restricting the amount of 
attention to the relationship with the messenger. This results in hypothesis 3: 
 
 
H3. When the Risk Warning is framed as 
Losses, Decision Makers are less likely to let 
their continuation-decision be influenced by 
the MHVVHQJHU¶VCollaborative Partnership.  
 
  
4.2.4. Mediating Effects 
 
In addtion to the analysis of moderating effects, we strive to contribute to insight into the 
Deaf Effect, by exploring mediating effects as well. In that sense we extend on the 
mediation analysis, as performed by Cuellar et al. (2006), by further testing whether or not 
Message Relevance could also be affecting the constructs and relations in our model. We 
will also study two other candidate mediators, which could help in further understanding 
how factors are of influence on the Deaf Effect.  
Mediating role of Message Relevance  
 
The very few experimental studies on the Deaf Effect (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006; 
Cuellar et al., 2007) follow the Heuristic-Analytic Theory of Evans (Evans, 2006; Evans, 
1996) in order to explain its causes. The dual model of information processing (heuristic 
and analytic) is shared with other researchers on biases and heuristics, such as System 1 
and 2 cognitive processes (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2002), the Heuristic-
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Systematic Model  (Chaiken, 1980) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). These models differ on their assumptions on how the heuristic and 
reasoning processing co-operate and interact. The H-A theory (Evans, 2006; Evans, 1996) 
assumes that the Heuristic processing acts like a filter to select the relevant parts out of all 
the information that people are exposed to. This relevant information is being transferred 
for further rational processing and decision making in the Analytic processing. Other 
theories assume more interaction between the two systems (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & 
West, 2002) in which the systems FRPSOHPHQWHDFKRWKHU&RQVLVWHQWZLWK(YDQV¶V+-A 
theory Cuellar found confirmation that Message Relevance was a mediator on some (but 
not all) of the determinants of the Deaf Effect (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar 
et al., 2007). From a case-study (Cuellar, 2009) KH FRQFOXGHG WKDW GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V
heuristics and biases (such as Illusion of Control) could also be of influence on the 
Relevance that a decision maker might assign to a Risk Warning. Therefore, we propose 
that Message Relevance could be mediating the decision to continue based on the Risk 
Warning as received and the decision maker¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RI ZLQQLQJ RU ORVLQJ :H
propose that decision makers would report more Message Relevance when the Risk 
Warning comes from a Partner instead of an Opponent. In Sunk Cost experiments (Arkes 
& Blumer, 1985; Arkes & Hutzel, 2000; Garland, 1990) decision makers appeared to be 
risk seeking in the domain of losses. Assuming that decision makers might be focused on 
these losses, they might give less attention to other messages, such as the Risk Warning, 
and find them to be less relevant. 
 
We propose the following hypotheses with regard to Message Relevance as mediator in the 
Deaf Effect:  
 
H4a. Decision Makers assign more 
Relevance to a Risk Warning when the 
Messenger is seen as a Collaborative 
Partner 
 
 
 
H4b. Message Relevance mediates the 
influence of the Messenger¶V
Collaborative Partnership on the  
decision to continue a course of action  
 
 
H4c. Decision Makers assign less 
relevance to a Message when it is 
Framed as Losses 
 
 
 
H4d. Message Relevance mediates the 
influence of the Message being framed 
as  Losses on the decision to continue a 
course of action  
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Mediating Role of Perceived Risk 
 
In order to allow for effective contribution of risk-assessment devices on PDQDJHUV¶
decision making, Keil et al. (2000c) studied how information from a risk-assessment was 
of influence on the decision that managers made in experimental conditions. Of course, an 
DQDORJRXVOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJFDQEHIROORZHGZKHQWKH³ULVN-aVVHVVPHQWGHYLFH´ZRXOGEH
an internal auditor who provides an obtrusive Risk Warning based on his/her professional 
risk-assessment. They confirmed that two relationships were holding: a) risk assessment 
GHYLFHV KDYH WKH LQWHQGHG HIIHFW RQ PDQDJHU¶V ULVN Serception and b) changes in risk 
perception translate to changes in decision making. Risk Perception has been defined as a 
³GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V DVVHVVPHQWRI WKH ULVN LQKHUHQW LQ D VLWXDWLRQ´ (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; 
Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Sjöberg, 2000b). Consistent with Keil et al. (2000c) and with 
various studies from Risk Research  (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) we propose that Risk Perception would be a 
reasonable mediatoURQPDQDJHUV¶GHFLVLRQs based on the Risk Warning they received.  
 
:HSURSRVHWKDWDGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VPerceived Risk would be influenced the most when the 
Risk Warning is received from a Collaborative Partner. The underlying assumption from 
Stewardship Theory is that the messenger and the decision maker are both aligned with the 
organization¶V goals and thus with each other. This suggests that Perceived Risk will tend 
to be aligned with the risk as presented by the Collaborative Partner who provided the Risk 
Warning.  
 
With an experiment Sitkin and Weingart (1995) found that Perceived Risk partially 
mediated problem framing as gains versus losses. They hypothesized that positive frames, 
which emphasize situational threats to existing resources, may make the risks inherent in a 
situation more salient (inducing risk-averse behavior), whereas an emphasis on the upside 
potential for increasing limited holdings or recouping losses may decrease the salience of 
risks by increasing the salience of opportunities (inducing risk-seeking behavior). Their 
explanation is consistent with the nonlinearity that lies at the heart of prospect theory and 
its empirical support. 
 
This results in the following hypotheses with regard to Perceived Risk as mediator of the 
Deaf Effect:  
 
H5a. Decision Makers perceive a 
higher level of risk, when the 
messenger of a Risk Warning is seen as 
a Collaborative Partner.   
 
 
 
H5b. Perceived Risk mediates the 
influence of the PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership on the 
decision to continue a course of action 
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H5c. Decision Makers perceive a 
lower level of risk after a Risk 
Warning, when the message  is Framed 
as Losses 
 
 
H5d. Perceived Risk mediates the 
influence of the Message being framed 
as Losses on the decision to continue a 
course of action  
 
Mediating role of Estimated Probability to Succeed 
 
In their study on Sunk Cost effects, several researchers (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Arkes & 
Hutzel, 2000; Garland, 1990) found that decisioQ PDNHUV¶ Estimated Probability to 
Succeed mediates subsequent risk-seeking or risk-averse decision making. From a large 
survey across managers, March and Shapira (March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995) 
found that experienced managers with a history of success would tend to show risk-
seeking behavior while over-estimating their probabilities to succeed, even when objective 
probability information was available. Also, other heuristics (such as Illusion of Control) 
that caused risk-seeking decision making were explained by biased Estimation of 
Probabilities to Succeed  (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000; Snow et al., 2007; 
Thompson et al., 1998). Therefore, we propose that Estimated Probability to Succeed 
would be mediating the decision to continue based on the Risk Warning as received and 
the decision maker¶VSHUception of winning or losing.  
 
The first mediation would apply to the influence of the source of the Risk Warning 
(coming from a Partner or an Opponent) on the decision to continue a project (reject or 
follow the Risk Warning). We propose that the Risk Warning (with a given 1/3 chance to 
succeed) coming from a Partner would influence decision makers to report a lower 
Estimated Probability to Succeed the project than when it comes from an Opponent.  The 
second mediation would apply to the influence of the gain/loss framing on the decision to 
continue. Several authors (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Arkes & Hutzel, 2000; Garland, 1990) 
reported a higher Estimated Probability to Succeed in conditions of higher Sunk Cost, 
while referring to Prospect Theory as an explanation for risk-seeking preferences as a 
consequence. Therefore we propose that decision makers would report a higher Estimated 
Probability to Succeed, when they face their continuation decision from the perspective of 
losing (instead of the perspective of winning).  
 
H6a.Decision makers estimate the 
probability to succeed lower when the 
meesenger of a Risk Warning is seen as 
a Collaborative Partner.  
 
 
 
H6b. 'HFLVLRQ 0DNHU¶V Estimated 
Probability to Succeed mediates the 
influence of the PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership on the 
decision to continue a course of action. 
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H6c. Decision Makers estimate the 
probability to succeed higher after a 
Risk Warning, when the message is 
Framed as Losses  
 
H6d. Estimated Probability to Succeed 
mediates the influence of the Message  
being framed as Losses on the decision 
to continue a course of action  
4.3. Research Method 
 
Since we aim to assess causal relations, we require (1) temporal precedence, (2) 
statistically significant correlations and (3) control over alternative explanations 
(Blumberg et al., 2008), p213. In order to meet these requirements of internal validity 
(eliminate explanations other than our hypotheses), we applied a 2x2 factorial between-
subject experimental design. There are two different treatments (factors) that sort our 
observations (Treatment of Message Framing and the PHVVHQJHUV¶ &ROODERUDWLYH
Partnership). Each treatment has two levels (the message framed as either Gains or Losses; 
the messenger seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent). The four different 
treatment conditions were randomly assigned to participants, double-blind. In this way, 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV -  either unknown or known to be relevant -  could 
still affect their answers, but are transformed into random background noise. If these 
personal characteristics (such as pre-conceptions) would have a strong effect on 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶ DQVZHUV WKLV ZRXOG UHVXOW LQ D YHU\ KLJK OHYHO RI EDFNJURXQG QRLVH 7KH
experimental design should be sufficiently powerful (signal to noise ratio) to assess 
statistically significant correlations between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable (Continue). Respondent characteristics that could be relevant (such as age, 
working experience, gender, risk-propensity, nationality) were measured as control 
variables. We reiterate these principles of between-subject experimental designs, because 
several choices in the four cycles of development and testing of our experiment scenario 
and measurements were made in order to improve the signal to noise ratio (strengthen the 
signal and attenuate noise). This was needed to successfully handle the disturbing 
LQIOXHQFH RI UHVSRQGHQWV¶ H[SHULHQFHV DQG SUH-conceptions - VXFK DV ³DXGLWRUV DUH
collaborative oU QRW´ ³,6-SURMHFWV FRPH ZLWK KLJK FRVWV DQG ORZ JDLQV´ 7KLV ILQDOO\
resulted in the procedures, treatments and measurements as we describe in the next 
sections.  
4.4. Procedures & Respondents 
 
The respondents who participated in this study were involved in under-graduate master 
courses on Accounting and Information Systems at four neighbor universities located 
within a seventy miles radius in the Netherlands and Belgium. Ninety-three percent of the 
students had a European nationality, dominated by Dutch and Belgian citizens. None of the 
participants were involved in pilot-testing of our study. The students participated on a 
voluntary basis at the first 20 minutes of their courses. In a double blind condition they 
received envelopes containing one out of four experimental scenarios at random. From the 
210 returned envelopes we found 11 forms not to be sufficiently usable since the main 
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question (decision) was not answered in an unambiguous way (missing, scratched or 
multiple answers). 
   
Size 
(N) 
Description Age Working 
Experience 
Gender Nationality 
 
199 
 
Masterstudents 
Economics 
(accounting & 
information systems 
courses) 
 
22.7 years 
(S.D. 2.3 
yrs) 
 
1.1 years 
(S.D. 1.8 yrs) 
 
58% Male 
42% Female 
 
26% Netherlands 
38% Belgium 
28% Other Europe 
8% Other 
 
Table 4-3 Descriptives of the respondents 
 
While the appropriateness of student subjects has been debated, there is a rich precedence 
for using students in studies with organizational decision tasks (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995), 
decisions associated with escalating IS-projects (Keil et al., 2000b; Park & Keil, 2009; 
Sabherwal et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2001) and Deaf Effect in IS-projects in particular 
(Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007). The question of whether students could be used 
within this experiment comes down to how much emphasis to place on external validity: 
should the subjects of our experiment function as exact surrogates for practitioners.  
External validity may be sacrificed to achieve internal and construct validity. For these 
types of validity homogenous samples, such as student subjects, and laboratory 
experiments are more important than the degree to which they function as exact surrogates 
for practitioners. For theory testing, after internal validity is achieved, external validity is 
addressed by testing across multiple contexts. Cook and Campbell (1979) state that, in 
practice, external validity is often sacrificed for the greater statistical power that comes 
through having isolated settings, standardized procedures and homogenous respondent 
populations. For investigators with theoretical interests their estimate is that the types of 
validity, in order of importance, are probably internal, construct, statistical conclusion, and 
external validity (p. 83).  
 
Therefore, in this specific situation, the question is whether student surrogates act similarly 
enough to actual practitioners to provide a sufficient level of internal validity to draw 
conclusions on causes and effects. Ashton and Kramer (1980) report that psychological 
VWXGLHV VKRZ WKDW VWXGHQWV DQG UHDO ZRUOG GHFLVLRQ PDNHUV VKRZ ³H[WUHPHO\ VLPLODU
LQIRUPDWLRQ SURFHVVLQJ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG ELDVHV´ S ,Q this discussion, an important 
study that must be considered is that of Chang and Ho (2004) who ran an experiment 
comparing student and manager escalation behavior when project completion and market 
information was manipulated. They concluded that in an escalation situation, students 
responded similarly to practitioners in the escalation decision where working experience 
was not a factor. Since our manipulation of Gain/Loss framing is not relatHGWRVXEMHFWV¶
working experience, we think it is defendable that student subjects can be used as 
surrogates of managers for the study as described in this Chapter14. 
 
                                                          
 
14 Please note that we arrive at a different conclusion on the manipulations of Perceived Control in Chapter 5. 
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The scenario for this experiment was developed and tested during a sequence of four 
pretests across part-time students and undergraduate students. The first three pretests 
covered a 2x2x2 factorial design, which we decided to split into the two 2x2 experiments 
of chapter 4 and 5. The original idea would require too much statistical power to test for 
moderating effects in a 2x2x2 design. The three pretests had provided insight into and 
improvements for the scenario, the manipulations and measurement model. Two separate 
final pretests were done for the 2x2 experiments of chapter 4 and 5. 
 
One of the issues that ZHKDG WRGHDOZLWKZDVUHVSRQGHQWV¶SUH-conceptions on whether 
internal auditors in general act in a collaborative manner to managers or not. During 
pretesting with experienced subjects, we initially found the effect of this preoccupation to 
be so strong that respondents simply failed to recall treatments that were opposite to their 
beliefs. By personalizing the auditor as mr. Smith, throughout the scenario and the 
measurements, we succeeded to decouple the experiment IURP UHVSRQGHQWV¶ SUH-
conceptions of DXGLWRUV¶FROODERUDWLYHQHVVIn order to develop and test our experiment, we 
also asked participants for a textual explanation of their answers. On several occasions, we 
found that experienced respondents had personally been involved in a situation similar to 
the one described in the scenario. Although this supports the realism and relevance of the 
scenario we also found that experienced participants included elements of their own 
experience into the scenario. They filled in the blanks and anchored our scenario to other 
instances from their own practical experience, which of course resulted in a higher level of 
noise in the experiment that could harm the statistical power of our study. Therefore, we 
had to strengthen the treatments we used in our study in order to reduce noise.   
4.5.  Treatments15 
 
Respondents were asked to consider themselves in the position of the Project Owner of a 
strategic IS-project within an insurance-company. For the purpose of this study we 
developed and tested a scenario that was derived from earlier studies in the field of 
escalating IS-projects and which considered the typical elements we had included in our 
study. The scenario was mainly phrased in accordance with the scenario on escalating IS-
projects as described by Wong et al. (2008)7KLVVFHQDULRZDVDGDSWHGIURPWKH³EODQN
UDGDUSODQH´FDVHPRGLILHGE\ Arkes and Blumer (1985), which has been widely used to 
study escalation of commitment (Conlon & Garland, 1993; Garland, 1990) in order to test 
Completion Effect and Sunk Cost Effect, the latter of which is considered to be exemplary 
of Prospect Theory. We followed the version of the scenario provided by  Wong et al. 
(2008) who rephrased the scenario according Tversky and Kahneman (1982) by offering 
two prospects with identical utility, while the risky choice had a 1/3 chance to succeed and 
a 2/3 chance to fail. This so called Risky Choice Framing16 (Levin et al., 1998) was 
implemented as follows: 
                                                          
 
15 We refer to the appendix 4.A. after this chapter for a full description of the scenarios, the questionnaire and the 
detailed considerations.   
16 In the operationalization of framing we preferred the socalled Risk Choice Framing over Attribute Framing and 
Goal Framing (Levin et al, 2002; Levin et al, 1998). We found this operationalization having clear precedence 
and was least confounded other project characteristics with the manipulation.  
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According to standard procedures, Mr. Smith of the Internal Audit department has recently 
reviewed the testing-procedures of your project.  
Mr. Smith reports that he has found serious weaknesses in the design and execution of the 
testing activities on the data exchange with other information systems. 
He estimates there is a 2/3 probability that exchange of data would show reliability problems 
in the first month of operations. As a consequence, he reports that the project should be 
redirected and should not be continued as planned. 
 
The LOSS-scenario received the following treatment: 
 
Taking into consideration the business case of the PENSION-VIEW project, this would mean 
that: 
 
If you decide to CONTINUE this project as planned, there would be: 
1/3 chance that the project will result in no LOSS compared to the business case 
2/3 chance that the project will result in 60 million euro LOSS compared to the business case 
 
On the other hand, if you decide to REDIRECT this project, it will require an unplanned 
investment for additional testing and fixing and will cause delays that carry financial 
consequences. If you decide to REDIRECT, the project will result in a sure LOSS of 40 
million euro compared to the business case. 
 
The GAIN-scenario received the following treatment: 
 
Taking into consideration the business case of the PENSION-VIEW project, this would mean 
that: 
 
If you decide to CONTINUE this project as planned, there would be: 
1/3 chance  that the project will result in a GAIN of 60 million euro 
2/3 chance  that the project will result in a GAIN of nothing 
 
On the other hand, if you decide to REDIRECT this project, it will require an unplanned 
investment for additional testing and fixing and will cause delays that carry financial 
consequences. If you decide to REDIRECT, the project will result in a sure GAIN of 20 
million euro. 
 
The description of the involvement of the auditor in the Information Systems Project and 
WKHDXGLWRU¶VUROHLQWKHSRVLWLRQRIEDGQHZVUHSRUWHr, was adapted from the Deaf Effect 
studies of Cuellar (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007). The treatment of the 
relationship between the Messenger and the Decision maker was phrased as follows for the 
low stewardship relation (low Collaborative Partnership): 
 
Mr. Smith has a long history of working AGAINST IS project teams with the goal of exposing 
project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He is seen as policeman who does not add 
any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. Smith is treated as an OPPONENT WHO IS 
NOT TO BE TRUSTED. 
 
7KLVWUHDWPHQWDGGUHVVHVWKHHOHPHQWVRI³ORQJKLVWRU\´ (Davis et al., 1997), exposure of  
failings (Davis et al., 1997), being seen as a ³SROLFHPDQ´(Chambers et al., 1988; Keil & 
Robey, 2001), acting as an opponent (Davis et al., 1997) and low mutual trust (Davis et al., 
88 
 
1997. The high stewardship relation treatment contained the elements of being seen as a 
³FROODERUDWLYHSDUWQHU´(Davis et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), a high level of 
mutual trust (Davis et al., 1997) and a contribution to management performance. This 
treatment was phrased as follows: 
 
Mr. Smith has a long history of working COLLABORATIVELY with IS project teams with the 
goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, thus enabling project owners to be 
successful. He is seen as adding value to the process. Thus, Mr. Smith is treated as a 
TRUSTED PARTNER. 
4.6. Measurement Model 
 
In order to analyze relations between the constructs at the conceptual level of our model, 
we first translate these constructs into operational variables. These operational variables 
should serve proper measurement and support statistical analysis of relations at operational 
level. In order to transfer statistical results at operational level to conceptual level, the 
internal validity, construct validity and statistical conclusion validity of the model should 
be safeguarded and assessed first (Shadish et al., 2002). We will follow two different paths 
for statistical analysis of the operational model (multiple regression and PLS), both with 
assumptions and tests on validity issues. Both paths require that variables at operational 
level have been defined and measured properly. Thus, we assess validity first before 
building further with our analysis and conclusions. As presented by Straub et al. (2004), 
validity of the instrumentation (manipulation and measurements) should form a basis for 
achieving internal validity (ruling out rival hypotheses) and statistical conclusion validity.    
 
In the table 4-4 we provide an overview of how we translated constructs to variables 
(called items). We refer to the appendix 4.A at the end of this chapter for a detailed 
description of the individual measurement items of the questionnaire we used within our 
experiment.       
 
Content Validity 
 
Content validity of this study refers to the essential question of whether our 
instrumentation (e.g. questionnaire items) pull in a representative manner that could be 
used to measure the content of a given construct (Cronbach, 1971). In table 4-4 we show 
that we adopted most definitions and measurement scales of our constructs from earlier 
studies. Only the measurements of the Collab construct were developed for this study, 
given our specific research scope of internal audit warnings and the relationship between 
auditor and management (Project Owner), according to Stewardship Theory principles. We 
took care of content validity by (1) incorporating the attributes of main articles on 
Stewardship-based relations (Davis et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) in general 
as well as in relation to internal auditing specifically (Kasima, Hanafib, & Rashidc, 2011) 
(2) consulting scholarly and practitioner experts and (3) following a 4-step development 
and testing process with open questions to testing-subjects to explain their answers.   
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Contruct Type Content Measurement Source of items 
 
Continue Endogenous, 
Dependent 
Variable 
Decision to continue or 
redirect the project 
One  8-point semantic 
differential scale item and 1-
item 7 point Likert scale for 
validation purposes  
 
Adapted from Cuellar 
(2006, 2007, 2009) on 
this scenario, altered 
during  pretesting 
MsgRelev Endogenous 
Independent 
Perceived Relevance of the 
%DG1HZ5HSRUWHU¶V
Message 
 
Three 7-point Likert scale 
items 
Adapted from Cuellar 
(2006, 2007, 2009) on 
this scenario 
Collab Exogenous 
Independent 
Bad News Reporter seen as 
trusted collaborative partner 
or as non-trusted 
competitive opponent 
One 7-point Likert scale item 
Two 7-point semantic 
differential scale items 
Developed for this 
context and tested 
during 4 pretest-cycles, 
based upon Schoorman 
and Davis 
 
RiskProp Exogenous 
(control) 
Risk Propensity of Decision 
maker 
Four 7-point Likert scale items  Consistent with Sitkin 
& Weingart (1995) 
 
RiskPerc Endogenous 
Independent 
Perception of Risk by 
Decision maker 
Four 7-point semantic 
differential scales and One 7-
point Likert scale 
 
Consistent with Sitkin 
& Weingart (1995) 
ProbSucc Endogenous 
Independent 
Estimated Probability to 
Succeed 
One percentage scale item Consistent with Arkes 
(2000), Garland (1990) 
 
Gender,  
Nationality 
Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQWV¶JHQGHUDQG
nationality 
 
Translated to dichotomous 
dummy variables (Dutch/non-
Dutch and Belgian/non-
Belgian 
 
Age, Working 
Experience 
Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQWV¶DJHDQG\HDUV 
of working experience 
1-item   
     
BeliefCollab Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQW¶VEHOLHIWKDW
auditors are collaborative  
 
1-item 7-point Likert scale  Used during scenario 
development and testing 
BeliefControl Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQW¶VEHOLHIWKDt IS-
projects are controllable 
 
1-item 7-point scale Used during scenario 
development and testing 
BeliefFavor Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQW¶VEHOLHIWKDW,6-
projects are favorable 
 
1-item 7-point scale Used during scenario 
development and testing 
PercContr Exogenous 5HVSRQGHQWV¶3HUFHLYHG
Control 
1-item percentage scale Allows comparison 
between Ch4 and Ch5, 
item consistent with Du 
Table 4-4 Measurement of Constructs 
 
Manipulation Validity 
 
As part of our between-subject experiment design, we intentionally exposed subjects to 
different treatments in order to control that independent variables (GainFrame and Collab) 
sufficiently vary across treatment-groups. Therefore, we test manipulation validity (Straub 
et al., 2004) in order to assess whether or not the treatments are effective as intended. 
During the development and testing of our manipulations we followed an iterative path of 
measuring and strengthening the manipulations that we used in our scenario (and reducing 
EDFNJURXQG QRLVH IRU H[DPSOH IURP UHVSRQGHQWV¶ preoccupations). In table 4-5a we 
present the mean values of the independent variable Collab for each of the four treatment 
conditions. The Gain/Loss treatment is used as an independent construct in our model. As 
expected from our pretests, we find the independent variable Collab to be different in  the 
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Collab Low and Collab High treatment conditions, without changing as the result of the 
Gain/Loss treatment conditions. This indicates that the treatments are effective in size and 
direction. 
 
 
Treat Loss Treat Gain   
 
Treat Collab 
Low 
 
3.60 (1.26) 
N=49 
 
3.42 (1.16) 
N=50 
 
3.51 (1.21) 
N=99 
Treat Collab 
High 
 
5.45 (0.93) 
N=50 
 
5.64 (0.79) 
N=49 
5.54 (0.88) 
N=99 
 4.53 (1.45)  N=99 
4.52 (1.49)  
N=99 
 
 
 Table 4-5a Mean Values of Collab per treatment condition 
 
Table 4-5b shows the results of an ANOVA in which the treatment conditions are entered 
as Independent variables and the Collab variable is considered to be the  dependent 
variable. The table shows that the Collab treatments are highly significant (at .000) to their 
own variable and that TreatGain is not significant (.963) to the Collab variable. No 
significant interaction effects are found in the treatments (at .219). We consider the R2 of 
.486 to be acceptable as a result of the iterative testing and improving of the treatment-
conditions (and reducing background noise) in the scenario that was performed.   
 
Independent 
Type III Sum of 
Squares F Sig. 
TreatGain 
 
.002 
 
.002 
 
.963 
TreatCollab 204.716 181.830 .000 
TreatGain * TreatCollab 1.710 1.518 .219 
 
Dependent Variable: Collab 
R2 is .486 
 Table 4-5b Manipulation Test ANOVA 
 
Since the treat Gain/Loss manipulation acts like an independent variable in the model, the 
effectiveness of this manipulation was assessed during the sequence of pretests and derived 
from other studies that applied a similar manipulation (Conlon & Garland, 1993; Wong et 
al., 2008). We consider our manipulation tests to have sufficiently covered the testing 
techniques for manipulation validity as proposed by Straub et al. (2004).  
 
Reliability 
 
Before we will test the hypotheses, we first consider reliability and convergent as well as 
discriminant validity of how we measured our constructs. In table 4-6a we present the 
FRQVWUXFWUHOLDELOLW\&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVFRUHVWKDWPHDVXUHWKHLQWHUQDOFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKD
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JLYHQFRQVWUXFW¶VLWHPVZHLJKWLQJWKHPall equally). Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 
(1998) suggest WKDW D &URQEDFK¶V  DOSKD VFRUH VOLJKWO\ ORZHU WKDQ  PLJKW VWLOO EH
acceptable for exploratory research and Nunnally (1967) recommends a threshold value of 
only 0.6 for exploratory research. In the column at the right end of the table we present the 
Cronbach alpha scores we obtained in Chapter 5, using subjects with working experience 
instead of students.  
 
Contruct Items Cronbach alpha Cronbach alpha 
Chapter 5 
Continue 2 0.944 0.913 
MsgRelev 3 0.858 0.876 
PercRisk 4 0.869 0.849 
Collab 3 0.922 0.898 
PercContr 3 n.a. 0.959 
RiskProp 4 0.731 0.840 
 
 Table 4-6a Reliability of Measurements 
 
Only the Risk Propensity measures raised concerns, but these were tested in many other 
studies and we also found more convincing results in chapter 5. We conclude that the 
reliability of our measurements of the constructs meet the thresholds. In the PLS-analysis 
we will extend Cronbach alpha reliability measurements with composite reliability scores 
and AVE scores.    
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
 
Our validation of the instruments we used for data gathering, proceeds with assessing the 
convergent and discriminant validity (Shadish et al., 2002) of how we measured the 
constructs in our study (construct validity). This is done in order to assess whether or not 
our measurement-variables, that are supposed to tap into the same construct, indeed stick 
together and are not sticking too much to measurements that were supposed to tap into 
other constructs. For that purpose, we performed a Principal Components Analysis, which 
is an exploratory factor analysis of clustering measurements into factors. It does not take 
into account any available information on which measurements were intended to tap into 
which constructs. Using Varimax rotation and a fixed number of factors that was equal to 
the number of variables, we found the results as presented in table 4-6b.    
 
The items in table 4-6b FRUUHODWH KLJKHU ZLWK WKHLU RZQ ³FRQVWUXFW´ IDFWRU  WKDQ WKH\
correlate with others (Shadish et al., 2002). As a consequence, we find convergent and 
discriminant validity  confirmed in this table. In the PLS-section we will further extend 
these validity tests with confirmatory tests for convergent and discriminant validity as 
supported by the PLS-modeling.  
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Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6
     
Continue1 -.212 -.146 -.335 .224 .826 .117
Continue2 -.238 -.145 -.334 .167 .813 .158
MsgRelev1 .060 .379 .795 -.078 -.131 -.059
MsgRelev2 .087 .359 .811 -.026 -.200 -.024
MsgRelev3 .167 .208 .786 -.082 -.226 -.025
PercRisk1 .811 .161 .051 -.208 -.075 .022
PercRisk2 .835 .115 .102 -.137 -.097 .064
PercRisk3 .789 .118 .047 .028 -.137 -.289
PercRisk4 .866 .070 .134 .009 -.119 -.031
ProbSucc -.175 -.260 -.079 .183 .331 .718
Collab1 .183 .795 .394 -.034 -.159 -.133
Collab2 .115 .879 .242 -.019 -.031 -.027
Collab3 .198 .854 .311 -.056 -.141 -.057
RiskProp1 -.082 -.180 .002 .646 .208 -.445
RiskProp2 -.076 .045 -.184 .780 -.064 .267
RiskProp3 -.101 -.009 -.063 .774 .075 .145
RiskProp4 -.051 -.051 .071 .682 .374 -.176
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Table 4-6b Construct Validity 
 
Finally, validity testing as described in this section is strengthened in two ways. First, we 
performed similar tests with an equal measurement model in a different experimental 
setting as described in Chapter 5. We also replicated measurements and validity tests 
during the 4 steps of pretesting with approximately 200 test-subjects. Second, we followed 
two distinctive and well-established approaches for further analyzing our data and 
hypothesis testing. For these reasons, we performed both regression analysis and PLS-
analysis to arrive at our conclusions on main-effects, mediating effects and moderating 
effects. 
4.7. Results from Regression Analysis 
 
In order to structure the results we first test the proposed main and moderating effects on 
the decision to continue or discontinue the project (the dependent variable Continue). 
These cover the first three hypotheses. Next, we analyze the proposed mediating role of 
Message Relevance (MsgRelev) which covers hypotheses 4a to 4d. In a similar way, we 
analyze the proposed mediating role of Perceived Risk (PercRisk) which covers 
hypotheses 5a to 5d. And we conclude with a similar analysis of the proposed mediation 
role of Estimated Probability to Succeed (ProbSucc) which covers hypotheses 6a to 6d.   
4.7.1. Regression Analysis on Main and Moderating Effects 
 
In order to test whether moderation effects could be found, we followed procedures 
according to Sharma et al. (1981) and we further used the operational guidance on 
multiple-regression of interaction effects as presented by Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) and 
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Aiken and West (1991). In Table 4-7 you find the results of the moderated regression 
analyses with Continue as dependent variable. The presentation of moderation effects is 
adopted from Tanriverdi (2006). 
 
 
 
Variable(s) Entered 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4c 
 
Controls 
Main 
Effect 
Main 
Effect 
 
Interaction 
Gender 
WorkExp 
RiskProp 
NationalityDutch 
NationalityBelgian 
GainFrame 
Collab 
Collab x GainFrameb 
    .047 
    .039          
    .381*** 
  -.061 
   .012 
 
 
     .059 
    -.009 
     .351*** 
    -.078 
    -.018 
    -.337*** 
     .017 
     .097 
     .280*** 
    -.073 
     .032 
    -.329*** 
    -.395*** 
     .021 
     .081 
     .270*** 
    -.091 
     .003 
    -.332*** 
    -.389*** 
    -.116* 
R2 
F 
ǻR2 
ǻF 
     .164 
   7.409*** 
     .274 
   11.855*** 
     .110 
 28.660*** 
     .417 
 19.092*** 
     .143 
 45.630*** 
     .429 
 17.503*** 
     .013 
   4.138*a 
a. significance  is .022 with T -2.034 for dataset N=199 
b. component variables are standardized for moderation analyses 
c. Durbin-Watson is 2.195 
+p<.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Dependent variable is Continue 
Table 4-7 Moderated Regression Analysis on Continue 
For interpretation of the model, we first take into account the subjects of our study and the 
control variables. We found WorkExp not to be significant, where it was found to be 
significant in earlier studies (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007) and in our study as 
presented in the next chapter (table 5-7). The main explanation for this would likely be the 
low level and low variance in working experience of the subjects that participated in this 
study. Since our respondents consisted of approximately one third of Dutch students, one 
third of Belgian students and one third of students from other countries, it is also relevant 
to notice that NationalityDutch and NationalityBelgium  did not have a significant 
influence on respoQGHQWV¶FRQWLQXDWLRQGHFLVLRQ 
 
Since earlier experimental research on Gain/Loss framing (GainFrame) has been done in 
our field of research, model 2 consists of the control variables of model 1 extended with 
GainFrame. Model 2 confirms a significant negative influence of GainFrame on the 
decision to continue, as was expected from Propect Theory studies and hypothesized here 
as hypothesis 2. From model 3 we conclude that Collab has a significant negative effect on 
Continue, which confirms hypothesis 1. 
  
In hypothesis 3 we proposed that the negative influence of Collab on Continue would be 
weaker in the Loss domain and stronger in the Gain Domain. Therefore, we expect to find 
a significant negative regression coefficient for the interaction variable Collab x 
GainFrame in model 4. We found hypothesis 3 confirmed in table 4-7. According to 
procedures of Sharma et al (1981), that we described in chapter 3, we conclude that 
GainFrame is a quasi-moderator on the relationship between Collab and Continue 
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(dependent variable), since it not only acts as a moderator but has a direct effect on 
Continue as well.  
For interpretation purposes we present the regression plots (without confounding variables) 
in figure 4-1 below. The figure shows that the regression lines in the Loss and in the Gain 
framing conditions are not parallel and GRQ¶WLQWHUVHFWeither within the range of treatment 
and measurement conditions we used in our experiment. Since the order of the two 
regression lines remains unchanged, WKLVW\SHRILQWHUDFWLRQLVFDOOHG³RUGLQDO´(Jaccard & 
Turrisi, 2003), p78. 
   
 
Figure 4-1 Regression plots with Gain/Loss framing as moderator17 
 
The results of the moderation analysis also show that the interaction effect is consistent 
with our expectations. The decision makers who received the Loss Framing treatment are 
more likely to continue the project and thus repond with Deaf Effect after the Risk 
Warning. As expected, the regression line in the Loss Domain is more flat than the 
regression line in the Gain Domain. Respondents who receive a Risk Warning that is 
framed as Losses, are less influenced by the relationship they have with the messenger as a 
Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent. The decision makers who receive the Gain 
Framing treatment are more likely to discontinue the project and are more influenced by 
their relationship with the messenger as Collaborative Partner or Opponent.  
4.7.2. Regression Analysis on Mediating Effects 
 
In order to test whether mediation effects could be found, we followed the procedures 
according to Baron and Kenny (1986). First, we should perform three regressions: 1) The 
                                                          
 
17 For interpretation purposes, we used unstandardized regression coefficients in these plots, according to 
Aiken&West, taking into account the constants and scales of this figure.  
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predictor variable to the mediator18, 2) the predictor variable to the outcome variable and 
3) the predictor and mediator together to the outcome variable.  Next, we should establish 
that conditions for mediation are met: which requires that the predictor variable should 
affect the mediator in the 1st regression, that the predictor variable should affect the 
outcome variable in the second regression and that the mediator should affect the outcome 
variable in the 3rd regression. If these conditions hold in the predicted direction, then the 
effect of the predictor on the outcome must be less in the 3rd regression than in the second. 
6REHO¶V WHVW (Sobel, 1982) is used in order to assess the approximate significance of the 
indirect effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable via the mediator. 
 
We start our mediation analysis with MsgRelev as a proposed mediator between Collab 
and Continue (hypothesis 4b). The first out of three regressions shows the predictor 
(Collab) has a significant regression coefficient (at .000) to the mediator (MsgRelev) with 
b (s.e.) of .564 (.047), beta19 of .654, t of 12.108 and R2 of .428, in the proposed positive 
direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is confirmed, which has 
been labeled earlier as hypothesis 4a. In the table below we describe the 2nd and 3rd 
regressions as required for mediation analysis according to Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Presentation of the results of these Causal steps Mediation results follows Wood et al 
(2008), using hierarchical regression and the Sobel Z20 to test the approximate significance 
of the indirect effect via the mediator. 
  
 Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
Collab  -.071 (.011)*** -.415 -6.383 40.746*** 196 .172 .172  
 
Model 2 
MsgRelev 
Collab 
 -.097 (.016)*** 
 -.016 (.013) 
-.490 
-.095 
-6.221 
-1.202 
43.640*** 195 .137 .309 -5.411*** 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=199, Durbin-Watson is 1.887 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 4-8a Mediated Regression Analysis of Collab to Continue 
                                                          
 
18 Throughout this thesis we consistently use the phrase  ³UHJUHVVLRQRI  X1 and X2 to <´in which Y is considered 
to be  the dependent or outcome variable that is observed and X1 and X2 are considered to be the independent or 
predictor variables who are manipulated. )RUPDOO\FRUUHFWWKLVVKRXOGEHSKUDVHVDV³UHJUHVVLRQRI<RQ;1 and 
X2´  
19 With b (s.e.) we refer to the unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. With beta we refer 
to the standardized regression coefficients that are corrected for the standard deviation.  
20 We used the Sobel Z calculator that is available on www. danielsoper.com. The following algorithm is applied 
by this calculator:  Z = ab / [ (b2 x s.e.a 2) + (a2 x s.e.b2) ] where a is the regression coefficient for the relationship 
between the independent variable and the mediator and b is the regression coefficient for the relationship between 
the mediator and the dependent variable.  
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Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of Collab in model 2 appears to be less than in model 1. Furthermore the Sobel Z statistic 
showed a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 4b was  confirmed21.  
 
Next we focus on hypothesis 4d with MsgRelev as a proposed mediator on the relation 
between GainFrame and Continue. The first out of three regressions shows the predictor 
(GainFrame) has a significant regression coefficient (at .031) to the mediator (MsgRelev) 
with b (s.e.) of .168 (.089), beta of .133, T of 1.818 and R2 of .018, in the proposed positive 
direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is confirmed, which has 
been labeled earlier as hypothesis 4c. In table 4-8b we describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions, 
needed for mediated regression analysis. 
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
GainFrame  -.095 (.016)*** -.379 -5.753 33.092*** 197 .144 .144  
 
Model 2 
MsgRelev 
GainFrame 
 -.098 (.011)*** 
 -.078 (.014)*** 
-.499 
-.313 
-8.843 
-5.552 
62.127*** 196 .244 .388 -1.846* 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=199, Durbin-Watson is 2.066, +p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 4-8b Mediated Regression Analysis of GainFrame to Continue 
Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of GainFrame in model 2 appears to be less than in model 1. Furthermore, the Sobel Z 
statistic showed a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 4d was  
confirmed22.  
 
We proceed with analysis of PercRisk as a proposed mediator. We first focus on PercRisk 
as a proposed mediator between Collab and Continue (hypothesis 5b). The first out of 
three regressions shows the predictor (Collab) has a significant regression coefficient (at 
.000) to the mediator (PercRisk) with b (s.e.) of .289 (.057), beta of .339,  T of 5.039 and 
R2 of .115, in the proposed positive direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition for 
mediation is confirmed, which has been labeled earlier as hypothesis 5a. In table 4-8c we 
describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions, needed for mediated regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
21 Since the regression coefficient of  Collab in table 4-8a model 2 is not significantly different from zero, there is 
no significant direct effect, so we find full mediation. 
22 Since the regression coefficient of GainFrame in table 4-8b model 2 is significantly different from zero, there is 
a significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation.  
97 
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
Collab  -.071 (.011)*** -.415 -6.383 40.746*** 196 .172 .172  
 
Model 2 
PercRisk 
Collab 
 -.061 (.013)*** 
 -.053 (.011)*** 
-.305 
-.312 
-4.637 
-4.742 
33.254*** 195 .082 .254 -3.443*** 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=199, Durbin Watson is 1.765 
 +p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 4-8c Mediated Regression Analysis of Collab to Continue 
Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of Collab in model 2 appears to be less than in model 1. Furthermore the Sobel Z statistic 
showed a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 5b was confirmed23.  
 
We proceed with hypothesis 5d with PercRisk as a proposed mediator on the relation 
between GainFrame and Continue. The first out of three regressions shows the predictor 
(GainFrame) has not a significant regression coefficient (at .158) to the mediator 
(PercRisk) with b (s.e.) of .090 (.089), beta of .072, T of 1.005 and R2 of .005, however in 
the proposed positive direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is 
not confirmed, which has been labeled earlier as hypothesis 5c. In table 4-8d we describe 
the 2nd and 3rd regressions, needed for mediated regression analysis.  
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
GainFrame -.094 (.017)*** -.376 -5.685 32.323*** 196 .142 .142  
 
Model 2 
PercRisk 
GainFrame 
 -.077 (.012)*** 
 -.087 (.015)*** 
-.385 
-.349 
-6.366 
-5.761 
39.685*** 195 .147 .289   -0.998 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=199, Durbin-Watson is 1.939, +p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 4-8d Mediated Regression Analysis of GainFrame to Continue 
Based on this table we conclude that the first condition for mediation was not fulfilled. 
Second, the effect of GainFrame in model 2 was not less than in model 1. Furthermore, the 
Sobel Z statistic did not show a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 5d 
was not confirmed.  
 
We proceed with analysis of ProbSucc as a proposed mediator. We first focus on 
ProbSucc as a proposed mediator on the relation between Collab and Continue (hypothesis 
6b). The first out of three regressions shows the predictor (Collab) has a significant 
                                                          
 
23 Since the regression coefficient of Collab in table 4-8c  model 2 is significantly different from zero, there is a 
significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation. 
98 
 
regression coefficient (at .000) to the mediator (ProbSucc) with b (s.e.) of -.5.291 (1.027), 
beta of -.349, T of -5.145 and R2 of .122, in the proposed negative direction. Thus we 
conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is confirmed, which has been labeled earlier 
as hypothesis 6a. In table 4-8e we describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions as required for 
mediation analysis. 
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F Df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
Collab  -.073 (.011)*** -.423 -6.453 41.638*** 191 .179 .179  
 
Model 2 
ProbSucc 
Collab 
  .004 (.001)*** 
 -.052 (.011)*** 
.340 
-.304 
 5.178 
-4.632 
37.036*** 190 .102 .281 -3.159*** 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=199, Durbin Watson is 1.917 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 4-8e Mediated Regression Analysis of Collab to Continue 
Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of Collab in model 2 is less than in model 1. Furthermore, the Sobel Z statistic showed a 
significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 6b was confirmed24.  
We complete this section on mediated regression analysis with hypothesis 6d proposing 
ProbSucc as a mediator on the relation between GainFrame and Continue. The first out of 
three regressions shows the predictor (GainFrame) has a significant regression coefficient 
(at .001) to the mediator (ProbSucc) with b (s.e.) of -4.881 (1.572), beta of -.219, T of -
3.105 and R2 of .048, in the proposed negative direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st 
condition for mediation is confirmed, which has been labeled earlier as hypothesis 6c. In 
table 4-8f we describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions, needed for mediated regression analysis.  
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F Df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
GainFrame  -.094 (.017)*** -.372 -5.541 30.705*** 191 .138 .138  
 
Model 2 
ProbSucc 
GainFrame 
  .004 (.001)*** 
 -.073 (.016)*** 
.383 
-.288 
6.066 
-4.562 
36.630*** 190 .140 .278 -2.452*** 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=199, Durbin-Watson is 2.001, +p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 4-8f Mediated Regression Analysis of GainFrame to Continue 
                                                          
 
24 Since the regression coefficient of Collab in table 4-8e  model 2 is significantly different from zero, there is a 
significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation. 
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Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of GainFrame in model 2 is less than in model 1. Furthermore the Sobel Z statistic showed 
a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 6d was confirmed25.  
 
4.8. Results from Partial Least Squares Analysis 
 
Next to the more traditional Regression Analysis to assess our hypotheses on main effects, 
mediating effects and moderating effects, we followed an additional path of Partial Least 
Squares in order to obtain method triangulation. Compared to the regression analysis, PLS 
has the advantage that it assesses the measurement model within the context of the 
structural model, rather than testing in two separate analyses (Gefen et al., 2000). 
Additionally, PLS is able to identify path loadings across the entire model in a single run 
as opposed to multiple runs required using regression techniques. This results in a more 
rigorous analysis than using factor analysis and regression alone (Gefen, et al. 2000, p. 24). 
As regression analysis does, PLS seeks to show rejection of a null hypothesis of 
independent variables having no effect on the dependent variable while accounting for a 
significant amount of the variance in the dependent variable (Gefen, et al. 2000, p.27). PLS 
techniques perform the analysis by iterating between confirmatory factor analysis and path 
analysis until the change in variance explained is not significant. It then uses bootstrapping 
WR HVWLPDWH WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH SDWKV ³1HLWKHU RI WKHVH 3/6 VLJQLILFDQFH HVWLPDWLRQ
PHWKRGV UHTXLUH SDUDPHWULF DVVXPSWLRQV´ (Gefen et al., 2000). In our use of PLS, we 
performed the PLS calculation to generate the basic PLS values and then used 
bootstrapping to compute the T-statistics for significance. 
 
PLS has previously been applied in exploratory studies on the Mum Effect and the Deaf 
Effect on escalating IS-projects (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007; Smith et al., 
2001) and is appropriate for testing theories in the early stages of development. On the 
Deaf Effect it has, to our knowledge, no precedence in testing interaction effects with 
moderation analysis. As proposed by Chin et al. (1996), PLS could provide additional 
strengths to the more traditional moderated regression analysis (Chin et al., 1996). In this 
study we used smartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005) version 2.0. which included the product 
indicator approach for moderating effects as proposed by Chin et al. (1996). Our 
measurement model meets their criteria for moderation analysis, since it does not contain 
any formative constructs, which would have required alternative approach to assess and 
test for moderating effects . 
4.8.1. PLS Measurement Model Assessment 
 
In the parallel section on regression analysis we performed Principal Components factor 
analysis in order to assess reliability, convergent and discriminant validity, through SPSS. 
In the context of the PLS-analysis we followed the steps as performed by earlier studies on 
                                                          
 
25 Since the regression coefficient of GainFrame in table 4-8f  model 2 is significantly different from zero, there 
is a significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation. 
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the Mum Effect and the Deaf Effect on escalating IS-projects (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar 
et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2001). Following these predecessors, we assessed the strength of 
the measurement model through tests of convergent and discriminant validity as well. 
Therefore, we conducted the tests as described by Chin (1998) and Fornell and Larcker 
(1981). 
Convergent validity.  
Two different assessments were made for convergent validity: (1) individual item 
reliability, and (2) construct reliability. We assessed the individual item reliability by 
examining the item-to-construct loadings for each construct that was measured with 
multiple indicators. In order for the shared variance between each item and its associated 
construct to exceed the error variance, the standardized loadings should be greater than 
0.70. During early stages of scale development, even loadings of 0.5 and 0.6 may still be 
acceptable for an item if other indicators within the same block of measures have high 
loadings (Chin, 1998). As seen in table 4-9 none of the constructs include any questionable 
indicators. 
Construct 
 
Item 
 
Item-to-Construct Loading 
 
Collaborative Risk Warner Collab1 0.944 
 Collab2 0.893 
 Collab3 0.950 
Continue Continue1 0.977 
 Continue2 0.975 
Warning Framed as Gain or Loss GainFrame 1.000 
Message Relevance MsgRelev1 0.900 
 MsgRelev2 0.912 
 MsgRelev3 0.851 
Perceived Risk PercRisk1 0.849 
 PercRisk2 0.856 
 PercRisk3 0.818 
 PercRisk4 0.870 
Risk Propensity RiskProp1 0.668 
 RiskProp2 0.735 
 RiskProp3 0.790 
 RiskProp4 
 
0.772 
 
Table 4-9 Item to Own Construct Loadings  
 
We also considered the construct reliability for each block of measures, as shown in table 
4-10. Compared to the construct reliability analysis, as presented earlier in table 4.6a, we 
extend on the Cronbach alpha calculations with composite reliability scores and AVE 
scores.   
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 AVE Composite Reliability Cronbachs Alpha 
    
Collab 0.864 0.950 0.922 
Collab * GainFrame 0.862 0.949 0.922 
Continue 0.953 0.976 0.951 
GainFrame 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Gender 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MsgRelev 0.789 0.918 0.866 
PercRisk 0.720 0.911 0.870 
ProbSucc 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RiskProp 0.552 0.831 0.730 
WorkExp 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    
Table 4-10 Construct Reliability  
ComposiWH UHOLDELOLW\ VFRUHV DQG &URQEDFK¶V DOSKD VFRUHV ERWK PHDVXUH WKH LQWHUQDO
FRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKDJLYHQFRQVWUXFW¶VLWHPV8QOLNHWKHPRUHWUDGLWLRQDO&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD
the composite reliability score does not assume that all indicators are equally weighted. 
Therefore &URQEDFK¶Valpha tends to be a lower bound estimate of reliability, whereas the 
composite reliability score is a better approximation under the assumption that the 
parameter estimates are accurate (Chin, 1998), p.320. Hair et al. (1998) suggest that a 
&URQEDFK¶V  DOSKD VFRUH VOLJKWO\ ORZHU WKDQPLJKW VWLOOEHDFFHSWDEle for exploratory 
research. Nunnally (1967) recommends a threshold value of only 0.6 for exploratory 
research. Table 4-10 shows that the construct reliability in our model exceeds these 
thresholds and has been established satisfactorily. Fornell and Larcker (1981) view 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) as a measure of construct reliability. The guideline 
threshold for AVE is 0.5, which means that 50 percent or more variance of the indicators is 
accounted for (Chin, 1998). As table 4-10 indicates, all of the constructs in our 
measurement model exceeded the established criterion for AVE. The AVE value of .55 of 
RiskProp is considered to be no major problem, since this construct has been validated by 
other researchers (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) and it shows an AVE value of .67 in Chapter 5 
table 5-10.  
Discriminant validity.  
In our section on regression analysis, we performed a Principal Components Factor 
Analysis in order to test for discriminant validity. In this PLS-section we conduct two 
RWKHU WHVWV IRU GLVFULPLQDQW YDOLGLW\ )LUVW ZH FDOFXODWHG HDFK LQGLFDWRU¶V ORDGLQJ RQ LWV
own construct as well as its cross-loading on all other constructs. Results are presented in 
table 4-11. 
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Construct Item Collab Continue Gain 
Frame 
Gender Msg 
Relev 
Perc 
Risk 
Prob 
Succ 
Risk 
Prop 
Work 
Exp 
Collab * 
GainFrame 
Collab Collab1 0.94 -0.44 0.02 -0.08 0.67 0.33 -0.36 -0.15 0.16 0.01 
 Collab2 0.89 -0.29 -0.03 -0.04 0.54 0.25 -0.26 -0.10 0.12 0.02 
 Collab3 0.95 -0.41 -0.00 -0.09 0.62 0.35 -0.34 -0.18 0.13 0.06 
Continue Continue1 -0.40 0.97 -0.37 0.11 -0.54 -0.39 0.43 0.41 0.10 -0.15 
 Continue2 -0.42 0.97 -0.35 0.07 -0.52 -0.40 0.43 0.35 0.11 -0.14 
GainFrame GainFrame -0.00 -0.37 1.00 -0.01 0.13 0.06 -0.21 -0.10 -0.13 -0.00 
Gender Gender -0.08 0.10 -0.01 1.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.16 0.22 -0.04 
MsgRelev MsgRelev1 0.61 -0.46 0.08 -0.00 0.90 0.21 -0.30 -0.16 0.02 0.03 
 MsgRelev2 0.62 -0.49 0.13 -0.03 0.91 0.23 -0.30 -0.14 0.00 0.05 
 MsgRelev3 0.52 -0.50 0.14 -0.09 0.85 0.29 -0.28 -0.20 -0.02 0.13 
PercRisk PercRisk1 0.30 -0.34 -0.00 -0.05 0.22 0.84 -0.25 -0.28 -0.01 0.02 
 PercRisk2 0.28 -0.34 0.03 -0.06 0.24 0.85 -0.24 -0.22 -0.06 0.14 
 PercRisk3 0.30 -0.36 0.10 -0.03 0.21 0.81 -0.31 -0.10 -0.04 0.13 
 PercRisk4 0.26 -0.34 0.09 -0.03 0.26 0.87 -0.25 -0.12 -0.01 0.04 
ProbSucc ProbSucceed -0.35 0.44 -0.21 -0.06 -0.33 -0.31 1.00 0.23 0.07 -0.03 
RiskProp RiskProp1 -0.15 0.26 -0.04 0.08 -0.13 -0.15 0.08 0.69 0.04 -0.11 
 RiskProp2 -0.11 0.27 -0.00 0.11 -0.15 -0.15 0.23 0.72 0.21 -0.12 
 RiskProp3 -0.10 0.30 -0.10 0.10 -0.15 -0.19 0.19 0.77 0.26 0.05 
 RiskProp4 -0.10 0.32 -0.13 0.19 -0.12 -0.14 0.15 0.77 0.13 -0.02 
WorkExp WorkExp 0.15 0.11 -0.13 0.22 0.00 -0.04 0.07 0.22 1.00 -0.07 
Collab* 
GainFrame 
Collab1*GainFrame 0.01 -0.14 0.00 -0.09 0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 0.94 
Collab2*GainFrame 0.01 -0.09 -0.00 0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.88 
 Collab3*GainFrame 0.05 -0.16 -0.00 -0.05 0.07 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.96 
Table 4-11 Item to Own Construct Correlation vs Correlations with Other Constructs 
In the last nine columns of this table, the loadings for each indicator on its own construct 
DUHKLJKHUWKDQWKHFURVVORDGLQJVIRURWKHUFRQVWUXFWV¶LQGLFDWRUVGoing across the rows, 
each indicator has a higher loading with its own construct than a cross-loading with any 
other construct. This provides good evidence of discriminant validity (Chin, 1998), p321. 
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As a second test of discriminant validity, we considered whether the AVEs of the latent 
constructs were greater than the square of the correlations among the latent constructs. 
When this is true, more variance is shared between the latent construct and its block of 
indicators than with another construct (Chin, 1998). As can be seen by reading across the 
rows of table 4-12, our measures passed this test thus providing additional evidence of 
discriminant validity. 
Construct 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
(AVE) Collab 
 
Collab* 
GainFrame Continue 
 
 
Gain 
Frame Gender 
Msg 
Relev 
Perc 
Risk 
Prob 
Succ 
Risk 
Prop 
Work 
Exp 
            
Collab 0.86 - 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.02 
Collab * 
GainFrame 
0.86 0.00 - 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Continue 0.95 0.17 0.02 - 0.13 0.01 0.30 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.01 
GainFrame 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 - 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Gender 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 
MsgRelev 0.78 0.43 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.00 - 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.00 
PercRisk 0.72 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.07 - 0.09 0.04 0.00 
ProbSucc 1.00 0.12 0.00 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.09 - 0.05 0.00 
RiskProp 0.55 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 - 0.05 
WorkExp 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 - 
 
Note: Figures in the last 10 columns represent squared correlations among constructs 
 
Table 4-12 AVEs vs Square of Correlations Among Latent Constructs  
 
4.8.2. PLS Structural Model Assessment  
 
With an adequate measurement model in place, we tested our hypotheses by examining the 
structural model. The explanatory power of a structural model can be evaluated by looking 
at the R2 value (variance accounted for) in the final dependent construct. We first focus on 
a structural model which includes the latent constructs that represent the independent 
Collab and GainFrame, the dependent Continue, the moderator CollabxGainFrame and 
the control constructs WorkExp, Gender and RiskProp as we presented in table 4-7 on 
moderated regression. As presented in figure 4-2, in this structural model the R2 for the 
final dependent construct Continue was .424 which is sufficient for further interpretation 
of the model.  
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Figure 4-2 PLS Path Coefficients Moderation  with 199 cases on Continue 
 
After computing path estimates in the structural model, using the entire sample, the 
smartPLS bootstrapping method was used to obtain the corresponding t-values, with 199 
cases. These results are presented in figure 4-3 
 
Figure 4-3 PLS Bootstrapping t-values Moderation  with 199 cases on Continue 
Path Coefficients and t-values for this model are presented in table 4-13 and these show 
that hypotheses 1 through 3 are confirmed by PLS as well (in addition to the confirmation 
found in the moderated regression analysis), while considering the same independent, 
dependent and control variables. 
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Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
t-statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Collab ĺ Continue (a) -0.384 -0.382 0.054 0.054     7.045*** 
Collab * Gain ĺ Continue (c) -0.115 -0.114 0.057 0.057     2.009* 
Gain ĺ Continue (b) -0.338 -0.343 0.051 0.051     6.529*** 
Gender ĺ Continue -0.002 -0.000 0.056 0.056     0.043 
RiskProp ĺ Continue 0.278 0.288 0.059 0.059     4.661*** 
WorkExp ĺ Continue 0.059 0.050 0.059 0.059     0.996 
a) refers to hypothesis 1, b) refers to hypothesis 2 and c) refers to hypothesis 3 
Table 4-13 Path Coefficients Of Structural Model with Moderator  
Next, we extend our structural model with the constructs MsgRelev, PercRisk and 
ProbSucc for analysis of mediation, as we did in tables 4-8a through 4-8f with mediated 
regression analysis according to Baron and Kenny (1986). The difference we can make 
with PLS at this point of the mediation analysis is twofold. The first difference is related to 
our measurement model. We can use the individual measurement items per construct, 
LQVWHDG RI D VLQJOH ³DYHUDJHG´ PHDVXUHPHQW SHU FRQVWUXFW which we had to use in 
regression analysis (Iacobucci, 2008), p20. Our measurement items of  the independent 
variable Collab intentionally have a high level of multi-collinearity which cannot be 
handled in regression analysis. The use of mXOWLSOH³SDUDOOHO´PHDVXUHPHQWVSHUFRQVWUXFW
reduces standard errors and thus increases reliability as well as power. The second 
difference is related to our causal model. Our mediated regression analysis was restricted 
to three focal constructs (per table 4-8a to 4-8f), we repeatedly analyzed one independent 
variable  (Collab), one mediator (MsgRelev) and one dependent variable (Continue). PLS 
allows us to analyze all the various mediation paths simulateously, so that we can assess 
how the direct and the several indirect paths compete in explaining the effect of our 
independent variables (Collab and GainFrame) on our dependent variable (Continue). 
Iacobucci (2008), p33 suggests that such a broader mediation model provides a richer view 
of a phenomenon (the Deaf Effect) and the explanations. He refers to it as a specific form 
of implementing a broader nomological network in a study, which is encouraged by 
methodologists (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).  
 
In figure 4-4 we show the estimated path coefficients based on the PLS-algorithm. In 
figure 4-5 we present the estimated t-values for these paths based on the bootstrapping 
algorithm. 
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Figure 4-4 PLS Path Coefficients Moderation&Mediation  with 199 cases 
 
Figure 4-5 PLS Bootstrapping t-values Moderation&Mediation with 199 cases 
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The explanatory power of this extended structural model is satisfactory with a R2 for the 
final dependent construct Continue of .539. The intermediate variables showed R2 values 
of 0.460 for MsgRelev and .149 for PercRisk and .171 for ProbSucc. These R2 values are 
sufficiently high to make interpretation of path coefficients meaningful. After computing 
path estimates in the structural model, using the entire sample, the smartPLS bootstrapping 
method was used to obtain the corresponding t-values, with 199 cases. These results are 
presented in table 4-14. Support for each hypothesis could be determined by examining the 
sign (positive or negative) and the statistical significance of the t-value for its 
corresponding path.  
 
Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard Error 
(STERR) 
t-statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Collab -> Continue -0.052 -0.054 0.070        0.735 
Collab -> MsgRelev 0.664 0.668 0.041      15.851*** 
Collab -> PercRisk 0.316 0.315 0.061        5.112*** 
Collab -> ProbSucc -0.353 -0.346 0.057        6.179*** 
Collab * GainFrame -> Continue -0.086 -0.092 0.049        1.761* 
GainFrame -> Continue -0.262 -0.256 0.051        5.078*** 
GainFrame -> MsgRelev 0.140 0.138 0.052        2.688*** 
GainFrame -> PercRisk 0.053 0.050 0.074        0.717 
GainFrame -> ProbSucc -0.215 -0.217 0.060        3.593*** 
Gender -> RiskProp 0.122 0.122 0.073        1.673* 
MsgRelev -> Continue -0.329 -0.323 0.068        4.802*** 
PercRisk -> Continue -0.178 -0.179 0.063        2.794*** 
ProbSucc -> Continue 0.147 0.145 0.052        2.803*** 
RiskProp -> Continue 0,217 0,223 0,048        4.455*** 
RiskProp -> PercRisk -0,166 -0,172 0,078        2.117* 
WorkExp -> RiskProp 0,206 0,207 0,069        2.984*** 
Table 4-14  Path Coefficients from Bootstrapping  (Mean, Standard Error, t-Values) 
This table shows that the direct effect of Collab on Continue in this model could not be 
rejected to be zero, having a t of 0.735. This means that on top of the indirect paths as 
described in the model (with mediation of MsgRelev, PercRisk and ProbSucc) no 
significant direct effect remains. The table also shows that the moderator effect (with t of 
1.761) as proposed in hypothesis 1 is still significant, taking into account all the alternative 
paths of our model. However, its relevance dropped a little. Further analysis showed that 
this was mainly caused by introducing MsgRelev into our model. This makes sense given 
our hypothesis that decision makers in a loss domain would be blind to a difference 
between a Partner or an Opponent risk warner, since  their attention would be drawn 
WRZDUGV³ORVLQJ´DQGOHVVWRZDUGVWKHDXGLWRUVZDUQLQJLWVHOIDQG who provided it.  
In table 4-15 we present the results of our mediation analysis in PLS according to the 
guidelines as described by Iacobucci (2008). We group both the direct and indirect 
(mediated) path coefficients of Collab and GainFrame on Continue. The indirect path 
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coefficients are calculated by multiplying the coefficients from independent variable to 
mediator with the coefficient from mediator to dependent variable (Iacobucci, 2008), p25. 
The resulting path coefficients all share the ground that they include all the effects within 
the PLS-model as a whole. Therefore they can be compared in size and proportion. For 
each indirect path we present the calculated  Sobel z statistics26 (which represents the 
effect size of the mediating path compared to the direct path). For the purpose of 
comparison, we present the Sobel z statistics of regression tables 4-8a through 4-8f as well. 
Finally, we present our conclusions on the hypotheses.  
  
 
Effect 
 
Sobel z  
from PLS 
Sobel z 
from 
regression 
 
Path 
coefficients 
 
Proportion 
of Effect  
 
 
Conclusion 
Collab to 
Continue 
Direct   - 0.052 13.8%  
Via MsgRelev   - 4.635*** - 5.411*** - 0.218 57.8% Hypothesis 4b confirmed 
 Via PercRisk - 2.480** - 3.443*** - 0.056 14.9% Hypothesis 5b confirmed 
 Via ProbSucc - 2.571** - 3.159*** - 0.051 13.5% Hypothesis 6b confirmed 
 Total   - 0.377 100%  
       
GainFrame 
to Continue 
Direct    - 0.262 75.3%  
Via MsgRelev   - 2.352**   - 1.846* - 0.046 13.2% Hypothesis 4d confirmed  
 Via PercRisk   - 0.694   - 0.998 - 0.008 2.3% Hypoth 5d not confirmed 
 Via ProbSucc   - 2.219*   - 2.452*** - 0.032 9.2% Hypothesis 6d confirmed 
 Total   - 0.348 100%  
Table 4-15  Overall results of our mediation analysis  
Table 4-15 shows that the Sobel z values from the regression analysis tend to be consistent 
with those from the PLS-analysis, although they show differences in the significance of 
individual mediation paths. These differences could be related to the characteristics of both 
methods. The regression analyses as presented in tables 4-8a to 4-8f do not take into 
account other mediation paths in the model. This could explain the result, which is 
intuitively inconsistent, that MsgRelev is a full mediator for Collab to Continue and that 
PercRisk and ProbSucc are partial mediators as well.     
4.9. Other Relevant Results from the Experiment 
4.9.1. Open Questions 
 
In addition to the hypothesis testing we performed in this chapter, the results of the 
experiment provided us with two additional sources of information that are of help in 
                                                          
 
26 We used the Sobel Z calculator that is available on www. danielsoper.com. The following algorithm is applied 
by this calculator:  Z = ab / [ (b2 x s.e.a 2) + (a2 x s.e.b2) ] where a is the regression coefficient for the relationship 
between the independent variable and the mediator and b is the regression coefficient for the relationship between 
the mediator and the dependent variable. 
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answering the research questions of this chapter. First, we had asked respondents, 
throughout the development and testing stages of our experiment, to describe why they 
decided to continue or redirect. Second, we asked respondents for the percentage of 
estimated probability for the project to succeed (and to meet the business case). Since the 
auditor provided a Risk Warning that included the assessed chance of succeeding (1/3) and 
failing (2/3), we can compare these estimated probabilities across the four treatment 
groups with the information they had received. This could help in understanding whether 
the Deaf Effect could apply to the probability part of the Risk Warning in particular.  
 
The open questions used in the test-stages ± which we eliminated in the final execution of 
the experiment since it appeared to take too much of the respondents¶WLPH ± provided us 
with the following findings from approximately 200 participants who joined the test-
stages: (1) The history with the messenger as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent, 
dominated the arguments to continuer; (2) Some respondents extended quite easily on their 
reasoning from considering the internal auditor as a Collaborative Partner to, as a next 
step, considering the auditor to be a credible source; These are distinct constructs but may 
have a causal or correlational relationship; (3) The framing-manipulation (as Loss or 
Gains) was not visible in the arguments, which supports that manipulation of framing did 
QRW IROORZ D UDWLRQDO SDWK RI UHDVRQLQJ LQ GULYLQJ UHVSRQGHQWV¶ GHFLVLRQ WR FRQWLQXH (4) 
2IWHQUHVSRQGHQWV¶RZQH[SHULHQFHVZLWKVLPLODUSURMHFWVZHUHXVHGLQWKHDUJXPHQWVRI
the continuation decision. Given the experimental design of random assignment of 
subjects, this would not lead to differences between treatment groups. 
4.9.2. Estimated vs Given Probabilities to Succeed 
 
The question posed to estimate the probability to succeed provided us with an additional 
perspective on this mediating variable of the Deaf Effect. In our scenario all subjects were 
provided with the similar Risk Warning coming from the internal auditor, that the 
probability to succeed with the project (and meet the business case) was assessed to be 1/3. 
We asked the subjects to provide a percentage on their estimated probability to succeed. 
 
The estimations across the four treatment groups are presented in Table 4-16 below27.  
 
 Treat Collab 
Low 
Treat Collab 
High 
 
Treat Gain 
 
45.0 % (22.2) 
N=49 
 
33.4 % (18.0) 
N=49 
 
Treat Loss 52.7 % (21.8) 
N=48 
45.2 % (23.2) 
N=49 
 
Table 4-16 6XEMHFWV¶(VWLPDWHG3UREDELOLW\WR6XFFHHGZLWKJiven probability of 1/3  
                                                          
 
27 Please note that for this purpose we used the treatment variables instead of the independent variables that we 
used in our causal model and hypothesis testing.     
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The table shows that subjects who received the message framed as Gains and provided by 
a Collaborative Partner, showed a mean estimation to succeed that was consistent with the 
ZDUQLQJ WKH\KDGUHFHLYHG ,W¶V LQWHUHVWLQJ WKDW the probability information from the Risk 
Warning was attenuated when the messenger was seen as an Opponent and also when the 
message was framed as Losses.  
4.10 Discussion and Implications 
4.10.1.  Contribution of this study 
 
2XU PRGHO H[SODLQHG D VXEVWDQWLDO DPRXQW RI WKH YDULDQFH   LQ WKH VXEMHFWV¶
decision to continue  a course of action and thus respond with the Deaf Effect to the 
internal auditoUV¶Risk Warning.  However, &XHOODU¶V VWXGLHV, that were centered around 
source-credibility, provided even more with 62.8% and 62.5% of explained variance 
(Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006). The main difference is that we excluded this 
influential Credibility factor ± RSHUDWLRQDOL]HGDV³FU\ZROI´- from our model.  The warning 
was provided by a source that meets professional standards of credibility. Before turning to 
D GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH VWXG\¶V OLPLWDWLRQV DQG LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU ERWK IXWXUH UHVHDUFK DQG
practice, it will be helpful to consider the following contributions of this study in light of 
these results. 
 
First, this study introduced and tested the effects of two variables ± (1) PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership and (2) the message framed as Gains or Losses ± on the decision 
to continue a course of action despite the availability of a clear and obtrusive Risk 
Warning. Both constructs had not been tested in the context of the Deaf Effect earlier. 
Both provided a substantive and almost equal contribution in causing the Deaf Effect. 
Nevertheless, they differed in the mediating constructs through which they affected the 
decision to continue and thus reject the Risk Warning. The question of whether the 
messenger is seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent highly influenced the 
Message Relevance (MsgRelev) that people assigned to this warning and it influenced 
VXEMHFWV¶ 3HUFHLYHG 5LVN RiskPerc) and estimated Probability to Succeed (ProbSucc) 
equally. The construct on the relationship with the messenger was derived from 
Stewardship Theory. We contribute to research on Stewardship Theory by testing it at a 
micro inter-personal level between the internal auditor and senior management, where 
most studies consider Stewardship Theory at organizational corporate governance level. 
Our results were consistent with expectations according to Stewardship Theory. The 
message framing as Gains or Losses had an effect on the continuation decision in a way 
that was expected from Prospect Theory. With this study we also find confirmation that 
GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VHVWLPDWHGSUREDELOLW\WRVXFFHHGZDVLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHmessage framing. 
It was surprising that Perceived Risk did not turn out to be a strong mediator. However, 
this might be explained by our framing manipulation at the level of the message and not at 
the project as a whole. The mediating role of Message Relevance is consistent with the 
Heuristic-Analytic Theory, which has major similarities with the System1 and 2 concepts 
of decision making that was referred to in Prospect Theory literature. We contribute to 
both Stewardship Theory and Prospect Theory research by considering them both in a 
study, thus including interaction effects in a specific context. 
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Second, this study provides some amount of quantitative empirical support for the 
theoretical distinction between internal auditors choosing either the path of Collaborative 
Partnership or choosing the path of behaving as an Opponent in bringing their Risk 
Warning to senior management such as Project Owners. This Partnership-Opponent 
distinction was suggested by other authors (Chambers et al., 1988; Keil & Robey, 2001) 
and buttressed primarily with qualitative, anecdotal evidence. In addition, this study 
contributes by providing empirical support that this distinction might be contingent to 
conditions of message framing. Furthermore, it suggests (table 5-14) that probability 
information in a Risk Warning would be transferred the least biased when the sender 
would be seen as a Collaborative Partner and when the message would be framed as Gains.  
 
Third, this study is one of the first attempts in examining the Deaf Effect with mediation 
analysis that provides insight into the proportional effects of direct and indirect paths. 
Together with moderation analysis, this provides a richer view on the causes of the Deaf 
Effect in the context of IS-projects and the role of various constructs. By combining 
different statistical methods of moderation and mediation analysis, we contributed to 
statistical conclusion validity. By combining exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
for convergent and discriminant validity and by performing various tests on measurement 
reliability, we contributed to construct validity for further research on these constructs in 
the context of Deaf Effect. And, by sharing main parts of our design across two different 
experiments, we also contributed to the external validity and nomological validity of 
research on the Deaf Effect based on the constructs and theories that we studied. 
4.10.2.  Main Findings 
 
The following summary provides an overview of the findings of this empirical study on 
main effects and moderation effects: (1) The decision makers are more likely to continue 
the course of action, the IS-project, after a Risk Warning that was framed negatively, as 
Losses. The decision makers are less likely to continue the course of action, when the 
message was framed positively, as Gains; (2) The decision makers are less likely to 
continue the course of action after the Risk Warning, when the messenger is seen as a 
Collaborative Partner. The decision makers are more likely to continue the course of action 
after the Risk Warning, when the messenger is seen as an Opponent; (3) The Risk Warning 
that is framed negatively - as Losses - attenuates the influence of the relationship with the 
messenger (seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent) on the decision to continue 
a course of action; (4) The estimation of the decision makers on the probability to succeed 
appears to be unbiased compared to the probability to succeed estimation provided in the 
Risk Warning when the Risk Warning is framed as Gains and the messenger is seen as a 
Collaborative Partner. 
 
With respect to mediation effects, this empirical study provided the following findings: (1) 
The decision makers assign less relevance to the Risk Warning when the messenger is seen 
as an Opponent. They assign more relevance to the Risk Warning when the messenger is 
seen as a Collaborative Partner; (2) The strongest path of mediation in our model is 
delivered by the heuristic to assign relevance to ± RU µILOWHU¶ ± messages dependent on 
whether the messenger is seen as a Collaborative Partner or an Opponent; (3) The 
influence of negative framing ± as Losses ± of the Risk Warning on decision makers¶ Deaf 
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Effect response, is only partially mediated and is mainly direct; (4) Perceived Risk is not 
significantly influenced by framing the Risk Warning as Losses. Message framing as 
Losses increases the Estimated Probability to Succeed and thus decreases the estimated 
probability to fail as well. So the probability part of Perceived Risk is influenced in our 
settings. 
4.10.3.  Limitations of The Study 
 
As is the case with all experiments,  we should be cautious when generalizing the results of 
this study for several reasons. First, the experiment conducted in this study took a 
necessarily narrow focus so as to achieve a high degree of control over extraneous 
variables. There are, without doubt, other organizational and political factors that may also 
affect managers¶ Deaf Effect responses to Risk Warnings. In Chapter 7 we will explore 
such factors following a multi-casestudy approach. Some factors may not lend themselves 
to experiments. Furthermore, this experiment does not provide insight into any feedback 
loops between messenger and decision maker in which the Deaf Effect might evolve.  
 
Second, in our study we focus on the Deaf Effect at inter-personal level: with the auditor 
as provider of an objective assessment and with the decision takHU¶VYLHZRQWKHPHVVHQJHr 
(as a Collaborative Partner or an Opponent) as a determinant. Of course, this inter-personal  
view is only one level in the corporate governance framework implementation based upon 
either Stewardship Theory principles. We did not study any effects at a department-level or 
at an organizational level.   
 
Third, our measures of the Collab construct in the context of Internal Auditor ± Project 
Owner relationship were self-developed given our particular level (inter personal) and 
context. Although they were derived from literature, tested and improved in the 
preparations of this study and shared with experts, they ask for more refinement and 
testing.    
 
Finally, as is customary to many experiments of this type, we have measured our 
constructs by self-report of student participants. Combined with the obtrusive nature of an 
experiment, WKLV PD\ UHVWULFW H[WHUQDO YDOLGLW\ RI WKH UHVXOWV ,W LV SRVVLEOH WKDW SHRSOH¶V
reaction to the treatment scenarios might differ from an on-the job reaction. It is also 
possible that self-reported measurements on Message Relevance, when asked to rate them 
on 7-point Likert scale, might not show entirely consistent results with measuring Message 
Relevance when subjects were involved in an eye movement tracking experiment. For this 
reason, the latter was proposed by Ball, Lucas, Miles, and Gale (2003) in order to measure 
Message Relevance in Heuristic Analytic theory experiments in psychology. This might 
also count for applied experiments as we performed here. The use of student participants 
could also restrict external validity of our results, although we replicated a significant part 
of the experiment in different experimental conditions with more experienced participants 
as well. The part that was not replicated (message framing as Gains/Losses) has been 
tested and confirmed in an impressive number of experiments on Prospect Theory.  
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4.10.4.  Implications for Internal Auditors 
 
Although not new of course, this study reminds the internal audit profession that the 
effectiveness of their service ± reporting on risks and controls ± includes the concepts of 
human information processing and bounded rationality.    
 
One guidance on effective communication that could be derived from our study is related 
to the Gain/Loss framing. A message that is strongly framed as Losses or deficiencies may 
promote risk seeking behavior according Prospect Theory, as was confirmed in our study. 
A broadly applied form of presentation of audit messages is setting norms (such as the 
business case in our experiment) and to then exclusively report deficiencies where the 
addressee falls short compared to these norms. According to our study, a more balanced 
focus on achievements, opportunities and positive framing of the message could reduce the 
Deaf Effect. Framing the alternative choices  in a positive way (as achievements, assets 
and real options) ± and thus assigning value to the discontinuation of the project ± could 
reduce persistence in the risky course of action. A positive framing of decision choices 
could go further than promoting risk averse choices according to Prospect Theory. It could 
also promote that the messenger would more likely be seen as a Collaborative Partner  who 
is worth listening to. Additionally, the moderator effect we found in this study suggests 
that the advantage of being seen as a Collaborative Partner further reduces the Deaf Effect 
in these conditions. In the conditions of our study we even found that the message framing 
as Gains combined with a Collaborative Partnership relation resulted in unbiased 
processing of probability estimations that were SDUWRIWKHDXGLWRU¶VULVNLQIRUPDWLRQ 
 
A second guidance on effective communication of auditor warnings, applies to how to 
make use of the advantage of Collaborative Partnership in a particular situation. If the 
internal auditor  might not directly be seen as a Collaborative Partner himself/herself, the 
audit executive ± with a strategic collaborative partnership history with the manager ± 
could be more effective in sharing concerns with executive management. Another scenario 
would be to share the factual concerns with a person or with persons who the decision 
maker sees as Collaborative Partner(s) and who are less incapsulated in the course of 
action (the project).  
4.10.5  Implications for managers and organizations 
 
The results of this study point at one of the pitfalls that organizations could face with 
regard to IS-projects. A pitfall would be that the stopping or redirecting of an IS-project 
would only be considered on its negative consequences. As we saw in the previous section 
with audit implications, Loss framing of the options (continue and redirect) would promote 
risk-seeking behavior. Positive framing of the message as Gains appeared to cause less 
biased processing of the risk warning and less influence of bounded rationality on decision 
PDNLQJ7KHLQWHUHVWLQJSDUDGR[DWRUJDQL]DWLRQOHYHOWKDWPD\IROORZLVWKDW³LIVWRSSLQJ
of IS-projects is seen as a reasonable option representing value and opportunities, then the 
overall success-rate of the IS-SURMHFWVPD\ LPSURYH´2UJDQL]DWLRQDO GDPDJH FDXVHG E\
persistence in failing projects could be fueled if stopping of a project is not seen as a 
valuable option but instead as an unrecoverable loss. 
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In this study we saw confirmed that framing as Losses would promote risk seeking 
behavior and persistence in continuation of projects that were no longer viable. There 
might be a consequence of all the negative publicity on failing IS-projects: they bring a 
negative frame through which we observe such projects. Bounded rationality makes us 
even more sensitive for information on another IS-project that failed and could prevent us 
from noticing the positive contributions of many of these IS-projects.  
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4.A. APPENDIX - Scenario and Measurements 
 
Experiment IS (Information System)-Project (version R1 - f0s0)  
Thank You for your willingness to participate in our study. The purpose of this experiment is to 
study business decision making and priority-setting in the field of IS-projects. Please carefully read 
the scenario below and respond to the questions. Please do NOT skip ahead through the pages of this 
experiment. Please do not discuss during the experiment. 
 
SCENARIO  
 
Imagine that you are the Senior Vice President of the Pensions Operations department within a large 
insurance company. You inherited a prestigious IS-project called PENSION-VIEW. As Project 
Owner, you became responsible for the successful implementation of PENSION-VIEW and for 
realizing the benefits for your organization with this in-house developed system.   
With this IS-project you could be the first insurance company in the market that grants all citizens 
(customers and potential customers) access to the complete set of their personal pension information. 
If your insurance company is the first in the market to provide this service at a reliable level, the 
expected revenue to your company would be 60 million euros, as documented in a detailed business 
case for the project.   
Your main competitors have all decided to wait for the supplier of a standard software-package to 
provide a module to the insurance-market that integrates and presents their pension data. If your 
implementation is too late or does not prove reliable during the first month of operations, you will 
miss your competitive advantage and your organization will gain nothing.   
The main challenge and risk of the PENSION-VIEW project are the large number of interfaces to 
retrieve reliable information from other information systems that contain pension data. 
Your PENSION-VIEW project is close to implementation and under time-pressure to continue 
implementation as planned.  
According to standard procedures, Mr. Smith of the Internal Audit department has recently reviewed 
the testing-procedures of your project.  
(TreatCollab = Low) 
Mr. Smith has a long history of working AGAINST IS project teams with the goal of exposing 
project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He is seen as policeman who does not add any 
value to the development process. Thus, Mr. Smith is treated as an OPPONENT WHO IS NOT TO 
BE TRUSTED. 
(TreatCollab = High) 
Mr. Smith has a long history of working COLLABORATIVELY with IS project teams with the 
goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, thus enabling project owners to be successful. 
He is seen as adding value to the process. Thus, Mr. Smith is treated as a TRUSTED PARTNER. 
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Mr. Smith reports that he has found serious weaknesses in the design and execution of the testing 
activities on the data exchange with other information systems. 
He estimates there is a 2/3 probability that exchange of data would show reliability problems in the 
first month of operations. As a consequence, he reports that the project should be redirected and 
should not be continued as planned.  
(TreatGain is Low) 
Taking into consideration the business case of the PENSION-VIEW project, this would mean that: 
If you decide to CONTINUE this project as planned, there would be: 
x 1/3 chance that the project will result in no LOSS compared to the business case 
x 2/3 chance that the project will result in 60 million euro LOSS compared to the business 
case 
 
On the other hand, if you decide to REDIRECT this project, it will require an unplanned investment 
for additional testing and fixing and will cause delays that carry financial consequences. If you 
decide to REDIRECT, the project will result in a sure LOSS of 40 million euro compared to the 
business case. 
(TreatGain is High) 
Taking into consideration the business case of the PENSION-VIEW project, this would mean that: 
If you decide to CONTINUE this project as planned, there would be: 
x 1/3 chance  that the project will result in a GAIN of 60 million euro 
x 2/3 chance  that the project will result in a GAIN of nothing 
 
On the other hand, if you decide to REDIRECT this project, it will require an unplanned investment 
for additional testing and fixing and will cause delays that carry financial consequences. If you 
decide to REDIRECT, the project will result in a sure GAIN of 20 million euro. 
 
 
 
 
Please determine whether you would be willing to continue or redirect, before you go to the next 
page. 
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Please provide your decision to continue or redirect the project 
Using ONLY ONE of the 8 boxes below, indicate whether you would decide to continue the project 
as planned or redirect, and how strong your leaning would be (Please remember to mark only ONE 
of the 8 boxes): (Continue1) 
 
 
 
Redirect 
     
Continue 
as 
Planned 
  
        
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Definitely Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly Definitely 
 
After this, please proceed with the following questions: 
 
I will certainly continue the PENSION-VIEW project as planned (i.e., without redirection): 
(Continue2) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The assessment of Mr. Smith was highly relevant in forming my decision to continue or redirect the 
PENSION-VIEW project: (MsgRelev1) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly Agree 
 
 
The assessment of Mr. Smith was very important in forming my decision to continue or redirect the 
PENSION-VIEW project: (MsgRelev2) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly Agree 
 
 
My decision was most influenced by the assessment of Mr. Smith : (MsgRelev3) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly Agree 
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I characterize the current status of the project as: (PercRisk1p)28 
 
       
1 
Significant 
Threat 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Significant  
Opportunity 
       
 
I characterize the current status of the project as: (PercRisk2p) 
 
       
1 
Potential for 
Loosing 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Potential for  
Winning 
 
 
I characterize the current status of the project as: (PercRisk3p) 
 
       
1 
Very Unlikely 
to Succeed 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Very Likely to 
Succeed 
 
 
I characterize the current status of the project as: (PercRisk4p) 
 
       
1 
Unpromising 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Promising 
       
 
       
,DPHDJHUWROLVWHQWR0U6PLWK³HDJHU´ ³JUHWLJ´LQGXWFK(Listen1) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly Agree 
 
,DPBBBBBBBBBWROLVWHQWR0U6PLWK³UHOXFWDQW´ ³DINHULJ´³HDJHU´ ³JUHWLJ´LQGXWFK
(Listen2) 
 
       
1 
Very Reluctant 
2 
Reluctant 
 
3 
Somewhat 
Reluctant 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Eager 
 
6 
Eager 
 
7 
Very Eager 
 
                                                          
 
28 Consistent with most researchers we presented High Perceved Risk as refering to focus on the downside of risk 
over its opportunities. Therefore we recoded PercRisk1p..4p  to PercRisk1..4 
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Now, please answer the following questions: 
 
I consider Mr. Smith to be a trusted partner to my PENSION-VIEW project: (Collab1) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
I consider Mr. Smith to be a collaborative partner to my PENSION-VIEW project: (Collab2) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
I consider Mr. Smith to be a  __________ to my PENSION-VIEW project: (Collab3) 
 
       
1 
Non-trusted 
Opponent 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Trusted 
Partner 
 
       
       
On a scale from 0-100% I rate: 
The level of Control I have over my project:        (PercContr3)                                     [_____] % 
LQGLFDWHV³QRFRQWURODWDOO´DQGLQGLFDWHV³FRPSOHWHFRQWURO´ ) 
The probability I will realize the 60 million business case of the project:  (ProbSucc1)   [_____] % 
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Would you please fill in the following questions with respect to your background: 
 
Age         [            ]   Years 
Gender          Male   Female 
Nationality       [                                   ] 
Years of Working Experience    [            ]   Years 
Years of Working Experience  with IS-projects     [            ]   Years 
 
Does following description apply to your position?             Auditor     No    Yes 
                                                 Advisor to management  No    Yes 
              Management   No    Yes 
 
How would you characterize large IS-projects in general: (BeliefFavor1) (BeliefControl129) 
 
       
1 
Very  
Unfavorable 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Very 
Favorable 
       
       
1 
Poorly 
Controlled 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Highly 
Controlled 
 
       
Do you agree that internal auditors in general are collaborative to managers: (BeliefCollab1) 
 
       
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
Neutral 
5 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6 
Agree 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
  
                                                          
 
29 The three questions on BeliefFavor1, BeliefControl1 and BeliefCollab1 are intended to measure and control the 
LQIOXHQFHRIWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶SUH-occupations that could disturb the treatments from being effective as intended. 
These questions were crucial in the development and test of the scenario and the treatments to reach a proper 
level of signal to noise. These questions are not meant to test respRQGHQWV¶DFWXDONQRZOHGJHZLWKUHJDUGWR,6-
projects and the role of internal auditors.   
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Finally, please mark your tendency to take risks compared to others 
 
Your tendency to choose risky alternatives based on the assessment of other people on whom you 
must rely: (RiskProp1) 
 
       
1 
Extremely 
LESS Likely 
than Others 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Extremely 
MORE Likely 
than Others 
 
Your tendency to choose risky alternatives relying on an assessment that is high in technical 
complexity: (RiskProp2) 
 
       
1 
Extremely 
LESS likely 
than Others 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Extremely 
MORE likely 
than Others 
 
Your tendency to choose risky alternatives which could have major impact on the strategic 
direction of your organization: (RiskProp3) 
 
       
1 
Extremely 
LESS likely 
than Others 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Extremely 
MORE likely 
than Others 
 
Your tendency to choose risky alternatives despite considerable failures in  risky choices you made 
in the past (RiskProp4) 
 
       
1 
Extremely 
LESS likely 
than Others 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Neutral 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Extremely 
MORE likely 
than Others 
 
 
Were you already involved in the pretesting of this study?    Yes   No   
  
Thank you for your time and effort! 
Please feel free to provide remarks: 
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CHAPTER 5. DEAF EFFECT IN IS-PROJECTS: AN EXPERIMENT ON 
ILLUSION OF CONTROL THEORY AND STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
5.1.  Introduction 
5.1.1. Contribution 
 
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to the explanation of Why the Deaf Effect 
occurs in the field of escalating IS-projects. We concluded in Chapter 2 that interaction 
EHWZHHQ GHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶ SV\FKRORJLFDO FRQGLWLRQV DQG FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH SULQFLSOHV
could explain the Deaf Effect. In this chapter we will empirically study whether or not two 
factors ± 1. Perceived Control and 2. Relationship with the messenger ± could explain the 
Deaf Effect. The expected influence of Perceived Control  is based on Illusion of Control 
Theory. The expected influence of the relationship with the messenger as a Collaborative 
Partner or an Opponent ± is based on Stewardship Theory (elaborated in section 2.5).  In 
table 5.1 we will first list the research questions and assumptions that we make in this 
Chapter. 
 
   Research Questions Type of 
Question 
   
5 &RXOGWKH3URMHFW2ZQHU¶VPerceived Control and the Stewardship relation 
with the messenger (collaborative partner) be of influence on the Deaf 
Effect for a Risk Warning?  
Why 
 5.1 Could these influences interact? Why 
 5.2 Are these influences mediated by Message Relevance, Risk 
Perception and Estimated Probability to Succeed? 
 
How 
   Scope and Assumptions 
  
x The decision maker of study (unit of analysis) is the executive in the role of IS-Project Owner; 
x The Bad News Messenger acts in the role of internal auditor who meets the professional 
standards of the Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004). These standards address the criterion 
of a Bad News Messenger who is acting as a credible source - i.e. who has the expertise and 
could be relied upon to make true assertions (Cuellar et al., 2006). Furthermore, they assure that 
the internal auditor would operate from an Auditing Function which is independent from 
management authority (Keil & Robey, 2001)30; 
   
Table 5-1 Contribution of this empirical study 
 
In the previous Chapter we discussed Stewardship Theory and the two roles of internal 
auditors, as Collaborative Partners or as Opponents to management. In early work on 
                                                          
 
30 The IIA professional standards on internal auditing (Gleim, 2001) prescribe that the internal auditor is 
considered to meet standards on  a. proficiency (1210)- knowledge and skills, b. due professional care (1220) ± 
apply skills, prudency  and care , c. organizational independence from executive management (1110) , d. 
individual objectivity (1120) ± impartial, unbiased attitude, avoid conflicts of interest, e. both in fact and 
appearance (1130). 
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internal auditing, Chambers and Selim (1988), p.73, reported that ³the auditee's reaction 
to the inspection style of auditing was hostile. The auditee was inclined not to listen to the 
auditor or to benefit from the findiQJV´ The Deaf Effect appears to be influenced by the 
style of auditing and the corresponding relationship with management. 
 
We expect that managers (Project Owners) are more likely to listen to the Risk Warnings 
coming from an auditor who is seen as a Collaborative Partner, regardless of the 
objectivity and credibility of the internal auditor to make true assertions on risks. We 
expect that managers will be less motivated intrinsically to listen to the Risk Warning, 
when the messenger is seen as an Opponent ± such an internal auditor is often labeled as a 
µSROLFHPDQ¶7KHVHH[SHFWDWLRQVDUHEDVHGRQWKH6WHZDUGVKLSSULQFLSOHV 
 
Research on Stewardship Theory suggests that a collaborative partnership relation  
interacts with psychological heuristics (Davis et al., 1997) in its effect on decision making 
behavior. In this Chapter we elaborate interaction with Perceived Control.  
5.1.2. Perceived Control and Illusion of Control Theory 
 
In Chapter 2 we defined Perceived Control as ´SHRSOH¶V RZQ MXGJPHQW RI WKH H[WHQW WR
ZKLFKWKH\FDQFRQWURODQRXWFRPHLQDVSHFLILFVLWXDWLRQ´ (Thompson et al., 1998).  ³This 
judgment is based upon their judgment of how much they intend the outcome and the 
GHJUHH RI FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKHLU DFWLRQ DQG WKH RXWFRPH´ Or phrased more simple 
(Thompson & Schlehofer, 2005) ³3HUFHLYHG&RQWURO LV WKHSHUFHSWLRQ WKDWRQHFDQ WDNH
DFWLRQ WRJHW GHVLUHGRXWFRPHV´ In Chapter 2 we also described the difference between 
Perceived Control and related constructs such as Self-efficacy and Locus of Control.  
 
Since Perceived Control is related to specific conditions, it could also explain irrational 
behavior in these conditions. In a sequence of socalled Illusion of Control experiments 
irrational decision making in chance conditions ± simple games ± was explained by 
Perceived Control being unrealistically high. Although this Illusion of Control Theory 
originally applied to pure chance conditions (without any actual control), it has been used 
in many other conditions as well in order to explain risk-taking behavior in car-driving 
(Horswill & McKenna, 1999), health (Harris, 1996) and IS-projects. In a study on 
escalating IS-SURMHFWV ,OOXVLRQ RI &RQWURO LV GHVFULEHG DV ³DQ H[SHFWDQF\ RI SHUVRQDO
success probability inappropriately higher than the objectivH SUREDELOLW\ ZRXOGZDUUDQW´
(Keil et al., 2007a). This phenomenon causes people to believe that statistical probabilities 
for (certain) risks do not apply to them. This belief can be caused by the development of a 
(too) high degree of confidence in their personal skills as a result of a previous history of 
success in a similar situation. If a predicted risk did not occur in past projects, people are 
OLNHO\ WR EH PRUH FRQILGHQW WKDW LW ZRQ¶W RFFXU LQ WKH QH[W SURMHFW HLWKHU Furthermore, 
pHRSOHZLOO RIWHQ DWWULEXWH D IDYRXUDEOH RXWFRPH WR WKHLU VNLOOV LQPDQDJLQJ D VLWXDWLRQ´
(Keil et al., 2007a). This also means that if the person has been successful as a manager 
that he/she develops confidence or even overconfidence in his/her skills to avoid failure in 
general. 
 
Other studies on Perceived Control in the field of Escalating IS-projects showed that low 
perceived control causes people to act in a more risk averse matter and are quick to 
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abandon a project (Du et al., 2007), This study by Du et al. (2007) also suggested that a 
sense of control could increase the expectation that risks could be avoided. Whyte and 
Saks (2007)  reported that self-efficacy may influence the perceived control that project 
managers have over their project. If project managers continue to believe that the project is 
under their control, they may be more likely to continue failing projects (Whyte & Saks, 
2007). Jani (2008) reported that, while executing a failing project, project managers who 
begin the project with high self-efficacy about successful completion of the project will 
tend to perceive greater degree of control over the failing project. Individuals with a high 
level of perceived control, tend to have much confidence in their ability to make the 
project a success. They usually attempt to overcome problems by investing additional time, 
effort and money into the project, instead of abandoning it (Whyte & Saks, 2007; Whyte et 
al., 1997; Wood et al., 1990). They tend to take negative feedback less seriously since they 
are convinced that the project will be successful in the end. This can cause them to ignore 
or react too slowly on potential warning signs for failure, opening the door for project 
escalation (Wood et al., 1990). 
 
Based upon these studies, we expect that a higher level of perceived control is correlated 
with lower level of estimated probability of failure. This suggests a tendency to take more 
risks and response with Deaf Effect to the probability information in a risk warning.  
 
Since we are particularly interested in the interaction of Perceived Control with 
characteristics of a situation, we consider empirical evidence from experiments in the field 
of Illusion of Control Theory that showed context-sensitivity of Perceived Control.  Many 
of the experiments on Illusion of Control Theory, depart from psychology and refer to 
chance conditions. The following examples give an impression on the type experiments 
that were performed in that domain (Thompson et al., 1998). In the first example, people 
can choose a lottery-ticket themselves (freedom of choice) or get assigned  one 
automatically. The first group was less willing to change their ticket to another ticket than 
the second group. In the second example, people who were allowed to shuffle playing-
cards or throw a dice oneself, estimated chances on success significantly higher than 
respondents who could only observe. As a third example, documents with a layout that 
showed some familiar characteristics (heading, logo, wordings) were found more reliable 
than blank or unfamiliar layout characteristics. Next, spending time on warming-up was of 
influence on estimated probabilities of success (even in pure chance conditions). As a final  
example, when someone is asked to predict the outcome of a roulette-throw, he estimates 
probabilities for this outcome much higher than without this prediction. These examples 
are based upon a literature overview by Thompon et al. (1998). The table 5-2a describes 
situational conditions that could be of influence on Perceived Control, mainly based upon  
7KRPSVRQ¶VRYHUYLHZFRPSOHPHQWHGZLWKRWKHUVWXGLHV.  
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Constructs Concepts Type of Relation Source 
 Locus of Control Causal, Positive (Thompson et al., 1998) 
 Self Efficacy Causal, Positive (Thompson et al., 1998) 
 Perceived Post-decisional 
Control 
Correlational (Shapira, 1995) 
Actual Control Actual control Causal, Positive (Thompson et al., 1998) 
 Management Control Systems Correlational, Positive (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) 
 Reliable Information Correlational, Positive (Helliar, Lonie, Power, & 
Sinclair, 2002; Shapira, 1995) 
 Exogenous/Endogenous Risks Causal, Endogenous: High, 
Exogenous: Low 
(Jani, 2008) 
 Task ± Complexity Causal, negative  
Familiarity Information with familiar 
headings, symbols, names 
Causal, Positive (Langer, 1975) 
 Practicing Causal, Positive (Langer, 1975) 
 Familiar Design Causal, Positive (Bouts&Van Avermaer, 1992) 
 Warm-up Period Causal, Positive (Ayeroff& Abelson, 1978) 
 Domain Familiarity Correlational, Positive (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) 
Involvement Freedom of Choice Causal, Positive (Langer, 1975) 
 Performer vs observer 
(responsibility) 
Causal, Performer: High 
Observer: Low, 
(Langer, 1975) 
 Time Causal, Positive (Thompson et al., 1998) 
Competition Confident (Insecure) Opponent Causal, Low (High) Perceived 
Control 
(Dykstra & Dollinger 1990) 
Foreknowledge Knowledge choice-outcome Causal, Positive (Wortman, 1975) 
 Prediction/Post-diction Causal, Prediction: High, Post-
diction: Low 
(Strickiand, Lewicke & Katz, 
1966) 
Need for the 
Outcome 
Need for outcome Causal, Positive (Biner et al, 1995) 
Intrusion of 
Reality 
Asking for objective 
probabilities induces a rational 
analysis which eliminates 
illusory of control 
Causal, Moderating (Langer, 1975) 
Table 5-2a  Factors that influence Perceived Control 
 
Factors such as freedom of choice, prediction, need for the outcome, familiarity, 
competition and responsibility are manipulated in experimental conditions as listed. In the 
field of stop/continue decisions in escalating IS-projects, these conditions could be induced 
by decision makerV¶ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO HQYLURQPHQW VXFK DV freedom of choice, 
responsibility, clear goals and plans, incentives, scarce resources, use of standards or 
reliability of information. Some of these factors are confirmed directly from literature on 
Escalating IS-projects. They are also confirmed in surveys that correlated managerial risk 
taking with Management Control Systems (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), reliable information 
(Helliar et al., 2002; Shapira, 1995) and time to decide (Helliar et al., 2002). Compared to 
the overview in table 5-2a, Perceived Control is still relatively unexplored in the field of 
Escalating IS-projects. 
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5.1.3.  Moderator Effects found in Illusion of Control Theory experiments 
 
In the table 5-2b we provide a list of factors that appeared to moderate effects. This table is 
also based the literature review on Illusion of Control experiments by Thompson et al. 
(1998).   
 
Constructs Concepts Type of Moderation Source 
 
Emphasis on 
Success or 
Failure 
Pattern of success (at the 
beginning, the end or 
random) 
Subjects with feedback on consistent success at 
the beginning, over-remembered successes, 
considered themselves to be skillfull and 
estimated highest probabilities of success  
 
(Langer&Roth,1975) 
 Frequency of 
reinforcement of success  
If the desired outcome happens frequently 
(regardless their actions), subjects consider 
probability of success higher 
 
(Tennen&Sharp, 
1973) 
 Emphasis on failure Emphasis on failure, reduces or eliminated 
Illusion of Control an may lead to overestimation 
of probability of failure (Learned Helplessness) 
 
(Matute, 1994) 
 Victims/non-victims  With similar level of actual control, former 
victims estimated probability of an accident 
higher than subjects who had not been victim of 
an accident before 
 
(Paker, Brewer and 
Spencer 1980) 
 Valence of outcome (gain 
positive or avoid 
negative)  
Subjects who saw green-light as winning, 
estimated Probability of Success much higher 
than subjects who lost when the light did not 
come on  
 
(Alloy and 
Abramson, 1979) 
 Focus on costs of 
potential outcomes   
Focus on negative attributes of the outcome, 
dampens illusion of control, results in lower 
probability estimates of success. 
 
(Dunn and Wilson 
1990); 
Mood Positive/Negative mood Positive moods (temporary or stable) lead to 
overestimation of probabilities of success. 
Negative moods (temporary or stable) lead to 
overestimation of probabilities of failure.  
 
(Alloy, Abramson 
and Viscusi, 1981) 
Wishful 
Thinking 
Imagine 
desired/undesired  
outcome 
Imagination of a desired outcome causes higher 
probability estimations of success. Imagination 
of an undesired outcome causes higher 
probability estimations of failure  
(Hogarth, 1987),  
(Babad & Katz, 
1991) 
Table 5-2b  Factors that interact with Perceived Control 
 
From this analysis of Perceived Control and interaction effects of Perceived Control, we 
now proceed with development of our hypotheses to explain the Deaf Effect from both 
Stewardship Theory and Illusion of Control Theory.  
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5.2. Hypotheses 
 
5.2.1. Main Effect of Messenger seen as Collaborative Partner vs Opponent 
 
An internal audit department that is based on the principles of Stewardship Theory would 
build up a reputation of acting collaboratively with managers in the organization in order 
to make them and the organization perform better. The managers would consider these 
DXGLWRUV¶ JRDOV WR EH FRQJUXHQW ZLWK WKHLU RZQ DQG WKRVH RI WKH Rrganization. The 
information on both sides would easily be shared in order to achieve the business goals. 
There would be no reason to hide information from one another (information asymmetry). 
According to this theory, managers would appear to be more receptive to (even negative 
results from) objective assessments performed by the auditors when they consider them to 
be Collaborative  Partners instead of Opponents or policemen. Following this line of 
reasoning, managers would assign more relevance to the message of an auditor who is 
considered to be a collaborative Partner then to the message of an auditor who is 
considered to be an Opponent RUµSROLFHPDQ¶. If the auditor would provide the results of an 
assessment showing that a project should not continue, we expect that the manager is more 
likely to discontinue the course of action when the messenger is considered to be a 
Collaborative Partner instead of an Opponent. 
  
This results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1.   Decision Makers are less likely to continue a 
course of action (respond deaf to a Risk Warning),  
when the Messenger is seen as a Collaborative 
Partner  
5.2.2. MDLQ(IIHFWRI'HFLVLRQ0DNHUV¶Perceived Control 
 
Several laboratory experiments in the field of Illusion of Control Theory confirmed that 
high Perceived Control is of influence on decision-mDNHUV¶ WHQGHQF\ WR overestimate 
probabilities of success compared to objectively assessed probabilities31. According to 
March and Shapira this promoted risk seeking behavior. In the context of escalating IS-
projects, Du et al. (2007) found that high perceived control promoted the tendency to 
continue a risky project.  
 
This results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2.   Decision Makers with high perceived control 
are more  likely to continue a course of action 
(respond Deaf to  a Risk Warning)  
  
                                                          
 
31 We refer to table 2-5 in chapter 2 where we describe experiments including the factors that are related to  
perceived control. 
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5.2.3. Moderating Effects 
 
As we explained in Chapter 3, moderation effects in applied fields often refer to so-called 
quasi moderators. Two factors show a direct effect on a dependent variable  and appear to 
interact on each others effect on that dependent variable. The theoretical perspective that is 
chosen determines which effect is considered to be moderating the other effect. If we take 
Stewardship Theory as a starting point, we assess whether the effect of the PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership relation on the continuation decision is changed (moderated) by 
WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V3HUFHLYHG&ontrol. If we take Illusion of Control Theory as a starting 
point we would assess whether the effect of WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V3HUFHLYHG&RQWURORQthe 
continuation decision is changed by a Collaborative Partnership with the messenger. Both 
are perspectives on the same interaction and both could be helpful in interpreting the 
interaction. Therefore we do not exclude either one of the positions in our analysis, both in 
the development of our hypotheses as well as in the analysis of the results32. 
      
Research on Stewardship Theory suggests that a partnership relation could interact with 
psychological heuristics (Davis et al., 1997) in its effect on decision making behavior. We 
take the psychological heuristics as confirmed in Illusion of Control Theory as a starting 
point for the development of our hypotheses on interaction. In this Chapter we provided an 
overview of Illusion of Control experiments and also listed conditions that appeared to 
moderate the results of these experiments. Some of the moderating influences that were 
found in these experiments could apply to the proposed interaction between a decision 
PDNHU¶V3HUFHLYHG&RQWURODQGWKHrelationship with the messenger.    
 
*LYHQ WKH QHJDWLYH QDWXUH RI WKH DXGLWRU¶V IHHGEDFN LW LV UHOHYDQW WKDW an emphasis on 
failure could reduce or eliminate illusion of control and might even turn overestimation of 
probability to success into an overestimation of probability to fail, as was found by Matute 
(1994) in an experiment. Other experiments confirmed that positive or negative framing of 
feedback information could interact with Perceived Control on risk taking behavior 
(Brockner et al., 1983; Forlani, 2002; Shapira, 1995). This interaction could apply on the 
effectiveness of auditors to reduce illusion of control. But it does not explain differences in 
the Deaf Effect between auditors who are seen as Collaborative Partner vs Opponent to 
management.  
In an experiment, Langer and Roth (1975)  had found that an intrusion of reality could 
eliminate illusion of control. Reminding people to objective probabilities could induce a 
rational analysis with reduction or elimination of illusion of control as a consequence. So 
the obtrusive message of the auditor could attenuate or mitigate the influence of Perceived 
Control on the Deaf Effect.This does not explain differences in Deaf Effect between 
auditors who are seen as Collaborative Partner vs Opponent to management.  
 
                                                          
 
32 As we described in chapter 3, the statistical techniques test on interaction- effects and perform identical tests for 
either choice of predictor vs moderator  
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The expected interaction appears to show if Perceived Control is studied in the context of 
competition with Opponents. Subjects tend to be motivated to challenge Opponents, if they 
consider to participate in a game that they associate with high perceived control  (well-
trained, skilled, high involved ± all factors from Illusion of Control experiments). This 
mechanism is known as  competitive arousal (Ku et al., 2005) and could promote risk 
taking behavior. We expect that  a decision maker with a high perceived control would 
show competitive arousal if the Risk Warning comes from an Opponent. He/she might feel 
triggered to compete with the messenger and show a stronger tendency to continue a 
course of action. This competitive arousal might not play a role when the messenger is 
seen as Collaborative Partner.  
 
In the low perceived control conditions the decision maker would assume that the effect of 
his/her decision on the results are mainly based on chance, or even worse, when having a 
negative outcome history in mind. In these condition it is likely that the decision maker 
will follow the Risk Warning of the messenger. Any Risk Warning based upon an 
assessment of a credible messenger ± either Partner or Opponent ± would likely be 
considered helpful and followed. In a situation of low perceived control, the attention of 
the decision maker (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1997), could be focused on helplessness which 
might make him/her less sensitive for the relationship with the messenger. This results in 
the following hypothesis: 
 
 
H3. Decision Makers with low Perceived 
Control are less likely to let their 
continuation-decision be influenced by 
seeing a risk messenger as a Collaborative 
Partner or as an Opponent.  
 
 
5.2.4. Mediating Effects 
 
In addition to the analysis of moderating effects, we strive to contribute to insight into the 
Deaf Effect, by exploring mediating effects as well. In that sense we extend on the 
mediation analysis as performed by Cuellar et al. (2006) by further testing whether or not 
Message Relevance could also be affecting the constructs and relations in our model. We 
will also study two other candidate mediators, which could help in further understanding 
how factors are of influence on the Deaf Effect.  
 
 
Mediating role of Message Relevance  
 
The very few experimental studies on the Deaf Effect (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006; 
Cuellar et al., 2007) follow the Heuristic-Analytic Theory of Evans (Evans, 2006; Evans, 
1996) in order to explain its causes. The dual model of information processing (heuristic 
and analytic) is shared with other researchers on biases and heuristics, such as System 1 
and 2 cognitive processes (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2002), the Heuristic-
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Systematic Model  (Chaiken, 1980) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). These models differ on their assumptions on how the heuristic and 
reasoning processing co-operate and interact. The H-A theory (Evans, 2006; Evans, 1996) 
assumes that the Heuristic processing acts like a filter to select the relevant parts out of all 
the information that people are exposed to. This relevant information is being transferred 
for further rational processing and decision making in the Analytic processing. Other 
theories assume more interaction between the two systems (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & 
West, 2002) in which the systems FRPSOHPHQWHDFKRWKHU&RQVLVWHQWZLWK(YDQV¶V+-A 
theory Cuellar found confirmation that Message Relevance was a mediator on some (but 
not all) of the determinants of the Deaf Effect (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar 
et al., 2007). From a case-study (Cuellar, 2009) KH FRQFOXGHG WKDW GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V
heuristics and biases (such as Illusion of Control) could also be of influence on the 
Relevance a decision maker might assign to a Risk Warning.  
 
As we described earlier related to hypothesis 1 we expect that the decision makers would 
report more Message Relevance when the Risk Warning comes from a Collaborative 
Partner instead of an Opponent. We also expect that Message Relevance mediates the 
HIIHFWRIWKHPHVVHQJHU¶V&Rllaborative Partnership on the decision to continue a course of 
action.  
 
The proposed position of Message Relevance as mediator between Perceived Control and 
Continue could follow two lines of reasoning. Both lines of reasoning propose that high 
Perceived Control would cause the Deaf Effect. And both lines also assume that the Deaf 
Effect for a warning would be explained by low relevance assigned to the message. It 
would not be reasonable to assume that the Deaf Effect would be caused by assigning high 
relevance to the message. The two lines of reasoning now focus on different expectations 
of the causal relationship between Perceived Control and Message Relevance. One could 
consider that there is a negative relationship: low perceived control makes the message 
more relevant. And Illusion of Control would cause the message to be considered less 
relevant. So in that line of reasoning the influence of Perceived Control on Continue 
would (partially) be explained by its influence on Message Relevance and for the rest 
(partially) explained by a direct effect of Perceived Control on Continue. But we also 
suggest a second ± more plausible - line of reasoning on Message Relevance. People with 
high Perceived Control consider that they are in the position to take action to achieve 
desired results. People with low Perceived CRQWUROGRQ¶WVHHD UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WKHLU
action and the results. They may consider the outcome depending on chance and may 
consider themselves to be helpless. This line of reasoning suggests that people with high 
SHUFHLYHGFRQWUROZLOODVVLJQPRUHUHOHYDQFHWRWKHDXGLWRU¶VPHVVDJHEHFDXVHWKH\WKLQN
they are in the position to take action, to follow the warning or reject it. The people in the 
low perceived condition may just blindly follow the aXGLWRU¶VZDUQLQJ ± regardless they 
see the auditor as Partner or Opponent ± not because they assign much relevance to the 
message. Why would they assign relevance to a message if they consider that their actions 
GRQ¶W influence the results, so why would it make sense to be informed to decide. In the 
second line of reasoning Message Relevance acts like a suppressor variable (Iacobucci, 
2008),p40 in the relationship between Perceived Control and the decision to continue a 
course of action. Without this suppressor the effect of Perceived Control on Continue 
would have been stronger than it is with the suppressor. Message Relevance acts like a 
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pain-UHOLHIPHGLFLQH WR FRSHZLWK WKH HIIHFWV RI ³LQMXU\´RQ ³SDLQ´The more injury the 
more medicine you take. The more medicine the less pain. The relationship still holds that 
more injury causes more pain, but there is an intervention to suppress the effect of injury 
on pain. A more relevant message will suppress the influence of Perceived Control on the 
decision to continue a course of action.   
  
Following the second line of reasoning, we propose the following hypotheses with regard 
to Message Relevance as mediator in the Deaf Effect: 
  
H4a. Decision Makers assign more 
Relevance to a Risk Warning when the 
Messenger is seen as a Collaborative 
Partner 
 
 
 
H4b. Message Relevance mediates the 
influence of the Messenger¶V
Collaborative Partnership on the  
decision to continue a course of action  
 
 
 
H4c. Decision Makers assign more 
relevance to a message when they 
assume a strong relationship between 
their actions and the results (high 
perceived control) 
 
 
 
H4d. Message Relevance suppresses 
the influence of Perceived Control on 
the tendency to continue (reject a Risk 
Warning)  
 
 
  
  
Mediating Role of Perceived Risk 
 
In order to allow for effective contribution of risk-assessment devices on PDQDJHUV¶
decision making, Keil et al. (2000c) studied how information from a risk-assessment was 
of influence on the decision that managers made in experimental conditions. Of course an 
DQDORJRXVOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJFDQEHIROORZHGZKHQWKH³ULVN-DVVHVVPHQWGHYLFH´ZRXOGEH
an internal auditor who provides an obtrusive Risk Warning based on his/her professional 
risk-assessment. They confirmed that two relationships were holding: a) risk assessment 
GHYLFHV KDYH WKH LQWHQGHG HIIHFW RQ PDQDJHU¶V ULVN SHUFHSWLRQ DQG E FKDQJHV LQ ULVN
perception translate to changes in decision making. Risk Perception has been defined as a 
³GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI WKHULVN LQKHUHQW LQDVLWXDWLRQ´  (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; 
Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Sjöberg, 2000b). Consistent with Keil et al. (2000c) and with 
various studies from Risk Research  (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; 
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Slovic et al., 1982) we propose that Risk Perception would be a reasonable mediator on 
PDQDJHUV¶GHFLVLRQs based on the Risk Warning they received.  
 
:HSURSRVHWKDWDGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VPerceived Risk would be influenced the most when the 
Risk Warning is received from a Collaborative Partner. The underlying assumption from 
Stewardship Theory is that the messenger and the decision maker are both aligned with the 
organization goals and thus with each other. This suggests that Perceived Risk will tend to 
be aligned with the risk as presented by the Collaborative Partner who provided the Risk 
Warning.  
 
In the field of escalating IS-projects, Du et al. (2007) found in an experiment that 
Perceived Control had a negative effect on decision maker¶s Perceived Risk.  
 
This results in the following hypotheses with regard to Perceived Risk as mediator in the 
Deaf Effect:  
 
H5a. Decision Makers perceive a 
higher level of risk, when the 
messenger of a Risk Warning is seen as 
a Collaborative Partner.   
 
 
 
H5b. Perceived Risk mediates the 
influence of the PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership on the 
decision to continue a course of action 
 
 
H5c. Decision Makers with high 
Perceived Control tend to perceive 
risks to be low 
  
 
H5d. Perceived Risk mediates the 
influence of Perceived Control on the 
decision to continue a course of action 
 
 
Mediating role of Estimated Probability to Succeed 
 
The first mediation would apply to the influence of the source of the Risk Warning 
(coming from a Partner or an Opponent) on the decision to continue a project (reject or 
follow the Risk Warning). We propose that the Risk Warning (with a given 1/3 chance to 
succeed) coming from a Collaborative Partner would influence decision makers to report a 
lower Estimated Probability to Succeed the project than when it comes from an Opponent.  
The underlying assumption is that they consider the Collaborative Partner to share the 
same goals.  
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As presented earlier in this chapter, in a sequence of experiments on Illusion of Control 
Theory, or phrased as the ³Perceived Control heuristic´ as proposed by Thompson et al. 
(1998) ± respondents showed to take risk-seeking decisions based on a biased Estimation 
of Probabilities to Succeed  (Gilovich et al., 2000; Langer & Roth, 1975; Snow et al., 
2007; Thompson et al., 1998). Therefore we propose that Estimated Probability to Succeed 
would act as mediator in our model, tightly related to the Perceived Control construct.  
Based upon the list of Illusion of Control experiments we expect that the decision maker 
with a high perceived control would estimate probability to succeed higher.  
   
H6a.Decision makers estimate the 
probability to succeed lower when the 
meesenger of a Risk Warning is seen as 
a Collaborative Partner.  
 
 
 
H6b. 'HFLVLRQ 0DNHU¶V (VWLPDWHG 
Probability to Succeed mediates the 
influence of the PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership on the 
decision to continue a course of action. 
 
 
H6c. Decision Makers with high 
Perceived Control tend to estimate the 
Probability to Succeed higher 
 
 
 
H6d. Estimated Probability to Succeed 
mediates the influence Perceived 
Control on the decision to continue a 
course of action 
 
 
5.3. Research Method 
 
In this substudy we will follow the empirical research strategy of a laboratory experiment. 
Laboratory experiments take place in a setting especially created by the researcher for the 
investigation of the phenomenon. With this research method, the researcher has control 
over the independent variable(s) and the random assignment of research participants to 
various treatment and non-treatment conditions (Boudreau et al., 2001). This strategy 
allows us to maximize precision of measurement of a universal behavioral systems 
(heuristics). It allows us to test theories in an applied context by ruling out rival 
explanations. 
 
To DQVZHU D ³ZK\´ TXHVWLRQ our research design requires (1) temporal precedence, (2) 
statistically significant correlations and (3) control over alternative explanations 
(Blumberg et al., 2008), p213. In order to meet these requirements of internal validity 
(eliminate explanations other than our hypotheses), we applied a 2x2 factorial between-
subject experimental design. There are two different treatments (factors) that group our 
observations (Treatment of Perceived Control and the messenger¶V &ROODERUDWLYH
Partnership). Each treatment has two levels (Low and High Perceived Control; the 
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messenger seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent). The four different treatment 
conditions were randomly assigned to participants, double-EOLQG,QWKLVZD\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
personal characteristics -  either unknown or known to be relevant -  could still affect their 
answers, but are transformed into random background noise. As a consequence they could 
no longer serve as a rival explanation for between group differences. If these personal 
characteristics (such as pre-conceptions) would have a VWURQJ HIIHFW RQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶
answers, this would result in a very high level of background noise. The experimental 
design should be sufficiently powerful (signal to noise ratio) to assess statistically 
significant correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
(Continue). Respondent characteristics that could be relevant (such as age, working 
experience, gender, risk-propensity, nationality) were measured as control variables.  
 
5.4. Procedures & Respondents 
 
The respondents who participated in this study were involved in parttime post-graduate 
courses Management Accounting and Control at a Dutch university. None of the 
participants were involved in pilot-testing of our study. The students participated on a 
voluntary basis at the first 20 minutes of their courses. In a double blind condition they 
received envelopes containing one out of four experimental scenarios at random. From the 
140 returned envelopes we found 6 forms not to be sufficiently usable since the main 
question (decision) was not answered in an unambiguous way (missing, scratched or 
multiple answers).  
 
Size 
(N) 
Description Age Working 
Experience 
Gender Nationality 
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Part-time students 
involved in 
management control 
course at Dutch 
university  
28.8 years 
(std dev 
5.7 yrs) 
5.0 years 
(std dev 5.1 yrs) 
62% Male 
38% Female  
98% Dutch 
2% Other  
Table 5-3 Descriptives of the respondents 
 
The classroom conditions provided us control over the execution of the experiment. These 
part-time post-graduate students were preferred over undergraduate students, for this 
particular study because of their relevant working-experience. Chang and Ho (2004) ran an 
experiment comparing student and manager escalation behavior when project completion 
and market information was manipulated. They concluded that in an escalation situation, 
students responded similarly to practitioners in the escalation decision where working 
experience was not a factor. Since our manipulation of Perceived Control is related to 
VXEMHFWV¶ ZRUNLQJ H[SHULHQFH ZH WKLQN LW would have been less defendable that under-
graduate student subjects could stand as surrogates for managers for the study as described 
in this Chapter. Please note that we arrive at a different conclusion on the manipulations of 
Gain/Loss framing in Chapter 4. To a certain extent our choice of subjects with working-
experience served the external validity of the study. The main reason however was to 
achieve the desired level of construct validity and internal validity in the study. 
Undergraduate students might not have been sensitive for the treatment of Perceived 
Control since they might not have been able to recognize the treatment conditions as 
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presented in the scenario and thus could have harmed treatment validity of our study. The 
use of respondents with relevant working experience also brought consequences of  
heterogeneity and disturbing factors from their personal working background we have to 
control in our study.   
 
We followed a sequence of steps, according to Blumberg et al. (2008), to develop and test 
our research design. The first three pretests covered a 2x2x2 factorial design, which we 
decided to split into the two 2x2 experiments of chapter 4 and 5. The original idea would 
require too much statistical power to test for moderating effects in a 2x2x2 design. The 
three pretests had provided insight into and improvements for the scenario, the 
manipulations and measurement model. Two separate final pretests were done for the 2x2 
experiments of chapter 4 and 5.  
 
The four cycles of development and testing of our experiment scenario and measurements 
were necessary to improve the signal to noise ratio (strengthen the signal and attenuate 
QRLVH 7KLV ZDV QHHGHG WR VXFFHVVIXOO\ KDQGOH GLVWXUELQJ LQIOXHQFH RI UHVSRQGHQWV¶
experiences and strong pre-occupations - sXFK DV ³DXGLWRUV DUHCollaborative Partners or 
QRW´ ³,6-projects come with high control´. During pretesting with experienced subjects, 
we first found the effect of this preconception so strong that respondents simply failed to 
recall treatments that were opposite to their beliefs. By personalizing the auditor as mr. 
Smith, throughout the scenario and the measurements, we succeeded to decouple from 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶SUH-RFFXSDWLRQVRQDXGLWRUV¶Collaborativeness. In order to develop and test 
our experiment, we also asked participants for a textual explanation for their answers. 
Several times we found described that experienced respondents had found themselves in a 
situation as described in the scenario. Although this supports the realism and relevance of 
the scenario, we found that experienced participants included elements of their own 
experience in the scenario. They filled in the blanks and anchored our scenario to other 
instances from their own practical experience, which of course resulted in a higher level of 
noise in the experiment that could harm statistical power of our study. Therefore we had to 
strengthen the  treatments we used in our study and reduce noise.  This finally resulted in 
the procedures, treatments and measurements as we describe in the next sections. 
 
5.5.  Treatments 
 
Respondents were asked to consider themselves in the position of Project Owner of a 
strategic IS-project within an insurance-company. For the purpose of this study we 
developed and tested a scenario that was derived from earlier studies in the field of 
escalating IS-projects which considered the typical elements we included in our study. The 
scenario was slightly adapted from the scenario we used in Chapter 4. The treatments for 
the Loss and Gain scenario were removed and replaced by the following treatments for 
Low and High Perceived Control, that were slightly adapted from a similar study by Du et 
al. (2007) on the influence of Perceived Control on the decision to continue an IS-project. 
In similar wordings as in the scenario of Chapter 4 the auditor, Mr. Smith, provided a Risk 
Warning: 
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Mr. Smith reports that he has found serious weaknesses in the design and execution of the 
testing activities on the data exchange with other information systems. 
He estimates there is a 2/3 probability that exchange of data would show reliability problems 
in the first month of operations. As a consequence, he reports that the project should be 
redirected and should not be continued as planned. 
 
Taking into consideration that the interfaces with other information systems are key for the 
success of the PENSION-VIEW project, you realize that: 
 
[High Perceived Control]  
 
Fortunately, all these information systems are maintained and supported by your own 
organization. The owners of these Information Systems reside at your location and they 
directly report to you. The specialists on these information systems also reside at your location 
and are highly accessible to you. There are clear controls in place for reporting and decision 
making.  For all these reasons, you consider yourself to have a VERY HIGH LEVEL OF 
CONTROL over the outcome of this IS-project. 
 
[Low Perceived Control]  
 
UnfortXQDWHO\DOOWKHVHLQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPV¶PDLQWHQDQFHDQGVXSSRUWKDVEHHQRXWVRXUFHGWR
an offshore location in China. The owners of these Information Systems are located at other 
departments at various locations. They do not report to you. The specialists on these 
information systems are located at the offshore location in China and are not at all accessible 
to you.  There are no clear controls in place for reporting and decision making. For all these 
reasons, you consider yourself to have a VERY LOW LEVEL OF CONTROL over the 
outcome of this IS-project. 
 
The description of the involvement of the auditor in the Information Systems Project and 
WKHDXGLWRU¶VUROHLQWKHSRVLWLRQRIEDGQHZVUHSRUWHr, was adapted from the Deaf Effect 
studies of Cuellar (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007). The treatment of the 
relationship between Bad News Messenger and Decision maker was phrased as follows for 
the low stewardship relationship (similar as chapter 4): 
 
Mr. Smith has a long history of working AGAINST IS project teams with the goal of exposing 
project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He is seen as policeman who does not add 
any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. Smith is treated as an OPPONENT WHO IS 
NOT TO BE TRUSTED. 
 
This treatment  addresses the elements oI³ORQJKLVWRU\´(Davis et al., 1997), exposure of 
failings (Davis et al., 1997), being seen as a ³SROLFHPDQ´(Chambers et al., 1988; Keil & 
Robey, 2001), acting as an Opponent (Davis et al., 1997) with low mutual trust (Davis et 
al., 1997. The high stewardship relation treatment contained the opposite elements of being 
seen as a ³FROODERUDWLYH SDUWQHU´ (Davis et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), 
expressing a high level of mutual trust (Davis et al., 1997) and a contribution to 
management performance. This treatment was phrased as follows: 
 
Mr. Smith has a long history of working COLLABORATIVELY with IS project teams with the 
goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, thus enabling project owners to be 
successful. He is seen as adding value to the process. Thus, Mr. Smith is treated as a 
TRUSTED PARTNER. 
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5.6. Measurement Model 
 
In order to analyze relations between the constructs at the conceptual level of our model, 
we first translate these constructs into operational variables. These operational variables 
should serve proper measurement and support statistical analysis of relations at operational 
level. In order to transfer statistical results at operational level to conceptual level, the 
internal validity, construct validity and statistical conclusion validity of the model should 
be safeguarded and assessed first (Shadish et al., 2002). We will follow two different paths 
for statistical analysis of the operational model (multiple regression and PLS), both with 
assumptions and tests on validity-issues. Both paths require that variables at operational 
level have been defined and measured properly. Thus, we assess validity first before 
building further with our analysis and conclusions. As presented by Straub et al. (2004) 
validity of the instrumentation (manipulation and measurements) should form a basis for 
achieving internal validity (ruling out rival hypotheses) and statistical conclusion validity. 
In the table 5-4 we provide an overview of how we translated constructs to variables 
(called items). 
    
Contruct Type Content Measurement Source of items 
 
Continue Endogenous, 
Dependent 
Variable 
Decision to continue or 
redirect the project 
One  8-point semantic differential 
scale item and 1-item 7 point Likert 
scale for validation purposes  
 
Adapted from Cuellar 
(2006, 2007, 2009) on 
this scenario, altered 
during  pretesting 
MsgRelev Endogenous 
Independent 
Perceived Relevance of the 
Bad New Reporter¶V
Message 
 
Three 7-point Likert scale items Adapted from Cuellar 
(2006, 2007, 2009) on 
this scenario 
Collab Exogenous 
Independent 
Bad News Reporter seen as 
trusted collaborative partner 
or as non-trusted competitive 
opponent 
One 7-point Likert scale item 
Two 7-point semantic differential 
scale items 
Developed for this 
context and tested during 
4 pretest-cycles, based 
upon Schoorman et al 
     
PercContr Exogenous 5HVSRQGHQWV¶3HUFHLYHG
Control 
1-item percentage scale 
Two 7-point Likert scale items 
% item consistent with 
Du (2007) 
RiskProp Exogenous 
(control) 
Risk Propensity of Decision 
maker 
Four 7-point Likert scale items  Consistent with Sitkin & 
Weingart (1995) 
 
RiskPerc Endogenous 
Independent 
Perception of Risk by 
Decision maker 
Four 7-point semantic differential 
scales and One 7-point Likert scale 
 
Consistent with Sitkin & 
Weingart (1995) 
ProbSucc Endogenous 
Independent 
Estimated Probability to 
Succeed 
One percentage scale item Consistent with Arkes 
(2000), Garland (1990) 
 
Gender,  
Nationality 
Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQWV¶JHQGHUDQG
nationality 
 
Translated into dichotomous dummy 
variables 
 
Age, Working 
Experience 
Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQWV¶DJHDQG\HDUV
of working experience 
1-item   
     
BeliefCollab Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQW¶VEHOLHf that 
auditors are collaborative  
 
1-item 7-point Likert scale  Used during scenario 
development and testing 
BeliefControl Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQW¶VEHOLHIWKDW,6-
projects are controllable 
 
1-item 7-point scale Used during scenario 
development and testing 
BeliefFavor Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQW¶VEHOLHIWKDW,6-
projects are favorable 
1-item 7-point scale Used during scenario 
development and testing 
Table 5-4 Measurement of Constructs 
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Content Validity 
 
Content validity of this study refers to the essential question of whether our 
instrumentation (e.g. questionnaire items) pull in a representative manner that could be 
used to measure the content of a given construct (Cronbach, 1971). In table 5-4 we show 
that we adopted most definitions and measurement scales of our constructs from earlier 
studies. Only the measurements of the Collab construct were developed for this study, 
given our specific research scope of internal audit warnings and the relationship between 
auditor and management (Project Owner), according to Stewardship Theory principles. We 
took care of content validity by (1) incorporating the attributes of main articles on 
Stewardship-based relations (Davis et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) in 
general, as well as in relation to internal auditing specifically (Kasima et al., 2011), (2) 
consulting scholarly and practitioner experts and (3) following a 4-step development and 
testing process with open questions to testing-subjects to explain their answers.   
 
Manipulation Validity 
 
As part of our between-subject experiment design, we intentionally exposed subjects to 
different treatments in order to control that independent variables (PercContr and Collab) 
sufficient vary across treatment-groups. Therefore, we test manipulation validity (Straub et 
al., 2004) in order to assess whether or not the treatments are effective as intended. During 
the development and testing of our manipulations we followed an iterative path of 
measuring and strengthening the manipulations that we used in our scenario (and reducing 
EDFNJURXQG QRLVH IRU H[DPSOH IURP UHVSRQGHQWV¶ preoccupations). In table 5-5a we 
present the mean values of the independent variables Collab and PercContr for each of the 
four treatment conditions. As expected from our pretests, we find the independent variable 
Collab to be different in the Treat Collab Low and High conditions, without minor 
movement on the treat PercControl High and Low conditions. And we find the 
independent variable PercContr to be different on the Treat PercControl Low and High 
conditions, without changing as the result of  the  Collab treatment conditions. This 
indicates that the treatments are effective in size and direction. 
 
 Treat PercControl Low 
 Treat PercControl 
High 
   
Treat Collab 
Low 
 
 
Collab 
 
3.85 (1.25) 
  
Collab 
 
3.91 (1.08) 
  
Collab 
 
3.88 (1.16) 
PercContr 2.94 (1.35)  PercContr 5.31 (0.78)  PercContr 4.13 (1.62) 
N=33 
 
 N=33  N=66 
Treat Collab 
High 
 
 
Collab 
 
5.38 (0.73) 
  
Collab 
 
5.52 (0.79) 
  
Collab 
 
5.45 (0.76) 
PercContr 2.94 (1.12)  PercContr 4.78 (1.20)  PercContr 3.86 (1.48) 
N=34 
 
 N=34  N=68 
 Collab 4.63 (1.27)  Collab 4.73 (1.24)    
 PercContr 2.94 (1.23)  PercContr 5.04 (1.04)    
 N=67  N=67    
Table 5-5a Mean Values of Collab and PercContr per treatment condition 
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Table 5-5b shows the results of an MANOVA in which the treatment conditions are 
entered as Independent variables and the Collab variable and PercContr variable are 
considered to be the dependent variables. The table shows that the Collab treatments are 
highly significant (at .000) on their own Collab variable and that TreatPercContr is not 
significant (.544) at that variable. The table also shows that the PerContr treatments are 
highly significant (at .000) on its own PercContr variable and that TreatCollab is not 
significant (.174) at that variable. No significant interaction effects are found in the 
treatments (at .187 and .800). We consider the R2 of .464 and .381 to be acceptable as a 
result of the iterative testing and improving the treatment-conditions (and reducing 
background noise) in the scenario that was performed. 
   
 
Dependent variable 
PercContra 
 Dependent Variable 
Collabb 
Independent variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares F-Value (Sig) 
 Type III Sum of 
Squares 
 
F-Value (Sig) 
Main Effect TreatPercContr 148.179 114.751 (.000)  .361 .371 (.544) 
Main Effect TreatCollab 2.416 1.871 (.174)  82.240 84.506 (.000) 
Interaction Effect 
TreatPercControl * 
TreatCollab 
 
2.268 
 
1.757 (.187) 
  
.063 
 
.064 (.800) 
a) R2 is .464 and b). R2 is .381 
Table 5-5b Manipulation Test 2x2 MANOVA 
We consider our manipulation tests to have sufficiently covered the testing techniques for 
manipulation validity as proposed by Straub et al. (2004).  
 
Reliability 
 
Before we will test the hypotheses, we first consider reliability and convergent as well as 
discriminant validity of how we measured our constructs. In table 5-6a we present the 
FRQVWUXFWUHOLDELOLW\&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVFRUHVWKDWPHDVXUHWKHLQWHUQDOFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKD
JLYHQ FRQVWUXFW¶V LWHPV ZHLJKLQJ WKHP all equally). Hair et al. (1998) suggest that a 
&URQEDFK¶V  DOSKD VFRUH VOLJKWOy lower than 0.7 might still be acceptable for exploratory 
research. Nunnally (1967) recommends a threshold value of only 0.6 for exploratory 
research. In the column at the right end we present the Cronbach alpha scores we obtained 
in chapter 4, using students instead of subjects with working experience. Based on the 
table 5-6 we conclude that the reliability of our measurements of the constructs meet the 
thresholds.   
 
 
 
141 
 
Contruct Items Cronbach alpha Cronbach alpha 
Chapter 4 
Continue 2 0.913 0.944 
MsgRelev 3 0.876 0.858 
PercRisk 4 0.849 0.869 
Collab 3 0.898 0.922 
PercContr 3 0.959 n.a. 
RiskProp 4 0.840 0.731 
           Table 5-6a Reliability of Measurements 
 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
 
Our validation of the instruments we used for data gathering, proceeds with assessing the 
convergent and discriminant validity (Shadish et al., 2002) of how we measured the 
constructs in our study (construct validity). This is done in order to assess that our 
measurement-variables that are supposed to tap into the same construct indeed stick 
together and are not sticking too much to measurements that were supposed to tap into 
other constructs. For that purpose, we performed a Principal Components Analysis, which 
is an exploratory factor analysis of clustering measurements into factors. It does not take 
into account any available information on which measurements were intended to tap into 
which constructs. Using Varimax rotation and a fixed number of factors that was equal to 
the number of variables, we found the results as presented in table 5-6b.  
   
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
    
Continue1 .256 .218 .198 -.235 -.187 .810 .027 -.017
Continue2 .292 .262 .094 -.168 -.146 .816 .136 -.126
MsgRelev1 .060 -.079 -.011 .360 .832 -.064 -.028 .068
MsgRelev2 .044 -.076 -.043 .271 .863 -.021 -.031 -.033
MsgRelev3 .070 -.109 -.100 .213 .806 -.218 -.067 -.010
PercRisk1 .003 .790 .093 -.114 -.137 .256 -.077 -.037
PercRisk2 .209 .793 -.004 -.059 -.156 .127 -.057 -.037
PercRisk3 .437 .703 .147 -.189 .101 .067 -.045 .146
PercRisk4 .192 .854 .149 -.074 -.049 .015 .097 -.109
Collab1 .005 -.058 -.046 .802 .339 -.180 .014 .051
Collab2 -.042 -.117 .030 .867 .266 -.108 .042 -.024
Collab3 -.051 -.171 -.060 .873 .248 -.068 -.091 -.010
PercContr1 .923 .207 .065 -.026 .075 .170 -.018 -.052
PercContr2 .934 .172 .048 -.048 .040 .151 -.041 -.039
PercContr3a .915 .171 .078 .018 .043 .086 .005 .017
Gender -.053 -.052 .043 -.028 -.096 .098 .959 .108
WorkExp -.041 -.071 -.023 .007 .011 -.086 .106 .976
RiskProp1 .208 .068 .803 .090 .007 .074 .152 .042
RiskProp2 .124 .118 .848 -.038 .042 -.177 .159 -.083
RiskProp3 -.018 .124 .774 -.014 -.127 .277 -.124 .076
RiskProp4 -.073 .022 .828 -.115 -.087 .117 -.117 -.059
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis;  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Table 5-6b Construct Validity (without ProbSucc) 
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We excluded ProbSucc from our description and analysis, since it showed very weak 
discriminant validity with PercContr. It shared with PercContr a heavy loading on 
Component 1 of .529 while it loaded with .647 only marginally more on component 9. 
Analysis of causal paths was performed both with ProbSucc included and excluded. In the 
causal path analysis it blended heavily with PercContr and appeared to be no signficant 
mediator. In many experiments ProbSucc was used as an indicator of Illusion of Control 
(Perceived Control exceeding objective levels of control) and blends to much with the 
defnition of Illusion of Control to use it as a separate construct any longer. 
 
,WHPVVKRXOGFRUUHODWHKLJKHUZLWKWKHLURZQ³FRQVWUXFW´IDFWRUWKDQWKH\FRUUHODWHZLWK
others (Shadish et al., 2002). We find convergent and discriminant validity to be confirmed 
in Table 5-6b. In the PLS-section we will further extend these validity tests with particular 
confirmatory tests for convergent and discriminant validity as supported by the PLS-
modeling.  
 
Finally, validity testing as described in this section is strengthened in two ways. First, we 
performed similar tests with an equal measurement model in a different experimental 
setting as described in Chapter 4. We also replicated measurements and validity tests 
during the 4 steps of pretesting with approximately 200 test-subjects. Second, we followed 
two distinctive and well-established approaches for further analyzing our data and 
hypothesis testing. For these reasons, we performed both regression analysis and PLS-
analysis to arrive at our conclusions on main-effects, mediating effects and moderating 
effects. 
5.7. Results from Regression Analysis 
 
In order to structure the results we first test the proposed main and moderating effects on 
the decision to continue or redirect the project (the dependent variable Continue). These 
cover the first three hypotheses.  Next, we analyze the proposed mediating role of 
message-relevance (MsgRelev) which covers hypotheses 4a to 4d. In a similar way, we 
analyze the proposed mediating role of perceived-risk (PercRisk) which covers hypotheses 
5a to 5d. And we conclude with a similar analysis of the proposed mediation role of 
Estimated-Probability-to-Succeed (ProbSucc) which covers hypotheses 6a to 6d.   
5.7.1. Regression Analysis on Main and Moderating Effects 
 
In order to test whether moderation effects could be found, we followed procedures 
according to Sharma et al. (1981) and we further used the operational guidance on 
multiple-regression of interaction effects as presented by Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) and 
Aiken and West (1991). In Table 5-7 you find the results of the moderated regression 
analyses with Continue as the dependent variable. The presentation of moderation effects 
is adopted from Tanriverdi (2006). 
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Variable(s) Entered 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4c 
 
Controls 
Main  
Effect 
Main  
Effect 
 
Interaction 
Gender 
WorkExp 
RiskProp 
PercContr 
Collab 
Collab x PercContrb 
     .133 
    -.169* 
     .261** 
 
 
     .152* 
    -.139 
     .197* 
     .390*** 
     .129 
    -.127 
     .172* 
     .369*** 
    -.345*** 
     .113 
    -.144* 
     .174* 
     .362*** 
    -.337*** 
    -.135* 
R2 
F 
ǻR2 
ǻF 
     .115 
   5.496** 
     .262 
   11.159*** 
      .147 
   25.027*** 
     .379 
 15.237*** 
     .117 
 23.558*** 
     .396 
 13.551*** 
     .017 
   3.561* 
a. significant at .030 with T-value is -1.887 for dataset N=134 
b. component variables are standardized for moderation analyses 
c. Durbin-Watson is 2.268 
+p<.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Dependent variable is Continue 
Table 5-7 Moderated Regression Analysis on Continue 
 
For interpretation of the model, we first take into account the subjects of our study and the 
control variables. We found WorkExp and RiskProp to be significant. The relevance of an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V \HDUV RI ZRUNLQJ H[SHULHQFH DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V 5LVN 3URSHQVLW\ ZDV
confirmed to be consistent with earlier studies (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007). 
These variables were controlled for in Model 1.  
 
Since in our field of research, earlier experimental research has been done on Perceived 
Control  (PercContr), model 2 consists of the control variables of model 1, extended with 
PercContr. Model 2 confirms a significant positive  influence of PercContr on the decision 
to continue as was expected from earlier studies and hypothesized here as hypothesis 2. 
From model 3 we conclude that Collab has a significant negative effect on Continue, 
which confirms hypothesis 1.  
 
In hypothesis 3 we proposed that the negative influence of Collab on Continue would be 
weaker  in the Low Perceived Control domain and stronger in the High Perceived Control 
Domain. Therefore, we expect to find a significant negative regression coefficient for the 
interaction variable Collab x PercContr in model 4. We found hypothesis 3 confirmed in 
table 5-5. According to the procedures of  Sharma et al. (1981), that we described in 
chapter 3, we conclude that PercContr is a quasi-moderator on the relationship between 
Collab and Continue (dependent variable), since it not only acts as a moderator but has a 
direct effect on Continue as well.  
 
For interpretation purposes we present the regression plots (without confounding variables) 
in figure 5-1 below. The figure shows the regression lines for various values of Perceived 
Control. Consistent with Aiken and West (1991), p13 these lines were calculated for  the 
mean scores of the moderator (Perceived Control) and a useful number of standard 
deviations added or subtracted. The regression lines DUH QRW SDUDOOHO EXW GRQ¶W LQWHUVHFW
within the range of treatment and measurement conditions we used in our experiment. 
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Since the order of the five regression lines remains unchanged, this type of interaction is 
FDOOHG³RUGLQDO´(Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003), p78.    
 
 
Figure 5-1 Regression plots with Perceived Control as moderator 
 
We see confirmed that the regression line in the Low Perceived Control conditions is more 
flat than in the High Perceived Control conditions. As hypothesized, in the High Perceived 
Control conditions, decision makers might show competitive arousal when the message 
comes from an Opponent and they are more likely to continue the project and respond 
Deaf Effect to the Risk Warning. In the Low Perceived Control conditions they consider 
themselves to be more helpless and are more likely follow any advice, regardless whether 
the message comes from a Collaborative Partner or an Opponent.  These hypotheses are 
confirmed in the subgroup regressions in figure 5-1 and in our moderated regression 
analysis. 
5.7.2. Regression Analysis on Mediating Effects 
 
In order to test whether mediation effects could be found, we followed the procedures 
according to Baron and Kenny (1986). First, we should perform three regressions: 1) The 
predictor variable to the mediator33, 2) the predictor variable to the outcome variable and 
3) the predictor and mediator together to the outcome variable.  Next, we should establish 
that conditions for mediation are met: which requires that the predictor variable should 
affect the mediator in the 1st regression, that the predictor variable should affect the 
outcome variable in the second regression and that the mediator should affect the outcome 
variable in the 3rd regression. If these conditions hold in the predicted direction, then the 
                                                          
 
33 7KURXJKRXWWKLVWKHVLVZHFRQVLVWHQWO\XVHWKHSKUDVH³UHJUHVVLRQRI;1 and X2 WR<´LQZKLFK<LV considered 
to be  the dependent or outcome variable that is observed and X1 and X2 are considered to be the independent or 
predictor variables who are manipulated. )RUPDOO\FRUUHFWWKLVVKRXOGEHSKUDVHVDV³UHJUHVVLRQRI<RQ;1 and 
X2´  
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effect of the predictor on the outcome must be less in the 3rd regression than in the second. 
6REHO¶V WHVW (Sobel, 1982) is used in order to assess the approximate significance of the 
indirect effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable via the mediator. 
 
We start our mediation analysis with MsgRelev as a proposed mediator between Collab 
and Continue (hypothesis 4b). The first out of three regressions shows that the predictor 
(Collab) has a significant regression coefficient (at .000) to the mediator (MsgRelev) with 
b (s.e.) of .567 (.065), beta34 of .606, T of 8.692 and R2 of .363, in the proposed positive 
direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is confirmed, which has 
been labeled earlier as hypothesis 4a. 
 
In the table 5-8a we describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions as required for mediation analysis 
according to Baron and Kenny (1986). Presentation of the results of these Causal steps 
Mediation results follows Wood et al (2008), using hierarchical regression and the Sobel 
Z35 to test the approximate significance of the indirect effect via the mediator.  
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
Collab -.061 (.013)*** -.382 -4.711 22.191*** 130 .146 .146  
 
Model 2 
MsgRelev 
Collab 
-.028 (.017) 
-.045 (.016)** 
-.164 
-.282 
-1.622 
-2.786 
12.550*** 129 .017 .163 -1.618a) 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=134, Durbin-Watson is 1.748, , a) signif at 0.052 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 5-8a Mediated Regression Analysis of Collab to Continue 
 
Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of Collab in model 2 appears to be less than in model 1. Furthermore the Sobel Z statistic 
showed a close to significant mediation at 0.052. As a consequence, hypothesis 4b was 
confirmed36. 
  
Next we focus on hypothesis 4d with MsgRelev as a proposed suppressor (vs mediator) on 
the relation between PercContr and Continue. The first out of three regressions shows the 
predictor (PercContr) has not a significant regression coefficient (at .299) to the mediator 
(MsgRelev) with b (s.e.) of .069 (.066), beta of .091, T of 1.042 and R2 of .008. Thus we 
                                                          
 
34 With b (s.e.) we refer to the unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. With beta we 
refer to the standardized regression coefficients that are corrected for the standard deviation 
35 We used the Sobel Z calculator that is available on www. danielsoper.com. The following algorithm is applied 
by this calculator:  Z = ab / [ (b2 x s.e.a 2) + (a2 x s.e.b2) ] where a is the regression coefficient for the relationship 
between the independent variable and the mediator and b is the regression coefficient for the relationship between 
the mediator and the dependent variable. 
36 Since the regression coefficient of  Collab in table 5-8a model 2 is significantly different from zero, there is a  
significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation. 
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conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is not confirmed, which has been labeled 
earlier as hypothesis 4c. In table 5-8b we describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions, needed for 
mediated regression analysis. 
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F Df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
PercContr .054 (.010)*** .423 5.329 28.400*** 130 .179 .179  
 
Model 2 
MsgRelev 
PercContr 
-.064 (.012)*** 
.059 (.009)*** 
-.377 
.458 
-5.173 
6.280 
30.392*** 129 .141 .320 -1.025 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
 N=134, Durbin-Watson is 1.956 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 5-8b Mediated Regression Analysis of PercContr to Continue 
 
Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are not fulfilled. The 
effect of PercContr in model 2 appears to be not less than in model 1. Furthermore the 
Sobel Z statistic showed no significant mediation. As a consequence, PercContr was not 
confirmed to act as mediator. It passed the 1st test of the proposed suppressor role 
according to Iacobucci (2008), p39, since the t-value of PercContr in model 2 was larger 
than this value in model 1. We will perform the other test for suppression later. Sofar,  this 
test confirms hypothesis 4d.  
 
We proceed with analysis of PercRisk as a proposed mediator. We first focus on PercRisk 
as a proposed mediator between Collab and Continue (hypothesis 5b). The first out of 
three regressions shows the predictor (Collab) has a significant regression coefficient (at 
.001) to the mediator (PercRisk) with b (s.e.) of .261 (.074), beta of .297,  T of 3.548 and 
R2 of .088, in the proposed positive direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition for 
mediation is confirmed, which has been labeled earlier as hypothesis 5a. In table 5-8c we 
describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions, needed for mediated regression analysis. 
 
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F Df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
Collab -.061 (.013)*** -.382 -4.711 22.191*** 130 .146 .146  
 
Model 2 
PercRisk 
Collab 
-.072 (.014)*** 
-.042 (.012)** 
-.396 
-.264 
-5.087 
-3.398 
26.160*** 129 .143 .289 -2.908*** 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
N=134, Durbin Watson is 1.949                                                                                                 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 5-8c Mediated Regression Analysis of Collab to Continue 
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Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of Collab in model 2 appears to be less than in model 1. Furthermore the Sobel Z statistic 
showed a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 5b was  confirmed37.  
 
We proceed with hypothesis 5d with PercRisk as a proposed mediator on the relation 
between PercContr and Continue. The first out of three regressions shows the predictor 
(PercContr) has a significant regression coefficient (at .000) to the mediator (PercRisk) 
with b (s.e.) of -.297 (.057), beta of -.418, T of -5.241 and R2 of .174, in the proposed 
negative direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is confirmed, 
which has been labeled earlier as hypothesis 5c. In table 5-8d we describe the 2nd and 3rd 
regressions, needed for mediated regression analysis. 
 
 Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
PercContr .054 (.010)*** .423 5.329 28.400*** 130 .179 .179  
 
Model 2 
PercRisk 
PercContr 
-.065 (.015)*** 
.035 (.011)** 
-.360 
.273 
-4.400 
3.335 
25.886*** 129 .107 .286 3.331*** 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
N=134, Durbin-Watson is 2.021 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 5-8d Mediated Regression Analysis of PercContr to Continue 
 
Based on this table we conclude that the first condition for mediation was fulfilled. 
Second, the effect of PercContr in model 2 was less than in model 1. Furthermore the 
Sobel Z statistic showed a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 5d was  
confirmed38. 
  
We proceed with analysis of ProbSucc as a proposed mediator. We first focus on 
ProbSucc as a proposed mediator on the relation between Collab and Continue (hypothesis 
6b). The first out of three regressions shows the predictor (Collab) has no significant 
regression coefficient (at .212) to the mediator (ProbSucc) with b (s.e.) of -.1.791 (1.428), 
beta of -.109, T of -1.254 and R2 of .012, in the proposed negative direction. Thus we 
conclude that the 1st condition for mediation is not confirmed, which has been labeled 
earlier as hypothesis 6a. In table 5-8e we describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions as required 
for mediation analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
37 Since the regression coefficient of  Collab in table 5-8c model 2 is significantly different from zero, there is a 
significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation. 
38 Since the regression coefficient of  PercContr in table 5-8d model 2 is significantly different from zero, there is 
a significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation. 
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Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
Collab -.060 (.013)*** -.383 -4.742 22.488*** 131 .147 .147  
 
Model 2 
ProbSucc 
Collab 
.004 (.001)*** 
-.054 (.012)*** 
.367 
-.343 
4.898 
-4.577 
25.210*** 130 .132 .279 -1.196 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
N=134, Durbin Watson is 1.959 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 5-8e Mediated Regression Analysis of Collab to Continue 
 
Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are not fulfilled. The 
effect of Collab in model 2 is slightly less than in model 1. Furthermore the Sobel Z 
statistic did not show a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 6b was not 
confirmed. 
  
We complete this section on mediated regression analysis with hypothesis 6d proposing 
ProbSucc as a mediator on the relation between PercContr and Continue. The first out of 
three regressions shows the predictor (PercContr) has a significant regression coefficient 
(at .000) to the mediator (ProbSucc) with b (s.e.) of 8.033 (.936), beta of .600, T of 8.580 
and R2 of .360, in the proposed positive direction. Thus we conclude that the 1st condition 
for mediation is confirmed, which has been labeled earlier as hypothesis 6c. In table 5-8f 
we describe the 2nd and 3rd regressions, needed for mediated regression analysis. 
  
Predictors b(s.e) Beta T F df ǻR2 Total R2 Sobel Z 
 
Model 1 
PercContr .057 (.010)*** .441 5.631 31.705*** 131 .195 .195  
 
Model 2 
ProbSucc 
PercContr 
.002 (.001)* 
.040 (.012)*** 
.218 
.311 
2.256 
3.222 
18.892*** 130 .030 .225 1.947* 
Dependent Variable: Continue 
N=134, Durbin-Watson is 1.858 
+p< .10 *p< .05 **p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 5-8f Mediated Regression Analysis of PercContr to Continue 
 
Based on this table we conclude that the conditions for mediation are fulfilled. The effect 
of PercContr in model 2 is less than in model 1. Furthermore the Sobel Z statistic showed 
a significant mediation. As a consequence, hypothesis 6d was confirmed39.  
 
                                                          
 
39 Since the regression coefficient of  PercContr in table 5-8a model 2 is significantly different from zero, there is 
a significant direct effect, so we find partial mediation. Since PercContr and ProbSucc showed problems in 
discriminant validity, the conclusion on hypothesis 6d can be disputed. ProbSucc will be further excluded from 
the PLS-analysis, since it could bias the measured results of other relationships in the model.  
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5.8. Results from Partial Least Squares Analysis 
 
Next to the more traditional Regression Analysis to assess our hypotheses on main effects, 
mediating effects and moderating effects, we followed an additional path of Partial Least 
Squares in order to obtain method triangulation. Compared to the regression analysis, PLS 
has the advantage that it assesses the measurement model within the context of the 
structural model, rather than testing in two separate analyses (Gefen et al., 2000). 
Additionally, PLS is able to identify path loadings across the entire model in a single run 
as opposed to multiple runs required using regression techniques. This results in a more 
rigorous analysis than using factor analysis and regression alone (Gefen, et al. 2000, p. 24). 
As regression analysis does, PLS seeks to show rejection of a null hypothesis of 
independent variables having no effect on the dependent variable while accounting for a 
significant amount of the variance in the dependent variable (Gefen, et al. 2000, p.27). PLS 
techniques perform the analysis by iterating between confirmatory factor analysis and path 
analysis until the change in variance explained is not significant. It then uses bootstrapping 
to estimate tKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH SDWKV ³1HLWKHU RI WKHVH 3/6 VLJQLILFDQFH HVWLPDWLRQ
PHWKRGV UHTXLUH SDUDPHWULF DVVXPSWLRQV´ (Gefen et al., 2000). In our use of PLS, we 
performed the PLS calculation to generate the basic PLS values and then used 
bootstrapping to compute the T-statistics for significance. 
 
PLS has previously been applied in exploratory studies on the Mum Effect and the Deaf 
Effect on escalating IS-projects (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007; Smith et al., 
2001) and is appropriate for testing theories in the early stages of development. On the 
Deaf Effect it has, to our knowledge, no precedence in testing interaction effects with 
moderation analysis. As proposed by Chin et al. (1996), PLS could provide additional 
strengths to the more traditional moderated regression analysis (Chin et al., 1996). In this 
study we used smartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005) version 2.0. which included the product 
indicator approach for moderating effects as proposed by Chin et al. (1996). Our 
measurement model meets their criteria for moderation analysis, since it does not contain 
any formative constructs, which would have required alternative approach to assess and 
test for moderating effects . 
5.8.1. PLS Measurement Model Assessment 
 
In the parallel section on regression analysis we performed Principal Components factor 
analysis in order to assess reliability, convergent and discriminant validity, through SPSS. 
In the context of the PLS-analysis we followed the steps as performed by earlier studies on 
the Mum Effect and the Deaf Effect on escalating IS-projects (Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar 
et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2001). Following these predecessors, we assessed the strength of 
the measurement model through tests of convergent and discriminant validity as well. 
Therefore we conducted the tests as described by Chin (1998) and Fornell and Larcker 
(1981). 
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Convergent validity.  
Two different assessments were made for convergent validity: (1) individual item 
reliability, and (2) construct reliability. Individual item reliability was assessed by 
examining the item-to-construct loadings for each construct that was measured with 
multiple indicators. In order for the shared variance between each item and its associated 
construct to exceed the error variance, the standardized loadings should be greater than 
0.70. During early stages of scale development, even loadings of 0.5 and 0.6 may still be 
acceptable for an item if other indicators within the same block of measures have high 
loadings (Chin, 1998). As seen in table 5-9 none of the constructs include any questionable 
indicators. 
 
Construct 
 
Item 
 
Item-to-Construct Loading 
 
Collaborative Risk Warner Collab1 0.900 
 Collab2 0.914 
 Collab3 0.923 
Continue Continue1 0.961 
 Continue2 0.961 
Message Relevance MsgRelev1 0.916 
 MsgRelev2 0.898 
 MsgRelev3 0.874 
Perceived Control  PercContr1 0.974 
 PercContr2 0.975 
 PercContr3 0.946 
Perceived Risk PercRisk1 0.800 
 PercRisk2 0.828 
 PercRisk3 0.845 
 PercRisk4 0.870 
Risk Propensity RiskProp1 0.829 
 RiskProp2 0.804 
 RiskProp3 0.851 
 RiskProp4 0.803 
Table 5-9 Item to Own Construct Correlation vs Correlations with Other Constructs 
 
We also considered the construct reliability for each block of measures, as shown in table 
5-10. Compared to the construct reliability analysis as presented earlier in table 5-6a we 
extend on the  Cronbach alpha calculations with composite reliability scores and AVE 
scores.   
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 AVE Composite Reliability Cronbachs Alpha 
    
Collab 0.833 0.937 0.900 
Continue 0.924 0.960 0.918 
MsgRelev 0.804 0.924 0.878 
PercControl 0.931 0.976 0.963 
PercRisk 0.699 0.902 0.857 
RiskProp 
 
0.676 
 
0.893 
 
0.843 
 
Table 5-10 Construct Reliability  
&RPSRVLWH UHOLDELOLW\ VFRUHV DQG &URQEDFK¶V DOSKD VFRUHV ERWK PHDVXUH WKH LQWHUQDO
FRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKDJLYHQFRQVWUXFW¶VLWHPV8QOLNHWKHPRUHWUDGLWLRQDO&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD
the composite reliability score does not assume that all indicators are equally weighted. 
Therefore alpha tends to be a lower bound estimate of reliability, whereas the composite 
reliability score is a better approximation under the assumption that the parameter 
HVWLPDWHVDUHDFFXUDWH´ (Chin, 1998), p.320. Hair et al. (1998) suggest WKDWD&URQEDFK¶V
alpha score slightly lower than 0.7 might still be acceptable for exploratory research and 
Nunnally (1967) recommends a threshold value of only 0.6 for exploratory research. Table 
5-8 shows that the construct reliability in our model exceeds these thresholds and has been 
established satisfactorily. Fornell and Larcker (1981) view Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE) as a measure of construct reliability. The guideline threshold for AVE is 0.5, which 
means that 50 percent or more variance of the indicators is accounted for (Chin, 1998). As 
table 5-10 indicates, all of the constructs in our measurement model exceeded the 
established criterion for AVE. 
 
Discriminant validity 
 
In our section on regression analysis, we performed a Principal Components Factor 
Analysis in order to test for discriminant validity. In this PLS-section we conduct two 
RWKHU WHVWV IRU GLVFULPLQDQW YDOLGLW\ )LUVW ZH FDOFXODWHG HDFK LQGLFDWRU¶V ORDGLQJ RQ LWV
own construct as well as its cross-loading on all other constructs. Results are presented in 
table 5-11.  
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In the last eight columns of this table, the loadings for each indicator on its own construct 
DUHKLJKHUWKDQWKHFURVVORDGLQJVIRURWKHUFRQVWUXFWV¶LQGLFDWRUV0RUHRYHUJRLQJDFURVV
the rows, each indicator has a higher loading with its own construct than a cross-loading 
with any other construct. This provides good evidence of discriminant validity (Chin, 
1998), p321. 
 
As a second test of discriminant validity, we considered whether the AVEs of the latent 
constructs were greater than the square of the correlations among the latent constructs. 
When this is true, more variance is shared between the latent construct and its block of 
indicators than with another construct (Chin, 1998). As can be seen by reading across the 
rows of table 5-12, our measures passed this test, thus providing additional evidence of 
discriminant validity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Construct Item Collab Continue Gender Msg 
Relev 
Perc 
Contr 
Perc 
Risk 
Risk 
Prop 
Work 
Exp 
Collab Collab1 0.90 -0.39 -0.06 0.58 -0.04 0.21 -0.11 0.07 
 Collab2 0.91 -0.36 -0.02 0.54 -0.07 0.26 -0.03 0.01 
 Collab3 0.92 -0.37 -0.11 0.53 -0.10 0.31 -0.11 0.00 
Continue Continue1 -0.41 1.00 0.08 -0.36 0.39 -0.44 0.33 -0.11 
Gender Gender -0.07 0.08 1.00 -0.14 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.18 
MsgRelev MsgRelev1 0.60 -0.30 -0.11 0.91 0.07 0.16 -0.08 0.06 
 MsgRelev2 0.52 -0.29 -0.11 0.89 0.07 0.15 -0.09 -0.01 
 MsgRelev3 0.49 -0.37 -0.17 0.87 0.04 0.20 -0.17 0.03 
PercContr PercContr1 -0.08 0.40 -0.05 0.08 0.97 -0.47 0.17 -0.11 
 PercContr2 -0.10 0.39 -0.07 0.04 0.97 -0.44 0.14 -0.09 
 PercContr3 -0.04 0.34 -0.05 0.07 0.94 -0.42 0.16 -0.05 
PercRisk PercRisk1 0.29 -0.41 0.06 0.26 -0.22 0.79 -0.21 0.11 
 PercRisk2 0.24 -0.36 0.06 0.21 -0.36 0.82 -0.13 0.11 
 PercRisk3 0.23 -0.39 0.07 0.04 -0.55 0.84 -0.24 -0.01 
 PercRisk4 0.20 -0.31 -0.01 0.16 -0.36 0.86 -0.24 0.15 
RiskProp RiskProp1 0.01 0.27 0.13 -0.01 0.25 -0.20 0.82 0.01 
 RiskProp2 -0.03 0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.15 -0.21 0.80 -0.05 
 RiskProp3 -0.13 0.36 0.01 -0.19 0.10 -0.25 0.85 -0.02 
 RiskProp4 -0.15 0.25 -0.01 -0.18 0.02 -0.14 0.80 -0.08 
WorkExp WorkExp 0.03 -0.11 0.18 0.03 -0.09 0.09 -0.04 1.00 
          
Table 5-11 Item to Own Construct Correlation vs Correlations with Other Constructs 
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Construct 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted  
(AVE) Collab Continue Gender 
Msg 
Relev 
Perc 
Contr 
Perc 
Risk 
Risk 
Prop 
Work 
Exp 
          
Collab 0.83 - 0.17 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Continue 1.00 0.17 - 0.01 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.01 
Gender 1.00 0.01 0.01 - 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
MsgRelev 0.80 0.37 0.13 0.02 - 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 
PercControl 0.93 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.01 - 0.00 0.03 0.01 
PercRisk 0.69 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.00 - 0.06 0.01 
RiskProp 0.67 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 - 0.00 
WorkExp 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 - 
          
Note: Figures in the last 8 columns represent squared correlations among constructs 
 
Table 5-12 AVEs vs Square of Correlations Among Latent Constructs 
 
5.8.2. PLS Structural Model Assessment 
 
With an adequate measurement model in place, we tested our hypotheses by examining the 
structural model. The explanatory power of a structural model can be evaluated by looking 
at the R2 value (variance accounted for) in the final dependent construct. As presented in 
figure 5-2, the explanatory power of this structural model is satisfactory with R2 for the 
final dependent construct Continue of .463 and the intermediate variables showed R2 of 
0.383 for MsgRelev and .302 for PercRisk. These R2 values are sufficiently high to make 
interpretation of path coefficients meaningful. After computing path estimates in the 
structural model, using the entire sample, the smartPLS bootstrapping method was used to 
obtain the corresponding t-values, with 134 cases. These results are presented in figure 5-3. 
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Figure 5-2 PLS Path-coefficients Moderation&Mediation on Continue 
 
 
Figure 5-3 PLS Bootstrapping t-values Moderation&Mediation  on Continue 
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Path coefficients and t-values for this model are listed in table 5-11. Support for each 
hypothesis could be determined by examining the sign (positive or negative) and the 
statistical significance of the t-value for its corresponding path. 
 
 
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample Mean 
(M) 
Standard Error 
(STERR) 
t-statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Collab ĺ Continue -0.158 -0.159 0.095        1.664* 
Collab ĺ MsgRelev 0.616 0.616 0.062        9.825*** 
Collab ĺ PercRisk 0.240 0.230 0.080        2.966*** 
Collab * PercControl ĺ Continue -0.146 -0.141 0.071        2.053* 
Gender ĺ Continue 0.116 0.116 0.067        1.723* 
Gender ĺ RiskProp 0.068 0.069 0.098        0.694 
MsgRelev ĺ Continue -0.185 -0.179 0.104        1.775* 
PercControl ĺ Continue 0.321 0.315 0.098        3.275*** 
PercControl ĺ MsgRelev 0.121 0.114 0.069        1.735* 
PercControl ĺ PercRisk -0.415 -0.428 0.074        5.550*** 
PercRisk ĺ Continue -0.210 -0.217 0.088        2.370** 
RiskProp ĺ Continue 0.141 0.138 0.064        2.190* 
RiskProp ĺ PercRisk -0.159 -0.182 0.099        1.607 
WorkExp ĺ Continue -0.135 -0.131 0.060        2.252* 
Table 5-13  Path Coefficients from Bootstrapping  (Mean, Standard Error, t-Values) 
 
This table shows that the direct effect of Collab on Continue in this model could be 
rejected to be zero, having a t of 1.664. This means that on top of the indirect paths as 
described in the model (with mediation of MsgRelev, PercRisk) a significant direct effect 
remains. The table also shows that the moderator effect (with t of 2.053) as proposed in 
hypothesis 3 is significant, taking into account all the alternative paths of our model.  
 
In table 5-14a we present the results of our mediation analysis in PLS according to the 
guidelines as described by Iacobucci (2008). We group both the direct and indirect 
(mediated) path coefficients of Collab and PercContr on Continue. The indirect path 
coefficients are calculated by multiplying the coefficients from independent variable to 
mediator with the coefficient from mediator to dependent variable (Iacobucci, p25). The 
resulting path coefficients all share the basis that they include all the effects within the 
PLS-model as a whole. Therefore they can be compared in size and proportion. For each 
indirect path we present the calculated  Sobel z40 statistics (which represents the effect size 
of the mediating path compared to the direct path).  
 
                                                          
 
40 We used the Sobel Z calculator that is available on www. danielsoper.com. The following algorithm is applied 
by this calculator:  Z = ab / [ (b2 x s.e.a 2) + (a2 x s.e.b2) ] where a is the regression coefficient for the relationship 
between the independent variable and the mediator and b is the regression coefficient for the relationship between 
the mediator and the dependent variable. 
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Effect 
 
Sobel z  
from PLS 
Sobel z 
from 
regression 
 
Path 
coefficients 
 
Proportion 
of Effect  
 
 
Conclusion 
Collab to 
Continue 
Direct       - 0.158 49.2%  
Via MsgRelev   -1.751*    -1.618*     - 0.113 35.2% Hypothesis 4b confirmed 
 Via PercRisk   -1.867*    -2.908***     - 0.050 15.6% Hypothesis 5b confirmed 
 Total       - 0.322 100%  
       
PercContr 
to Continue 
Direct          0.321 83.2%  
Via MsgRelev    -1.189    -1.025    - 0.022 - 5.7% Hypothesis 4d  confirmed 
 Via PercRisk    2.204*      3.331***      0.087 22.5% Hypothesis 5d confirmed 
 Total        0.386 100%  
Table 5-14a  Overall results of our mediation analysis 
 
In table 5-14a we find that the mediation effects were consistent across regression analysis 
and PLS. Hypthesis 4d on the proposed suppressor role of MsgRelev on PercContr 
requires some additional explanation based upon suppressor tests as proposed by Iacobucci 
(2008), p39. The first test for suppression was found confirmed in table 5-8b in which the 
t-value of PercContr in model 2 was larger than this value in model 141. So when we 
control for the influence of MsgRelev, the direct relation between PercContr and Continue 
increases42. A second proof for suppression was found in the PLS model, in which the 
direct path coefficient of PercContr on Continue was positive and the indirect path via 
MsgRelev was negative, also providing evidence for suppression. Since suppression also 
theoretically makes sense, we confirmed hypothesis 4d.    
 
For comparison purpose we present the Sobel z statistics of regression of chapter 4 in table 
5-14b.  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
41 For mediation, the t-value of PercContr in model 2, should have been lower than the t-value in model 1.   
42 Interpret in our injury ± medicine ± pain example as: if we take into account the influence of the medicine, we 
find that the effect of injury on pain would be much stronger, since it was suppressed by the medicine 
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Effect 
 
Sobel z  
from PLS 
Sobel z 
from 
regression 
 
Path 
coefficients 
 
Proportion 
of Effect  
 
 
Conclusion 
Collab to 
Continue 
Direct   - 0.052 13.8%  
Via MsgRelev   - 4.635*** - 5.411*** - 0.218 57.8% Hypothesis 4b confirmed 
 Via PercRisk - 2.480** - 3.443*** - 0.056 14.9% Hypothesis 5b confirmed 
 Via ProbSucc - 2.571** - 3.159*** - 0.051 13.5% Hypothesis 6b confirmed 
 Total   - 0.377 100%  
       
GainFrame 
to Continue 
Direct    - 0.262 75.3%  
Via MsgRelev   - 2.352**   - 1.846* - 0.046 13.2% Hypothesis 4d confirmed  
 Via PercRisk   - 0.694   - 0.998 - 0.008 2.3% Hypoth 5d not confirmed 
 Via ProbSucc   - 2.219*   - 2.452*** - 0.032 9.2% Hypothesis 6d confirmed 
 Total   - 0.348 100%  
Table 5-14b  Overall results of our mediation analysis in chapter 4 
 
5.9. Other Relevant Results from the Experiment 
 
In addition to the hypothesis testing we performed in this chapter, the results of the 
experiment provided us with two additional sources of information that are of help in 
answering the research questions of this chapter.  
5.9.1. Open Questions 
 
We asked respondents throughout the development and testing stages of our experiment, to 
describe why they decided to continue or redirect. We eliminated this question in the final 
execution of the experiment since it appeared to take too much time of respondents. The 
open question provided us with the following findings from approximately 200 
participants who joined the test-stages: (1) The history with the messenger as a 
Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent, dominated the arguments to continue ± and was 
sometimes rationalized further; (2) Some respondents extended quite easily on their 
reasoning from considering the internal auditor as a Collaborative Partner to, as  a next 
step,  considering the auditor to be a credible source;  These are distinct constructs but may 
have a causal or correlational relationship; (3) Arguments related to Perceived Control  
sometimes were followed by UHVSRQGHQWV¶ RZQ H[SHULHQFHVZLWK VLPLODU SURMHFWV*LYHQ
the experimental design, of course this GRHVQ¶W cause differences between treatment 
groups. 
5.9.2. Estimated vs Given Probabilities to Succeed 
 
We asked all respondents to estimate the probability to succeed the project (and meet the 
business case). Since the auditor provided a Risk Warning that included the assessed 
chance of succeeding (1/3) and failing (2/3), we can compare these estimated probabilities 
across the four treatment groups with the information they had received. This could help in 
158 
 
understanding whether the Deaf Effect could apply to the probability part of the Risk 
Warning. The estimations across the four treatment groups are presented in Table 5-15 
below43. 
 
 Treat Collab 
Low 
Treat Collab 
High 
   
Treat PercContr 
High 
60.2% (19.7) 
N=33 
50.1% (15.9) 
N=34 
 
Treat PercContr 
Low 
37.9% (21.3) 
N=32 
40.0% (18.4) 
N=34 
 
Table 5-15 6XEMHFWV¶(VWLPDWHG3UREDELOLW\WR6XFFHHGZLWKJLYHQSUREDELOLW\RI3 
 
Subjects who received the low perceived control treatments estimated their probability to 
succeed slightly higher than the chance the auditor had provided in the Risk Warning. 
Remember that these subjects had working experience from the field, which could explain 
this bias. For example their idea that they regularly estimate probabilities to fail lower than 
the auditors estimate them. In this low perceived control position it hardly made any 
difference whether the auditor was seen as Collaborative Partner or Opponent. The high 
control treatment subjects estimated probabilities to succeed much higher. The interesting 
finding here is that their estimations to succeed further rose when they considered the 
messenger to be an Opponent (where this did not make a difference in the low perceived 
control treatment). This comfirms the expected effect of competitive arousal to the 
messenger in these conditions. This effect was attenuated in the low perceived control 
treatment conditions. 
 
5.10 Discussion and Implications 
5.10.1.  Contribution of this study 
 
Our model explained a substantial amount of the variance (46.3  LQ WKH VXEMHFWV¶
decision to continue a course of action and thus respond with the Deaf Effect to the 
LQWHUQDODXGLWRUV¶Risk Warning. Compared to the 53.9% explained variance with student 
subjects in chapter 4, we think this is relatively high given the use of respondents with 
working experience here, which inevitably brings noise and requires stronger treatments. 
&XHOODU¶V VWXGLHV, that were centered around source-credibility, provided even more with 
62.8% and 62.5% of explained variance (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006). The main 
difference is that we excluded this influential Credibility factor ± operationalized as 
³FU\ZROI´- from our model.  The warning was provided by a source that meets 
professional standards of credibility %HIRUH WXUQLQJ WR D GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH VWXG\¶V
                                                          
 
43 Please note that for this purpose we used the treatment variables instead of the independent variables that we 
used in our causal model and hypothesis testing.     
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limitations and implications for both future research and practice, it will be helpful to 
consider the following contributions of this study in light of these results. 
 
First, this study introduced and tested the effects of two variables ± (1) PHVVHQJHU¶V
Collaborative Partnership and (2) GHFVLVLRQPDNHU¶VSHUFHLYHGFRQWURO ± on the decision to 
continue a course of action despite the availability of a clear and obtrusive Risk Warning. 
Both constructs had not been tested in the context of the Deaf Effect earlier. Both provided 
a substantive and almost equal contribution in causing Deaf Effect. Nevertheless they 
differed in the mediating constructs through which they affected the decision to continue 
the course of action. The question of whether the messenger is seen as a Collaborative 
Partner or as an Opponent highly influenced the Message Relevance (MsgRelev) that 
people assigned to this warning and it LQIOXHQFHGVXEMHFWV¶3HUFHLYHG5LVNRiskPerc). The 
construct on the relationship with the messenger was derived from Stewardship Theory. 
We contribute to research on Stewardship Theory by testing it at a micro inter-personal 
level between the internal auditor and senior management, where most studies consider 
Stewardship Theory at organizational corporate governance level. Our results were 
consistent with expectations according to Stewardship Theory and were consistent with the 
findings in chapter 4. The GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V SHUFHLYHG FRQWURO had an effect on the 
continuation decision in a way that was expected from Illusion of Control Theory, with 
Perceived Risk as a strong mediator. The mediating role of Message Relevance was 
particular. It partially mediated the influence of the messenger¶V&ROODERUDWLYH3artnership 
on the decision to continue the course of action. This was consistent with the Heuristic-
Analytic Theory and with the results of chapter 4. Message Relevance appeared to act as 
suppressor variable for the effect of Perceived Control on the decision to continue the 
course of action.    
 
Second, this study provides some amount of quantitative empirical support for the 
theoretical distinction between internal auditors choosing either the path of Collaborative 
partnership or choosing the path of behaving as an Opponent in bringing their Risk 
Warning to decision makers. This distinction was suggested by other authors (Chambers et 
al., 1988; Keil & Robey, 2001) and buttressed primarily with qualitative, anecdotal 
evidence. In addition, this study contributes by providing empirical support that this 
distinction might be contingent to conditions of WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V3HUFHLYHG&RQWURO  
 
Third, this study is one of the first attempts in examining the Deaf Effect with mediation 
analysis that provides insight into the proportional effects of direct and indirect paths. 
Together with moderation analysis, this provides a richer view on the causes of Deaf 
Effect in the context of IS-projects and the role of various constructs. By combining 
different statistical methods of moderation and mediation analysis we contributed to 
statistical conclusion validity. By combining exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
for convergent and discriminant validity, and by performing various tests on measurement 
reliability we contributed to construct validity for further research on these constructs in 
the context of the Deaf Effect. And by sharing main parts of our design across two 
different experiments we also contributed to the external validity and nomological validity 
of research on the Deaf Effect based on the constructs and theories that we studied. 
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5.10.2.  Main Findings 
 
The following summary provides an overview of the findings of this empirical study on 
main effects and moderation effects: (1) Decision makers with low Perceived Control are 
more likely to discontinue the course of action after a Risk Warning. Decision makers with 
high Perceived Control are more likely to continue the course of action and repond with 
Deaf Effect to the Risk Warning; (2) The decision makers are less likely to continue the 
course of action after the Risk Warning, when the messenger is seen as a Collaborative 
Partner. The decision makers are more likely to continue the course of action after the Risk 
Warning, when the messenger is seen as an Opponent; (3) Decision maker¶s high level of 
Perceived Control amplifies the influence of the relationship with the messenger (seen as a 
Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent) on the decision to continue a course of action; 
and (4) Decision mDNHUV¶(VWLPDWHG3UREDELOLWy to Succeed is highest for decision makers 
with high Perceived Control who see the messenger as an Opponent. 
 
With respect to mediation effects, this empirical study provided the following findings: (1) 
The decision makers assign less relevance to the Risk Warning if the messenger is seen as 
an Opponent. They assign more relevance to the Risk Warning when the messenger is seen 
as a Collaborative Partner; (2) The effect of GHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶ 3HUFHLYHG&RQWURO RQ the 
decision to continue  is partially mediated by Perceived Risk, however the effect is mainly 
direct; (3) Message Relevance is a suppressor for the effect RIGHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶3HUFHLYHG
Control on the decision to continue a course of action ,W DFWV OLNH D µFRSLQJ¶ YDULDEOH
without this variable the influence of Perceived Control even would  have been stronger. 
5.10.3.  Limitations of The Study 
 
As is the case with all experiments, we should be cautious when generalizing the results of 
this study for several reasons. First, the experiment conducted in this study took a 
necessarily narrow focus in order to achieve a high degree of control over extraneous 
variables. There are, without doubt, other organizational and political factors that may also 
affect PDQDJHUV¶'HDI(IIHFW UHVSRQVHV WR5LVN:DUQLQJV. In Chapter 7 we will explore 
such factors following a multi-casestudy approach. Some factors may not lend themselves 
to experiments. Furthermore, this experiment does not provide insight into any feedback 
loops between the messenger and the decision maker in which the Deaf Effect might 
evolve. Second, in our study we focus on the Deaf Effect at inter-personal level: with the 
auditor as provider of an objective assessment and with the decision mDNHU¶VYLHZRQWKH
messenger (as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent) as a determinant. Of course, this 
inter-personal view, is only one level in the corporate governance framework 
implementation based upon Stewardship Theory principles. We did not study any effects at 
a department-level or at an organizational level. Third, our measures of the Collab 
construct in the context of Internal Auditor ± Project Owner relationship were self-
developed given our particular level (inter personal) and context. Although they were 
derived from literature, tested and improved in the preparations of this study and shared 
with experts, they ask for more refinement and testing. Finally, as is customary to many 
experiments of this type, we have measured our constructs by self-report of student 
participants. Combined with the obtrusive nature of an experiment this may restrict 
H[WHUQDO YDOLGLW\ RI WKH UHVXOWV ,W LV SRVVLEOH WKDW SHRSOH¶V UHDFWLRQ WR WKH WUHDWPHQW
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scenarios might differ from an on-the job reaction. It is also possible that self-reported 
measurements on Message Relevance, when asked to rate them on 7-point Likert scale, 
might not show entirely consistent results with measuring Message Relevance when 
subjects were involved in an eye movement tracking experiment. For this reason, the latter 
was proposed by Ball et al. (2003) in order to measure Message Relevance in Heuristic 
Analytic theory experiments in psychology. This might also count for applied experiments 
as we performed here.  
5.10.4.  Suggestions for Further Study 
 
We think that further experimental research on Perceived Control in the field of the Deaf 
Effect in Escalating IS-projects could prove very interesting. This could follow two paths. 
First, within-subject experimental designs ± such as of Jani (2005) - could provide more 
refined insight in cumulated effects of Perceived Control on Deaf Effect. A second path 
could be found in replications in this context of the various psychology experiments on 
Illusion of Control Theory. Factors such as decision maker¶Vfreedom of choice, predicted 
outcome, need for the outcome, familiarity, competition and actor/observer positions have 
been tested in card-playing psychological experiments. In the field of stop/continue 
decisions in escalating IS-projects, these conditions could be induced by Decision MakerV¶
organizational environment, such as: freedom of choice, responsibility, clear goals and 
plans, incentives, scarce resources, use of standards, reliability of information. By knowing 
the influence of Perceived Control on the Deaf Effect, it could be interesting to investigate 
organizational conditions that could be of influence on Perceived Control and thus on the 
Deaf Effect.  
 
Finally, the Stewardship Theory component of our study could be further elaborated in the 
context of the Deaf Effect for auditor warnings in IS-projects. From methodological 
perspective, it appears to be interesting to follow a path of multi-level constructs to take 
into account both the organizational level and the individual level of the decision maker in 
order to obtain a deeper understanding of the Deaf Effect in IS-projects, with the IS-study 
of Burton-Jones and Gallivan (2007) as an example of how this could be approached. 
Furthermore it would be interesting to isolate constructs ± such as Trust - that are closely 
related to Stewardship Theory, on their causal relation with the Deaf Effect.  
5.10.5.  Implications for Internal Auditors 
 
Although not new of course, this study reminds the internal audit profession that the 
effectiveness of their service ± reporting on risks and controls ± includes the concepts of 
human information processing and bounded rationality. 
 
One guidance on effective communication that could be derived from our study is related 
to the decisioQPDNHU¶VSHUFHLYHGFRQWURO A decision maker with a perceived control too 
high could become deaf to Risk Warnings and could become too much risk seeking. As we 
could learn from Illusion of Control experiments, Perceived Control can be influenced by 
many factors. A positive outcome history with earlier projects could be one of the 
dominant factors of high perceived control. The internal auditors could be alert on 
indicators that ± often experienced ± managers could be prone to invulnerability effect. 
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Compare with the over-confident car-GULYHU ZKR GRHVQ¶W XVH VHDWEHOWV XVHV D PRELOH
phone or violates traffic rules. Similar indicators could be found as thresholds in business 
environment and could be helpful for auditors to notify tendencies to invulnerability effect 
through high perceived control. Furthermore, the internal auditor should realize that a 
decision maker with high Perceived Control could be promoted to respond Deaf when he 
sees the messenger as an Opponent. This means that the internal auditor him or herself is 
more than just an observer of the project and of the decision making. 7KHLQWHUQDODXGLWRU¶V
reported observations could fuel escalation of commitment and the Deaf Effect even 
further when the internal auditor is seen as an Opponent who is exposing management 
failure. The auditor should take this into consideration for his communication to 
management and aim for a communication strategy that brings perceived control to a 
realistic level.  
 
A second guidance on effective communication of auditor warnings, applies to how to 
make use of the advantage of Collaborative Partnership in a particular situation. If the 
internal auditor  might not directly be seen as a Collaborative Partner him/herself, the audit 
executive ± with a strategic Collaborative Partnership history with the manager ± could be 
more effective in sharing concerns with executive management. Another scenario would 
be to share the factual concerns with a person or with persons that the decision maker sees 
as Collaborative Partner(s) and who are less incapsulated in the course of action (the 
project).  
5.10.6  Implications for managers and organizations 
 
The main implications of our study at management and organization level go beyond the 
effective contribution of an internal auditors tR WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V,6-projects. Regardless 
the role of the internal auditor, the organization itself and the managers involved are not 
served by irrational decision making in IS-projects due to exceeded thresholds on 
perceived control. Heuristics are parWRIPDQDJHU¶VH[SHULHQFHDQGDUHYHU\XVHIXO WR WKH
performance of managers and their valuable contribution to the organization. Strategic IS-
SURMHFWV RIWHQ DUH VR FRPSOH[ LQWDQJLEOH DQG UHOHYDQW WKDW WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V PRVW
experienced staff will be assigned to such projects. Nevertheless there could be some 
pitfalls connected to these heuristics which should be circumvented within the 
organization. Organizational conditions should not allow or even promote Perceived 
control to exceed a threshold. As we saw in the Illusion of Control experiments, freedom 
of choice, high involvement, long experience, need for the outcome could elevate 
perceived control to much higher levels than warranted by the actual level of control. So 
the organization should guard that thresholds on these ± and similar ± organizational 
factors are not exceeded without notice. With interventions such as job-rotation, adapted 
incentive schemes, peer reviews and with clear standards, the organization could balance 
PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHLYHGFRQWrol to remain at sane levels.   
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CHAPTER 6. ACTOR-OBSERVER DIFFERENCE UPON IS-RISK 
WARNINGS:  AN EXPERIMENT ON ILLUSION OF CONTROL 
THEORY   
  
6.1.  Introduction 
 
In CKDSWHUZHH[DPLQHGWKHLQIOXHQFHRIGHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶3HUFHLYHG&RQWURORQthe Deaf 
Effect for a Risk Warning from the internal auditor. We found that this influence was 
SDUWLDOO\PHGLDWHGE\GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V3HUFHLYHG5LVNXSRQWKDWZDUQLQJ,QWKLVFKDSWHU
we will focus on Perceived Risk. 
 
From earlier laboratory experiments we learned thaW GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V SHUVRQDO
characteristics such as working experience, age, gender and risk propensity affected the 
Deaf Effect(Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006; Cuellar et al., 2007). This working 
experience was measured as a number of  working years. This number of years appears to 
reflect that people have developed heuristics over time that may be of influence on the 
Deaf Effect. Despite the equal number of working years, people in different roles may 
have developed different heuristics. These heuristics could account for different 
perceptions of risk across managers and internal auditors based on identical information on 
IS-risks. Therefore, we aim to gain further insight into these differences across managers 
and internal auditors in their perception of risks which could be related to their perceived 
control heuristics. 
 
Surveys from the field shed more light on whether experienced managers indeed could 
show risk behaviour tendencies that could be related to Perceived Control. Perceived 
Control was addressed in a large scale study on risk-taking obtaining responses from 656 
executives (March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995) from American and Israeli executives 
from private-sector and public-sector firms. The findings of this study on Perceived 
Control are supported by another large survey and interviews performed across 509 
executives across US and Canada (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). That survey suggests 
WKDWPDQDJHUVGRQ¶WDFFHSWWKHLGHDWhat the risks they face are inherent in their situation. 
Rather, they believe that risks can be reduced by using skill to control the dangers (March 
& Shapira, 1987), p1410. Seventy-five percent of the managers saw risks as controllable. 
Managers see themselves as taking risks, but only after modifying and working on the 
dangers so that they can be confident of success. Prior to a decision, they look for risk 
controlling strategies (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; March & Shapira, 1987). The 
highest ranked modes of dealing with risks according to Shapira (1995) p76, were (1) to 
collect more Information, (2) to check different sspects, (3) actively work on the problem 
and (4) to delay the decision. Shapira suggested that managers consider these as ways to 
exert skill and enhance perceived control over the risks.  
 
A survey across 210 British and Scottish Managers and accountants (Helliar et al., 2002) 
showed that, managers and auditors exhibit many of the biases that have been documented 
for executives in other studies (March & Shapira, 1987; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). This survey 
also provided insight into several differences between managers and auditors in their 
Perception of Risk, which we will describe later as an introduction to our hypotheses. At 
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this point, we conclude that it appears to be useful for our study on the Deaf Effect to 
obtain further insight in differences in Risk Perception across managers and internal 
auditors, based upon different heuristics that could be related to their working experience 
in either role.  
 
Two perspectives are taken to analyze these differences. First, we are interested in whether 
working experience as an auditor ± with their heuristics as observer -  or as a manager ± 
with their heuristics as actor - leads to different perceptions of identical information on IS-
risks. Second, we are interested in whether employees with different Risk Propensity, 
would show different Perceived Risk after receiving a Risk Warning. We will explain and 
elaborate these perspectives in the next section. 
6.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
In order to refine our Research Questions we first clarify that the proposed contribution of 
this study will be to understand How Risk Perception could differ between managers and 
internal auditors on reported IS-risks. The assumptions and scope that we will take into 
account are: 
x The unit of analysis is the employee who receives a Risk Warning on IS-risks; 
x The Messenger acts in the role of internal auditor who meets the professional 
standards of the Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004). These standards address 
the criterion of a Bad News Messenger who is acting as a credible source - i.e. 
who has the expertise and could be relied upon to make true assertions (Cuellar et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, they assure that the internal auditor would operate from 
an Auditing Function which is independent from management authority (Keil & 
Robey, 2001); 
x The dependent variable is Perceived Risk. As we found in previous chapters, this 
variable played a role in explaining the Deaf Effect for Risk warnings. 
This brings us to the following table with the research questions which we aim to answer 
in this chapter: 
 
   Research Question Type of 
Question 
   
   
6 Do managers and internal auditors have different perceptions of risk after 
receiving a Risk Warning, which can be related to their working 
experience? 
Why/How 
 6.1 Are these differences consistent with expected heuristics from 
Illusion of Control Theory ± the actor/observer heuristic in particular? 
Why/How 
 6.2 Are these differences related to Risk Propensity? Why/How 
 
 
  
Table 6-1 Contribution of this empirical study 
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The suggested actor/observer difference is derived from an applied study on Illusion of 
Control in car driving behavior. Horswill and McKenna (1999) used an experiment to 
assess the effect of perceived control on risk taking in a dynamic every day task. Using 
established and validated video simulation techniques, the risk-taking preferences of 96 
drivers were measured for a range of driving activities (speed choice, following distance, 
gap acceptance and overtaking). Their Perceived Control manipulation was as follows: half 
of the participants were told to imagine they were driving the vehicle, and the other half 
were told to imagine they were passengers. Those who were told to imagine they were 
driving chose significantly faster speeds than did those who were told to imagine they were 
passengers. People who assumed to be sitting at the driver-seat showed significantly more 
risk seeking behaviour than people assumed to be sitting at the passenger seat. So, the role 
of actor versus observer moderated the behaviour that participants showed based on the 
information they saw on video.  
 
We consider the auditors to be in the position of observer. They have developed heuristics 
from sitting at the passenger-seat within their organisation and they provide Risk Warnings 
to management with the objective that these managers take action. We consider 
management to be in the position of actor. They have developed heuristics from sitting in 
the drivers-seat and taking action. According to Illusion of Control Theory, the manager 
(actor) would show more risk seeking behaviour and show lower Perceived Risk than the 
observer, the auditor. 
 
This actor/observer effect was confirmed in a sequence of simple Illusion of Control 
experiments in which participants were asked to estimate their probabilities to win in a 
lottery under various experimental conditions. Participants who were allowed to choose 
their own lottery tickets required more compensation to be induced to exchange their 
tickets than those who did not choose their ticket (Langer, 1975). In a second "lottery 
ticket exchange" study, the same result was found even when the exchange ticket had a 
higher probability of winning than did the original ticket. Similarly, choice and 
involvement (choice of symbols and shuffling the symbol deck) led to stronger beliefs in 
WKHVXFFHVVRIRQH¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDWH[WUDVHQVRU\SHUFHSWLRQ$\HURII	$EHOVRQ,Q
a coin toss experiment, participants who were the performers rated themselves better at the 
task and predicted they would have more successes than observers did (Langer & Roth, 
1975).  
 
Based on these experiments, we expect that managers will show a lower Perceived Risk 
than internal auditors based on identical information. We find support in the survey across 
210 British and Scottish Managers and accountants (Helliar et al., 2002) that showed 
similarities and differences between managers and auditors. It showed that both managers 
and auditors focus on the (positive/negative) framing of a decision with an emphasis on the 
magnitude of negative outcomes and with a insensitivity to probability estimates.  Results 
showed for both auditors and managers that relevant information, more control, greater 
expertise, ability to consult colleagues, time to consider a decision, and the potential of 
positive outcomes play a significant role in the perception of risk. Furthermore, decision 
PDNHU¶V SHUVRQDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG RUJDQLVDWLRQDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV culture, reward 
structure and favourable economic circumstances) play a significant role for both auditors¶
DQGPDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIULVNEXWGLGQ¶WGLIIHUEHWZHHQWKHWZRJURXSV5HVXOWVDOVR
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suggest that the probability of a loss to occur drives auditors¶ ULVNSHUFHSWLRQ WRDKLJKHU
level than it does to managers. The same applies to the magnitude of any potential loss 
resulting from a decision. Thus, information on higher probability and impact would drive 
auditors to significantly higher levels of perceived risk than it does to managers.  
 
Based on these studies, we expect WKDWPDQDJHUVDQGDXGLWRUV¶3HUFHLYHG5LVNLVGRPLQDWHG
by information on Impact. They differ in the level of Perceived Risk and their different 
heuristics related to Probability of Loss. To once again make the comparison with car-
driving, for managers their perceived control is likely to increase over years. This may 
drive them to underestimate probability that risk could occur to them personally (Sjöberg, 
2000a), much in the same way as it does to experienced car-drivers (Horswill & McKenna, 
1999). The experienced car-driver, sitting at the steering-wheel, does not assume that is his 
or her car-accidents are cheaper to repair than those of others ± i.e. the impact of risk. 
Instead, they assume that the probability that a car-accident happens to them personally is 
lower than for others. 
 
As reported by March and Shapira (1987) p1411, only two of the 50 executives 
interviewed said that they accept risk estimates as given to them. Most managers believe 
that they can do better than is expected. Managerial confidence in the possibilities for post-
decision reduction in risk comes from an interpretation of their managerial experience. 
Thus, managers accept risks, in part, because they do not expect that they will have to bear 
them. They perceive that risk-information does not apply to them personally.They 
especially tend to think that they can beat the probability estimations. Their experience and 
FRQILUPDWLRQVRIEHDWLQJWKHRGGVPD\IXUWKHUERRVWPDQDJHUV¶FRQILGHQFHDQGSHUFHLYHG
control while making decision on risks (Shapira, 1995), p82. Experienced managers 
appeared to be the least sensitive for given probability-information, while being confident 
that these probabilities did not apply to them personally (Shapira, 1995), p74.    
 
These considerations provide us with the following hypotheses for our study. 
 
H1a. Probability Information in a Risk 
Warning affects the Risk Perception of 
the receiver of that Risk Warning 
 
 
 
H1b. Impact Information in a Risk 
Warning affects the Risk Perception of 
the receiver of that Risk Warning 
 
H1c. Impact Information in a Risk 
Warning affects the Risk Perception more 
strongly than Probability Information. 
 
 
H2a. Employees with a role of acting on 
IS-risks show a lower Risk Perception 
than employees with a role of observing 
IS-risks when they receive a Risk 
Warning. 
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H2b. Employees with a role of acting on 
IS-risks are less affected by Probability 
information in a Risk Warning than 
employees with a role of observing IS-
risks. 
 
 
 
In addition to the actor/observer perspective we also SURSRVHHPSOR\HH¶V5LVN3URSHQVLW\
to be related to his/her working experience. The suggested influence of Risk propensity on 
Perceived Risk is indicated as follows. When someone is more risk averse, this may result 
LQ WKLV SHUVRQ¶V ULVN WROHUDQFHV EHLQJPRUH HDVLO\ H[FHHGHG DQG in perceiving risks in a 
particular situation more highly than someone who is less risk averse.  A person¶VDWWLWXGH
towards risk is considered a general personality-trait (refered to as risk-attitude) or could 
be domain-specific, called risk propensity (Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O'Creevy, & 
Willman, 2005). Sitkin and Weingart (1995) propose that both risk perception and risk 
propensity play a role in human decision making. There appears to be strong support for 
the existence of a relatively stable individual tendency to take or avoid risks. MacCrimmon 
and Wehrung (1985) for example, found consistent responses of people on different 
measures of willingness to take risks. These findings suggest the possibility to rate 
VRPHRQH¶VEHKDYLRURQDVFDOHIURPULVN seeking to risk averse. Some authors have even 
defined risk propensity as a personality trait, implying that it is stable over time and across 
circumstances (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1981). Subsequently, 
various measures have been designed to assess risk propensity as a stable personality trait 
by applying measures similar to personality assessment instruments. We refer to Harrison, 
Young, Butow, Salkeld, and Solomon (2005) for an overview of  measurement instruments 
WKDWDVVXPHWKDWSHUVRQ¶VULVNSURSHQVLW\LVVWDEOHDFURVVGRPDLQV 
 
In a study by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002), support for risk propensity as a stable trait 
was not found across different domains. These results suggest that people could show 
consistent risk averse behavior within certain domains and can show completely opposite 
behavior in other domains. )RU H[DPSOH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V EHKDYLRU RI DEXQGDQW VPRNLQJ
and drinking suggests a risk-seeking risk propensity in the domain of personal health. This 
however does not automatically imply that the same individual is risk seeking in other 
domains such as career and prestige. On the contrary, the individual could very well 
behave in a very risk-averse manner in such domains. From this perspective, risk 
propensity is defined as a domain specific behavioral tendency rather than as a pure 
personality trait (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992)$QLQGLYLGXDO¶VULVNSURSHQVLW\LVODUJHO\VKDSHG
by the characteristics of time and situation. Certain situations could demand certain 
DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGULVNRUSUHYLRXVH[SHULHQFHVLQDFHUWDLQGRPDLQFRXOGKDYHFKDQJHGRQH¶V
attitude. The behavioral tendency within specific domains however, has been found to be 
stable (Weber et al., 2002). To assess risk propensity across and within specific domains, 
various instruments have been developed as well. The before mentioned overview by 
Harrison et al. (2005) also includes instruments that bare the assumption that Risk 
Propensity is domain specific. 
In order to undeUVWDQGDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VJHQHUDO WHQGHQF\ WRZDUGHLWKHU WDNLQJRUDYRLGLQJ
risk, one should investigate the underlying factors. Sitkin and Pablo (1992) have conducted 
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a comprehensive examination of different streams of literature on risk and decision-
making. This study resulted in the proposition of a model in which the causal relations that 
account for risk behavior are explained. Risk propensity was found to be the most 
important determinant of risk behavior. Further examination revealed three underlying 
factors that shape risk propensity: risk preference, inertia and outcome history. Risk 
preference is proposed as a shaping factor of risk propensity (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) and 
refers to the stable individual risk disposition to prefer or dislike risks. Inertia refers to the 
notion that individuals exhibit routine ways of handling risky situations. This individual 
orientation appears to be persistent over time, forming a relatively stable pattern (Kogan & 
Wallach, 1964; Slovic, 1972). Consistent with this pattern, it is expected that people who 
behaved risk aversely in the past will often continue this behavior, even with a stimulus 
that asks for a shift to more risk seeking behavior. This persistent behavioral tendency 
appears to shape risk propensity for a large part (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Outcome history  
of previous risky situations is an aspect omitted in many theories. Prospect Theory, for 
example, does not include historical events at all in the decision making process44. The 
outcome of previous risky decisions however, KDVEHHQVKRZQWRLQIOXHQFHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
risk propensity. Osborn & Jackson (1988) found that decision makers seek risks in the 
domain of gains if prior risk-seeking actions were successful. The same pattern can be 
applied to risk-averse decision strategies if prior risk-averse actions were successful. Sitkin 
and Weingart (1995) reached the same conclusions after finding a significant influence of 
RXWFRPH KLVWRU\ RQ ULVN SURSHQVLW\ 2XWFRPH KLVWRU\ DSSHDUV WR LQIOXHQFH RQH¶V ULVN
propensity by altering risk behavior.  
 
Adopting the position that Risk Propensity would be domain specific and be shaped by 
former experiences and behavior, we propose that differences in Risk Propensity across 
employees will be related to differences in Perceived Risk as well. While referring to the 
constructs and relations according to the model as presented by Sitkin and Pablo (1992) 
and refined by Sitkin and Weingart (1995), many experimental studies in the domain of 
Information Systems (Du et al., 2007; Keil et al., 2000b; Keil et al., 2000c) and  escalation 
behavior (Wong, 2005), confirmed that people with a high level of Risk Propensity (high 
tolerance) will likely show a low level of Perceived Risk in this domain. This results in 
hypothesis H3a: 
 
 
H3a. Employees with a Low Risk 
Propensity on IS-risks  show a higher 
Risk Perception than employees with a 
high Risk Propensity on IS-risks when 
they receive a Risk Warning 
 
 
In the next section we will discuss the research strategy and design used in order to test the 
hypotheses as described.   
                                                          
 
44 This claim is made by Sitkin and Pablo (1992). Although one could argue whether Outcome History might be 
embedded in the Reference Point as defined in Prospect Theory, Outcome History is not defined as a distinct 
construct in Prospect Theory.  
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6.3. Research Method 
 
In this substudy we will follow a strategy of experimental research in order to create 
settings that are helpful to answer our research questions. As reported earlier in this 
chapter, the actor/observer effect has already been tested and confirmed in various Illusion 
of Control game-playing experiments in laboratory conditions. Greenberg and Tomlinson 
(2004) show that laboratory experiments are widely regarded for the opportunities they 
provide to control variables of interest and answer Why questions. They also show that 
laboratory experiments are criticized on their artificial settings that would lack context 
realism and which limits their usefulness in studying organizational phenomena. Our 
research question however typically refers to such organizational phenomenon and 
requires that we have respondents with actor/observer heuristics from their working 
experience as internal auditors or as managers. In order to trigger those heuristics by 
realistic warnings, we would have to bring those respondents in experimental settings as 
close as possible to their realistic working conditions. So from that perspective we would 
prefer the empirical research strategy of a field experiment (Boudreau et al., 2001). Field 
experiments involve the experimental manipulation of one or more variables within a 
naturally occurring system and a subsequent measurement of the impact of the 
manipulation on one or more dependent variables (Boudreau et al., 2001). Field 
experiments are conducted in natural settings, and are not subject to the same criticisms of 
artificiality and lack of generalizability. However, EHFDXVHLW¶VGLIILFXOWLIQRWLPSRVVLEOH
to control the impact of variables in a field experiment, they tend to lack the same high 
degree of control found in most lab experiments (Greenberg & Tomlinson, 2004). In order 
to stress context realism we involved in our study managers and internal auditors from one 
particular dutch financial organization and provided them with experimental manipulations 
and measurements that were as close to realistic as we could reasonably get, by (1) using 
hypothetical audit-findings which were adapted from existing audit-findings (2) using  
their own and operational reporting standards, definitions and measurement scales. 
However, it would not have been realistic nor ethical to perform a true field experiment 
and report nine hypothetical (relatively high risk) audit-ILQGLQJVLQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶Vreal 
risk-procedures and to distribute those hypothetical findings to managers and internal 
auditors throughout the organization as part of real operational reporting procedures. 
Therefore we had to reach one notch down on the context-realism axis of this study by 
choosing a research strategy that could be best described as a³VLWXDWHG H[SHULPHQW´
(Greenberg & Tomlinson, 2004). This is an experiment that is executed in organizational 
field conditions and that maximizes the benefits of those realistic conditions while taking 
care of principles of experimental validity as known from laboratory experiments.  
 
One of the major threats to validity in our experiment, would be the lack of control  over 
confounding variables. Structural variance in personal and situational characteristics could 
provide rival explanations for our hypotheses in the case that statistiscal conclusions 
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appear to confirm these hypotheses. This regular threat to internal validity45 is often 
mitigated in laboratory experiments by applying a  between-subject design with random 
assignment of treatment conditions (Shadish et al., 2002) to groups of participants. Given 
the nature of our research question ± to assess interaction effects - this would have required 
a number of participants that was considered too high to be realistic for a study in field 
conditions46. Therefore, we have applied two major design principles in this study. We 
strongly mitigated the heterogeneity of respondents on situational factors (culture, type of 
organization, size of organization) by chosing respondents from one single organization. 
Although this partially reduced the external validity of our study, it improved internal 
validity of our study and provided opportunities to compare between groups of respondents 
(internal auditors and IS managers) on standardized criteria. The second principle of our 
H[SHULPHQWDO GHVLJQ DLPHG WR PLWLJDWH WKH VWUXFWXUDO LQIOXHQFH RI UHVSRQGHQWV¶ SHUVRQDO
characteristics on our results. We applied a within-subject experimental design to provide 
all participants with a sequence of treatments and measurements. Repeated observations 
from indivuals allow us to control for personal differences -  they become their own 
control group for these treatments ± and can increase statistical power so that fewer 
participants could be used (Shadish et al., 2002), p109. Based on our objective to analyze 
differences between groups of employees (internal auditors and IS managers) who are 
provided with a sequence of within-subject treatments, we implemented our experiment as 
a mixed design (Field, 2009), p507. In order to deal with remaining validity threats and for 
further interpretation, our design included additional measurements of particular 
characteristics that could show to be relevant. Finally, we provided our respondents with 
post-experiment questions that should unhide problems as well as a question on their risk 
assessments in the field which could provide an additional perspective on interpreting the 
results of the experiment.   
 
6.4. Procedures & Respondents 
 
As part of our research design we decided to select respondents from one organization in 
our study, as a few other studies did (Biggs, Messier, & Hansen, 1987; Curtis & Viator, 
2000). This allowed us to strengthen the validity of our study, since all respondents were 
familiar with the risk reporting framework and the context of the treatments. It also 
mitigated the influence of confounding variables from the organizational context on the 
observations in our study. The shared HR-framework with standardized joblevels and 
titles, allowed us a better analysis of group-differences between employees in different 
roles, but with comparable working experience. We could take into account different 
dynamics in which people build up the working experience that is relevant to their role  
(Biggs et al., 1987; Curtis & Viator, 2000) and could therefore improve internal validity of 
our study.  
 
                                                          
 
45 We refer to section 3.3.3. on Research Design and Validity in which describe triangulation across the empirical 
studies in this thesis 
46 Assuming that we adopt the single measurement-scales from our organizational field context, it would require 
over 500 participants to assess significant interaction effects according to estimations presented by Chin (1996).   
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We involved 70 internal auditors and 32 IS-managers from D'XWFKILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQ¶V
PDLQRIILFHV LQRXUVWXG\$OOHPSOR\HHVZHUH IDPLOLDUZLWK WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVWDQGDUGV
and procedures on risk-reporting, either from an internal auditing perspective or from a 
management perspective. Given the dominant role of Information Technology and 
,QIRUPDWLRQ 6\VWHPV ZLWKLQ WKH EDQN¶V VWUDWHJ\ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG RSHUDWLRQV DOO
employees had some familiarity with the implications of IS and IS-risks. These employees 
ZRUN LQ WKH EDQN¶V RIILFHV LQ$PVWHUGDP/RQGRQ DQG H[HFXWH WKHLU WDVNV JOREDOO\ IURP
regional hubs.  
 
The respondents were invited by email and joined the study on a voluntary basis. The 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶JHQGHUH[SHULHQFHQDWLRQDOLW\DQGIXQFWLRQOHYHOare described in tables 6-2a 
and 6-2b below. The request was directed47 at employees that had been involved in internal 
audit reporting on IS risks over the previous years, either as an internal auditor (observing, 
assessing, discuss and reporting on IS-risks) or as an IS manager (receiving internal audit 
reports, discuss, response and take action on IS-risks).   
 
Working Experience Gender Nationality Function Level 
 
< 3 yrs 
3-5 yrs 
5-10 yrs 
10-15 yrs 
> 15 yrs 
 
 
3 
23 
32 
12 
0 
 
4% 
33% 
46% 
17% 
0% 
 
Male 
Female 
 
58 
12 
 
83% 
17% 
 
Dutch 
British 
Other 
 
 
 
 
37 
22 
11 
 
53% 
31% 
16% 
 
 
1 Auditor 
2 Senior Auditor 
3 Auditmanager (VP) 
4 Head Audit (SVP) 
5 Director Audit (EVP) 
 
16 
31 
21 
1 
1 
 
24% 
44% 
30% 
1% 
1% 
 
Total 70 100% 
 
 70 100%  70 100%  70 100% 
   Table 6-2a Descriptives of the Internal Auditors 
 
   Table 6-2b Descriptives of the IS-managers 
 
This table shows that the IS managers showed slightly more years of experience and higher 
function levels than the internal auditors did. This appears to be a reasonable 
representation of employees who are involved in the reporting of IS-risks by internal 
auditors. Internal auditors at all function levels execute audits, discuss findings with their 
                                                          
 
47 In chapter 4 and 5 we included the Collaborative Partner vs Opponent relationship between internal auditor as 
messenger and manager as receiver. We expect that the Collaborative Partners are better represented than 
Opponents in the group of IS managers that were willing to participate in this study on a voluntary basis.      
Working Experience Gender Nationality Function Level 
 
< 3 yrs 
3-5 yrs 
5-10 yrs 
10-15 yrs 
> 15 yrs 
Unknown 
 
 
0 
1 
7 
10 
13 
1 
 
0% 
3% 
22% 
31% 
41% 
3% 
 
Male 
Female 
 
28 
4 
 
88% 
12% 
 
Dutch 
British 
Other 
 
 
 
 
9 
22 
1 
 
28% 
69% 
3% 
 
 
1.Projectmgr equiv 
2.Sr.Projectmgr equiv 
3.Progmgr/IS-mgr (VP) 
4.Progmgr/IS-head (SVP) 
5.IS-Director (EVP) 
 
1 
10 
6 
8 
7 
 
3% 
31% 
19% 
25% 
22% 
 
Total 
 
32 100%  32 100%  32 100%  32 100% 
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senior staff and report to higher management within IS and business. Internal auditors and 
IS managers showed a different representation of Dutch and British participants.    
  
6.5.  Treatments 
 
Within the context of our mixed design experiment, we gave all respondents similar 
within-subject treatments. The within-subject treatments consisted of a sequence of nine 
audit-findings that were provided by an internal auditor. In order to create equal 
conditions, all participants ± regardless their role in practice ± were placed in the position 
where they received the audit warnings and were asked to assess a Riskrating based on the 
same information.  
 
The treatments varied in the level of Probabilty and Impact that was assessed and 
presented for that finding by the internal auditor. In order to obtain independence of the 
individual treatments, we presented them as individual findings covering the domain of IS-
risks as defined by CobiT48. The audit-findings (cases) were derived from earlier real 
audit-reports and adapted for the purpose of this study. They covered IS-risks, such as IS-
EDFNXS¶V '6 ,6-capacity planning (DS2), IS-helpdesk (DS10), IS-change 
management (AI6) and IS-continuity (DS4) from the domains Acquisition & 
Implementation (AI) and Delivery & Support (DS) according to the IS-governance 
framework CobiT. The findings covered the complete range of combinations of probability 
and impact levels (Low-Medium-High). We pre-tested and mitigated inconsistencies 
EHWZHHQ ³JLYHQ´ SUREDELOLW\ DQG LPSDFW DQG WKH GHVFULSWLRQ WKURXJK IHHGEDFN IURP ,6-
professionals (IS Audit director, IS-audit lecturer and IS-consultant). Those professionals 
involved in pre-testing were not invited to respond to this study. We refer to the appendix 
of this chapter for the details on our treatments and the information we provided to the 
respondents. 
6.6.  Measurement Model 
 
In order to analyze relations between the constructs at the conceptual level of our model, 
we first translated these constructs into operational variables. These operational variables 
should serve proper measurement and should support statistical analysis of relations at 
operational level. In order to transfer statistical results at operational level to conceptual 
level, the internal validity, construct validity and statistical conclusion validity of the 
model should be safeguarded and assessed first (Shadish et al., 2002). Variables at 
operational level should have been defined and measured properly so we assessed validity 
first before building further with our analysis and conclusions. As presented by Straub et 
al. (2004) validity of the instrumentation (manipulation and measurements) should form a 
                                                          
 
48 We prefered individual findings on a broader range of IS-risks over the alternative of providing findings on an 
IS-project or multiple IS-projects. The domain of IS-projects would have fit better the other empirical chapters, 
however would have blended the treatments. The treatments in this chapter are applicable to Deaf Effect for 
internal auditor warnings on IS-risks.    
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basis for achieving internal validity (ruling out rival hypotheses) and statistical conclusion 
validity.    
 
In the table 6-3 we provide an overview of how we translated constructs to variables 
(called items).  We refer to the appendix at the end of this chapter for a detailed description 
of the individual measurement items of the questionnaire that we used in our field-
experiment. For reason of context-realism, we adopted most manipulation- and 
measurement instruments from the organization in which we performed this study. 
 
Variables 
 
Contruct Type Content Measurement Source of items 
 
RiskRating 1 to 9 Endogenous, 
Dependent 
Variables 
Rated Risk Level 
according to 
organization standards 
9 within-subject 
measurements with 1-item 3 
level rational scale  
 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VULVN
assessment and reporting 
standards 
Probability Exogenous 
Independent 
Probability-Level of 
Risk as assessed by the 
internal auditor 
 
9 within-subject treatments 
With 1-item 3-level  scale 
items 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VULVN
assessment and reporting 
standards 
Impact Exogenous 
Independent 
Impact-Level of Risk 
as assessed by the 
internal auditor 
 
9 within-subject treatments 
With 1-item 3-level  scale 
items 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VULVN
assessment and reporting 
standards  
RiskProp Exogenous 
Independent 
Domain related Risk 
Propensity  
Six 5-point Likert scale 
items  
Adapted from Risk 
Propensity Scale of 
Nicholson (2005) 
 
VicePres Exogenous 
Independent 
Working experience 
rewarded Vice-
President  
Dichotomous VicePresident 
or not. Reported titles (VP-
SVP-EVP) and jobfunctions 
 
Jobfunctions, and titles 
(VP-SVP-EVP) were 
reported according to 
organizations HR-
framework 
 
AuditRole Exogenous 
Independent 
Role as Auditor 
(observer) or Manager 
(Actor) 
 
Dichotomous Auditor or not Jobfunction 
 
Gender,  
Nationality 
Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQWV¶JHQGHU
and nationality 
 
Translated into dichotomous 
dummy variables 
 
Education Exogenous, 
Control 
Highest professional 
education 
Self-report  
Working 
Experience 
Exogenous, 
Control 
5HVSRQGHQWV¶\HDUVRI
working experience 
1-item  Not used, given various 
interpretations 
Table 6-3 Measurement of Constructs 
 
The nine measured Riskrating scores served as the final dependent variables in our model 
(thus required multivariate analysis). We preferred the term RiskRating over Risk 
3HUFHSWLRQ LQ WKLV VWXG\5LVN3HUFHSWLRQ LVGHILQHGDV  ³'HFLVLRQPDNHU¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI
WKHULVNLQKHUHQWLQDVLWXDWLRQ´6LWNLQ	3DEOR6LWNLQ	:HLQJDUW6M|EHUJ
2000b). This definition fits the constructs we consider to be our dependent variables. The 
issue however is, that Riskrating ± in addition to the definition of Risk Perception ± is 
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defined as a means of standardized communicating about risk perceptions within the 
organisation.    
 
:H PHDVXUHG UHVSRQGHQWV¶ Risk Propensity according to the Risk Propensity Scale as 
developed by Nicholson (Nicholson et al., 2005), which we adapted to the specific domain 
of our IS-risks. This instrument met our criterion that it would support the assumption that 
risk propensity could vary across domains instead of considering it as a stable personality 
trait. Second, it should show concistency with the broad domain of treatments and 
Riskratings that we covered in this study. This instrument appeared to fit better in this 
study than the RiskPropensity instrument that we used in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
Measurement of working experience was self-reported. Working experience was not only 
expressed in years, but could also be derived from (self-reported) job-titles. We used the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V+5-framework to assign function levels to these job-titles. There were 5 
corresponding function levels within the area of internal auditing and IS-management. In 
our analysis we preferred this measure on working-experience over the UHSRUWHG³\HDUVRI
H[SHULHQFH´7KLVis because we found that the number of years was interpreted in various 
ways by respondents (depending on their career-path, including for example earlier IS-
functions). Furthermore, DQ HPSOR\HH¶V IXQFWLRQ OHYHO LV OLQNHG WR WKat HPSOR\HH¶V
knowledge and experience in the domain of his profession and corresponding 
responsibilities. The HR-framework also incorporates standardized HR-controls such as 
criteria and procedures for promotion or assignments to Vice President (VP), Senior Vice 
President (SVP) and Executive Vice President (EVP) positions. Therefore we think this 
³93-OHYHO´ DOORZV IRU EHWWHU FRPSDULVRQ EHWZHHQ UHVSRQGHQWV ZLWK GLIIHUHQW UROHV DQG
career-paths than using the number of years with working experience. 
 
Reliability 
 
Before we will test the hypotheses, we first consider reliability and convergent- and 
discriminant validity of how we measured our constructs. In table 6-4, we present the 
FRQVWUXFWUHOLDELOLW\&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVFRUHVWKDWPHDVXUHWKHLQWHUQDOFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKD
JLYHQ FRQVWUXFW¶V LWHPV ZHLJKWLQJ WKHP HTXDOO\ Hair et al. (1998) suggest that a 
&URQEDFK¶V  DOSKD VFRUH VOLJKWO\ ORZHU WKDQPLJKW VWLOOEHDFFHSWDEOH IRUH[ploratory 
research. Nunnally (1967) recommends a threshold value of only 0.6 for exploratory 
research. 
   
Contruct Items Cronbach alpha Remarks 
RiskProp 6 0.832  
RiskProp 5 0.820 
 
After removal RiskProp6. 
Table 6-4 Reliability of Measurements 
 
We measured RiskPropensity on a 6-item 5-point scale, adapted from Nicholsen 
(Nicholson et al., 2005)  for measuring Risk Propensity in a specific domain of study. We 
found that RiskProp6 measurements showed problems in Convergent and Discriminant 
Validity of RiskProp since it blended with Audit_role. Therefore we removed RiskProp6 
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from our measurement model and recalculated Cronbach alpha. We conclude that the 
reliability of our measurements meets the thresholds.     
 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
 
Our validation of the instruments we used for data gathering, proceeds with assessing the 
convergent and discriminant validity (Shadish et al., 2002) of how we measured the 
constructs in our study (construct validity). This in order to assess that our measurement-
variables that are supposed to tap into the same construct indeed stick together and are not 
sticking too much to measurements that were supposed to tap into distinct constructs. For 
that purpose, we performed a Principal Components Analysis, which is an exploratory 
factor analysis of clustering measurements into factors. It does not take into account any 
available information on which measurements were intended to tap into which constructs. 
Based on Varimax rotation, we found the results as presented in table 6-5.     
 
                       Component  
1 2 3  
RiskProp1 .785 .249 .207 
RiskProp2 .792 .036 -.047 
RiskProp3 .682 -.343 .079 
RiskProp4 .746 -.328 -.046 
RiskProp5 .800 .006 .013 
Gender .038 -.050 .988 
Audit_Role -.019 .919 -.046 
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis., Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
  Table 6-5 Construct Validity  
 
,WHPVVKRXOGFRUUHODWHKLJKHUZLWKWKHLURZQ³FRQVWUXFW´IDFWRUWKDQWKH\FRUUHODWHZLWK
others (Shadish et al., 2002). We find convergent and discriminant validity to be confirmed 
in Table 6-5.   
 
For the purpose of statistical validity in testing our hypotheses, we considered whether our 
nine measurements of RiskRatingprob,impact could violate assumptions for parametric testing. 
The 3-level ratingscores are considered to be professional assignments based on an 
assessment of a situation. Risk-levels within the bank have been formally defined, trained 
and discussed in Professional Practice-sessions and assigned across audit-reports for years.  
The 3-level measurement Rating-scale in this context, meets major characteristics of 
interval data, wiWKFRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI³GLVWDQFHVEHWZHHQOHYHO-1, level-2 and level-
 ULVN´ DV H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH VFDOH$FFRUGLQJ WRBlumberg et al. (2008) p444, this would 
allow us to apply parametric testing, since parametriFWHVWVLQWKHVHFRQGLWLRQVGRQ¶WGLIIHU
from non-parametric tests (rank-order) in significance and power, thus they will not likely 
result in different conclusions. Therefore, we will apply parametric testing of hypotheses in 
this study. 
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6.7.  Results from Mixed Design ANOVA 
 
We use Mixed Design ANOVA (Field, 2009), p506 for statistical testing of our 
hypotheses. This is an extension of the two-way repeated measures ANOVA which serves 
the analysis of within-subject treatments across multiple groups of respondents. The 
within-subject dependent variables  RiskRatingprob, impact were measured in the following 
sequence from 1st to 9th obervation RiskRating3,3; RiskRating3,1; RiskRating3,2; 
RiskRating2,1; RiskRating1,1; RiskRating2,3; RiskRating1,3; RiskRating2,2 and RiskRating1,2. 
The between-subject factors that were measured are Audit_Role and RiskPropensity. 
 
Since not all of the respondents had provided the RiskPropensity answers, we started our 
analysis with observations from 64 internal auditors and 32 IS-managers. Mixed Design 
ANOVA assumes numbers of observations across the treatment groups that are almost 
equal (Shaw & Mitchell-Olds, 1993). In order to control for effects of the groupsize-
difference on our results, we decided to perform two separate analyses. The first analysis 
compares all internal auditors with all IS-managers and could be biased by group 
differences. For the second analysis we focus on the 21 internal auditors and 21 IS-
managers whose experience has been rewarded with a VicePresident (VP) role. At the cost 
of losing statistical power from excluding more than half of the observations, we will have 
a more balanced set of observations of internal auditors and IS-managers, equal in size and 
consisting entirely of VicePresidents. Based on our hypotheses, these are the most 
interesting groups to compare, since they are expected to show the strongest heuristics49.      
 
We first tested whether or not our data met the assumptions for Mixed Design ANOVA. 
We did not find consistent recommendations for minimum sample size, so we used the 
recommendation that Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) made for MANOVA, which is similar 
to Mixed Design ANOVA in that both involve multiple dependent variables. The 
minimum sample size for these problems is 10+the number of dependent variables. In both 
conditions - the whole group and the VP group ± we exceeded the requirement of 19 
respondents. For all further tests of our hypotheses and assumptions, we will further 
analyse 1. the whole group and 2. the VP-groups. 
 
ANOVA assumes that the scores under different conditions are independent. Since this 
assumption cannot be met in a repeated measures design,an additional assumption of 
sphericity is added, which means that the relationship between pairs of experimental 
conditions is similar. If this assumption is not met then the validity of the F-ratio might be 
harmed. Therefore, ZH SHUIRUPHG WKH 0DXFKO\¶V WHVW ZKLFK WHVWV WKH K\SRWKHVLV WKDW
variances of the differences are equal between treatment levels (Field, 2009), p460. 
0DXFKO\¶VWHVW- for the whole group - indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not 
been violated for the main effect of Probability, F2(2) = 5.94, p = 0.05, and Impact, F2(2) = 
0.82, p = 0.66. So it is reasonable to conclude that the variances of the differences are 
                                                          
 
49 Other options to split up our data for mixed design ANOVA have been considered. Within the context of this 
PhD-thesis we found it appropriate to perform two separate analyses which provided us with a richer view on the 
data. 
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roughly equal and that F-ratios are valid without need for correction of the degrees of 
IUHHGRP0DXFKO\¶VWHVW± for the whole group - indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated for the interaction effect of Probability*Impact, F2(9) = 18.36, p = 
0.031. In order to obtain valid F-ratios we had to correct the degrees of freedom using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (H  0DXFKO\¶VWHVW- for the VP-group - 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of 
Probability, F2(2) = 9.89, p = 0.00. In order to obtain valid F-ratios we had to correct the 
degrees of freedom using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (H  0DXFKO\¶V
test ± for the VP-group ± indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated 
for the main effect of Impact, F2(2) = 1.93, p = 0.38. and for the interaction effect of 
Probability*Impact, F2(9) = 9.23, p = 0.41. So it is reasonable to conclude that the 
variances of the differences are roughly equal and these F-ratios are valid without need for 
correction of the degrees of freedom.  
 
We compared the Within-Subject main effects based on post-hoc analysis of means with 
Bonferroni adjusted confidence intervals. For the whole group, we found a significant 
main effect of the given Probability OHYHO LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶RiskRating, F(2, 
136)= 11.58, significant at p < 0.001. We found this confirmed for the VP-group, where 
we found a significant main effect of the given Probability level information on 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶ RiskRating, F(1.38, 24.97) = 4.28, significant at p < 0.03. These results 
confirm hypothesis H1a. For the whole group, we also found a significant main effect of 
the given Impact OHYHO LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶ RiskRating, F(2, 136) = 327.57, 
significant at 0.000. We found this confirmed for the VP-group, where we found a 
significant main effect of the given Impact leveOLQIRUPDWLRQRQUHVSRQGHQWV¶RiskRating, 
F(2, 36) = 183.08, significant at p < 0.01. These results confirm hypothesis H1b.  
 
We did not find a significant interaction effect of Probability*Impact levels information on 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶ RiskRating, F(3.50, 238.52) = 1.19, not significant at 0.26 for the whole 
group. We found this confirmed for the VP-group, where we found no significant 
interaction effect of Probability* Impact OHYHOV LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶RiskRating, 
F(4,72) = 1.12, not significant at 0.23. We did not find confirmation of the interaction 
between the provided Probability and Impact levels.  
 
For the whole group, we found a significant interaction effect of Probability*AuditRole on 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶RiskRating, F(2,136) = 3.70, significant at 0.02. We found this confirmed for 
the VP-group, where we found a significant interaction effect of Probability* AuditRole on 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶ RiskRating, F(2,36) = 3.96, significant at 0.02. These results confirm 
hypothesis H2b.  
 
There was no significant interaction effect of Impact*AuditRole , so the difference between 
the auditors and the IS managers showed in their sensitivity for Probability information in 
particular, as was expected from our literature review. For the whole group, we found a 
significant interaction effect of Impact*RiskPropensity RQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶ RiskRating, 
F(30,136) = 1.90, significant at 0.00. We found this confirmed for the VP-group, where we 
found a significant interaction effect of Impact*RiskPropensity RQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶
RiskRating, F(28,36) = 1.81, significant at 0.04. These results confirm hypothesis H3b. 
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There was no significant interaction effect of Probability*RiskPropensity across the 
auditors and the IS managers of our study. 
 
The test of Between-Subjects Effects on the whole group , showed AuditRole to be 1-tailed 
significant at 0.047 with F=2.88 and 1 df. This could not be confimed for the VP-group 
which showed not significant at .45 with F=0.03 and df=1. These results provided 
ambiguous support for hypothesis H2a. 
 
The test of Between-Subjects Effects on the whole group , showed RiskPropensity to be 1-
tailed significant at 0.010 with F=2.10 and 15 df. This could not be confimed for the VP-
group which showed not significant at 0.12 with F=1.44 and df=14. These results provided 
ambiguous support for our hypothesis H3a. 
 
For interpretation of our results we provide a visual presentation of the means across the 
treatment conditions. In figure 6-1 we present the interaction between the within-subject 
treatments and the between-subject differences for the whole group of respondents. In the 
plots on the left you find the moderation of between-subject AuditRole variable on the 
within-subject Probability-treatment effects. At the horizontal axis you find the three levels 
of Probability-treatments. The score at Probability=1 represents the estimated mean 
RiskRating scores of RiskRating1,1 , RiskRating1,2 and RiskRating1,3 . So each mean is 
calculated from 3 observations for 64 internal auditors respectively from 3 times 36 
observations of IS managers. In a similar manner, the figure shows the mean risk-scores 
for the three treatments with Probability=2 and the three treatments Probability=3. The 
OLQHV GLVWLQJXLVK WKHVH VFRUHV EHWZHHQ WKH PDQDJHUV ³DFWRUV´ DQG WKH DXGLWRUV
³REVHUYHUV´ ,Q WKHplots on the right at the horizontal axis you find the three levels of 
Impact-treatments. The score at Impact=1 represents the estimated mean RiskRating scores 
of RiskRating1,1 , RiskRating2,1 and RiskRating3,1 . So each mean is calculated from 3 
observations for 64 internal auditors and from 3 times 36 observations from IS managers. 
Similarly, the figure shows the mean risk-scores for the three treatments with Impact=2 
and the three treatments Impact=3. In figure 6-2 we present similar plots for the VP-
groups. Every mean in those plots was calculated from 3 observations for 21 internal 
auditors respectively from 3 times 21 observations from IS managers.  
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 Figure 6-1 Interaction Plots for Whole Group 
 
  
Figure 6-2 Interaction Plots for VP Group  
 
Comparing the slopes50 of the lines between the left and the right plots shows that 
RiskRatings are much more dominated by Impact-levels than by Probability-levels.  
Raising the Impact level from 1 to 3 resulted in an estimated increase of RiskRating with 
1.55 resp 1.34 for the internal auditors resp managers in the group as a whole. These 
                                                          
 
50 The slopes between levels 1 and 2 and between levels 2 and 3 are not precisely equal, since this is not a 
regression slope, but a visual presentation of differences between calculated means. 
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results were similar for the VP-group with 1.50 for the internal auditors and 1.25 for the IS 
Managers. Raising the Probability  level from 1 to 3 resulted in an estimated increase of 
RiskRating of 0.52 for the internal auditors and 0.53 for the VP internal auditors in 
particular. For the whole group of internal auditors the Impact level thus weighted 2.9 
times as much as the Probability level in their RiskRating. With Impact Level showing 2.8 
times the weight of Probability level, this was similar for the VP internal auditors. Next 
figures show the main difference between the internal auditors and the IS-managers. 
Raising  the Probability  level from 1 to 3 resulted in an estimated increase of RiskRating 
of 0.12 for the IS managers (0.52 for the internal auditors) and no more than 0.02 for the 
VP IS managers in particular (0.53 for the VP intrernal auditors). For the whole group of 
IS managers the Probability level only weigthed 1/11 times the Impact level in their 
RiskRating (compared to the 1/3 times for the internal auditors). For the VP group of IS 
managers the weight of Probability level almost disappeared with assigning less than 1/60 
times the weight of Impact Level in their RiskRating (compared to the stable 1/3 times for 
the VP internal auditors.  
 
Comparing the slopes of the two lines in the left plots clearly shows the moderation effect 
of AuditRole (the between-subject difference between auditors and managers) on the direct 
effect of the Probability Level on RiskRating (the within-subject measurements). These 
lines are flat for the IS managers where they are much steeper for the internal auditors. 
This visually represents the moderation effect on probability, as was confirmed in the 
ANOVA testing of hypothesis H2b. 
6.8. Other Relevant Results from the Field Experiment 
 
After they had finalised the cases, we asked respondents in open questions about any 
difficulties they might have encountered in assessing Risk ratings  of the cases. We also 
invited them to provide us with other remarks that could be relevant for interpreting their 
answers. Tables 6-6a and 6-6b provide an overview of reported problems by the 70 
internal auditors and 32 IS-managers in assessing risks based upon the risk-information 
provided in this study. 
 
 
Difficulties in assessing risk level of cases Internal 
auditors 
% IS-
managers 
% 
 
Number of  respondents with no problem 
 
55 
 
78% 
 
24 
 
75% 
Number of respondents with remarks 15 22% 8 25% 
Number of respondents with major problem 0 0% 0 0% 
 
Table 6-6a Number of reported problems and remarks on assessing risk levels of cases 
 
 
Based on this table 6-6a, we consider the finding that no respondents reported major 
problems as a contribution to manipulation validity of our study. As shown in table 6-6b, 
PRVW UHPDUNV UHIHUUHG WR WKH LQWHUHVW IRU PRUH LQIRUPDWLRQ FRPSDUHG WR WKH DXGLWRU¶V
finding and assigned levels of Probability and Impact.     
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Remarks  made by Internal Auditors  Remarks made by IS-managers  
 
 
Exact business impact is unknown 
 
13/70 
 
More information on business impact 
 
5/32 
Lack of detailed circumstances 7/70 More detailed information  3/32 
Lack of knowledge about mitigating 
controls 
5/70 
 
  
Table 6-6b Reported problems and remarks on assessing risk levels of cases 
 
 
We also asked the respondents to provide us with 3 to 5 most important criteria which they 
use in assessing Risk Ratings. Table 6-7 provides an overview of reported items by the 70 
internal auditors and 32 IS-managers in assessing risks based upon the risk-information 
provided with audit-findings in general. 
 
 
 
 
   Table 6-7 Reported criteria used for assessing Risk Ratings 
 
The qualitative answers provide us with richer insight into SHRSOH¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQV LQDQ
assessment of risks and differences between internal auditors and IS managers. Table 6-7 
VKRZVWKDW³W\SHRIV\VWHP´³FRQWLQXLW\RIVHUYLFH´³YDOXHRIULVNFRVW-effectiYHQHVV´DQG
³WLPH-FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIULVN´GLUHFWH[SRVXUHGXUDWLRQDUHUDQNHGKLJKHUE\,6PDQDJHUV
than by internal auditors. All these elements are closely associated with setting priorities in 
solving problems, which is considered a task of management more than a task of auditors.  
 
Out of 70 internal auditors: how 
many times they reported a criterium 
to be used when they assess a risk 
Instances Out of 32 IS-managers: how 
many times they reported a 
criterium to be used when 
they assess a risk 
Instances 
Probability 50 Probability 16 
Impact 49 Type of system/Nature of 
Business 
15 
Professional Judgement/experience 22 Impact 14 
Materiality 22 Impact on continuity of service 14 
Regulatory Impact 20 Reputational Impact 11 
Reputational Impact 18 Experience with similar risks 11 
Value at Risk 17 Financial Impact 10 
Mitigating Controls 14 Mitigating controls/solutions 9 
Type of system / Nature of business 13 Value at risk/ cost-effectiveness 6 
Impact on business continuity 10 Legal and compliance impact 5 
Client satisfaction exposure 8 Client satisfaction exposure 4 
Fraud Risk 2 Time characteristics of risk 
(direct/duration) 
4 
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Given the results of our statistical analysis, it is interesting that Probability of Risk is 
mentioned most by both groups of respondents. As we could see in the plots of figures 6-1 
and 6-2, these respondents showed relatively insensitive to Probability information 
compared to the Impact information. We think there could be two main explanations for 
this suggested inconsistency. First, people are aware that probabilities play and should play 
a role in risk assessments, however probabilities are very hard to estimate, visualize and 
thus to perceive (Sjöberg, 2000c). Impact information is much more accessible from 
memories and easier to visualize and express. Therefore Impact might dominate heuristics 
and memories as it comes to terms. This appears to be confirmed since 22 out of 23 criteria 
in table 6-7 that were reported by our respondents are shades of Impact, next to  the one 
VLQJOHDQGFRPSUHKHQVLYHFULWHULRQ³3UREDELOLW\´ 
6.9. Discussion and Implications 
6.9.1. Contribution of this study 
 
Our experiment situated in the field provided us with empirical evidence on differences in 
the risk perception of employees across roles within a company when provided with 
warnings on IS-risks by an independent internal auditor. We could assess whether these 
differences applied to specific parts of the Risk Warning as expected from literature. For 
our explanation of the Deaf Effect for IS-Risk warnings provided by internal auditors, this 
chapter suggests that this Deaf Effect could apply for specific parts of the warning more 
than for other parts, depending on the heuristics of the receiver. These heuristics are related 
to the work experience that has developed over years in a role as manager or internal 
auditor. We assessed the effect of the actor/observer control heuristic that was expected to 
come with their role and working experience. The IS-managers are assumed to have 
GHYHORSHG³DFWRU´KHXULVWLFVRQ ,6-risks, since they are used to be responsible for taking 
action on IS-risks audit findings. The internal auditors are assumed to have developed 
³REVHUYHU´ KHXULVWLFV RQ ,6-risks. We also assesVHG WKH HIIHFW RI HPSOR\HH¶V 5LVN
Propensity on their Perceived Risk after a risk warning. This Risk Propensity is developed 
based on risk preferences, inertia and outcome history, which all could come with working 
experience over years. 
 
More generally, bH\RQG LWV FRQWULEXWLRQ WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJ PDQDJHU¶V 'HDI (IIHFW IRU
LQWHUQDODXGLWRUV¶ZDUQLQJVRQ,6-risks, this chapter specifically addresses an open research 
question in literature (Curtis, Jenkins, Bedard, & Deis, 2009; Weidenmier & Ramamoorti, 
2006) of whether internal auditors differ from other actors when faced with evidence on 
IS-risks. In particular, this insight is relevant since collaboration with IS-managers is key 
for internal IS-DXGLWRUV¶HIIHFWLYHQHVV(Hunton & Wright, 1995). Both parties are involved 
in reporting and mitigating IS-ULVNV ZLWKLQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH
framework. Understanding of differences in the perception of risks could contribute to 
improved collaboration. 
 
Finally, in our study we involved 70 internal auditors and 32 IS-managers from a 
Dutch/British financial institution. This allowed us to use a setting that was realistic to 
their working-practice and allowed for a direct comparison between respondents in their 
role of Internal Auditor or IS-manager, ceteris paribus. Choosing employees from one 
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organisation  allowed us to use the shared HR-framework for a direct comparison between 
auditors on similar levels of experience/seniority, taking into account eventual different 
dynamics in which people build up the working experience that is relevant to their role  
(Biggs et al., 1987; Curtis & Viator, 2000).  
6.9.2.  Main Findings 
 
The following summary provides an overview of the findings of this empirical study on 
main effects and moderation effects: (1) Both impact information and probability 
information in the message affect the Risk Perception of the receivers of a risk warning 
(hypotheses 1a and 1b); (2) The internal auditors in our study weigh the impact 
information approximately three times the probability information. This is the case for 
both the internal auditors as a whole group as well as more specifically for the most 
experienced group of internal auditors, who have a position of Vice President, Senior Vice 
President or Executive Vice President; (3) IS managers weigh the impact information 
approximately eleven times the  probability information. With a ratio of one to sixty, this is 
even more extreme for the most experienced group of IS managers who have a position of 
Vice President, Senior Vice President or Executive Vice President; (4) This difference 
could be explained since the influence of probability information on Perceived Risk, is 
VLJQLILFDQWO\ PRGHUDWHG E\ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UROH DV a manager (actor) or as an auditor 
(observer), for the group as a whole, which  is confirmed for the experienced respondents 
in particular (hypothesis 2b). As expected from earlier field studies, managers show to be 
insensitive to given probability information in a Risk Warning; (5) The difference in 
Perceived Risk between managers and internal auditors is confirmed for the group as a 
whole, but is not significant for the experienced respondents in particular (hypothesis 2a); 
The managers show lower levels of perceived risk than the auditors, yet for the most 
experience group this was not significant; and (6) The empOR\HH¶V 5LVN 3URSHQVLW\ Ls 
significantly correlated with Perceived Risk  for the group internal auditors and IS 
managers as a whole. This could however, not be confirmed for the experienced internal 
auditors and IS-manager in particular (hypothesis 3a). 
6.9.3.  Limitations of The Study 
 
As is the case with all experiments, we should be cautious when generalizing the results of 
this study for several reasons. First, situated experiments are applied in a specific context, 
one financial institution in our case. This provided us with the opportunity to allow 
FRPSDULVRQDFURVVUHVSRQGHQWVLQYDULRXVUROHVVLQFHWKH\VKDUHGWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V+5-
framework. This also strongly mitigated variance in organizational conditions and had the 
advantage that respondents were familiar with procedures and measurements. These 
FRQGLWLRQVKRZHYHUGRQ¶WDOORZVWDWLVWLFDOJHQHUDOL]DWLRQWRRWKHUVLWXDWLRQV1HYHUWKHOHVV
based on analytical generalization, we suggest that the results show a reasonable level of 
representativeness for other situations in which Information Systems are both of strategic 
and operational importance, and internal audit staff is equipped based upon international 
standards as was the case in this situation.  
 
Second, we adopted several measurement instruments used in this particular organization, 
so these particular instruments could not be borrowed from scientific literature. Typical 
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concerns that might arise, such as 1-item measurement, have partially been taken care of in 
the experimental design, such as measuring a sequence of nine 1-item measurements. The 
contribution of this study weighted the heaviest towards context realism, while striving for 
precision of measurement at reachable level within the context. 
6.9.4.  Suggestions for Further Study 
 
We suggest that the particular characteristics of a field or situated experiment (Greenberg 
& Tomlinson, 2004) deserve further application in this domain of study. Those 
experiments lean towards context realism and maximize precision of measurement. 
Experiments situated in realistic organizational settings, can provide triangulation with 
laboratory experiments ± such as the Illusion of Control experiments - and with surveys 
from the field, such as the surveys across managers and auditors that we referred to in this 
chapter. In addition to the actor/observer effect, many other Illusion of Control laboratory 
H[SHULPHQWV FRXOG VHUYH WR EH UHSOLFDWHG LQ UHDOLVWLF ILHOG VHWWLQJV DV µVLWXDWHG
H[SHULPHQWV¶(Greenberg & Tomlinson, 2004). More specifically, we suggest that the 
studies on the actor/observer effect would be open for further replication and refinement in 
an organizational context. For example, they could be applied to other roles within an 
organization that share these characteristics. 
6.9.5.  Implications for Internal Auditors 
 
Although not new of course, this study reminds the internal audit profession that the 
effectiveness of their service ± reporting on risks and controls ± includes the concepts of 
human information processing and bounded rationality.  
 
The actor/observer effect and differences in Risk Propensity across employees, may cause 
that they actually perceive risks differently from each other. This may show, for example, 
in discussions on reported audit findings. Given the dominant weight of Impact 
Information, it may be the most effective to focus attention and effort on discussing the 
Impact is side of the Risk Warning. Discussions on probabilities might be less effective 
DQGHIILFLHQWVLQFHWKH\DUHVWURQJO\ELDVHGGHSHQGLQJRQRQH¶VSHUVRQDOKHXULVWLFVDQG
2. they appear to have a smaller weight in the ultimate Perceived Risk that would bring 
someone to take action or not. Recalling and using incidents when presenting auditing 
findings, Risk Warnings, might be most effective since they focus on the Impact part, to 
which people are most sensitive. 
6.9.6  Implications for managers and organizations 
 
The results of our study suggest that employees with different actor/observer heuristics and 
risk propensities, show different Perceived Risk upon receiving a Risk Warnings. This will 
likely lead them different decisions  showing different levels of risk taking.  Heuristics and 
bounded rationality come with an emSOR\HH¶V H[SHULHQFH DQG DUH YHU\ XVHIXO WR WKH
performance of the employees in their contribution to the organization. Eliminating 
heuristics would make no sense to the organization. Irrational decision making would not 
make sense either. Therefore, the most fruitful approach appears to be to make use of the 
strengths and to mitigate negative effects of these heuristics.  For example, by arranging 
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organizational conditions to ensure that risk seeking behavior would not exceed thresholds 
that would violate tKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VULVNDSSHWLWH-REURWDWLRQRIHPSOR\HHVDFURVVDFWRU
and observer roles might also contribute to improved collaboration and information 
exchange on risk taking. Observers do not necessarily have to be Internal Auditors of 
course. Managers could also share information and decisions with peer-managers that are 
not involved in the particular course of action, and thus might serve in a role of observer 
from distance. This however would also require organizational conditions that support 
collaborative partnership between these counterparts within an organization.  
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6.A. APPENDIX - Questionnaire Situated Experiment 
Annex I ± Case 
 
The participants in the on-line questionnaire were asked to read the following case 
material. It consists of fifteen individual imaginary audit findings. They are shown here 
including their respective probability and impact indicators as they were presented to the 
participants. The participants were asked to provide the risk ratings themselves. The case 
was constructed by preparing a set of audit issues that correspond with the varying input of 
probability and impact, according to [Company name] risk framework.  
 
Finding 1 ± Lack of antivirus controls 
 
Impact: High   Probability: High 
 
To protect against the negative impact of malicious software like computer viruses an anti-virus 
VWUDWHJ\ VKRXOG EH LQ SODFH 7KLV VWUDWHJ\ VKRXOG GHWDLO KRZ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG
computer systems are to be protected by anti-virus software, firewalls or other measures. During the 
audit the following came to our attention: 1. No anti-virus strategy is in place; 2. About 40 percent of 
the workstations contains no virus scanner; and 3. The virus scanners on servers are of different 
suppliers, a long time out of date and not maintained. The risk posed by the lack of these controls is 
compounded by the fact that users have full access to their workstations and may install software that 
is not inspected, verified and controlled by the network administration team. The severity of this 
situation is exemplified by the frequent downtime of both servers and workstations due to the effects 
of viruses as reported by the network infrastructure team. The risk exists downtime increases and 
information is compromised if no further action is taken, leading to significant operational losses due 
to inoperable computer systems. Besides operational effects a reputational risk exists because of the 
deteriorated service levels. 
 
Finding 2 ± Insufficient helpdesk capacity 
Impact:  Low   Probability: High 
 
Users of computer systems in large companies are frequently faced with problems they cannot solve 
themselves. This includes software problems, obtaining password resets or requesting new hardware 
or software. For this reason a helpdesk should be available to these users that can assist them quickly 
and efficiently with their requests. It was noted that the current helpdesk is understaffed. Average 
time waiting for is measured at 15 minutes and resolution of non-urgent requests on average takes 
three days rather than the one day mentioned in the service level agreement. The risk exists users are 
not assisted adequately or quickly enough with their problems because of this lack of resources. This 
may lead to frustration with system users and operational losses by unnecessary time spent on the 
phone with the helpdesk or waiting for resolution of a problem. 
 
Finding 3 ± Inadequate system capacity 
Impact:  Medium     Probability: High 
 
Computer systems require resources. This may vary from processing capacity to storage capacity and 
from response time to network bandwidth. To ensure the right resources are available to all systems a 
capacity management plan should be in place for all systems. The storage capacity of the logistic 
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planning tool was found to be at its limit. More than 98 percent of the disk storage space was utilised 
and the system administrator reported weekly outages because of this. While the system has denoted 
as important rather than critical, continued malfunction of the system will lead to further 
interruptions in the planning process. This has led to increased delivery times and overstocked 
storage rooms. In a few instances service level agreements with clients have not been met and 
complaints may increase if these problems are not solved. 
 
Finding 4 ± Lack of backup facility for labeling system 
Impact:  Low   Probability: Medium 
 
When employing computer systems in the daily workflow of a company, continued operation 
without disturbance is necessary for effective production. For this reason it is best practice to ensure 
that for an automated system a disaster recovery procedure is written and implemented. This would 
include the means to quickly restore a system in case of problems by creating back-ups of the 
system. It was noted that the mail labeling system is old and the hardware is at the end of its expected 
lifetime. This has already led to replacement of parts last year causing a temporary unavailability of 
the system. When the system is not available the mail room must return to manually producing the 
labels for posting which as in the past will require overtime of the employees finish their work until 
the system is restored. The risk exists mail is not delivered timely to customers. 
 
Finding 5 ± Lack of business continuity plan for audit department 
Impact:  Low   Probability: Low 
 
To ensure continued operation in case of a disaster or emergency, businesses require a business 
continuity plan that will enable them to pick up normal operations as quickly as possible, should such 
a situation occur. It was noted that for the audit department such a plan was not available at the time 
of the audit. Neither was a call tree, containing the details of all staff available as a minimum 
communication plan. The risk exists that in case of an emergency or disaster the audit department 
will not be able to quickly resume normal operations and reports will not be delivered when they are 
due. 
 
Finding 6 ± Inadequate client acceptance policy 
Impact:  High   Probability: Medium 
 
It is in the long term interest of a company to set up relationships with reputable and trustworthy 
clients. To this end a proper client acceptance policy should be in place to ensure that no dealings 
take place with criminal, financially unsound or otherwise unwanted clients. A client acceptance 
policy was not present at the time of our review. Neither were files available where important 
information on clients like chamber of commerce and lists of authorised signatories were stored. 
Although the client relationship managers of the company are very experienced and have taken anti-
money laundering courses, the risk of attracting unwanted customers remains. This may lead to 
defaulted payments or reputational damage when the company is connected to criminal customers in 
the media or the loss of an operational license when regulatory bodies judge the client take-on 
process inadequate. 
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Finding 7 ± Single point of failure in company network  
Impact:  High Probability: Low 
 
When company processes cross borders because of an international client base, reliable network 
connectivity is of the utmost importance. For this reason these network connections should be 
redundant, if one connection fails the other can take over so operational processes may continue 
uninterrupted. The current company network infrastructure is based on a star topology. This means 
that all network traffic comes through one location and all other geographic locations are connected 
to it. All these connections are redundant, this means two network lines, owned by different network 
operators, connect all remote locations to the central location. Despite the redundancy of the network 
there is still a single point of failure in the central location. If the network connection in this location 
is lost none of the other locations can communicate with each other. The risk therefore exists that 
productivity comes to a full standstill when problems arise in the central location. 
 
Finding 8 ± Inadequate change management process  
Impact: Medium   Probability: Medium 
 
To ensure that changes to WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ,7 V\VWHPV DUH LPSOHPHQWHGZLWKRXW SUREOHPVD FKDQJH
management process should exist. This process should ensure that changes are well planned, the 
proper approvals are obtained and the impact on other systems is acceptable. It was noted that the 
current change management process is inadequate. The only evidence of control over changes in the 
IT systems was a list of changes to be performed in the coming period. It was not noted how large 
the change is, what impact the changes have, when they should occur and what the dependencies are. 
The systems in use are not highly complex but changes are implemented regularly. Additionally, the 
systems are not essential for continuous production, but will cause delays and ineffective processing 
when unavailable. 
 
Finding 9 ± Inadequate service level agreement 
Impact:  Medium   Probability: Low 
 
To ensure that applications are serviced in line with requirements service level agreements should be 
drawn up between the service provider and the client. These agreements contain service windows, 
maximum time between failures, response times etc. It was noted that for several non essential but 
important systems that are hosted by an external service provider no service level agreement was 
available, but that support was given on a best effort basis. In the current situation, when problems 
VKRXOGDULVHDWWKHSURYLGHU¶VVLGHLWLVXSWRWKHPWRSULRULWLVHZKDWFXVWRPHUWRVHUYLFHDVDPDWWHU
of priority. At present this will have to be accepted with no contractual means of ensuring that the 
required level of service is maintained. This risk is mitigated by the fact that the provider is 
recognised as a large professional party with a good reputation. 
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Annex II ± Questionnaire 
 
 
The text of the questionnaire was as follows: 
 
µDear participant, 
 
<RX¶YHEHHQVHQWWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHEHORZDVSDUWRIUHVHDUFKFRQGXFWHGIRUWKH(UDVPXV8QLYHUVLW\
Rotterdam. All results will be treated confidentially and only generalised results will be published. 
 
We would kindly ask you to complete the questionnaire by assigning the fictitious issues below a 
risk rating of high, medium or low and by also answering the first set of questions. A definition of 
risk is included with this questionnaire to assist with assigning these ratings. Please note that the 
fictional issues are shortened and explicitly written for the purpose of this research. Whenever the 
risk rating is not clear from the issue, please select the risk rating that is nearest to the probable actual 
rating. In any case, you must pick one. 
 
When the questionnaire is completed you are asked to answer the following open questions: 
x Please describe why you were able or unable to assess the risk in the issues. 
x Please indicate what factors influence the risk rating you have assigned to the issues. Name at 
least five factors. 
x 3OHDVHSURYLGHDQ\RWKHUFRPPHQWV\RXPLJKWKDYH¶ 
 
Annex III - Risk definitions [Company Name] 
 
 
Low Risk: Audit finding, the solution to which may lead to improvement in the quality 
and/or efficiency of the organisational entity or process being audited. Risks of 
damage to the organisation are limited.  Routine management attention is 
warranted.   
 
Medium Risk: Audit finding that may lead to: (1) financial losses; (2) loss of controls within the 
organisational entity or process being audited; (3) reputation damage; and/or (4) 
adverse regulatory impact. Timely management attention is warranted.   
 
High Risk: Serious audit finding that may lead to: (1) substantial losses, possibly in 
conjunction with other weaknesses in the control framework of the organisational 
entity or process being audited; (2) serious violation of industry best practice; (3) 
serious reputation damage; and/or (4) significant adverse regulatory impact. 
Immediate management attention is required.   
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Annex IV ± Likert Scale Risk Propensity 
 
The risk propensity questionnaire presented to both auditors and auditees is as follows: 
 
We are interested in everyday risk-taking. Please could you tell whether you would expose 
yourself to the following risks. 
Please use the scales as follows: 1: never, 2: rarely, 3: quite often, 4: often, 5: very often 
 
a) Business Continuity Risks e.g. back-up system, disaster recovery 
procedures, business continuity planning 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Change Management Risks e.g. full change documentation, formal 
approval, impact analysis 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) Configuration Management 
Risks 
e.g. inventory of configuration items, 
versioned software releases, asset 
inventory 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Testing Risks e.g. presence test, acceptance, 
development, production environment, 
user acceptance testing 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Security Risks e.g. system access, encryption of data, 
integrity of data 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Service Level Risks e.g. service level agreements, definition 
of performance indicators, performance 
measurement 
1 2 3 4 5 
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CHAPTER 7. DEAF EFFECT IN ESCALATION OF IS-PROJECTS: AN 
EXPLORATORY MULTI-CASESTUDY ON CAUSES AND AUDITOR-
MANAGER INTERACTION 
  
7.1.  Introduction 
 
In the previous Chapters 4 and 5 we found confirmed that the relationship between the 
internal auditor ± as a bad news messenger ± and the decision maker is of influence on the 
Deaf Effect for a Risk Warning on a failing IS-project. It seems to make a difference 
whether the messager is seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent. This is 
confirmed, for both students and people with relevant working experience, in two slightly 
different experimental settings. In the laboratory settings of these experiments, this 
relationship was manipulated by the history that was build up with the internal auditor who 
behaved as an Opponent ± who exposes management failures, or as a Collaborative Partner 
± who contributes to management performance. This history reflects two different roles 
that are assigned to internal auditors, depending on the Corporate Governance framework 
within the organization. According to Corporate Governance principles from Agency 
Theory, the internal auditor has a monitoring role towards management on behalf of the 
organization. According to the Corporate Governance principles from Stewardship Theory, 
the internal auditors are expected to contribute to management performance as a business 
partner and consultant to management. Both roles are reflected in the definition of internal 
auditing that was issued by the Institute of Internal Auditing in 1999 that says (IIA, 2004):  
 
³DQ LQGHSHQGHQW REMHFWLYH DVVXUDQFH DQG FRQVXOWLQJ DFWLYLW\ GHVLJQHG WR DGG YDOXH DQG
improve an organL]DWLRQ¶VRSHUDWLRQV ,WKHOSVDQRUJDQL]DWLRQDFFRPSOLVK LWVREMHFWLYHV
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of 
WKHULVNPDQDJHPHQWFRQWURODQGJRYHUQDQFHSURFHVVHV´. 
 
Our experiments showed a main effect that respondent are more likely to follow the Risk 
Warning of a messenger who was seen as a Collaborative Partner. At the same time, we 
found that the strength of this effect varies across conditions. As suggested by Davis 
(Davis et al., 1997), the effectiveness of these relationships interact with the psychological 
conditions of the decision makers. In our experiments we found this confirmed for decision 
PDNHU¶V SHUFeived control. High perceived control increases the influence of the 
relationship with the messenger. If the message comes from an Opponent instead, it is 
more likely to be ignored. Decision makers with a low perceived control ± apparently ± are 
more likely to listen to the message from either a Collaborative Partner or an Opponent 
than decision makers with a high perceived control are. In the experiments we also found 
that the presentation of a Risk Warning ± by either putting attention on Gains or Losses ± 
is of influence. It has a main effect and it also demonstrates an attenuation of the influence 
of the messenger - decision maker  relationship on the Deaf Effect. These experiments 
provide clear empirical support for the influence of the messenger-decision maker 
relationship on the Deaf Effect. The experiments also showed that this influence is 
sensitive to interaction effects with other factors. That makes it interesting for further study 
in field conditions and for identifying potential factors that can  be of influence on the Deaf 
Effect as well. With this exploratory field study we aim to gain further insight in the Deaf 
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Effect and to elicit candidate factors and interactions, from people who experienced the 
Deaf Effect in the field. Although open for candidate factors, our study will remain 
focused on the Deaf Effect as dependent variable, and continuously keeps an eye on the 
independent variable Partner/Opponent relationship.    
7.2. Research Questions 
 
In order to refine our Research Questions we first clarify that the proposed contribution of 
this field-study will be to explore Why and How the Deaf Effect occurs in the field of 
escalating IS-projects. The assumptions and scope that we will take into account are: 
 
x The unit of analysis is the Internal Auditor who encountered a Deaf Effect response in 
an IS-project; 
x The Bad News Messenger acts in the role of internal auditor who meets the 
professional standards of the Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004). These 
standards address the criterion of a Bad News Messenger who is acting as a credible 
source - i.e. who has the expertise and could be relied upon to make true assertions 
(Cuellar et al., 2006). Furthermore, they assure that the internal auditor would operate 
from an Auditing Function which is independent from management authority (Keil & 
Robey, 2001); 
x The dependent variable is the Deaf Effect ± to continue the course of action despite 
the warning. We are interested in contingency factors related to the influence of the 
LQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHµPartner/Opponent UHODWLRQVKLS¶RQthe Deaf Effect.    
 
This brings us to the following table with research questions we aim to answer in this 
chapter: 
 
   
   Research Question Type of Question 
   
7 What other factors could be proposed to be of influence on the Deaf 
Effect, taking into account the influence of Partner/Opponent 
relationship on the Deaf Effect? 
Why/How 
 7.1 What other factors are proposed to be of influence on the Deaf 
Effect? 
Why/How 
 7.2 What other factors are proposed to interact with the 
Partner/Opponent relationship in its influence on Deaf Effect? 
Why/How 
 7.3 What structures and attributes can we identify that can be of help 
for further explanatory studies on Deaf Effect that will include 
those factors?  
How 
Table 7-1  Research Questions of Empirical Study 
 
 
Figure 7-1 provides a graphical representation of the scope of relations that we aim to 
explore.  
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Figure 7-1 Scope of Empirical of Empirical Study Chapter 7 
 
The factors that we consider to be within the scope to be explored could be of influence on 
the Deaf Effect (Continue) directly. They could also be of influence on whether the 
messenger is seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent. Factors might also  
moderate (attenuate, amplify or change) the influence of the Partnership/Opponent relation 
on the decision to continue a course of action.. We also include in our scope the feedback 
from the Continuation decision (representing Deaf Effect) on the Partner/Opponent 
relationship. In our considerathe decision to include or exclude potential factors from our 
scope, we use the criterion of whether a factor could be of influence on the Deaf Effect, 
since that is the dependent variable in our study.   
7.3. Research Method 
 
In order to answer our Research Questions we will use a qualitative approach following a 
Case Study method. Yin (2009) describes, based on three criteria, when a case study 
method is appropriate as research method. The three criteria are: form of research 
question, requiring control of behavioral events and focus on contemporary events. In this 
study the exploration of µZK\¶DQGµKRZ¶DUHWKHFHQWUDOTXHVWLRQs, the study does not need 
control over behavioral events but it does focus on contemporary events. Based on the 
answers to these three criteria the case study could be used as a research method to answer 
the research questions (Yin, 2009), p8.  
 
The topic of Deaf Effect is suitable to be studied with a Case Study method. We refer to 
the most frequently encountered definitions of case studies, which have mainly been 
focused on the types of topics to which case studies have been applied. Yin (2009), p17 
SURYLGHVDVH[DPSOH³7KHHVVHQFHRIDFDVHVWXG\WKHFHQWUDOWHQGency among all types of 
case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were 
WDNHQ KRZ WKH\ ZHUH LPSOHPHQWHG DQG ZLWK ZKDW UHVXOWV´  <LQ UHIHUV WR GHFLVLRQV
individuals and events amongst suitable topics for a case study. So the Deaf Effect 
phenomenon fits into this list of suitable topics, since it refers to a decision at the 
individual level of a decision maker (in the role of Project Owner).    
 
Since we aim to contribute to an understanding of the µZK\¶DQGµKRZ¶RIthe Deaf Effect, 
an explanatory Case Study would have been the most preferred type of Case Study. Taking 
into account not only the form of the research question, but the substance as well however, 
194 
 
it is more realistic to obtain an Exploratory Case Study (Yin,2009), since the Deaf Effect 
phenomenon is still in the early stages of investigation (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al., 2006). 
Even if we let our Case Study be guided by the influence of the Partner/Opponent Relation 
between Bad News Messenger and decision maker on the Deaf Effect, experiences from 
the field suggest that many factors could be of influence on this causal factor and could 
moderate its effect. In this dynamic and complex setting it is not realistic to allow testing 
of causal relations by ruling out rival explanations, as is proposed for explanatory case 
studies (Yin,2009). This would have resulted in interview-questions that would have been 
dominated by UHMHFWLRQRIIDFWRUVZKLOHZHDLPWRJHWDULFKSLFWXUHRIµFRXOGEH¶IDFWRUV
including the variety of attributes that could be of influence on the Deaf Effect. Therefore, 
we find it more appropriate to choose the method and principles of an exploratory case 
study, guided by attention on the Partner/Opponent relation and the influential factors that 
were identified in earlier experiments on the Deaf Effect.  
 
We depart from the hypothesis that the decision makers are more likely to listen and 
follow the Risk Warning coming from a Collaborative Partner instead of one coming from 
an Opponent. Since such a Partnership relation might be sensitive to certain influences, we 
explore our case-data in search for conditions and patterns of this independent variable in 
the Deaf Effect situations reported. With this approach of induction we aim to deliver 
propositions and structures that could be helpful for further deductive research on Deaf 
Effect. Wallace (1971) XVHG WKH PHWDSKRU RI WKH ³ZKHHO RI VFLHQFH´ IRU WKLV LWHUDWLYH
research process of deduction and induction to study and explain a phenomenon ± such as 
Deaf Effect in our case. Braster (2000), p29 suggests that Case Studies are applicable in 
both the deductive and the inductive approach. According to Braster, a Case Study fits well 
with an inductive approach and can very well take theoretical assumptions as a starting 
point. Therefore, we conclude that the exploratory Case Study as Research Method can 
serve our Research Questions. Finally, Braster (2000), p112 suggest that with this 
inductive approach the starting point of analysis is the collected data ± realizing however 
that these data have been collected with assumptions and theories in mind. This means that 
analysis of the Case Study data could not follow strategies such as pattern matching, 
explanation building and time series analysis, which are deductive by nature51. Braster 
(2000), p113 proposes that Grounded Theory principles of iterative coding and analytical 
memo-writing (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 2008; Saldana, 2009) are appropriate for 
exploring concepts and the development of theories based on case-study data. In our 
elaboration of this study we followed a Grounded Theory study of Flint, Woodruff, and 
Gardial (2002)  that explored Customer¶'HVLUHG9DOXH&KDQJHLQD%XVLQHVV-to-Business 
Context. This study showed high similarities with the form and substance of our research 
questions, and was based on interviews in the field with key-purchasing managers who had 
direct experience with the phenomenon being studied. In a similar manner, we aim to 
                                                          
 
51 Deductive strategies such as explanation building and timeseries might appear to be suitable, since they also 
allow iterative development based upon the case study data. We did not find them appropriate however, since 
they would drive the study to iterative refinement of hypotheses due to inconsistent results. Our aim is not to 
achieve refinements but to explore interactions. So we depart from the casestudy data instead of from the 
hypotheses.     
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explore the Deaf Effect based on interviews (cases) with internal auditors who had direct 
experience in the field.  
7.4. Research Design and Quality 
 
For the purpose of our study we adopted a multiple-case design, with a single unit of 
analysis per case. This is one out of four types of designs for a case study, as presented in 
table 7-2 (Yin, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 7-2 Basic types of designs for case studies (Yin, 2009) 
 
A case can best be described as one particular Deaf Effect situation as reported and 
described in an interview. One of the reasons why a multiple-case study is more 
appropriate here than a single-case study, is that it helps to find more factors that could 
contribute to the Deaf Effect and because it gives more insight into the variety of these 
factors. Furthermore, evidence from multiple-case studies show a higher data reliability 
than evidence from one study. Therefore, the study is more robust and reliable than in the 
case of a single-case study (Yin, 2009). The multiple-case study is also more applicable in 
the case where a phenomenon is shown in multiple cases (Yin, 2009).  
  
Because the study focuses on internal auditors who encountered the Deaf Effect in the 
context of a specific IS-project, a single-unit of analysis is used for each context. We did 
not interview multiple people that were involved in the same Deaf Effect situation. Based 
on these arguments, the case study design which will be used is the model shown in the 
upper-right corner of the model shown in table 7-2, a holistic multiple-case design. 
 
In order to discuss the quality threats and controls that are embedded in the research design 
and execution, we will discuss criteria of validity according to Yin (2009), p41. We follow 
Braster (2000), p61 who refers to several authors that suggest that these criteria apply to all 
types of case studies ± thus including exploratory case studies.  Brastner also mentions that 
other researchers claim that different sets of quality criteria should be used for different 
types of research, such as trustworthiness criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) that would only 
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apply to (interpretive) qualitative research opposed to (positivistic) quantitative research. 
We prefer the validity criteria as proposed by Braster (2000) and Yin (2009) to keep 
consistency with the other empirical chapters in this thesis. In table 7-2 we will describe 
how we embedded these criteria in our design and execution. 
 
Validity Controls in our Research Design and 
Execution 
Applies to  
 
Reliability - Use case study protocol 
- Develop case study database 
- Use native language 
- Use few and open questions 
Data collection 
Data analysis 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Construct validity - We use interviews from multiple sources 
- Use of verification questions 
- Iterative Coding of Sensitizing Concepts  
Data collection 
Data collection 
Data analysis 
Internal validity - Temporal descriptions   
- Iterative Coding of actions and effects  
- Theoretical Replication Within-Subject 
- Explorative Explanation Building 
- Arrive at Logic Models and Review 
Data collection 
Data analysis 
Data collection 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
External validity - Use replication logic in multiple-case 
studies 
Data collection 
Table 7-2  Quality Controls in our Exploratory Case Study Design 
 
In the next two sections we will describe how we implemented data collection and data 
analysis in order to achieve validity as presented in table 7-2. 
7.5  Data Collection   
  
We used a case study protocol (Yin, 2009), p45 to enhance Reliability of our study so that 
it could be audited and repeated. The case study protocol describes our research objectives, 
respondents, our invitations to respondents, text for introduction of the interviews, the 
main questions and topics that could require attention while executing the interviews. The 
case study protocol was peer-reviewed before we started our interviews and was adhered to 
during the interviews.  
 
Although our case study protocol and database are in English for review purposes, our 
LQWHUYLHZVZHUH KHOG LQ WKH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ QDWLYH ODQJXDJH'XWFK7KH UHFDOOHG VWRULHVRI
'HDI(IIHFWVLWXDWLRQVFRQWDLQHGSUHFLVHZRUGVRQSHRSOH¶VDFWLRQVDQGUHDFWLRQV ± which 
expressed subtle levels of anger, irritation or cynicism. It would have harmed reliability of 
the data collection if respondents and researcher would have used a non-native language to 
exchange information with two steps of translation that could cause misinterpretations.  
 
Reliability was also served by the open nature of the questions (Braster, 2000), p75. which 
allowed the respondent a lot of room to pay attention to details that he/she found relevant 
in their contribution to Deaf Effect. We also encouraged respondents to explain why they 
held these beliefs and asked them whether there were relevant issues that had not been 
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mentioned yet. These open invitations contribute to reliability of the study to measure the 
elements that are relevant.     
 
The interviews also contributed to Construct Validity since we obtained information from 
various respondents on different Deaf Effect situations. Interviews, however, bring some 
weaknesses and threats (Yin,2009), p102. First, they could bring bias due to poorly 
articulated questions. We mitigated this weakness by using a case study protocol with 
standard introduction of the purpose, topic and definitions that we used in our study. 
Furthermore, we recalled ± if appropriate during the interviews± the definitions that we 
used. In order to mitigate response bias, we sometimes asked questions in various ways 
and we triggered individuals to explain seemingly inconsistencies in the story. Interviews 
might also bring inaccuracies due to poor recollection even given the fact that the 
respondents reported from autobiographical memories of personal experience. The 
announcement and introduction of the interview provided respondents the opportunity to 
choose a Deaf Effect situation they could easily recall. We have no reason to assume poor 
recollection given the level of detail that was provided by respondents, their answers on 
questions for more detail and their open remarks on details that they could not recall. The 
threat of reflexivity ± giving the interviewer what he wants to hear ± would not be likely 
given the open and exploratory nature of the questions instead of closed and confirmative 
questions. We might further FRQVLGHU WKDW WKHVH VHQLRU LQWHUQDO DXGLWRUV DUH XVHG WR ³QRW
DOZD\VVD\ZKDW\RXZDQWWRKHDU´ 
 
We used interviews as our single source of evidence. We were not in the position to further 
enhance  Construct Validity with data-triangulation with other sources of evidence such as 
documentation, or archival records. The Deaf Effect situations on Strategic IS-projects 
were highly confidential for the organizations that were involved, so asking for additional 
evidence would not be appropriate. Strict confidentiality was guaranteed in the invitation 
and the introduction of our interviews and allowed us to transcribe data form these 
interviews for further analysis.   
 
Since the objective of our Case Study was to explore the explanation of the Deaf Effect, 
we did not aim for, nor achieved, Internal validity to arrive at a level of an Explanatory 
Case Study. This would have required extensive interrogation of respondents in order to 
rule out Rival Explanations (Yin, 2009), p42. This did not fit our purpose to collect and 
explore possible explanations and to encourage respondents to talk and explain freely.  
 
We finally contributed to internal validity by asking the respondents a final question on a 
contrast situation, in which the same auditor found that the Project Owner ± preferably the 
same - ZDVHDJHU WR OLVWHQDQGIROORZWKHDXGLWRU¶VPHVVDJH WRUHGLUHFWRUVWRSDSURMHFW. 
We asked what was the most relevant factor that explained why the Deaf Effect situation 
RFFXUUHGLQWKHRQHLQVWDQFHDQGQRWLQWKHRWKHU7KLVIRUPRIµWZRWDLO¶PXOWLFDVHVWXG\
implementation (Yin, 2009) p59, provides additional insight into promising factors that 
could contribute to theory-building to explain the Deaf Effect. 
 
With respect to External Validity of our study we are aware of the limited number of 
observations from 11 interviews in total. External validity in case studies assumes 
analytical generalization ± where surveys for example assume statistical generalization 
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(Yin,2009), p44. So the question of External Validity is whether or not the observations 
from the Deaf Effect situations of our respondents would be representative in concepts and 
structures. We think that they are since our respondents (1) were role-prescribed Bad News 
Messengers, (2) reported to IS-Project Owners and (3) met professional and organizational 
criteria to act as a credible and independent source. They were obtained from information-
oriented sampling across senior internal auditors in the Netherlands. Most of them were 
working in the field of financial services and transportation services. This is a domain that 
has delivered many single-case studies on Escalating IS-projects in the past (see table 2-3 
for an overview of single case studies). A point of attention for external validity is that the 
influence of cultural factors might be little illuminated  given the focus on Dutch 
situations. In table 7-3 we provide an anonymized insight into the background of our 
respondents52 
 
Role and experience Gender Nationality Age Type of 
Organization 
Company 
Size 
# employees 
Head IT-Audit, >15yrs 
 
Head IT-Audit, >20yrs 
 
Male 
 
Male 
Dutch 
 
Dutch 
 
50-55 
 
40-45 
Banking T 
 
Banking T 
>10000 
 
>10000 
Director IT-control, 
>15yrs 
 
Senior manager IT-
portfolio control, >25yrs 
 
Male 
 
 
Male 
Dutch 
 
 
Dutch 
40-45 
 
 
50-55 
Insurance U 
 
 
Insurance U 
>10000 
 
 
>10000 
Senior IT-audit 
manager/controller, 
>20yrs 
 
Male Dutch 40-45 Insurance  V 
 
>10000 
Director Internal Audit, 
>25yrs 
Male Dutch 55-60 Insurance W 
 
>10000 
Senior IT-audit 
manager, >25yrs 
Male Dutch 55-60 Banking X >10000 
Senior audit manager, 
>20yrs 
 
Male Dutch 45-50 Banking Y >10000 
Director Internal Audit, 
>25yrs 
Male Dutch 55-60 Insurance Z 
 
>10000 
Chief Audit Executive, 
>20yrs 
 
Senior Auditor, >10 yrs 
 
Male 
 
 
Male 
Dutch 
 
 
Dutch 
40-45 
 
 
40-45 
Transportation Q 
 
 
Transportation Q 
4000 
 
 
4000 
Table 7-3 Anonymous Description of Respondents 
 
                                                          
 
52 We had performed a pilot interview in an early stage of our study which is not included. The sequence of 
respondents in this table is not related to the case-numbers that we will use later in this chapter. 
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7.6. Data Analysis 
  
We transcribed our interviews into 6-10 pages of text per interview. After a review of the 
interviews, we prepared our first analytic memo of patterns that emerged from those 
interviews. We discussed this memo with peer researchers. We followed a two cycle 
coding and analytic memo writing procedure according to guidelines for qualitative 
research by Saldana (2009). In the first coding cycle we identified any text-fragments that 
appeared to contain causes of Deaf Effect or that appeared to be related to the 
Partner/Opponent relationship between internal auditor and decision maker. Based on this 
initial coding we prepared a second analytic memo that we discussed with peer 
researchers. We coded and structured the factors that these internal auditors found relevant 
for explaining the Deaf Effect. We were especially interested in the relationship between 
messenger and decision maker. At several points in time we asked the respondents about 
this relationship, so that we could obtain a view on how it developed in that particular 
situation and what events and actions were of influence. This provided us with a rich 
insight into factors that would likely contribute to the Deaf Effect. At the same time, it also 
showed that multiple interactions and factors contributed to Deafness. Next to the 
description and clustering of factors that were proposed to have a ± direct or indirect ± 
causal effect on the Deaf Effect, we prepared an analytic story that describes how the Deaf 
Effect occurred after a Bad News Message. This analytic story was based on our 
interviews and guided our attention to the interaction strategies between the internal 
auditor (bad news messenger) and the Project Owner (decision maker). It also provided us 
with insight into the variety of factors that appeared to be of influence across the 11 cases. 
These cases appeared to provide sufficient variety and insight into factors (categories) to 
satisfy the criterion for theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2006), p100. Based on these 
emerging patterns and clustering of factors, we refined our coding and further refined our 
analysis.  
 
Of the four proposed general strategies to analyze qualitative data from case studies (Yin, 
2009), p130, we determined that the development of a case description be the most 
appropriate for our exploratory study. Our approach follows the iterative Analytic Memo 
Writing procedure for qualitative (Grounded Theory) research as proposed by Charmaz 
(2006), p11, and Saldana (2009), p32. The iterative coding and analytic memo writing also 
contributed to the Internal Validity of our study since temporal patterns and perceived 
explanations ± as provided by the respondents - were further structured and refined into 
clusters of  factors that are proposed to be influential on Deaf Effect. From this iterative 
process we finally arrived at logic models that are proposed for further research.  
 
In order to store and maintain the collected data, we developed a case study database (Yin, 
2009), p45. This contributed to the Reliability of our study since it facilitates for it to be 
audited and repeated. In the case study database  we stored (1) the original taped 
interviews, (2) the transcribed word documents, (3) the list of codes, (4) marked coding 
within the documents, (5) word-tables with key-characteristics, (6) multiple versions of 
analytic memos and (7) marked anecdotes that were used in the final analytic memo which 
is embedded in this Chapter. The database was stored and maintained in nVivo release 9 
which is a recent implementation of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS). This implementation contributes to reliability, transparency and 
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flexibility of our case study data, which allows for further elaboration and reviewing of the 
analysis of the texts from our interviews. 
7.7. Results 
7.7.1. Clustering of Factors that were reported to be of influence on Deaf 
 
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶VWRULHVFDQEHWLHGWRJHWKHUWKURXJKDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKH
Bad News Message on the Deaf Effect as a sequence of events and conditions that 
developed over time. In figure 7-5 we present our structure using an analogy with a study 
WKDW H[SORUHG WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI &XVWRPHUV¶ 'HVLUHG 9DOXH &KDQJH LQ D %XVLQHVV-to-
Business Context (Flint et al., 2002). At the right end of this figure we present the Deaf 
Effect as the dependent variable of our study. In the second left block in this figure we 
describe the properties of the bad news message that respondents used in explaining Deaf 
effect in the occasion that they described. Consistent with Flint, we describe the variety in 
form and intensity of the Bad News Messages as shown in our interviews. In the bottom of 
this figure, we show the final Partner/Opponent relationship when Deaf Effect occurred at 
the right end and how it developed is shown by reading from left to right. At the left-end 
we describe the initial relationship before the bad news message was given. Initial states 
are described by Organization Conditions, Messenger Characteristics, Receiver 
Characteristics and Project Characteristics. These conditions may directly, or indirectly, be 
of influence on the Deaf Effect. Attributes of the Bad News Message could be of influence 
on the Deaf Effect directly, but can also be of influence on the Partner/Opponent relation. 
Consistent with Flint et al. (2002), we derived and clustered Action/Interaction Strategies 
that were reported by our respondents in order to explain the Deaf Effect.  
 
 
Figure 7-3 Model to structure the factors that are of influence on Deaf Effect 
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7.7.2. Reported Definitions and Indicators of Deaf 
 
In the introduction of our interviews we recalled our definition of the Deaf Effect, 
according to Cuellar (2009) : ³ZKHQDGHFLVLRQPDNHUGRHVQ¶W KHDU LJQRUHV RYHUUXOHV D
report of bad news to continue a failing FRXUVHRIDFWLRQ´$VWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLQRXU
study we noted the descriptions for Deaf Effect that the respondents used in their 
interviews. The following descriptions were used by the respondents while they described 
Deaf Effect situations. Case #3: The executive did not agree with us which gave a lot of 
turbulence. At that point there was a Deaf Effect, as I interpreted, in the sense of that they 
did not want to accept our message.  
 
The respondents also described several indicators of the Deaf Effect, which told them that 
the decision maker (Project Owner) did not hear, ignored or overruled the bad news report. 
As described in case #2 ³, GLGQ¶W JHW DQVZHUV DQ\PRUHPHHWLQJVZHUH FDQFHOOHG 7KH
PRVW W\SLFDO ZDV WKDW KH WKH PDQDJHU GLGQ¶W DQVZHU P\ SKRQHFDOOV 6R , DVNHG P\
colleague to call him, and in two seconds he was on the phone. Yes and then you know they 
GRQ¶W ZDQW WR KHDU \RXUPHVVDJH´The Bad News Messenger in case #4 described, as 
indicator for the Deaf Effect, that ³WKHPDQDJHUKDGQRWSUHSDUHGRXUPHHWLQJDQGKDGQRW
read my note. And he asked me why I waVERWKHULQJKLPZLWKP\GHWDLOV´. 
 
From our interviews, we also obtained two additional descriptions in which the Deaf Effect 
was not as black-and-white as we used in our definition. The internal audit director in case 
#3 referred to ±what he called ± temporary deafness. Just after the Bad News Message the 
manager showed deafness, but after a while this appeared to be recovered from, so the 
deafness was not permanent. Another internal director in case #9 referred to partial 
deafness in which the manager appeared to listen to important parts of the message, and 
showed deafness for other parts. 
7.7.3. Reported Interaction Strategies 
 
We proceed with a backwards-oriented description starting from the Deaf Effect back to 
the events and factors that led to it.The first of these factors that we discuss are the 
interaction strategies that finally resulted in the Deaf Effect.  In the tables 7-4a through 7-
4d we present the interaction strategies that were mentioned in the interviews as being 
relevant in the explanation of the Deaf Effect. We clustered them into 4 groups of 
strategies. The first group refers to changes in the communication between messenger and 
decision maker. In the second group we present action/interaction strategies that are 
focused on making a change in the position of the actor (strengthening, withdrawing or 
other). The third group refers to actions/interaction strategies that are focused on the 
position of the other (strengthen, weaken or other). The fourth group consists of 
actions/interaction strategies that were focused on the project (freeze, redirect, change 
roles).  The tables present the following information derived from the cases: who the 
person was that showed the interaction strategy, was it the Bad News Messenger, the 
decision maker or ± in some cases - a higher authority who intervented? In each column 
202 
 
we present in how many out of 11 cases the actor had applied this strategy. In the last three 
columns we show in which cases this was associated with a shift in the partnership 
relation53. Within each table, the interaction strategies are listed in the most natural 
chronological sequence of appearance, according to our interviews, although there is no 
fixed sequence across all interviews.        
 
Communication Strategies 
 Bad News 
Messenger 
Decision 
Maker 
Higher 
Authority 
Associated with  
Shift in Relation 
    More  
Partner 
 
Neutral 
More  
Opponent 
Use of more 
evidence and 
arguments 
6/1154 5/11  3,755 9,10,12 4,8,11 
Switch from 
informal to formal 
communication 
7/11 2 /11   7,9 2,4, 8,11,12 
Switch from Content 
to Form 
(Rating/Color) 
5/11 2/11   8,9 2,4,11 
Switch from Content 
to Persons 
2/11 5 /11  8 2 4, 9,11,12 
React emotionally 2/11 3 /11  8 2,4 11,12 
Go up in hierarchy 11/11 2 /11  3,5 4,6,7 2,8,9,10,11,12 
Switch from formal 
to informal 
communication 
5/11 2 /11  3,5,8,9,10  4 
Table 7-4a Action/Interaction strategies on Communication 
 
Table 7-4a shows that both messengers and decision makers provided additional evidence 
and arguments to convince the other. In some cases this sharing of information was 
                                                          
 
53 The association of an interaction strategy with a shift in the Partner/Opponent relationship is Neutral by default 
unless there are indications that it moved. These indications are interpreted by the researcher for each individual 
case from 1. The answer of the respondent on the question about the status of partner/opponent relationship at that 
point 2. The reaction of the countHUSDUWWKDWFRXOGLQGLFDWHDVKLIWUHDFWZLWKHPDLOLQFDSLWDOVGRQ¶WDQVZHU the 
SKRQH  7KH XVH RI W\SLFDO ZRUGV E\ WKH UHVSRQGHQWV OLNH ³ZH-together-common-VKDUH´ YV ³KH-they i-we 
DJDLQVW´7KHVHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVFRXOGEHGLVSXWHGIRUDQLQGLYLGXDOFase, but are intended to provide insight over 
all cases whether it would lean towards shifting in either direction.    
54 Refers to the number of cases out of a total of 11 interviews 
55 Refers to the individual case numbers  
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appreciated and was associated with mutual understanding and partnership (case #3 and 
#7). In some cases this repeating and stressing of evidence was associated with a worsened 
partnership relation. In case #4 the Bad News Messenger had reported 25 concerns on the 
project and had arranged a 3 hour meeting to discuss those issues. A short while later only 
three issues appeared to be solved and the messenger arranged another urgent meeting 
with the responsible manager. This manager acted much more as an opponent in this 
meeting. An overwhelming amount of evidence and arguments could also be used by the 
manager. The internal auditor in case #11 reported that he was provided with piles of 
paper with so called evidence that should reject his opiQLRQ³7KH\KDGRUGHUHGVRPHRQH
to prepare lots of detailed information to counter act the smallest details in my audit note. 
Just to knock down my message with impressive details and calculations. But with my own 
financial background and the record of the project, it was more than obvious that the 
SURMHFW¶VEXVLQHVVFDVHZDVQRORQJHUYLDEOH´  
 
In 7 out of 11 cases, the Bad News Messenger switched from informal ± mostly oral 
communication - to formal communication ± mostly reported with a rating. In most of 
these cases this switch was associated with a worsened partnership. The same applied to 
occurrences where the focus of a discussion moved away from the content and toward the 
formal side of the message, such as a Rating (as in case #8 and case #9) or as reported in 
case #11: ³7KH\VKLIWHGIURPWKHFRQWHQWRIP\PHVVDJHWRWKHIRUPDQGDVVXPSWLRQVWKDW,
KDGXVHGLQP\QRWH´ 
 
Several cases marked a clear point in which the decision maker switched the focus of the 
communication from content to personal factors. This could show in many forms, but all of 
them made it clear that the message - either due to content or form ± was related to the self 
and other persons including the messenger. As reported in case #2: <<The response of the 
director in that meetinJZDVQRW DERXW FRQWHQW DQ\PRUH+H VDLG³KRZFDQ \RX NQRZ´
³ZLWK ZKRP GLG \RX WDON´ ³WKDW JX\ GRHVQ¶W XQGHUVWDQG´ +H PRYHG WR SHUVRQV DQG
blaming instead of discussing content>>. In case # 4 the Bad News Messenger also 
phrased the words of the manager literally ³KH\\RXZKDWGR\RXWKLQN\RXDUHGRLQJ
ZLWK\RXERWKHULQJPHZLWK\RXUGHWDLOV´)RUPHWKLVVKRZHGWKHDeaf Effect. I had the 
IHHOLQJ³KH\\RX\RXUVHOIMXVWUHDGP\FRQFHUQVLQVWHDGRIUHIXVLQJWRXQGHUVWDQG´<HV
that pushes you into the direction of policeman and you get that feeling although you 
GLGQ¶WZDQWWR!! In many cases the manager appeared to be triggered personally by the 
message, since he strongly associated himself with his project (case #6), he felt that his 
experience or reputation was neglected (case #4, case #6); he felt himself being put in an 
uncomfortable position of being criticized in the presence of his peers (case #2) or he felt 
criticized on his integrity to disclose information on the actual project status (case #11). 
The switch from content to personal factors/level could also be recognized in case #8 when 
the Bad News Messenger described  KHORRNHGPHLQWKHH\HVDQGVDLGµ-RKQ\RXDUH
UHDOO\QRWKHOSLQJPHDQG\RXKDUPRXURUJDQL]DWLRQ¶«$QG,VDLGµ)UDQNWKH way that 
\RXWDNH\RXUGHFLVLRQVVKRZVWKDW\RXGRQ¶WWDNHWKLVSUREOHPVHULRXVly¶!!.  The switch 
from content to personal factors/level was made in a subtle way by the Bad News 
Messenger as well, for example as shown in case #9 by the question <<now be honest, 
ZRXOG \RX JLYH \RXUVHOI D UDWLQJ ³VDWLVIDFWRU\´"!!. It appeared that the switch from 
content to personal factors/level was crucial in several deafness situations. Interpreting the 
Bad News Message as a personal criticism or not appeared to distinguish Deaf Effect 
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situations from highly comparable situations in which the manager showed no Deaf Effect 
and even showed to be eager to listen (case#2, case #8). In case #11, the internal manager 
said that remarks on strategic issues - ³GRHVLWPDNHVHQVHZhat you are doing and are you 
GRLQJ LWZHOO´ - are often perceived as personal criticism and therefore it is much more 
easy to report deficiencies on operational issues such as controls and security.  
 
The switch from content to personal communication, was often followed by emotional 
reactions such as getting angry upon receiving the Bad News Messenger as reported in 
cases #2, #4, #8, #11 and #12. The interviews showed that in all cases of the Deaf Effect 
the Bad News Messenger decided to report to someone higher up in the hierarchy. In most 
situations this was clearly associated with a shift to a worsening the partnership relation. 
The Bad News Messenger in case #2 explained that <<he saw us clearly as policemen. Of 
course this was related to our intervention that has ± how shall I call it - a policeman 
flavor. It is no joke when somebody goes to your boss and talks about what you do within 
\RXUGHSDUWPHQWDQG WKDW WKLQJVDUHQRW JRLQJZHOO<RX¶UHQRWZDLWLQJ IRU WKDW NLQG RI
help.>> 
 
In six cases there was a clear switch in the communication from formal to informal 
communication ± often in a small and trusted setting with executives from the audit 
department and business. In most of these cases this switch was associated with improved 
partnership. As reported by internal audit director in case #3, ³LQIRUPDOGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDW
\RXKDYHGLQQHU WRJHWKHU LQIRUPDOO\EXW LW LVPRUH OLNHZDONLQJ LQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VURRPV
DQGEHVXUH\RXNHHSRQWDONLQJWRHDFKRWKHU´ 
 
After these general communication strategies, table 7-4b shows the interaction strategies 
that are are focused on making a change in the position of the actor himself/herself 
(strengthening, withdraw or other). 
 
Strategies with Focus on Self 
 Bad News 
Messenger 
Decision 
Maker 
Higher 
Authority 
Associated with  
Shift in Relation  
    More  
Partner 
 
Neutral 
More 
Opponent 
Talk to my 
Projectmanager/supplier 
not to me 
 6/11   2,6,7 4,11,12 
Introduce External Threat 2/11 3/11  9 2,10 12 
Find support of powerful 
or trusted others 
5/11 2 /11  3 4,5,6,9,11  
Use Power and Authority 8/11 1 /11   4,6,8 2,3,9,11,12 
Withdraw 0/11      
Table 7-4b Action/Interaction strategies with Focus on Self 
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In six out of 11 cases decision makers showed that they did not want to hear the Bad News 
Message since they believed that it should be addressed to someone else. In most cases 
they referred to the Project Manager (case #6, case #12). This confirmed and motivated the 
Bad News Messenger to take position even more boldly that the Decision Maker should 
take responsibility. In case #8 WKH0DQDJHUSRLQWHGDWDQRWKHUGHSDUWPHQW³KH VDLGZH
auditors should point our arrows to that department in order to improve their service first. 
1RZ\RXDUHFULWL]LQJDQGSXQLVKLQJWKHEHVWLQFODVV´ 
 
In several cases the internal auditors introduced an external threat (regulatory) to 
strengthen their own position. The Decision Makers in case #10 and #2 introduced 
external commercial and operational threats to strengthen their position: ³ZHPXVWSURFHHG
for sake of continuity of service to our FXVWRPHUV´. Finally, the respondents reported the 
strategy to find support of powerful or trusted others. This appeared to be most often used 
for obtaining confirmation and gaining supporting for RQH¶V RZQ SRVLWLRQ7KLV ZDV QRW
associated with a worsening partnership relation. Nevertheless, this last strategy could 
indicate a point of no return ± to give up opinions without losing face towards those trusted 
and powerful others that showed their support.  
  
Messengers in several cases used their authority and organizational power, mainly to 
report concerns in their regular procedures. In some cases this was associated with a 
worsened partnership ± according to the Bad News Messenger¶V perspective of the 
situation.  
 
In our cases we did not find any instance of a Bad News Messenger or Decision Maker 
that actually had decided to withdraw. In several cases however, the Bad News Messenger 
mentioned that he had considered to withdraw. In case #6 the internal audit director had 
considered whether or not the Bad News Message - at this point in time - was worth the 
WURXEOHDQGZKHWKHU LWZRXOGEHPRUH HIIHFWLYH WR VDYH WKH³DPPXQLWLRQ´ IRUDQRWKHU ± 
even more important ± situation. Since the interviews were focused on the Deaf Effect 
situations, it is reasonable that ZHGLGQ¶WILQGUHSRUWHGWKHVHZLWKGUDZ-situations, although 
it still could be an interaction scenario to withdraw in. 
 
7KHDERYHPHQWLRQHGLQWHUDFWLRQVWUDWHJLHVZHUHIRFXVHGRQRQH¶VRZQSRVLWLRQ%DVHGRQ
the interaction strategies above, the Bad News Messenger and Project Owners may have 
shifted more towards Opponents. Table 7-4c shows the action and interaction strategies 
WKDWZHUHIRFXVHGRQWKHRWKHU¶VSRVLWLRQ7KRVHVWUDWHJLHVDOUHDG\DVVXPHWKDWWKHRWKHULV
considered an Opponent who should be stopped or redirected. 
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Strategies with Focus on Other 
 Bad News 
Messenger 
Decision 
Maker 
Higher 
Authority 
Associated with  
Shift in Relation  
    More  
Partner 
 
Neutral 
More 
Opponent 
'RQ¶WVKDUH
information 
 2/11   6 2 
Withhold opponent 
from goal 
achievement 
 7/11   7,9 4,6,8,11,12 
Dispute Credibility 
of other 
 5/11   8,9 2,11,12 
Threat Opponent  2 /11    5,11 
Table 7-4c Action/Interaction strategies with Focus on Other 
 
A typical strategy was to frustrate the Bad News Messenger in making his or her message 
effective. The most often found form of this was to frustrate the finalization of the 
PHVVHQJHU¶VQRWHRUUHSRUWDFFRUGLQJWRSURFHGXUHVVRPHWLPHVLQDVXEWOHZD\,QCase #7 
the auditor mentioned that he had prepared a note with his remarks, which he discussed 
with the project manager first. Then he adapted the note since he wanted the project 
manager to subscribe his facts. So it took some time before he had a note that was 
subscribed by the project manager. Then he asked for a management response and saw 
this took a while again. At the time the project was ready to provide a management 
response, they claimed that the facts had changed and that the auditor should talk to 
VHYHUDOSHUVRQVDJDLQ+HFRQFOXGHVZLWK´6RWKH\WU\WRSRVWSRQHDQGGHOD\7KDW¶VZKDW
\RX VHH´ 7KH DXGLW GLUHFWRU LQCase #9  confirms these experiences. He contrasts that 
reports are quick and easily finished if  he gives a Satisfactory Rating. However,  if he 
gives an Unsatisfactory Rating it takes a lot of time for the report to be finished and the 
management response to be received.  
 
We also found other subtle ways to prevent the messenger from being effective. For 
example, by giving the messenger the impression that his message was taken very 
seriously, in which it took some time before WKH PHVVHQJHU UHDOL]HG WKDW WKLV ZDVQ¶W 
actually the case. The internal auditor in Case #11 reported that the manager thanked him 
gratefully for the reported concerns and remarks. The auditor was told that they 
appreciated his contributioQ DQG WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG FHUWDLQO\ WDNH QRWLFH RI LW ³:LWK
hindsight now I realize this was just a smart way of preventing me from having influence 
RQ WKHGLUHFWLRQRI WKHSURMHFW´And further in Case #11 the Bad News Messenger tells 
that he was invited to talk to the Risk Director, who was very kind and listening to the 
DXGLWRU¶VFRQFHUQV LQKLVSUHVWLJLRXVRIILFH³,W WRRNPHDZKLOH WRXQGHUVWDQG WKDW WKHVH
PHHWLQJVZHUHDQRWKHUZD\WRHOLPLQDWHP\PHVVDJHWRKDYHGLUHFWHIIHFWRQWKHSURMHFW´ 
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Also less subtle ways to delay and prevent the messenger from being effective in finalizing 
and reporting his message were found. In case #4 the Bad News Messenger found that it 
took a lot of effort to arrange a meeting to discuss his concerns as described in a note. 
Then he found that the responsible manager had not prepared the meeting and had not 
read the note with concerns. 
 
Furthermore, several instances showed that the credibility of the Bad News Messenger was 
disputed in an obtrusive or more subtle way. The decision maker countered the bad news 
message by claiming that the messenger had too much distance to be informed (case #3), 
missed important issues (case #8), looked too much at details (case #4). This was however 
not necessarily associated with a worsened partnership relation. For example, in case #9 
WKHPDQDJHU VDLG WR WKH LQWHUQDO DXGLWRU ³, ZLOO WU\ WR H[SODLQ it to you, but it is very 
FRPSOLFDWHGDQG,GRQ¶WH[SHFW\RXDXGLWRUVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKLVDOO´ 
 
In two cases the Bad News Messengers reported that they had received personal threats 
regarding their job-security within the organization urging them to withdraw their bad 
news message. It was remarkable to notice that in one case the internal auditor had been 
operationally involved and appreciated within the project for a longer time. After his 
FRQWULEXWLRQ DSSHDUHG WR WKUHDWHQ WKHPDQDJHU¶V VWUDWHJLF JRDOV, this appreciation turned 
into anger focused on the Bad News Messenger personally, finally resulting in personal 
threats. The operational involvement as insider and partner to the project even appeared to 
arouse that the anger was focused on the messenger personally56.  
 
In table 7-4d we present the action and interaction strategies that were focused on the 
project as well as what happened with the project. Just in a few cases, the decision maker 
had frozen or redirected the project in the end. In most cases an intervention of a higher 
authority had taken place, in terms of removing the manager from the project and to freeze 
or redirect the project. The internal auditor in case #7 said that ultimately his concerns 
UHDFKHG WKH OHYHO RI WKH H[HFXWLYH ERDUG $QG ³WKHQ WKLQJV KDSSHQHG WKDWZH FRXOG QRW
REVHUYHIURPRXUSRVLWLRQ%XWLWWXUQHGRXWWKDWWKHPDQDJHUZDVVXGGHQO\UHSODFHG´DQG
was moved to a different project. The internal auditor in case #12 described that ± after 
the auditor had reported his concerns to the executive board ± the director was replaced 
and sent for early retirement, although the auditor did not know whether this was the only 
reason of course. In several of the reported Deaf Effect situations, a higher authority ± 
executive board ± had finally stopped or redirected the project. 
 
                                                          
 
56 This conclusion could not be drawn from a single phrase in the interview, but it is plausible from the storyline 
of this interview that the assumed partnership led to this focus of anger on the bad news messenger personally. 
We use a metaphor to explain. We invite the reader to assume that he/she would be coach of a sports team, for 
example a soccerteam. Winning the current match could be of strategic value and could determine the future of 
you and your organization. Unfortunately - while close to winning - you loose this game, because ± in the second 
half, just for finish - one player scores a hattrick against you. You might be strongly disappointed, emotionally, 
angry. But it is not likely that your anger will focus on the player that scored the goals ± or even threat him or her. 
This might be different when this player belongs to your own team and was assumed that his goals would be 
DOLQHG ZLWK \RXUV ,Q WKLV VLWXDWLRQ LW¶V PXFK PRUH SODXVLEOH WKDW \RXU DQJHU ZRXOG EH FRQFHQWUDWHG RQ WKLV
³WHDPPHPEHU´SHUVRQDOO\ZKRSHUVLVWHGLQKDUPLng your goals. You might feel betrayed.   
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Focus on Project 
 Bad News 
Messenger 
Decision 
Maker 
Higher 
Authority 
Associated with  
Shift in Relation  
    More  
Partner 
 
Neutral 
More 
Opponent 
Replace managers   6/11 3 2,4,7 11,12 
Freeze & Redirect  3/11 4/11 3,4,5 2,7 12 
Stop    3/11  6 11,12 
Table 7-4d Action/Interaction Strategies with focus on project 
7.7.4. Reported Properties of the Bad News Message 
 
In order to explore the Deaf Effect, we discussed the action/interaction strategies that 
started with the Bad News Message and finally resulted in the Deaf Effect. We also 
discussed that these interactions could turn Partners into Opponents. In table 7-5 we 
present the properties of the Bad News Messages that were mentioned by our respondents 
in their explanation of the Deaf Effect. The dimensional range of these properties was 
derived from the specific values that were mentioned in the interviews. In the right 
columns, we describe whether the interviews suggested association of the property with a 
worsened Partnership or directly with the Deaf Effect.   
 
The Bad News Messengers mentioned whether their message was presented in an oral and 
informal form or as a formal (audit) report or letter. Cases #2, #4, #8, #11 and # 12 
suggested that an informal and oral presentation was more associated with partnership and 
that a written formal presentation was more asociated with the messenger and decision 
maker being seen as opponents. They also mentioned the Status of their bad news message 
± in this context often in written form ± as a draft, concept or final version of the message.  
Cases #8 and #4 suggested that discussion of an early draft version of a report was 
associated more with partnership than a fait accompli, which is less open for discussion 
and feedback. Expectancy also appeared to be a property of the Bad News Message that 
was relevant for the Deaf Effect. An unexpected Bad News Message was more associated 
with worse partnership relations. The same applied to a disclosure of the Bad News 
Message, for example to peers or the boss of the project owner, as we saw in Case #2. The 
positive or negative framing of the Bad News Message was also mentioned to be relevant 
for the Deaf Effect. The internal audit director in case #9 reported that it was important to 
stress positive elements as well. The internal audit director in case #3 said that the negative 
remarks should be embedded in a more balanced context. Too much attention on negative 
attributes apparantly was relevant for the Deaf Effect.  
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Properties of Bad 
News Message 
Dimensional Range of Property Association 
 
A. Form Variety 
 Worsened 
Partnership 
Cause Deaf 
Effect 
 
1. Formal 
 
Oral informal ± Written formal 
 
Written formal 
 
2. Status Draft ± concept ± final Final  
3. Expectancy Entirely Unexpected ± Entirely Expected Unexpected  
4. Disclosure Confidential ± Full disclosure Full disclosure  
5. Framing Gains/Losses  Losses 
B. Intensity    
 
1. Rate 
 
Unacceptable ± Undesirable ± Marginally 
Undesirable 
 
Unacceptable 
 
2. Urgency Evolutionary/gradual ± Revolutionary/rapid Revolutionary  
3. Impact 
 
Operational-Attributes Only  
Structural ± Attributes and Consequences 
Strategic ± Endstates 
 
 
Strategic 
Table 7-5 Properties and Dimensional Ranges of Bad News Messages 
The intensity of the Bad News Message could be expressed in terms of Rating. Especially 
WKHUDWLQJ³XQDFFHSWDEOH´DSSHDUHGWREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDQOpponent relationship. On the 
other hand, we learned from cases #8 and #9 that Rating could reduce the Deaf Effect, 
since the message was unambiguous and received executive board attention. The expressed 
Urgency in the Bad News Message was associated with an Opponent relationship in case 
#4, probably since it is perceived to be obtrusive. As we discussed in the previous section, 
the impact of the Bad News Message was relevant as well. Apparently it makes a 
difference whether the message disputes the viability and end-state of the project ± at 
strategic level ±or that it disputes operational issues of the project. This was made visible 
in case #11. The auditor had built up a history with the project in which they followed his 
advices on internal controls and security. Apparantly, this changed as soon as his remarks 
moved towards concerns on the strategic level of the project.  
7.7.5. Reported Context  
 
In this section we return to the context and initial conditions before the bad news message 
was given. Initial states are described by Organization conditions, Messenger 
characteristics, Receiver characteristics and Project characteristics. These conditions may, 
directly or indirectly, be of influence on the Deaf Effect. The interviews did not provide 
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sufficiently detailed information to describe properties and dimensional ranges as we did in 
the previous sections on the individual Deaf Effect cases. It also would require much more 
interviews to achieve theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2006), p101. 
 
In the interviews we found that several references were made to the Corporate Governance 
principles in the organisation. Also, the role of the internal audit department within the 
organisation was mentioned many times when people discussed the Deaf Effect situation. 
Several internal audit directors (case #3 and #9) referred to the role that was described in 
their internal audit charter. OQHRIWKHPKDGHYHQXVHGWKHPHWDSKRURI³SROLFHPHQ´LQKLV
internal audit charter.  
 
We also found on several occassions that a reference was made to the Retaliation Culture 
within the organisation. In some cases, a high level of Retaliation (case #11 and #12) was 
mentioned as a cause of the Deaf Effect since managers would suffer heavy consequences 
if their project were to fail. In other cases, a low level of Retaliation was mentioned as a 
cause of the Deaf Effect (case #5 and #6), which made managers perceive to be 
invulnerable.   
 
Finally, the importance of a clear Risk Appetite at organization level was mentioned 
several times. The internal audit director in case #3 described the process of several 
workshop meetings he had had with executive management. These workshops created a 
common understanding of internal audit and executive management on strategic risk 
taking within the organisation. He mentioned its contribution to avoid Deaf Effect 
situations. This was not only based on better understanding of the content, but also on a 
process in which executives and internal audit staff developed a  partnership relation on 
strategic risks.    
 
At messenger/organisation level, the Authority of the messenger was mentioned in several 
cases. It was referred to as an interaction strategy to use authority and to report the 
concerns within regular procedures. It was interesting to notice that this was not always 
associated with a shift to see the counterpart as an Opponent. Fair and open use of 
authority (as in case #4, #6 and #8) appeared to be neutral with regard to the 
Partner/Opponent UHODWLRQVKLS 7KLV DVVXPHV WKDW WKH PHVVHQJHU¶V UROH DV GHULYHG IURP
corporate governance principle) could bring two distinct concepts: the Partner/Opponent 
relationship and the authoULW\7KRVHPLJKWLQWHUDFW,IWKHµSROLFHPDQ¶KDVKLJKDXWKRULW\
you may listen, regardless of whether you consider him to be your Partner or Opponent 
(case #12). As Chambers et al. (1988) p72, underline: ³:HWHQGWRREH\WKHSROLFHEHFDXVH
WKH\ DUH WKH SROLFH´ ,I WKH PHVVHQJHU¶V DXWKRULW\ VKULQNV WKHQ LW PDNHV D GLIIHUHQFH
whether you consider him or her to be a Collaborative Partner or an Opponent. Therefore 
we propose 0HVVHQJHU¶V $XWKRULW\, as described in Whistleblowing literature (Near & 
Miceli, 1995), to interact with the Partner/Opponent relationship.  
 
At messenger level, the Credibility of the messenger, as proposed by Cuellar (2009) was 
not mentioned by our respondents, since they refered to their own situation and did not 
dispute their own credibility. In the interaction strategies, table 7-4c, we saw confirmed 
that messenger credibility was a relevant property of the Bad News Messenger. 
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$WWKHUHFHLYHUOHYHORXUUHVSRQGHQWVPDLQO\UHIHUHGWRWKHSURMHFWRZQHU¶Vexperience, in 
terms of trackrecord with IS-projects and trackrecord with earlier internal audit 
engagements. An analysis of relevant personal characteristics of the receiver would 
UHTXLUH PRUH SV\FKRORJ\ UHVHDUFK VNLOOV WR EH H[HFXWHG %XW HOHPHQWV RI PDQDJHUV¶
perceived invulnerability and narcisism appeared to be recognized from the interviews.  
 
Finally, a typical combination of Project Owner characteristics and Project Manager 
characteristics is worth mentioning in relation to Deafness. We mentioned earlier that 6 
out of 11 cases showed an interaction strategy of ³WDONWRP\SURMHFWPDQDJHUQRWWRPH´. 
In these cases, the Project Owner showed very low involvement with the project, was 
poorly informed, not familiar with IS-projects and not really interested in the project and in 
criticism. They appeared to be not willing to hear the Bad News Messenger, maybe due to 
a lack of comprehension or exposure. In contrast to the Project Owners that were 
discussed, project managers mentioned in the interviews showed to be very experienced, 
powerful, involved and well informed. These Project Managers were often found to be in a 
dominant role in the interaction strategies that resulted in Deafness. So this typical 
combination of Project Owner and Projectmanager resulted in - what one of the 
respondents called informally after the interview± DµGRXEOHGHDI¶HIIHFt. 
   
7.8. Storyline from the multi-case study: an analytical note 
 
With the analytical note in this section we reflect on our interviews, departing from the 
experiments we described in Chapters 4 and 5. In our multi-case study we found that, with 
the exception of one case, all cases confirm that the messenger was seen as an Opponent at 
the point that the Deaf Effect showed. So, this condition preceded the Deaf Effect in a way 
that was consistent with our experiments. The Collaborative Partnership is also mentioned 
to distinguish Deaf Effect situations from contrasted situations. As a contrast we asked all 
respondents to recall another extreme opposite  reaction in which the manager ± probably 
the same - had showed extreme attention and urge to listen to the DXGLWRU¶V ZDUQLQJ WR
redirect a project. The auditors mention that ± in those opposite to deaf situations - the 
PDQDJHUIRXQGWKHDXGLWRU¶VZDUQLQJDQGWKHDXGLWRU¶VLQYROYHPHQWWREHDOLJQHGZLWKWKH
PDQDJHU¶VSHUVRQDOJRDOVDQGZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHVWKDW the manager had with regard to the 
project. The manager, in these cases, showed high intrinsic motivation to listen to the 
DXGLWRUDQGHYHQFODLPHGKLJKXUJHQF\DQGSULRULW\WRUHFHLYLQJWKHDXGLWRU¶VPHVVDJH7KH
manager scheduled meetings and even called during the weekend to be informed on the 
DXGLWRU¶VPHVVDJH7KHDXGLWRULQWKHVHFDVHVZDVobviously seen as a Collaborative Partner 
WR DFKLHYH WKH PDQDJHU¶V JRDOV IRU H[DPSOH E\ FUHDWLQJ the opportunity, evidence and 
justification for redirection of the project or a fresh project restart. In the opposite situation 
± where the Deaf Effect had occurred ± these managers postponed meetings with the 
DXGLWRUDQGUHIXVHGWRDQVZHUWKHSKRQH7KH\OLWHUDOO\GLGQ¶WZDQWWRKHDUWKHPHVVDJHDQG
showed reluctance to share information with the auditor since there appeared to be no 
Collaborative Partnership (anymore). 
  
The interviews provided us with a list of factors and events that were mentioned by the 
internal auditors in order to explain Deaf Effect in specific cases. We found that the 
Collaborative Partnership vs Opponent relationship between Internal Auditor and manager, 
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appeared to be of influence on the communication and could change over time or due to 
events, actions and interactions, finally resulting in the Deaf Effect. We grouped typical 
actions and interaction strategies that had been applied by the messengers and the decision 
makers. We also listed characteristics of the Risk Warnings that were mentioned by the 
internal auditors in their explanation of the Deaf Effect. Finally, we categorized conditions 
that were mentioned in the Deaf Effect cases into characteristics of the messenger, 
characteristics of the manager, characteristics of the organization and characteristics of the 
project. This structuring of factors showed us some patterns that can be interesting for 
further exploration of Deaf Effect. 
  
We found that a history of Collaborative Partnership can turn out to be fragile after a Risk 
Warning has been given. The interviews provide examples of how a relation of 
Collaborative Partnership can turn into the opposite. In these cases the internal auditors 
had often been strongly involved in the project - based on their expertise on internal 
controls or IT-security ± and had acted as advisors to the project mostly at an operational 
and tactical level. The auditors arrived at a role conflict when they found evidence or 
concerns that the project was no longer viable and should be redirected. With professional 
care, the auditors ± in these cases ± rechecked and reported arguments and their concerns 
on the strategic direction and viability of the project to senior management. At this point, 
the different perceptions and heuristics of the managers and auditors start playing a role at 
the level of bounded rationality. The managers literally perceive and observe risks 
differently from how they were reported by the internal auditor ± as we found confirmed in 
our field-experiment with managers and auditors in chapter 6. At this point the Deaf Effect 
comes in ± driven by bounded rationality and heuristics such as illusion of control and 
estimation of probabilities. At this point, managers still rationalize their decisions and 
suggest that the auditors should do more research. They strive to convince the auditors 
with ³UDWLRQDO´DUJXPHQWVDQGDUHVWLOOZLOOLQJWRVKDUHLQIRUPDWLRQVRWKH\GRQ¶WVHHWKH
auditors as Opponents (yet).  
 
The turning-point comes when the manager feels to be criticized or attacked personally. 
The interviews mark this shift quite clearly as a change in arguments from factual to 
personal. Not all interviews show this step. It shows specifically in those interviews where 
WKHPDQDJHU¶VSHUVRQDOEHOLHIVPHULWVVHOI-esteem, self-efficacy or job security are at play 
and where the auditors warning could cause personal losses in that respect. At that point, 
the auditor is no longer considered as a Partner but turned into an Opponent. Most 
auditors, however, still considered themselves to be Partner of management and repeated 
the arguments louder and louder to overcome the Deaf Effect they experienced. The 
increased stressing of the Risk Warning appears to be counter effective in several 
occasions. 
 
From this point we find several interaction strategies that were applied by the manager and 
by the internal auditor. In these Deaf Effect situations, it appears that these strategies fuel 
that counterparts consider each other as Opponents more and more. This starts with 
communication at a rational level (although with bounded rationality) which moves 
towards a personal level. Person related arguments can result in emotional and irrational 
reactions. Our interviews show several examples of managers who got angry and started to 
threaten or impress the auditor. Both parties consider themselves to be Opponents at this 
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point. We see that (1) Opponents seek support from other powerful people to stand behind 
them, (2) they further increase commitment to the positions they have taken, there is no 
way back without face-losing, (3) efforts shift towards harming the credibility of the 
Opponent and disturbing the goal-achievement of the Opponent, finally resulting in the 
Deaf Effect as reported in our interviews. In several cases this is followed by a powerful 
intervention of a higher authority within the organization.  
 
Although the patterns and factors are not equal for all cases, the interviews suggest  that: 
(1) The initial conditions ± such as Perceived Control, Gain/Loss framing and a history as 
a Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent, as we tested in our experiments,  set a direction 
either towards the Deaf Effect or towards listening to the Risk Warning at the level of 
bounded rationality; (2) Characteristics of the Risk Warning and the communication 
strategies that are applied by the messenger and the decision maker accelerate towards the 
Deaf Effect in these cases; (3) The Deaf Effect is not only related to WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V
commitment to finish the project, but appears to be related to WKH GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V
commitment to eliminate the warning and the messenger as well; (4) Regardless of the 
content of the message, the internal auditor can unintentionally promote deaf effect by 
framing of the message and his/her interaction strategies in such a manner that it can divert 
attention from the content itself and towards  conflict and persistence. The internal auditor 
is not just observing a situation as it is, in the contrary: he is part of the situation and thus 
of influence on the situation as well. 
 
From our interviews we discovered that a history of Collaborative Partnership at executive 
level can be very powerful in avoiding or recovering Deaf Effect on strategic IS-projects. 
This strategic partnership appears to be more robust than project involvement at 
operational level. Finally, our interviews suggest that clear VWDQGDUGVRQDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
risk appetite can play a role in reducing Deaf Effect and further escalation. These standards 
can create a common point of reference that is shared between the internal auditor and the 
manager. This, in turn, can reduce the dominance of bounded rationality, subjectivity and 
personal elements in the observations and discussions on whether certain risks are 
DFFHSWDEOHRUQRW(YHQZKHQPDQDJHUVVHHDXGLWRUVDV³SROLFHPHQ´LWZRXOGGHILQLWHO\EH
of help to share risk-norms as poLQWV RI UHIHUHQFH ³GR ZH FRQVLGHU GULYLQJ D FDU DW
100km/hour or 130km/hour to be a norm of acceptable risk in driving-behavior, or do we 
leave room for the policeman to find 100km/hour to be too risky, while some experienced 
drivers may find 180km/hour nRWWRRULVN\DWDOOIRUWKHPSHUVRQDOO\´     
 
7.9. Propositions for further Research 
7.9.1.  Proposed Quantitative Studies  
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore factors that could be of influence on the Deaf 
Effect, and that could probably interact with the initial independent variable of our study, 
the Partner/Opponent relationship between messenger and Project Owner. We structured 
factors and proposed properties and property ranges that may be interesting for further 
study. This overview of factors could also be helpful in identifying confounding factors 
that should be controlled in future explanatory studies on the Deaf Effect. 
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For further analysis of direct effect and interactions on the Deaf Effect we suggest that the 
PHVVHQJHU¶VAuthority and the 2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶V 5LVN DSSHWLWH deserve priority in factorial 
experimental studies. Also varieties of the Bad News Message properties can be promising 
for further experimentation. These could lend themselves for similar experimental designs 
to the ones that we applied in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
The associations between interaction strategies (such as shift from content to personal 
factors) and shifts in the Partner/Opponent relationship require further examination. The 
number of interviews and our measurents are sufficient to identify these interesting topics 
of study, however require further elaboration on precision of measurement and 
generalization. We suggest that a multi-country survey across a large number of internal 
auditors on the Deaf Effect can bring more validity and insight on these topics. 
7.9.2. Proposed Qualitative Studies 
 
In addition to the above mentioned propositions and structures, our study revealed an 
important role of interaction strategies between messenger and decision maker (Project 
Owner) on the Deaf Effect. The dynamics of these strategies between the two counterparts 
appear to fuel the Deaf Effect in many of our cases. It appears that GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V Deaf 
Effect, as a cause of Escalation of Commitment of IS-projects, can be better understood by 
logic of reinforcing circles between messenger and decision maker. As a starting point for 
such study we propose two models that contain such logic (Yin, 2009), p149 and partially 
fill them in based on the 11 interviews that we performed.  
 
First proposed Logic Model ± Behavioral Persistence (Simon) 
 
The first Logic Model which we propose to further study interaction between internal 
auditor and manager (Project Owner) is based on the principles of behavioral persistence 
as described by (Simon, 1997), p105. This model appears to be simple and powerful in 
explaining behavior. Two principal sets of mechanisms may be distinguished that bring 
about the integration of behavior in a broader pattern: (1) those that cause behavior to 
persist in a particular direction once it has been turned in that direction, and (2) those that 
initiate behavior in a particular direction. Behavior-initiating mechanisms are largely 
external to the individual, although they usually imply his sensitivity to particular stimuli. 
They can be interpersonal  and they can be invoked by someone other than the person they 
are intended to influence. In this model, the internal auditor persists in either the 
Collaborative Partner or Opponent relation that has been chosen initially. When we 
mechanically apply the causal relations of our experiments - this results in the chain of 
actions and reactions as depicted in figure 7-4 to be executed clockwise or counter 
clockwise. An event or a particular interaction strategy as presented in table 7-4a to 7-4d 
can change this relationship from Collaborative Partner towards Opponent or from 
Opponent to Collaborative Partner. This moves the dynamics in the model from the 
clockwise  ³3DUWQHU´- circle at the right-end towards the counter-FORFNZLVH ³2SSRQHQW´
circle at the left-end. 
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Figure 7-4 Exploration of Behavioral Persistence (Simon) as logic model for Deaf Effect 
 
In our interviews we did not find the clockwise circle - from start to end - since we only 
included the Deaf Effect situations in our study. The left circle is confirmed in case #12 ± 
from start to end - and in the ultimate stages of most other cases. We did not measure 
message relevance in these cases directly. Although interesting, this model assumes 
mechanistic interaction between the Bad News Messenger and the decision maker which 
might be too rigid to make it feasible as a logic model. If we extend it with the possibility 
that events could change the relationship between messenger and decision maker, the 
model becomes more useful as a logic model, especially in situations in which the internal 
auditor arrived at a Role Conflict. We found in several cases that the internal auditor was 
highly involved and appreciated in the project as a Partner based on his expertise. In these 
cases of incremental increase of ± operational- partnership, some auditors arrived at a Role 
Conflict. They reported that they suddenly realized that they had become too much 
encapsulated in the project and found their efforts to no longer be in line with their 
supposed contribution to organization goals. Especially in situations when they started to 
dispute the viability of the project ± based on their insider information ± this could redirect 
the interaction into a counter clockwise reinforcing circle of Opponents. Based on our 
interviews we conclude that the theoretical logic in this model of interaction can be helpful 
in further exploring Deaf Effect, although it may be too rigid to explain the Deaf Effect in 
field conditions.  
 
Second proposed Logic Model ± Eskalazions Wasserfalle (Glasl) 
 
Based on the analysis of our interviews, we consider that a second Logic Model can be 
fruitful to analyze and further theorize the interaction between internal auditor and 
manager in the situation of the Deaf Effect. This model refers to the communication 
between two parties. It explains the theoretical logic of Escalation of Conflict between 
those two parties. We recall that we, different from other studies on Escalating IS-projects,  
have a messenger (internal auditor) and decision maker (Project Owner) in scope. We 
think it is reasonable that the escalation of conflict between two parties - that includes 
escalation of commitment to the own choice ± can be helpful in understanding the 
theoretical logic of the Deaf Effect. The action of one person can fuel (or reduce) the 
counterpart to show further commitment to the own opinion and choice and this can further 
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promote or reduce the Deaf Effect. In the final iteration of this qualitative study, we 
already grouped our observations - the action/interaction strategies - towards the 
characteristics of this model.   
   
The Escalation of Conflict Waterfall (Glasl, 1982, 2011) provides a sequence of levels in 
which the interaction between two parties can turn from Partnership-based towards 
extreme versions of Opponent-based relationships. Each level shows typical characteristics 
of communication that have not been shown yet in the previous level. The model is based 
on the systems hierarchy of Boulding (1956). A conflict develops as follows: when people 
interact as Opponents at a high level in Boulding¶VKierarchy, and this interaction exceeds 
a threshold, then the conflict can flow to a lower level in Bouldings Hierarchy. In the first 
VWDJHSHRSOHDUHVWLOODFWLQJDVSDUWQHUV³.RRSHUDWLRQ´EXWKDYHGLIIHUHQWRSLQLRQs. In stage 
two and three they turn into OpponentV³.RQNXUUHQ]´The issues of conflict change and 
move to lower levels in the systems hierarchy of Boulding. This model from sociology 
applies the conflict escalation to relations on micro (inter-personal), meso (inter-
organization) and macro (inter-society) level. In the table 7-5 we indicate the Escalation of 
Conflict stages with the Conflict Issues. In the third column, we  describe the relation as 
either Partner or Opponent according to this model. In the most right column we indicate 
whether we recognize the escalation of conflict stages in our interviews.  
  
Escalation Stage Conflict issues Partnership Recognized in 
our cases? 
1. "Hardening" Objective issues 
Hardening standpoints 
as Partner >as 
Opponent 
Frequent 
2. "Debates and 
polemics" 
Objective issues and  
relative position, superiority 
Ability to influence 
as Partner > = < 
as Opponent 
Frequent 
3. "Actions, not words" Objective issues and self-image 
Freedom of action 
3URYHRQH¶VRZQPDVWHU\ 
Blocking the counterpart 
as Partner < 
as Opponent 
Frequent 
4. "Images and 
coalitions" 
Counterpart is the problem 
Win or lose 
Save reputation 
As Partner << 
As Opponent 
Frequent 
5. "Loss of face" Fundamental values 
Expose counterpart 
Rehabilitate dignity 
As Partner << 
As Opponent 
Some 
6. "Strategies of 
threats" 
Control of counterpart As Partner << 
As Opponent 
Few 
7. "Limited destructive 
blows" 
+XUWFRXQWHUSDUWPRUHWKDQRQH¶V
own group 
Nothing to gain 
Survival 
As Partner << 
As Opponent 
Few 
8. "Fragmentation of 
the enemy" 
Annihilate counterpart 
Survival 
As Partner << 
As Opponent 
No 
9. "Together into the 
abyss" 
Annihilation at any cost As Partner << 
As Opponent 
No 
Table 7-5 Exploration of the Eskalazions Wasserfalle (Glasl) as  logic model for Deaf Effect 
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We refer to appendix 7.A for a more elaborated version of this table. Based on our analysis 
of the interviews we conclude that the Escalation of Conflict Waterfall (Glasl, 1982, 2011) 
is be a promising model with theoretical logic of interaction between Bad News Messenger 
and Decision Maker that can further explain the Deaf Effect from the perspective of 
dynamics.  
7.9.3. Practical Consequences of this study and Epilog 
 
A better understanding of the causes and dynamics of the Deaf Effect can be very relevant 
to professionals who aim to be effective in their communication of Risk Warnings to 
managers. The presence of two counterparts ± the messenger and receiver ± shows 
HVFDODWLRQ RI FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH RZQ SRVLWLRQ DW ERWK VLGHV:KLOH WKH 3URMHFW2ZQHU¶V
commitment may shift from achieving an organization goal (the business case of a project) 
towards (finishing) the project itself, this commitment can further shift towards the 
position taken against the Risk Warning and against the messenger. The messenger ± an 
internal auditor in our cases ± should also realize that stressing a message will not always 
be effective and can even promote the messenger to pass a point of no return that may 
bring more harm than it solves. So, understanding the dynamics of interactions± such as 
presented in this study and reflected in the two proposed logic models ± can be helpful to 
internal auditors and other messengers in daily practice.  
 
Another practical consequence of our study sheds light on the fragility of relationships 
with management. When it comes WR ³D PRPHQW RI WUXWK´, a history of operational 
involvement and partnership with a project, might even work against the messenger when 
he blows the whistle on the viability of this project. As we saw in one of our cases, this 
could be interpreted as betrayal and could even fuel Deaf Effect. While a history of 
partnership at operational level might be not effective or might even be counter-effective, a 
partnership at strategic level might be more robust and helpful to avoid or reduce Deaf 
Effect. Two internal audit directors recalled the added value of a sequence of strategy 
sessions in which executive internal audit staff and executive business management openly 
discussed hypothetical and factual cases on strategic risk taking. They discussed openly on 
trust, image, personal considerations, tolerances and organizational interests. The purpose 
RI WKHVHPHHWLQJV ZDV WR VKDUSHQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
risk-appetite on strategic issues. The side effect of these meetings appeared to be that 
executive staff ± both from audit and business ± built up a relationship in which they 
shared their views, assumptions and insecurities on strategic risk taking. This not only 
resulted in a shared point of reference but also in a strategic partnership relation on risk 
taking  that was valuable in avoiding and recovering Deaf Effects on strategic IS-projects 
as we studied. 
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7.A. APPENDIX ± Case Study Questions 
 
We define the phenomenon of Deaf Effect DV RFFXUULQJ ³ZKHQ D GHFLVLRQ PDNHU GRHVQ¶W KHDU
ignores, overrules a report oIEDGQHZVWRFRQWLQXHDIDLOLQJFRXUVHRIDFWLRQ´(Cuellar, 2009) 
We invite you to tell us about a situation in which you as internal auditor provided information 
(written or oral report) to responsible management that continuation of a risky-course of action was 
QRW YLDEOH DQG UHGLUHFWLRQZRXOG EH QHHGHG LQRUGHU WR UHPDLQ FRQVLVWHQWZLWK WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
risk-appetite). We focus on IS-projects (in broad definition). 
 
Please talk freely about factors or conditions that were of influence on the Deaf Effect. We will 
capture and transcript for methodological reasons. Of course we maintain full confidentiality on the 
information you share with us. We will exclude all names or identities from our transcription. Our 
study is not aimed on the content or persons within your case but on better understanding (causes, 
indicators  and effects) of the Deaf Effect. In that aspect we hope it contributes to the internal audit 
profession. We are mainly interested in your observations and perceptions on the 
communication/interaction with your counterpart and the conditions (organizational and/or project) 
that have been of influence to your view. We are not aiming to study the organization or project 
itself. Our study consists of multiple case observations from internal auditors across various 
organizations. Talk freely. During this interview we keep in mind factors from literature and 
empirical studies that might be relevant and will raise them if your story suggests it might play a role 
here. 
 
If time allows, we would gladly invite you to compare this Deaf Effect situation with another of your 
cases where this (or another) counterpart showed to be highly sensible for your audit-warnings. 
Which are the crucial differences compared to the former case, which might explain why deaf 
KDSSHQHGLQWKHRQHVLWXDWLRQDQGLWGLGQ¶WLQWKHRWKHU 
 
Now, would you please take in your mind a situation in which you encountered a Deaf Effect of your 
audit-findings and share with us what sequences of events and causes you observed and perceived 
that describe and explain the Deaf Effect occurrence. Also please describe how you recognized and 
reacted on this situation. Ultimately please describe the consequences.  We would suggest you to 
descULEHLQFKURQRORJLFDORUGHU« 
 
Factors that should be touched in the interview (with empirical studies on deaf in mind) are: 
1. How did auditor and manager see their relationship (Opponent-policeman vs trusted partner; 
goal congruence, information symmetry); This should be recalled at several points in the story; 
Did they have a history?;  
2. Did the manager have a history on IS-projects and did this have effect on deaf? 
3. How would you describe the involvement of the manager with this IS-project? (well informed, 
need for outcome, clear plan, implementation mindset, competitive arousal, investment of time, 
early responsible, freedom of choice, domain-familiar, skilled, personal, prestige) and to what 
extent did this play a role on Deaf Effect; (these are all factors perceived control experiments) 
4. In what phase of the project got the auditor involved and why. In what phase of the project did 
the Deaf Effect occur. Did it raise at once or was there a path incrementally leading to it; Was 
the level of Sunk Cost playing here? 
5. How did the Deaf Effect show to you? For example: No reply, shirking, cancel meetings, 
counter-attack, exclude auditors from meetings or other; 
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6. What conditions or events played a role that fueled this Deaf Effect? (project-characteristics, 
organizational culture, retaliation, spotlights, other parties involved, organizational 
change/competition; 
7. What were consequences of Deaf Effect on your own approach/position of Bad News 
Messenger? 
x Did you act less/more collaborative or more/less as policeman? 
x Do you think you SHOULD act less/more collaborative and more/less as policeman 
(Belief-update) 
x Do you think you WOULD act less collaborative and more as policeman next time 
8. To your experience, are there any other factors that could cause deaf for your audit-warnings 
DQG GLGQ¶W VKRZ XS LQ WKLV FDVH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ-channel, reporting standards, external 
regulations, external audits, sunk cost, optimism/pessimism, unclear risk-appetite, unclear 
policies) 
9. If you compare this Deaf Effect situation with another of your cases where this (or another) 
counterpart showed to be very eager to listen to your audit-warnings. Which are the crucial 
differences compared to the former case, which might explain why deaf happened in the one 
VLWXDWLRQDQGLWGLGQ¶WLQWKHRWKHU 
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7.B. APPENDIX ± Escalation of Conflict Waterfall 
 
Stage Conflict issues Behavioural norms In-group/out-group 
cognitions and attitudes 
Treshold to next 
level 
1.  
"Hardening" 
 
 
as Partner > 
as Opponent 
a. Objective issues, 
b. Hardening 
standpoints 
Straight argumentation a. Awareness of mutual 
dependence, b. Nascent role 
expectations, c. Nascent in-
/out-group formation, d. 
"skins" form around groups, e. 
Suspicions about hidden 
motives 
Tactical tricks used 
in the 
argumentation 
2.  
"Debates and 
polemics" 
 
 
as Partner > = < 
as Opponent 
a. Objective issues 
and relative 
position,  
b. superiority,  
c. Ability to 
influence 
a. Verbal confrontations, b. 
Tactical feints in 
argumentation, c. Debates 
a. Affinity inwards,  
b. Fixation at standpoints,  
c. Ambivalence cooperation/ 
competition, d. Suspiciousness,  
e. Counterpart has "typical 
behaviour" 
Action without 
consultation 
3. 
 "Actions, not 
words" 
 
 
as Partner < 
as Opponent 
a. Objective issues 
and self-image,  
b. Freedom of 
action,  
c. 3URYHRQH¶VRZQ
mastery,  
d. Blocking the 
counterpart 
a. Action without 
consultation,  
b. Accomplished facts,  
c. Symbolic behaviour 
(jargon), d. Decreased verbal 
communication - increased 
non-verbal communication,  
e. Extended social arena 
a. Blocked empathy 
b. "Counterpart not capable 
of development" 
c. In-group conformity pressure 
a. "Deniable 
punishment 
behaviour"  
b. Covert attacks 
directly aimed at  
identity of 
counterpart 
4. 
 "Images and 
coalitions" 
a. Counterpart is 
the problem 
b. Win or lose 
Save reputation 
a. "Deniable punishment 
behaviour", b. Exploi-tation 
of gaps in norms,  
c. Formation of coalitions,  
d. Attacks on core identity 
a. Dual cognition (black/white) 
b. Coherent enemy image 
c. Attribution of collective 
characteristics to counterpart 
d. Self-image as only reacting 
to counterpart 
Loss of face 
5.  
"Loss of face" 
a. Fundamental 
values, b. Expose 
counterpart, c. 
Rehabilitate dignity 
a. Attacks on the public face 
of the counterpart,  
b. Restore prestige 
a. Enemy "unmasked": 
perceived as morally corrupt  
b. Guilt symbiosis in-group 
a. Ultimatum 
b. Strategic threats 
6. 
 "Strategies of 
threats" 
Control of 
counterpart 
a. Presentation of ultimata 
b. Panic-ruled actions 
c. Self-binding statements 
d. Extension of conflict 
a. Own actions are only 
reactions, b. Perceived 
impotence ±> rage 
c. Need for control 
a. Execution of 
ultimata, b. Attacks 
on counterparts 
sanction potential 
7.  
"Limited 
destructive 
blows" 
a. Hurt counterpart 
more than 
RQH¶VRZQJURXS 
 b. Nothing to gain 
c. Survival 
a. Attacks at sanction 
potential, b. Threats + 
interrupted communi- 
cation 
a. Counterpart prepared to do 
anything, b. Counterpart not 
human, c. Power-thinking 
dominates,  
d. Malice important motive 
a. Attacks at core of 
enemy, b. Effort to 
shatter enemy 
8. 
"Fragmentation 
of the enemy" 
a. Annihilate 
counterpart 
b. Survival 
a. Attack at vital functions 
b. Actions to shatter 
counterpart, c. Attack on 
cohesive function 
a. Annihilation fantasies  
b. Fascination with  
mechanical annihilation 
 mechanisms 
a. Giving up self-
preservation 
b. Total war 
9.  
"Together into 
the abyss" 
Annihilation at any 
cost 
a. Total war with all means 
b. Limitless violence 
a. $FFHSWRQH¶VRZQ
destruction if counterpart is 
destroyed 
± 
Table 7A-1 Escalation of Conflict Stages according to Glasl57 
 
 
                                                          
 
57 This table is adapted from the translation by Th. Jordan (2000), University of Gothenburg 
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Across the escalation stages, this table describes the Conflict Issues, which drift away from 
content to personal issues to elementary issues as job-security, as we saw in our cases. It 
also describes the Behavioural Norms across the escalation stages. As we saw in our cases, 
these can drift away from straight communication, to verbal confrontations, to actions 
without consultation, to decreased verbal communication towards and finally ending in 
personal threats in some of our cases.  The table also describes the In-Group/Out-group 
Cognitions and Attitudes across the escalation stages. In our cases we saw a movement 
from the Counterpart being seen as a Partner, towards ambivalence, towards the 
counterpart being seen as an Opponent or even as an Enemy. In our cases we also saw 
action strategies that aimed to involve other parties as In-Group or to position them as Out-
Group. Finally, the table describes the thresholds to the next lower level in the Escalation 
Waterfall. We also recognize several of these Thresholds in our cases, such as (1) Tactical 
tricks in argumentation (2) Action without consultation, (3) Aim at identity of counterpart, 
(4) Deniable punishment behavior and (5) Setting Ultimatums.  
 
Next to the overview as presented in table 7A-1, Jordan (2000) has published several 
translated summaries of the Escalation Waterfall in English, such as a 5-pager and the 
following brief summary:   
 
Glasl's escalation model is a very useful diagnostic tool for the conflict facilitator, but also 
valuable as a means for sensitizing people to the mechanisms of conflict escalation. Such 
sensitizing may lead to a greater awareness of the steps one should take care to avoid if 
one wants to prevent a conflict from escalating out of control. In a more academic 
perspective, the model also provides a theory of conflict escalation that emphasizes the 
situational pressures acting upon people involved in a conflict. Rather than seeking causes 
in the individuals, the model emphasizes how there is an internal logic to conflict 
relationships, stemming from the failure of "benign" ways of handling contradictory 
interests and standpoints. Conscious efforts are needed in order to resist the escalation 
mechanisms, which are seen as having a momentum of their own. 
 
Both table 7A-1 and this summary underline the practical and the theoretical relevance of 
the model to further study of the Deaf Effect from the perspective of escalation of 
FRPPLWPHQW QRW RQO\ IURP WKH 3URMHFW 2ZQHU¶V SRVLWLRQ EXW IURP WKH PHVVHQJHU¶V
position and the interaction between both of them as well.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1.  Introduction 
  
We conclude this thesis with a discussion on our study from different perspectives. In 
section 8.2 we present the main findings of our study from a theoretical perspective ± in 
terms of causes and effects and interactions. Our contribution to the research on Escalating 
IS-projects respectively on Internal Auditing will be discussed in section 8.3 and 8.4. In 
section 8.5. we will discuss our study from the perspective of methodology and limitations. 
In the sections 8.6. and 8.7. we will discuss the practical implications of our study for 
internal auditors and for managers. The implications of the study for society are discussed 
in section 8.8, which will be followed by the researFKHU¶V HSLORJRQ WKHSURFHVV DQG WKH
product of this PhD-project.   
8.2.  Main Findings 
 
In the Chapters 4 to 7 we presented the findings of the individual empirical studies and  we 
answered the research questions for each of them. In this concluding chapter we combine 
these findings in order fulfill the objective of our research that we phrased as follows:  
 
³&RQWULEXWHWRWKHH[SODQDWLRQof Why the Deaf Effect occurs in the field of escalating IS-
projectV´E\H[DPLQLQJPDLQFDXVDOHIIHFWVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQ effects  from following three 
perspectives: 
 
(1) 7KH³&ROODERUDWLYH3DUWQHUYV2SSRQHQW´Relationship between Internal Auditor (Bad 
News Messenger) and Project Owner (Decision Maker) ± based on Stewardship Theory; 
 
(2) 3URMHFW2ZQHU¶VPerceived Control heuristic which might bring biased processing of 
WKHDXGLWRU¶VULVNZDUQLQJERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\± based on Illusion of Control Theory;  
 
(3) The presentation of the risk warning either with the focus on Gains or with the focus on 
Losses ± based on Prospect Theory. 
 
With the focus on the Deaf Effect, our study takes the position that a manager ± in the role 
of Project Owner ± would ignore,  overrule or not hear a Risk Warning that continuation of 
an IS-project is no longer viable and thus the project should be discontinued. This Risk 
Warning is provided by a credible source, who is assumed to make true assertions based on 
thorough investigation. Given their standards and requirements of proficiency, 
independency and due professional care, we used internal auditors as the messenger of the 
Risk Warning.  
 
We recall the metaphor that we used in Chapter 1 for our study: the decision maker is 
sitting at the driver-seat, while the internal auditor provides a Risk Warning sitting at the 
passenger-seat. We study whethHU WKH GULYHU¶V 'HDI (IIHFW IRU WKH 5LVN :DUQLQJ is 
influenced by (a) whether he/she sees the messenger as a collaborative partner or as an 
RSSRQHQW ZKR H[SRVHV WKH GULYHU¶V IDLOXUHV, (b) whether the driver perceives to be in 
control, and (c) whether the message is framed positive or negative.    
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The relationship between internal auditors and Project Owners is dominated by principles 
and assumptions of Agency Theory (incongruent goals and information asymmetry) or 
Stewardship Theory (congruent goals and information sharing) following the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHIUDPHZRUN. According to Agency Theory, the internal 
auditors are supposed to monitor manageUV¶ risk-taking and expose any management 
failures and decisions that are not consistent with the RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V interests. Thus they 
will act as Opponents to management. According to Stewardship Theory, the internal 
auditors are supposed to contribute to management performance by challenging and 
improving decision making. They will act as Collaborative Partners to management. 
According to Stewardship Theory, managers (Project Owners) are more intrinsically 
motivated to listen to the risk warning when it comes from a Collaborative partner instead 
of an Opponent. 
 
2XUVWXG\IRFXVHVRQGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶V3URMHFW2ZQHU¶V imperfections in the processing 
of (risk) information. The so-called Bounded Rationality acts on the level of decision 
PDNHU¶Vheuristics and biases that explain deviations from rational decision making. The 
Perceived Control heuristic has been subject to many experiments on biased risk-taking 
preferences according to Illusion of Control Theory. If a decision maker has a high level of 
Perceived Control, he/she is more likely to express risk-seeking behavior and thus we 
expect him/her to be PRUHOLNHO\WRUHVSRQGZLWK'HDI(IIHFWWRWKHLQWHUQDODXGLWRU¶V5LVN
Warning. According to Prospect Theory, decision makers are more likely to make risk-
seeking decisions when information is presented in terms of Losses. When the same 
information is presented in terms of Gains (due to a change in reference-point), decision 
makers are more likely to make risk-averse decisions. We expect that decision makers are 
PRUH OLNHO\ WR UHVSRQG ZLWK 'HDI (IIHFW WR WKH LQWHUQDO DXGLWRU¶V 5LVN :DUQLQJ LI WKH
warning is presented in terms of Losses instead of Gains.   
 
In the 2x2 laboratory experiments we described in Chapters 4 and 5, we asked participants 
to place themselves in the position of Project Owner and decide about continuation of an 
IS-project after they received a Risk Warning from an internal auditor. In Chapter 4 we 
provided respondents with treatments of (1) the messenger seen as a Collaborative Partner 
or as an Opponent, and (2) the Risk Warning presented in terms of Gains or Losses. In 
Chapter 5 we provided respondents with treatments of (1) the messenger seen as a 
Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent, and (2) the Project Owner having a High or Low 
level of Perceived Control of the outcome of his/her IS-Project. 
 
Both in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 we find confirmed that decision makers are more likely to 
follow the Risk Warning if the messenger has a history as a Collaborative Partner. If the 
messenger has a history as an Opponent who exposes management failures, then the 
decision makers are more likely to respond with the Deaf Effect to the Risk Warning. 
These results are consistent with our expectations according to Stewardship Theory. In 
Chapter 4 (see table 4-7) we find confirmed that decision makers are more likely to 
respond with Deaf Effect if the Risk Warning is framed in terms of Losses instead of 
Gains. These results are consistent with expectations according to Prospect Theory. In 
Chapter 5 we find confirmed that decision makers are more likely to respond with Deaf 
Effect if they have a High level of Perceived Control (see table 5-7) over the project 
outcome. The results are consistent with expectations from Illusion of Control Theory. 
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Conclusion 1 ± Main Effects  
 
Based on the significant main effects of Collab (the messenger is a Collaborative Partner), 
PercContr GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V 3HUFHLYHG &RQWURO DQG GainFrame (the Risk Warning 
framed in terms of Gains or Losses) that were shown in Chapter 4 and 5, we conclude that 
all three theories ± Stewardship Theory, Illusion of Control Theory and Prospect Theory - 
contribute to the explanation of the 3URMHFW2ZQHU¶VDeaf Effect for Risk Warnings. 
 
With our next step we aim to get insight in the main effects of each theory compared to the 
others, before we will proceed with the analysis of interaction effects. Since our results are 
from two different experiments, we compare the main effects within each experiment and 
draw a conclusion on the ranking of the three theories in their explanation of the Deaf 
(IIHFW :H IROORZ D µKRUVHUDFH between theories¶ DSSURach, adapted from Keil et al. 
(2000a) who performed such a comparison of four theories (including Agency Theory and 
Prospect Theory) based on a survey on escalating IS-projects across IS-auditors. They 
compared theories on their contribution to the amount of variance explained (ǻ52) in the 
dependent variable. 
 
In table 4-7 model 4 we find that the ǻ52 of Collab exceeds the  ǻ52 of GainFrame while 
taking into account the control variables. This is confirmed in the model 1 ǻ52 values of 
Collab and GainFrame as presented in the tables 4-8a to 4-8f. These results suggest that 
Stewardship Theory (with Collab as the independent variable) provides a higher 
contribution to the explanation of the Deaf Effect than Prospect Theory (with GainFrame 
as the independent variable).  In table 5-7 model 4 we find that the ǻ52 of PercContr 
exceeds the  ǻ52 of Collab while taking into account the control variables. This is 
confirmed in the model 1 ǻ52 values of PercContr and Collab as presented in the tables 5-
8a to 5-8f. These results suggest that Illusion of Control Theory (with the independent 
variable PercContr) provides a higher contribution to the explanation of the Deaf Effect 
than Stewardship Theory (with the independent variable Collab).   
 
It should be noted that the differences in ǻ52are limited in size and all three theories 
provide ǻ52 in the range from 0.11 to 0.19 explained variance of the decision to Continue 
in our two experiments. The ranking of theories, however is consistent across all 
observations and appears to be consistent with expectations from the similar analysis made 
by Keil et al. (2000a) on their survey. The inside-out ranking also logically makes sense: it 
starts with characteristics of the decision maker, followed by the interaction with the 
messenger, finishing with the framing-action taken by the messenger.  
 
Conclusion 2 - Ranking of Main Effects 
 
Based on the combined findings on the amount of variance of Continue explained in 
Chapter 4 and 5 on the Main Effects of the individual factors Collab, GainFrame and 
PercContr we conclude that the theories can be ranked in their contribution to the 
explanation of the Deaf Effect in this study from Illusion of Control Theory highest, to 
Stewardship Theory mediate and Prospect Theory lowest.  
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With oXUUHVHDUFKREMHFWLYHWRH[SODLQ3URMHFW2ZQHUV¶'HDI(IIHFW IRULQWHUQDODXGLWRUV¶
Risk Warnings, ofcourse we aim to contribute to improved effectiveness of Risk Warnings. 
In order to assess whether the ranking of theories can be useful to the messenger to 
maximize the effectiveness of his/her warning, we also consider the predicted change in 
Deaf Effect due to changes in the independent variables Collab, PercContr and 
GainFrame.  
 
The standardized regression coefficients in table 4-7 model 3 and 4 show that the Continue 
variable is more sensitive to changes in the Collab variable than to changes in the 
GainFrame variable, while taking into account the control variables. We find confirmed in 
the tables 4-8a to 4-8b that the standardardized regression coefficients of Collab are larger 
than these coefficients of GainFrame. In our PLS-analysis we also find this confirmed in 
the pathcoefficients in table 4-13 and in the total effects as presented in table 4-15. Taking 
into account the consistent results across the various measurements of the main effects, we 
therefore conclude that the Deaf Effect would be more sensitive to changes in Collab than 
to changes in GainFrame. The standardized regression coefficients in table 5-7 model 3 
and 4 show that the Continue variable is more sensitive to changes in the PercContr 
variable than to changes in the Collab variable, while taking into account the control 
variables. We find confirmed in the tables 5-8a to 5-8b that the standardardized regression 
coefficients of PercContr are larger than these coefficients of Collab. In our PLS-analysis 
we also find this confirmed in the pathcoefficients in table 5-13 and in the total effects as 
presented in table 5-15. Taking into account the consistent results across the various 
measurements of the main effects, we therefore conclude that the Deaf Effect would be 
more sensitive to changes in PercContr than to changes in Collab.  
 
Conclusion 3 - Ranking of Main Effects 
 
Based on the combined findings in Chapter 4 and 5 on the regression coeffcients and PLS 
pathcoefficents of the individual factors Collab, GainFrame and PercContr we conclude 
that the predicted change of 3URMHFW2ZQHU¶VDeaf Effect can be ranked highest from a 
FKDQJHLQ3URMHFW2ZQHU¶V3HUFHLYHG&RQWUROWRa change in the Collaborative Partnership 
relation ranked as mediate and a change in Gain/Loss framing ranked lowest. In order to 
maximize the effectiveness of the Risk Warning, it appears to be rational that the 
messenger follows this sequence under the assumption that all three factors provide equal 
opportunities and effort to be changed by the messenger.  
  
 
In our experiments we also measured mediating factors that provide more insight into how 
the main effects of Collab, PercContr and GainFrame on the Deaf Effect took place. We 
find that the influence on the Deaf Effect is partially mediated by (1) decision makeUV¶
biased perceptions of risk, (2) assigning less or more relevance to risk information and (3) 
biased estimations of probabilities to succeed/fail. These are all typical effects of bounded 
rationality in the processing of risk information. We also find confirmed that the 
information processing biases strongly apply to the probability part of the Risk Warning. 
These results are consistent with Illusion of Control Theory and surveys that show that 
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managers assume that given probability information does not apply to them personally and 
that they can beat the odds.  
 
Conclusion 4 ± Mediation of Main Effects 
 
Based on the analysis of mediation in Chapters 4 and 5 we find that the influence of 
Collab, GainFrame and PercContr on the Deaf Effect is partially mediated by the various 
mediating variables Message Relevance (MsgRelev), Perceived Risk (PercRisk) and 
Estimated Probability to Succeed (ProbSucc) that are known from experiments on 
LPSHUIHFWSURFHVVLQJRILQIRUPDWLRQDQGWKDWUHIHUWRGHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶ERXQGHG rationality. 
 
The experiments that we described in Chapter 4 and 5 also provide us with information on 
interaction effects. These interaction effects are significant according to table 4-7 model 4 
and table 5-7 model 4. Insight into the interaction effects allows us to make further 
refinements on the main effects that were presented earlier. The interaction effects are 
made visible in the sub-group regressions presented in the figures 4-1 and 5-1. These 
figures are presented below and the interaction effects are briefly discussed. For further 
explanation of these figures, we refer to the Chapters 4 and 5.   
 
  
 
If no interaction effects had existed, all regression lines in these figures would have been 
parallel. In the left figure 4-1, we find that the influence of Collaborative Partnership on 
Deaf Effect is attenuated when the Risk Warning is presented in terms of Losses. We think 
this can be best interpreted by GHFLVLRQPDNHU¶Vlimited information processing capabilities 
in which most of the attention of the decision maker is caught on losing and limited 
attention is left to focus on messenger characteristics. The left figure also shows that the 
influence of Gain/Loss Framing on Deaf Effect is very limited when the messenger is very 
strongly seen as an Opponent. At the lowest values of Collaborative Partnership, the 
regression lines for Gain and Losses are very nearby. In these conditions most attention 
appears to be caught by the strong messenger characteristic as an Opponent, which leaves 
limited room for attention to the characteristics of the Risk Warning. At the highest values 
of Collaborative Partnership, the influence of Gain/Loss framing on the Deaf Effect is the 
largest. We find the lowest likeliness of the Deaf Effect when the Risk Warning is framed 
in terms of Gains coming from a messenger who is seen as a Collaborative Partner. In this 
condition, the probability information of the Risk Warning appears to be processed 
unbiased:  respondents estimated their probabilities to succeed equal to the probabilities as 
provided in the Risk Warning (see table 4-16). 
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In the right figure 5-1, we find that the influence of PHVVHQJHU¶VCollaborative Partnership 
on Deaf Effect is attenuated when the decision maker has a very low level of Perceived 
Control. The indifference for the messenger characteristics in the low Perceived Control 
conditions may be best interpreted as DGHFLVLRQPDNHUZKRGRHVQ¶WNQRZZKDWWRGRDQG
who surrenders and listens to any messenger with a strong opinion. A history with the 
messenger as an Opponent, strongly elevates Deaf Effect if the decision maker has a high 
Perceived Control. This may EH H[SODLQHG E\ GHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶V FRPSHWLWLYH DURXVDO
towards a messenger who is seen as an Opponent and who claims that the project should 
be stopped, while the decision maker may feel invulnerable and in the position to exert 
control over the SURMHFW¶Voutcome.  
 
Conclusion 5 ± Interaction Effects 
 
In addition to the Main Effects of Collab, GainFrame and PercContr as we found earlier, 
Chapters 4 and 5 show the following interaction effects: 
 
(1) The influence of Gain/Loss framing on the Deaf Effect is largest when the messenger is 
seen as Collaborative Partner. The influence of Gain/Loss framing on the Deaf Effect is 
attenuated when the messenger is strongly seen as an Opponent;  
 
(2) When the messenger is strongly seen as an Opponent then the influence of the Project 
2ZQHU¶V3HUFHLYHG&RQWURORQ WKH'HDI(IIHFW LV ODUJHVW7KHKLJKHVW OLNHOLKRRGRI'HDI
Effect occurs when the Risk Warning is provided by a messenger who is strongly seen as 
an Opponent by a decision maker with a high level of Perceived Control. The influence of 
Perceived Control on the Deaf Effect is attenuated when the messenger is seen as a 
Collaborative Partner; 
   
(3) The influence of the messenger¶V &ROODERUDWLYH 3DUWQHUVKLS on the Deaf Effect is 
attenuated when the message is framed in terms of Losses: the likelihood of the Deaf 
(IIHFW LV UHODWLYHO\ KLJK 7KH LQIOXHQFH RI WKH PHVVHQJHU¶V &ROODERUDWLYH 3DUWQHUVKLS LV
attenuated when the decision maker has a low level of Perceived Control: the likelihood of 
the Deaf Effect is relatively low.   
 
After our laboratory experiments, we moved our study to the field. In a situated  
experiment we find that Perception of Risk ± which had appeared to be a mediator for Deaf 
Effect in our laboratory experiment ± differs across managers and internal auditors, as 
expected. We expect that managers have developed heuristics from working experience as 
actors ± VLWWLQJDWWKHGULYHU¶VVHDWZKLOHLQWHrnal auditors have developed heuristics from 
working experience as observers ± sitting at the passenger seat. In Chapter 6 we find 
confirmed that the managers perceive risks to be lower than internal auditors do, as is 
expected from Illusion of Control Theory experiments. We also find FRQILUPHGPDQDJHUV¶
insensitivity for probability information in a warning on IS-risks that was provided by an 
internal auditor. This is most visible for the group of managers who are very experienced 
and in the position of Vice President, Senior Vice President or Executive Vice President. 
Assuming that heuristics come with working experience, these results are consistent with 
our expectations. Although we did not measure the Deaf Effect in this situated experiment, 
PDQDJHUV¶ LQVHQVLWLYLW\ IRUSUREDELOLW\ LQIRUPDWLRQ LQ WKHDXGLWRU¶V ULVNZDUQLQJVXJJHVWV
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WKDWDPDQDJHU¶VDeaf Effect would especially apply to the probability part of this warning. 
Risk Perception was confirmed earlier to be a mediator of Deaf Effect. 
 
Conclusion 6 ± Actor/Observer differences 
 
Based on the situated experiment as we described in Chapter 6, we conclude that heuristics 
related to working experience as an actor or observer are of influence on the Perceived 
Risk after the Risk Warning has been received from an internal auditor. We also find 
confirmed that employees with heuristics as an actor are insensitive for probability 
information in a Risk Warning. 
 
In the fourth part of our study we interviewed executive internal auditors who have 
experienced the Deaf Effect for their Risk Warnings on large IS-projects. We asked them 
to describe factors and events that explain the Deaf Effect in that case. Throughout these 
case descriptions we asked them to identify their relationship with the Project Owner as 
either Collaborative Partners or as Opponents. We find that all three factors that we 
involved in our experiments are mentioned in those interviews in order to explain the Deaf 
Effect in that situation. We also find that, with the exception of one case, all cases confirm 
that the messenger is seen as an Opponent at the point that the Deaf Effect shows. So, this 
condition precedes the Deaf Effect in a way that is consistent with our experiments.  
 
The interviews provide us with a list of factors and events that are mentioned by the 
internal auditors in order to explain Deaf Effect in specific cases. We find that the 
Collaborative Partnership vs Opponent relationship between Internal Auditor and manager, 
appears to be of influence on the communication and can change over time or due to 
events, actions and interactions, finally resulting in Deaf Effect. We grouped typical 
actions and interaction strategies that had been applied by the messengers and the decision 
makers. We also listed characteristics of the Risk Warnings that were mentioned by the 
internal auditors in their explanation of Deaf Effect. Finally, we categorized conditions that 
were mentioned in the Deaf Effect cases into characteristics of the messenger, 
characteristics of the manager, characteristics of the organization and characteristics of the 
project. Below we present figure 7-3 with the clustering of the factors we found in our 
interviews. For the description and examples of these factors we refer to Chapter 7.  
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The interviews also suggest that: 
 
(1) A history of Collaborative Partnership between Project Owner and internal auditor at 
the level of strategic risk-taking can prevent Deaf Effect from occurring. A history of 
Collaborative Partnership at operational or tactical level sometimes fuels the Deaf Effect 
for a Risk Warning at strategic level (continue/redirect the IS-project); 
 
(2) The Project Owners perceive risks differently from the risks reported by the internal 
auditor ± as we found earlier in our situated experiment with managers and auditors in 
chapter 6. Managers often consider their decisions to be rational and suggest that the 
auditors should do more research. They try to convince the auditors with arguments they 
consider to be rational themselves. In these conditions the managers do not particularly see 
the auditors as Opponents.  
 
(3) A turning-point in the relationship between messenger and Project Owner shows when 
the latter feels to be criticized or attacked personally. The interviews mark this shift quite 
clearly as a change in arguments from factual to personal. It shows specifically in those 
LQWHUYLHZVZKHUH WKHPDQDJHU¶VSHUVRQDOEHOLHIVPHULWV VHOI-esteem, self-efficacy or job 
security are at play and where the auditor¶s warning could cause personal losses in that 
respect. At that point, the auditor is no longer considered to be a Partner but turned into an 
Opponent. Most auditors, however, still considered themselves to be Partner of 
management and repeated the arguments louder and louder to overcome the Deaf Effect 
they experienced. The increased stressing of the Risk Warning appears to be counter 
effective in several occasions. 
 
(4) From this point we find several interaction strategies that are applied by the manager 
and by the internal auditor. In these Deaf Effect situations, it appears that these strategies 
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accelerate that Project Owner and messenger: a. are considering each other more and more 
as Opponents or even as ennemies and b.escalate their commitment to the position they 
have taken regarding the Risk Warning. This may finally result in an escalation of conflict 
as GHVFULEHGLQ*ODVO¶V(VFalation Waterfall.  
   
(5) Finally, our interviews suggest that a clear risk appetite of the organization can be of 
help in order to prevent the Deaf Effect. The organisDWLRQ¶V ULVN DSSHWLWH FDQ VHUYH DV D
common point of reference that is shared between the internal auditor and the manager. 
This can reduce the dominance of bounded rationality, subjectivity and personal elements 
in the observations and discussions on whether certain risks would be acceptable or not. 
(YHQZKHQPDQDJHUVZRXOGVHHDXGLWRUVDV³SROLFHPHQ´LWZRXOGGHILQLWHO\EHRIKHOSWR
have a risk-norm as a SRLQWRI UHIHUHQFH ³is 130km/hour the norm of acceptable risk in 
cardriving behavior, or do we leave room for the policeman to find 100km/hour to be too 
risky, while some experienced drivers might find 180km/hour not risky at all for them 
SHUVRQDOO\´   
 
The interviews in our exploratory multi-case study provide us with factors and stages that 
can be helpful to further research on the Deaf Effect. 
8.3. Contribution to literature on Escalating IS Projects 
 
In Chapter 2 we provided an overview of the literature on escalating IS-projects. In this 
section we will describe the contribution of our study to this literature, taking into account 
the research questions, the design and scope of our empirical sub-studies and the results of 
those sub-studies. We refer to the individual chapters for the further explanation of these 
contributions to literature on escalating IS-projects. 
 
As presented in table 2-5 the literature in Escalating IS-projects shows a history of 
experimental studies that tested a sequence of  factors and theories in order to explain the 
escalation phenomenon. These factors have been clustered in psychological, social, 
organizational and project factors. Our study contributes to this sequence of experiments as 
follows: (1) with its focus on the Deaf Effect our study proceeds on the few earlier 
experiments on this particular phenomenon that is relatively unexplored within literature 
on Escalating IS-projects; (2) in our experiments we examine the interaction effects of one 
unexplored organizational factor with two different psychological factors that have been 
involved in studies earlier; (3) the mediation analysis of this study combines multiple 
perspectives with its replication across two sub-studies and with applying multiple 
methods of analysis of the mediation paths; (4) we performed a situated experiment in 
order to test the Perceived Control heuristic in a realistic context; (5) we separately 
consider the probability and the impact information in a risk warning which suggest that 
the Deaf Effect could apply to particular components in the Risk Warnings; (6) we take the 
position of Project Owner as our unit of analysis, while most experimental studies have 
FKRVHQWKH3URMHFW0DQDJHU¶VRUVXSSOLHUDVWKHXQLWRIDQDO\VLVDQGRXUVWXG\SURYLGHV
an experimental scenario and further validated and refined measurement instruments that 
can be of use to future experiments. 
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With our multi-case study we contribute to literature on Escalating IS-projects as follows 
(1) we provide a structure that contains several factors which can be interesting for further 
causal examination of the Deaf Effect; (2) we describe  the variety of properties of these 
factors as we found in our interviews which can be helpful to future research on the Deaf 
Effect; (3) we describe the association of interaction strategies with changes in the 
relationship as a Partner or as an Opponent; and (5) we suggest two logic models that can 
be helpful to further study on the interaction between messenger and Project Owner related 
to Deaf Effect.  
 
From our multi-case study we also identify a pattern in which both the Project Owner and 
the messenger expressed an escalation of commitment related to the position they had 
taken with regard to the Risk Warning. This pattern appears to match the escalation of 
conflict model as described by Glasl (2011). The results suggest that the Deaf Effect may 
be associated with a typical instance of the so-called the goal substitution (Garland & 
Conlon, 1998). The goal-substitution effect refers to an entrapment paradigm, which 
argues that goals shift µµfrom an economic motiYe at the outset to some other motiYe later´ 
(Brockner et al. (1 979) p. 494). The goal substitution as defined by Garland refers to the 
completion effect in which the achievement of the project goals is substituted with the 
completion of the project as a goal itself. Our multi-case study suggests that these goals 
may also be substituted by the 3roject Owner¶s goal to eliminate the 5isk :arning or even 
eliminate the messenger. 
8.4. Contribution to literature on Internal Audit 
 
Although our study is mainly embedded in literature on Escalating IS-projects, it may 
contribute to literature on Internal Audit as well. In our study we used an internal auditor 
in the role of provider of the Risk Warning to which the IS-Project Owner responded with 
Deaf Effect. TKH'HDI(IIHFWFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDVDGHILFLHQF\ LQ WKH,QWHUQDO$XGLWRU¶V
effectiveness, as was confirmed by the internal auditors that we involved in our multi-case 
study. We will discuss the suggested contribution of our study to literature on Internal 
Auditing from the following perspectives (1) the Collaborative Partnership relation 
between the internal auditor and Project Owner; (2) the relevance of escalating IS-projects 
to internal audit; (3) the Deaf Effect for internal audit warnings and (4) the communication 
of internal audit messages and the relevance of interaction strategies.   
 
First, we focus on the relationship between internal auditor and IS-Project Owner. In 
academic research, mosWHPSLULFDOZRUNUHODWHGWRLQWHUQDODXGLW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKRWKHU
organizational parties deals with the relationship between internal audit and the audit 
committee (Raghunandan, Rama, & Scarbrough, 1998; Raghunandan, Read, & Rama, 
2001) (Goodwin, 2003). Other authors examine the relationship between internal audit and 
senior management, with a focus on the relationship between the Chief Audit Executive 
and the CEO/CFO (Sarens & Beelde, 2006) (Lenz & Sarens, 2012). To our knowledge, the 
relationship between internal auditor and management, in the role of IS-Project Owner in 
this case, is relatively unexplored and can be relevant to internal audit research when we 
assume that failure of strategic IS-projects should be a concern to internal audit. We will 
discuss this assumed relevance later. Our study contributes to the Internal Audit research 
by focusing on the interpersonal relationship between the individual internal auditor, not 
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necessarily the Chief Audit Executive, and the IS-Project Owner. Further Internal Audit 
research could address whether this relationship is best described in terms of auditor-
auditee or in terms of auditor-customer. As already reported in early work by (Chambers et 
al., 1988), p68, a misconception of this relationship and any changes in these roles could 
cause an expectation gap and interaction-problems between internal auditors and these 
managers. Failure to reach understanding could result in the perception that internal audit 
is simple an obstacle to achieving organizational objectives. This can run in ignored audit 
recommendations (Flesher & Zanzig, 2000). 
 
Second, we focus on the contribution of our study, given its perspective of escalating IS-
projects. The relevance of Information Systems to the internal audit research has been 
proposed by  (Weidenmier & Ramamoorti, 2006), with their overview of research 
opportunities in Information Technology and Internal Auditing. Opportunities are found 
ZLWK UHJDUG WR  ,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHPV¶  XVHIXOQHVV WR LQWHUQDODXGLWRUV DQG  LQWHUQDO
DXGLWRUV¶UROHDQGUHTXLUHGVNLOOVWRFRQWULEXWHWRSURSHUO\PDQDJHG,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHPV
Escalated IS-projects were already reported to be a relevant topic to internal auditors in 
2002 (Harrast & Bean). In a more recent study Gray, Gold, Jones, and Miller (2010) 
UHSRUWHGVFKRODU UHVXOWVRQ LQWHUQDODXGLWRUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQ WR,6-projects. So we think we 
can justify our assumption that the topic of escalating IS-projects is relevant to internal 
audit research. This could open research questions for further empirical studies on the 
competencies on IS, IS-projects and IS-project escalation that are required within internal 
audit functions to meet their challenges, proceeding on for example earlier studies on IS-
audit competencies (Brazel & Agoglia, 2007) (Biggs et al., 1987) (Curtis & Viator, 2000). 
This could be followed with empirical research on the allocation of these competencies 
within the internal audit function and on the Collaboration between internal auditors on 
this topic. As reported by Hunton, Wright, and Wright. (2004), iQWHUQDODXGLWRUVZKRGRQ¶W
have those IS-competencies show much lower sensitivity to IS-risks in ERP 
implementations than their colleagues who do have those IS-competencies. If not properly 
managed we think this could result in a Deaf Effect for IS-related risks within the internal 
audit function. Weidenmier and Ramamoorti (2006) and Curtis et al. (2009) already 
stressed the need for research on cooperation between IS-auditors and general auditors in 
planning, executing and reporting of audit-engagements. 
 
Third, we consider the contribution of our study from the Deaf Effect perspective. An 
improved understanding of the Deaf Effect in Escalating IS-projects could be of help  to 
the empirical research on the added value and effectiveness of Internal Audit, which still is 
a relatively unexplored though relevant domain of research as reported by Sarens (2009). 
The DeaI(IIHFWFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDVDIDLOXUHRILQWHUQDODXGLW¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVZKLFKFRXOG
HYHQ EH IROORZHG ODWHU E\ WKH LQHYLWDEOH ³ZKHUH ZDV LQWHUQDO DXGLW"´ TXHVWLRQ SRVHG E\
Gramling and Hermanson (2009) referring to many disastrous business failures with the 
typical features of escalating commitment to a failing course of action. As recently 
reported by Lenz and Sarens (2012) the concept of Internal Audit effectiveness is 
prominently positioned in the IIA definition (IIARF, 2011) and debated in practice 
(Deloitte, 2010) (PWC, 2010), however, Internal Audit effectiveness is still a relatively 
unexplored area in academic research (Arena & Azzone, 2009) (Sarens, 2009) (Soh & 
Martinov-Bennie, 2011). It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to describe the 
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various approaches and definitions of internal audit effectiveness. Many studies relate 
LQWHUQDODXGLWHIIHFWLYHQHVV WRWKHµGHPDQGVLGHSHUVSHFWLYH¶PHHWLQJWKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRI
the internal audit committee (Davies, 2009) (Arena & Azzone, 2009),  meeting the reliance 
expectations of external auditors (Cohen & Sayag, 2010) or relate it to expectations and 
support by senior management (Sarens & Beelde, 2006) while referring to CEO/CFO. 
Other studies relate the internal audit effectLYHQHVVWRWKHµVXSSO\VLGHSHUVSHFWLYH¶WRWKH
skills and competencies of the individual internal auditors (Arena & Azzone, 2009) or  
relate it to the compatibility with the politics and culture of an organization (Sarens & 
Abdolmohammadi, 2011). In their recent study, Lenz and Sarens (2012) suggest that 
internal audit effeFWLYHQHVV FRXOG EH UHODWHG WR µPRPHQWV RI WUXWK¶ LQ WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ
between the internal audit department and senior management (in a German context). 
Based on our interviews with executive internal auditors, we suggest that Deaf Effect 
events on strategic topics such as continuation of an escalating IS-project could serve as a  
µPRPHQWRIWUXWK¶SURYLGLQJDPHDVXUDEOHH[KLELWLRQRILQWHUQDODXGLWHIIHFWLYHQHVV 
 
Finally, we consider the contribution of our study to the internal audit literature from 
communication perspective. In our experiments we found that the negative framing of a 
message, in terms of losses compared to point of reference, could strongly be of influence 
to the Deaf Effect. In the multi-case study we also saw that communication strategies and 
interaction strategies could follow patterns with marked thresholds. These patterns were 
associated with changes in the relationship between internal auditor and Project Owner and 
were associated with the instances of the Deaf Effect in our study. We also found that 
attributes of communicating the message, for example formal or informal, were mentioned 
as relevant in order to explain the Deaf Effect events in our study. When attributes of 
communication are so strongly of influence on the achievement of the intended effect, 
FKDQJH D FRXUVH RI DFWLRQ WKDW KDUPV WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V LQWHUHVWV LW ZDUUDQWV VLJQLILFDQW
research attention to causal studies on communication effectiveness in the field of internal 
auditing. Proceeding on the study and report on internal audit communication and behavior 
by Dittenhofer, Ramamoorti, Ziegenfuss, and Evans (2010), our study could contribute 
with the schemes in chapter 7 containing several communication factors with variation of 
their properties that could be used in causal studies.  
 
Our study did not aim to answer particular research questions that were derived from 
literature on internal auditing. Although departed from the angle of escalating IS-projects, 
we suggest that the results of our study could be helpful to research in the field of internal 
auditing as well. 
 
8.5.  Methods and Limitations 
 
In this section we will discuss the choices and consequences with regard to the 
methodology and assumptions that we applied to our study. We will first discuss how we 
implemented triangulation. We will proceed with a discussion of the limitations of this 
study. 
 
Since the objective of this study was to contribute to knowledge on a relatively unexplored 
phenomenon, we found it would be appropriate to study the phenomenon from various 
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perspectives and to use a convergent research methodology, called triangulation (Webb et 
al., 1966). In accordance with basic principles of geometry, multiple viewpoints contribute 
to greater accuracy. Collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same phenomenon 
could improve research accuracy in a similar way. From a validation perspective, Shadish 
et al. (2002) posit the idea of multi operationism and argue that more than one method 
should be used in the validation process to ensure that variances reflect the trait and are not 
the artifact of the method. Jick (1979) suggests that triangulation, in addition to bringing 
validation and reliability, also enables researchers to capture a more complete, holistic, and 
contextual portrayal of the units under study. He promotes the idea that quantitative and 
qualitative research could be complementary. Jick (1979) also suggests that multi-methods 
could parallel theoretical triangulation and could contribute to synthesis or integration of 
theories that bear on a common problem. We will describe below how we applied 
triangulation in our research design and the execution of our study.  
 
Theoretical triangulation is applied by considering interactions between organizational 
theory (Stewardship Theory of corporate governance) and two psychological decision 
making theories, namely Prospect Theory and Illusion of Control Theory. Both 
psychological theories have been extensively tested and confirmed in noise-free and 
simple-context experiments. By varying and controlling an organizational context factor, 
we learn more about the contingency of these theories applied in our research domain and 
we contribute slLJKWO\WRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ³EHKDYLRULQFRQWH[W´  
 
Triangulation in research methods is obtained by combining two laboratory experiments, a 
situated experiment and a multi-case study in order to obtain insight into why the Deaf 
Effect for risk warnings occurs (in the domain of escalating IS-projects). The laboratory 
experiments provide methodological strength in terms of precision of measurement and 
deduction by testing of a set of theoretically determined hypotheses. The situated 
experiment contributes to context realism and considers whether the Deaf Effect might 
more specifically apply to the probability part of a risk warning, as was expected from 
literature. The qualitative multi-case study provides richer insight into the conditions of 
deafness and feedback loops between the bad news messenger and the decision maker. It 
also provides us with an inductive contribution from the interviews, delivering some 
unexpected findings that are interesting to serve as propositions for further study. 
 
Triangulation in the data collection and measurement of our experiments is obtained by 
replicating a major part of the treatment scenario and the measurement model across two 
groups of respondents: (1) undergraduate students of different nationalities and (2) dutch 
part-time students with relevant working experience. This contributes both to the construct 
validity as well as to the external validity of our study. In the other two empirical studies 
we collect data from subjects in the field. 
 
Triangulation in statistical analysis is obtained in multiple ways. We analyze the 
interaction effects by using Moderated Regression Analysis as well as Subgroup 
Comparison of regressions (Aiken & West, 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003; Sharma et al., 
1981) and moderated Partial Least Squares analysis (Chin et al., 1996). This mixed 
approach allows us to cross-validate the results, given the assumptions of these statistical 
methods. We analyze the mediating effects by using regression analysis and PLS as well. 
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In the mediated regression analysis we follow procedures of Baron and Kenny (1986) and 
we calculate Sobel-z statistics for estimating significance of mediating effects (Sobel, 
1982). In the PLS analysis, we estimate path coefficients and significance of mediation 
(and suppression) according to procedures of Iacobucci (2008), with bootstrapping 
procedures and we calculate Sobel-z statistics. We cross-validate the results across these 
statistical methods for mediation analysis and compare the results across the experiments 
in chapter 4 and 5. These triangulations provide us with strengthened internal validity and 
statistical conclusion validity. 
 
Triangulation in testing the construct validity in our study is performed by a combination 
of tests as proposed by Straub et al. (2004). We apply the tests that are typical for 
UHJUHVVLRQ DQDO\VLV FURQEDFK DOSKD H[SORUDWRU\ IDFWRU DQDO\VLV DQG IRU 3/6 $9(¶V
composite reliability, confirmatory factor analysis). These triangulations provide us with 
strengthened construct validity across the experiments of our study. 
In hindsight, we think triangulation brought us interesting parts of our study. Our research 
objective provided us with theoretical triangulation as a starting point for our study. The 
continuous search for opportunities to triangulate at the various levels and stages of our 
study provided us with improvements in the strength of our study. It also made us 
experience some of the underlying assumptions of different methods and how sensitive 
results sometimes can be to those assumptions. Of course, triangulation and redundancy 
also contributed to the complexity of our study, as predicted by Jick (1979), which might 
not make our research  exemplary for a lean study. 
 
In the empirical Chapters we describe the limitations of the individual sub-studies in full 
extend. Summarized, the following limitations apply to our study: (1) we measure the 
constructs in our studies with self-report by the participants. For particular constructs, such 
as message relevance, other methods of measurement, such as eye movement tracking are 
preferred over self-report; (2) self-report of both independent and dependent variables from 
a single source in our multi-case study can be subject to common methods variance bias 
(Hair et al., 1998). We think however this is not a major concern here, given the 
exploratory nature of this sub-study; (3) most participants with working experience that 
were involved in our study had the Dutch nationality. Also a relatively high part of the 
participants had their working experience from financial institutions. Given our focus on 
strategic IS-projects and internal auditors, this choice is defendable. Generalization of our 
research to other counties and to other business lines however should be done with care, 
especially by taking into account cultural differences that can be of influence on decision 
PDNHU¶VKHXULVWLFVDQGELDVHV     
8.6. Audit Implications 
 
The main implications of our study for the professional practice of internal auditors are 
described form the perspectives (1) partnership on strategic level and (2) communication 
of Risk Warnings. 
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The importance of Strategic Level Partnership between internal auditors and senior 
managers 
 
Our empirical study shows that a history of Collaborative Partnership between an internal 
auditor and a manager can reduce the Deaf Effect. We also learned from our interviews 
how easily  this relationship can be harmed when personal and emotional arguments get 
involved. Collaborative Partnership of internal auditors at operational project level (as 
advisors on controls and security)  appeared not to be effective in assuring a solid 
partnership relation with managers that can resist serious issues on strategic project level 
(continuation, redirection). Therefore, a solid partnership relation between internal auditors 
and executive management at strategic level should be established. Two Chief Audit 
Executives provided an interesting solution that appears to be consistent with the 
Stewardship principles of Collaborative Partnership. Executive staff of these internal audit 
departments had taken the initiative to organize a sequence of strategic sessions with 
executive business management to discuss strategic risk taking. The discussed how the 
risk-appetite of the organization could be made clear by using hypothetical cases. Personal 
struggles in decision making were shared and discussed between executive auditors and 
executive management. Participants got used to being challenged and showing 
vulnerability in their considerations on strategic risk taking. They also developed a 
FRPPRQSRLQWRIUHIHUHQFHRQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VULVNDSSHWLWH7KLVVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGing 
and vulnerability of the executive audit staff and executive managers had helped them to 
overcome Deaf Effect situations.  
 
Communication of Risk Warnings ± Knowledge of bounded rationality 
 
Although not new of course, this study reminds the internal audit professionals that the 
effectiveness of their service ± reporting on risks and controls ± includes the concepts of 
human information processing and bounded rationality. A reported audit-finding on risks 
RQO\WXUQVLQWR³LQIRUPDWLRQ´ZKHQWKHUHFHLYHUcomprehends the message and has given it 
DPHDQLQJUHODWHGWRKLV³PHQWDOPRGHO´WKDWFRQVLVWVRINQRZOHGJHH[SHULHQFHVEHOLHIV
preferences and heuristics. Although the auditors are not responsible for the decisions that 
are made based on their risk reporting, we consider it to be a requisite for effective audit 
communication to take into account the information processing biases of the receiver. Just 
like the provider of a medicine should take into account and guide proper usability of their 
products as well as the embedded bounded rationality of the users of their products and 
services. We think internal auditors should be skilled and trained to recognize and 
anticipate to elements of bounded rationality in order to make their risk warnings more 
effective. Knowledge of the elements of bounded rationality should not only apply to the 
receivers of their Risk Warnings, but should concern the internal auditors themselves in 
their role of senders of those Risk Warnings as well. We think this should be part of 
Professional Practice education of internal auditors and IS-auditors.        
 
Communication of Risk Warnings ± A recipe for maximization of Effectiveness? 
 
Inevitably this research raises the question whether our results can help the messenger with 
a prescribed rational approach in order to maximize the effectiveness of a Risk Warning 
across the three factors we included in our study. In section 8.2, conclusion 3 we reported 
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that the SUHGLFWHG FKDQJH RI 3URMHFW2ZQHU¶V'HDI (IIHFW can be ranked highest from a 
FKDQJHLQ3URMHFW2ZQHU¶V3HUFHLYHG&RQWUROWRDFKDQJHLQWKH&ROODERUDWLYH3DUWQHUVKLS
relation ranked as mediate and a change in Gain/Loss framing ranked lowest58. In order to 
maximize the effectiveness of the Risk Warning, it appears to be rational that the 
messenger follows this sequence under the assumption that all three factors have equal 
levels of opportunity and effort to be changed by the messenger. Of course this assumption 
often does not hold. If possible anyway, it may take the messenger very much effort to 
FKDQJH 3URMHFW 2ZQHU¶V Perceived Control heuristic that has been built by the Project 
2ZQHU¶V SHUVRQDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG H[SHULHQFH And it may be relatively easy to the 
messenger to frame his/her message in terms of gains or losses by changing the point of 
reference. The messenger is capable to change the relationship with the Project Owner by 
WKH PHVVHQJHU¶V RZQ DFWLRQV EXW KHVKH KDV WR GHDO ZLWK WKH 3URMHFW 2ZQHU¶V SUH-
occupations and actions as well. We therefore think we cannot offer a decision-tree to be 
followed by the internal auditor in order to maximize effectiveness of the Risk Warning. 
However, we can certainly give some guidelines to internal auditors that contribute to the 
effectiveness of their Risk Warnings. 
 
Communication of Risk Warnings ±Take notice of PDQDJHU¶VPerceived Control 
 
We saw that the Deaf Effect for a Risk Warning is most likely when the Project Owner has 
a high perceived Control, the message is framed as losses and coming from a messenger 
who is seen as an Opponent. This expressed elements of Competitive Arousal. When the 
Project Owner has a relatively low level of Perceived Control he/she is less sensitive for 
the messenger characteristics and is much more likely to comply to the Risk Warning. We 
therefoUH WKLQN LW LV KHOSIXO WR LQWHUQDO DXGLWRUV WR WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW WKH3URMHFW2ZQHU¶V
Perceived Control when they present a Risk Warning to a Project Owner. Indicators of 
High Perceived Control should be further developed for this specific context. However, we 
find in our interviews that some internal auditors simply ask the Project Owner whether 
and why he/she perceives a high level of control over the IS-project.   
 
Communication of Risk Warnings ± Presentation of the message 
   
One guideline for effective communication that can be derived from our study is related to 
the Gain/Loss framing. A bad news message that is strongly framed in terms of losses or 
deficiencies may promote risk seeking behavior according Prospect Theory which is  
confirmed in our study. A broadly applied form of presentation of audit messages is setting 
norms (such as the business case in our experiment) and exclusively reporting deficiencies 
where the addressee falls short compared to these norms. As we learned from our 
interviews, deficiencies might even be presented more emphasized to convince the receiver 
of the message when the Project Owner might not pay sufficient attention to the message. 
This stressed negative framing may actually even cause more deafness. According to our 
study, a more balanced focus on achievements, opportunities and positive framing of the 
                                                          
 
58 When we add the interaction effects, it is likely that for Project Owners with Low Perceived Control the 
ranking of Gain/Loss framing and Collaborative Partnership will switchJLYHQWKH3URMHFW2ZQHUV¶LQVHQVLWLYLW\
to the messenger characteristics in that condition. 
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message could reduce Deaf Effect. Framing the optional choices in a positive way (as 
achievements, assets and real options) ± and thus assigning value to the stopping or 
redirection of the project ± could reduce persistence in the risky course of action 
(continuing the project and showing deafness to the warning). Another way to reduce the 
effect of framing in terms of Losses, can be found by introducing a second point of 
reference next to the norm, for example by showing progress compared to the previous 
period.   
 
Communication of Risk Warnings ± Make use of Partnership relations 
 
The next guideline for effective communication of auditor warnings, applies to how to 
make use of the advantage of a Collaborative Partnership in a particular situation. If the 
internal auditor might not directly be seen as a Collaborative Partner him/herself, then the 
audit executive ± with a strategic Collaborative Partnership history with the manager as 
described in the previous section - may be more effective in sharing concerns with 
executive management. Another option would be to share the factual concerns with a 
person or with persons that the decision maker sees as Collaborative Partner(s) and who 
are less incapsulated in the course of action (the project) than the decision maker is. This 
should be done while strongly keeping in mind the shared goals, information transparancy 
and a Collaborative Partnership with the manager. This should not be confused with 
getting people behind you as part of the conflict escalation model in which the opposition 
between the own objectives of the auditor and the objectives of the Project Owner would 
play a central role. In a few cases the internal auditor introduced the threat of an external 
opponent as an argument to be themselves considered as Collaborative Partners to 
management and have their own message accepted by management. 
  
Communication of Risk Warnings ± Recognize stages of conflict escalation 
 
We think it would be helpful when internal auditors are skilled and trained to recognize the 
stages of conflict escalation and the turning points. This can prevent unintended effects of 
WKH DXGLWRU¶V RZQ UHDFWLRQ WR WKH 3URMHFW 2ZQHU¶V DFWLRQV Especially the inclination to 
react on Deaf Effect with more stressed communication has shown to be ineffective in 
obtaining receptivity for the message. A beautiful anecdote of overcoming a deaf reaction 
came from one of the respondents. This Chief Audit Executive told about a major 300 
million euro IS-project in 1995, the Project Owner IRXQG³WRRLPSRUWDQW´WREHFULWLFL]HG
by the internal audit department. The internal audit department had major concerns about 
WKHYLDELOLW\RIWKLVSURMHFWEXWZDVQ¶WLQWKHSRVLWLRQWo be heard or receive any attention 
for their concerns at executive management level. To overcome this deafness they started 
whispering instead of shouting. They provided a sequence of positive and detailed remarks 
to management at several operational issues that appeared to be symptoms of underlying 
structural and strategic problems. These issues were reported in a Collaborative and 
positive way and appeared to unfreeze the high level of perceived control over this project 
at the top of the organization. These reported symptoms received more and more attention 
at executive management level and finally resulted in a request to the internal audit 
department to assess the design and viability of the IS-project in cooperation with the most 
respected and trusted IS-specialists from various parts of the organization, including the 
project itself. From this anecdote we learn that if you want to obtain the attention of 
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someone who shows deafness, it may sometimes be more effective to whisper than to 
shout your message.   
 
Our results suggest that decision makers are less likely to comply to the Risk Warning if 
WKHPHVVHQJHU LV VHHQ DV D µSROLFHPDQ¶Our interviews also show that decision makers 
may be extrinsically motivated to comply to the warning, if the messenger has a very high 
authority µWhey listen to the police because they are the police¶. This can attenuate the 
effects in our study. If the messenger however for any reason might lose some of the 
authority, the effects in our study will likely show up again.   
8.7.  Management and Organization Implications 
 
The main implications of our study at management and organization level go beyond the 
effective contribution of an internal audit department that prevents the organization from 
taking strategic risks (with IS-SURMHFWVWKDWZRXOGYLRODWHWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VULVNDSSHWLWH
Regardless of the role of the internal auditor, the organization itself and the managers 
involved are not served by irrational decision making in the continuation of IS-projects 
that are no longer viable. We will discuss implications of our study from a bounded 
rationality perspective. 
 
Recognize heuristics ± Use heterogeneity 
 
+HXULVWLFV DUHSDUW RI DPDQDJHU¶V H[SHULHQFH DQG DUHYHU\XVHIXO WR WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI
managers and their valuable contribution to the organization. Strategic IS-projects often 
DUHVRFRPSOH[LQWDQJLEOHDQGUHOHYDQWWKDWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VPRVWH[SHULHQFHGVWDIIZLOO
be assigned to such projects. These valuable heuristics also bring their biases in the 
processing of riskinformation by these managers. We think it is important to avoid that 
such managers become surrounded by a homogenous group of IS-project staff who might 
show too much similarity on heuristics such as perceived control and positive/negative 
framing of tKHSURMHFW7KLVFRXOGLQIODWHWKHVHLQGLYLGXDO¶VKHXULVWLFVHYHQIXUWKHUDWJURXS
level and bring about group polarization. So an heterogenous group of project staff can be 
very useful to prevent Deaf Effect at group level. 
 
Risk Appetite of the organization ± Discuss it 
 
From our interviews we learned that a clear risk appetite at organization level can be very 
helpful in reducing IS-SURMHFW2ZQHU¶V'HDI (IIHFW )LUVW LW VHWV D VWDQGDUG WKDW FDQ EH
used as a point of reference for strategic risk taking at organization level. This reduces the 
influence of subjectivity and bounded rationality of the actors on their decision making. 
Second, it proved to be very useful that executive managers and executive auditors openly 
GLVFXVV WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V ULVNDSSHWite and how to apply it. This created a Collaborative 
Partnership that was helpful in avoiding the Deaf Effect on strategic IS-projects, as 
reported by some Chief Audit Executives that we interviewed.     
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Create a safe environment ± But not too safe 
 
Our results suggest that the Deaf Effect can be reduced when actors in the organization see 
each other as Collaborative Partners and can criticize each other in terms of gains in order 
to contribute to a better performance. SXFKDµVDIHHQYLURQPHQW¶ can be helpful to redirect 
projects when needed without responsible managers losing face and spending valuable 
resources on the continuation of failing projects. Although we did not investigate this, we 
expect that an environment µWRR VDIH¶ could elevate decision PDNHU¶V VHQVH RI
invulnerability, perceived control and might thus promote risk-seeking behavior as well.         
 
Redirection of projects ± Use positive Framing   
 
Stopping or redirecting IS-projects is often only considered on its negative consequences. 
In our study we find that negative framing of the options (continue and redirect)  promotes 
risk-seeking behavior and PDQDJHU¶V 'HDI (IIHFW IRU 5LVN :DUQLQJV. Positive framing 
reduces the Deaf Effect for Risk Warnings. The interesting paradox at organization level 
that follows LVWKDW³LIVWRSSLQJRI,6-projects is seen as a reasonable option, representing 
value and opportunities, then the overall success-rate of the IS-SURMHFWV PD\ LPSURYH´ 
This may require that an organization adopts a different perspective on the management of 
risks and the performance of their IS-project portfolio, for example based on Real Options 
Theory.  
 
Reduce the complexity of IS-Projects 
 
In section 2.3.1 we described the IS-project factors that cause escalation of commitment, 
such as: costs, difficulty, duration, large pay-off, unclear scope, changing requirements and 
other factors that refer to the complexity of IS-projects. Although we did not include these 
factors in our study on the Deaf Effect, we think it is obvious and also relevant to 
organizations that the reduction of the complexity of IS-Projects also reduces the 
dominance of bounded rationality in decision making on IS-projects. Smaller IS-projects 
not only provide more opportunities for redirection in a next step but reduce bounded 
rationality in decision making as well.  
8.8. Social Implications 
 
The social implications of this study are considered from three perspectives:  (1) escalating 
IS-projects, (2) escalation of commitment and (3) the Deaf Effect for risk warnings. 
 
Escalating IS-projects 
 
Escalating IS-projects are a problem for private companies and for many governmental 
organizations as well. The Dutch governmental Algemene Rekenkamer (Audit Chamber) 
issued a report on the relevance and problems of complex IS-projects in 2007. The Dutch 
parliament announced another investigation on failing IS-projects in 2012. Governmental 
projects especially show the high degrees of complexity, external political pressure, large 
budgets, short term orientation and large exposure that typically promote escalation of 
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commitment. So improved decision making on these projects can certainly make sense to 
society 
 
Although IS-projects in particular are prone to escalation ± given their complexity, costs, 
attention, strategic value, duration and intangibility ± our conclusions may also apply to 
other projects that share similar characteristics. We expect that many prestigious strategic 
projects in other applied fields yield similar characteristics. This could for example apply 
to real estate projects, to projects on transportation infrastructure or to business mergers.    
 
In this study we found that negative framing can promote risk seeking behavior and 
persistence in continuation of projects that are no longer viable. There may be a 
consequence of all the negative publicity on failing IS-projects: it brings a negative frame 
through which we observe such projects. Bounded rationality makes us even more 
sensitive for information on again another IS-project that failed and prevents us from 
noticing the positive contributions of many of these IS-projects. 
 
Escalation of Commitment 
 
Our study only focused on the Deaf Effect related to decision making in the field of 
escalating IS-projects. As we described in section 2.2., WKH SKHQRPHQ µHVFalation of 
FRPPLWPHQW¶KDVDOVREHHQIRXQGDQGVWXGLHGLQRWKHUGRPDLQVVXFKDVSURIHVVLRQDOVSRUWV
(Staw & Hoang, 1995), lending and banking ( Staw et al., 1997), political decision making 
(Ross & Staw, 1986) or even escalating of commitment to fraudulent activities 
(Drummond, 2002). The results of our study on the Deaf Effect may be useful to other  
domains of escalation of commitment where clear Risk Warnings are available like in our 
study.  
 
Deaf Effect 
 
The Deaf effect is not restricted to escalating IS-projects or escalating commitment of 
course. Our findings on the effective communication on risks could apply to other domains 
as well in which perceived control, gain/loss framing and the messenger-decisionmaker 
relationship is involved. This could apply to the business context of strategic decision-
making on acquisitions or mergers. This could also apply to  risk-communication in 
security or health related domains. Bringing your risk warning as an Opponent with strong 
negative framing might promote Deaf Effect for your warning. This could play a role in a 
broad range of applied domains. With regard to health-warnings this could for example 
explain the reported effect that people started to smoke even more since the introduction of 
the obtrusive personal warning on cigarette-boxes that smoking kills you.  
8.9. Suggested Research 
 
For suggested further research we combine two perspectives. From the perspective of the 
methodology and techniques as applied in this study, we proceed on section 8.3. We take 
in consideration our literature review on escalating IS-projects as presented in tables 2-1 to 
2-4 in which we took the methodological and design perspectives of case-studies, surveys 
and experiments in this stream of literature. From content perspective we proceed on 
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section 8.2 with our main findings and the implication for practice as we reported in 8.4 to 
8.6. 
 
We suggest that a cross-cultural survey amongst internal auditors provides an additional 
angle on Deaf Effect. This can proceed along the route of the influence of the corporate 
governance model (and internal audit function within this model) on Deaf Effect. 
Furthermore, it can proceed on the influential elements of organization culture (such as: 
power distance, time orientation, uncertainty avoidance). Next to this it can proceed on the 
SURSRVHGLQIOXHQFHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRQPDQDJHUV¶'HDI(IIHFWDVGHULYHG
from our multi-case study.  
 
From a methodological perspective we also consider that Systems Dynamics modeling  
provides an interesting path to proceed on our study. The analysis of the interaction effects 
within  our study could be enriched by considering temporal, incremental effects and 
feedback loops over time. Starting points could be found in the form and strength of the 
causal relations as we measured them in our experiments. Context variables and feedback 
loops could be derived from our multi-case study. Both escalation of commitment and the 
Deaf Effect in the interpersonal communication between messenger and decision maker 
are developing over time and are fueled by bounded rationality heuristics. Sterman (2000) 
provides methodological guidance for the development and testing of valid models of 
bounded rationality heuristics in decision making within contextual organizational 
conditions. We started a first tentative pilot implementation in Vensim on this road in the 
applied to domain of escalating IS-projects (Zuiderwijk, 2011), based upon SD-studies by 
Abdel-Hamid (Abdel-Hamid & Madnick, 1991; Abdel-Hamid & Tarek, 1988). 
 
We also consider that further applied experimental research on Perceived Control in the 
field of Deaf Effect in Escalating IS-projects can prove very interesting. This could follow 
two paths. First, within-subject experimental designs ± such as of Jani (2005) - can provide 
more refined insight into cumulated effects of Perceived Control on Deaf Effect. A second 
path can be replication in this applied domain of several psychological experiments on 
Illusion of Control Theory. Factors such as decision PDNHU¶Vfreedom of choice, predicted 
outcome, need for the outcome, familiarity, competition and actor/observer positions have 
been tested in card-playing psychological experiments. In the field of stop/continue 
decisions in escalating IS-projects, these conditions can EH LQGXFHGE\'HFLVLRQ0DNHUV¶
organizational environment, including factors such as: freedom of choice, responsibility, 
clear goals and plans, incentives, scarce resources, use of standards, reliability of 
information. Knowing the influence of Perceived Control on Deaf Effect, it can be 
interesting to investigate organizational conditions that are of influence on Perceived 
Control and thus on Deaf Effect. The organizational factors that were mentioned in our 
interviews on Deaf Effect are candidates.  
 
We think it is interesting to perform similar experiments as ours that include the  
LQWHUDFWLRQHIIHFWVRI&ROODERUDWLYH3DUWQHUVKLSZLWKWKHPHVVHQJHU¶V$XWKRULW\DQG
with the existence of a clear Risk Appetite at organization level.Based on our interviews 
we expect that such interaction effects exist and can further refine context variables that 
apply to our conclusions. The factors that we listed in figure 7-3 also provide opportunities 
for further experimentral research on the Deaf Effect.    
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Another interesting route for further study on the Deaf Effect follows the path of the 
various types of Gain/Loss framing as presented by Levin et al. (2002). This provides 
additional methodological variance in manipulation and measurement of Framing Effects 
and thus extends validity of the framing effects we found in our study. As proposed by 
Ball et al. (2003) measurement of mediating variables such as Message Relevance, might 
better be measured by eye-tracking experiments than by self-report (as we did in our 
study). Finally, it would be an interesting path to use the three framing types of Levin as a 
lens for narrative study in the field. The words that managers use in talking freely about 
their IS-project may unhide the type and level of their Gain/Loss framing of the project. 
We performed a tentative Grounded Theory study on this research-idea (Benschop, 
Nuijten, & Pijl, 2011). We suggest that managers who use frame-typical words, might be 
more receptive for risk-warnings that are presented by using the same frame-typical words.  
 
Furthermore, an interesting path for future research could be to follow the influence of 
management expectations on the Deaf Effect. We learned from Prospect Theory 
experiments how much influence it can have on information processing when a point of 
reference is changed. It can be very interesting to improve the understanding of similar 
points of reference on the other factors that we included in our study. In the development 
of our study we found that the UHVSRQGHQWV¶ expectations on the collaborativeness of 
internal auditors was a strongly anchored point of reference. While we used it as a control-
variable in our study, it could be the focus of future research as well.  
 
Finally, the Stewardship Theory component of our study can be further elaborated in the 
context of Deaf Effect for auditor warnings in IS-projects. From a methodological 
perspective, it appears to be interesting to follow a path of multi-level constructs to take 
into account both the organizational level and the individual level of the decision maker in 
order to obtain a deeper understanding of Deaf Effects in IS-projects, with the IS-study of 
Burton-Jones and Gallivan (2007) as an example of how this could be approached. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to isolate and test constructs ± such as Trust - that are 
closely related to Stewardship Theory, on their isolated causal effect on deafness.  
8.10. Epilog 
 
In this study we made a small step in finding explanations of the Deaf Effect in the field of 
IS-projects. It took almost 250 pages of writing - and reading - to get a little bit acquainted 
with Kikazaru, the ape that covered his ears not to hear any evil. The story of this ape 
hopefully provides some knowledge that is of help in making projects more succesful and 
taking the gains or pains from pulling the plug when needed. Knowledge in itself however 
does not make that change come about. Remember that we have been talking about a 
µGHFLVLRQ PDNHU¶ WKURXJKRXW WKLV WKHVLV 2QH ZKR GRHVQ¶W NQRZ DQGPLJKW QRW HYHQ EH
aZDUH WKDW KH VKRZV GHDIQHVV RU ZKR NQRZV EXW GRHVQ¶W ZDQW WR KHDU .QRZLQJ DQG
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJDUHQRWHQRXJKWRPDNHWKHGLIIHUHQFHLILWGRHVQ¶WOHDGWRDFWLRQZKLFK
is described as the Knowing-Doing Gap by Pfeffer and Sutton (1999). It takes courage to 
make the step from hearing and knowing to actually taking action to redirect or stop a 
project when needed. So finally we should search for the fourth ape Shizaru who referred 
to ´Qot taking action´Hopefully we came a little bit closer. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 Introductie 
 
De drie aapjes op de titel pagina zijn afkomstig uit de Chinese Oudheid en heten Mizaru 
(bedekt zijn ogen), Kikazaru (bedekt zijn oren) en Iwazaru (bedekt zijn mond). In het 
WestHQ ZRUGW DDQ KHQ GH EHWHNHQLV WRHJHNHQG GDW YHUDQWZRRUGHOLMNHQ µGH DQGHUH NDQW
RSNLMNHQ¶ RI µ]LFK GRRI KRXGHQ¶ YRRU NULWLVFKH VLJQDOHQ Dit laatste wordt ook wel 
aangeduid met Deaf Effect. Deze studie richt zich op het Deaf Effect bij 
eindverantwoordelijken (projecteigenaren) van strategische informatiserings-projecten. Het 
Deaf Effect wordt gezien als één van de mogelijke oorzaken waardoor sommige projecten 
niet tijdig gestopt of bijgestuurd worden en µvoortdenderen¶ zonder het beoogde doel te 
bereiken. Dit komt niet alleen voor bij informatiserings-projecten. Deze blijken echter bij 
uitstek kenmerken te EHYDWWHQ GLH KHW ]RJHQDDPGH µHVFDODWLH YDQ FRPPLWPHQW¶
aanwakkeren en zijn daardoor interessant om te onderzoeken. Daarnaast zijn 
informatiserings-projecten van strategisch belang voor vele organisaties en vragen zij 
veelal substantiele investeringen. 
 
Er is sprake van Deaf Effect als een verantwoordelijke manager slecht nieuws niet hoort, 
het bericht negeert of het onschadelijk maakt. Er hoeft dus niet altijd sprake te zijn van 
opzet. Er kan ook sprake zijn van begrensde rationaliteit waardoor waarschuwingen niet de 
aandacht krijgen, zoals een goed boek alle aandacht kan vasthouden om vooral door te 
gaan met lezen en hinderlijke onderbrekingen van buitenaf te negeren.  
 
In deze studie onderzoeken wij enkele factoren die, mogelijk in combinatie, van invloed 
kunnen zijn op het Deaf Effect. In ons onderzoek gaan wij er van uit dat slecht nieuws  
wordt verstrekt door iemand die verstand van de materie heeft, deugdelijk onderzoek heeft 
gedaan en zo objectief en onafhankelijk mogelijk kan rapporteren. Zoals andere 
onderzoekers hebben wij gekozen voor internal auditors omdat zij geacht worden aan deze 
voorwaarden te voldoen en dus een onderbouwde en geloofwaardige waarschuwing af te 
geven. Wij onderzoeken het Deaf Effect van de projecteigenaar. Dit is degene die 
verantwoordelijk is om te bewaken dat de organisatiedoelstellingen met het project ook 
daadwerkelijk worden gerealiseerd en de belangen van de organisatie worden veilig 
gesteld. De projecteigenaar wordt veelal beschouwd als de opdrachtgever van het project 
en is, bijvoorbeeld als divisiedirecteur, eindverantwoordelijk om go/nogo beslissingen te 
nemen op belangrijke momenten in een informatiserings-project. 
 
Wij onderzoeken of de volgende drie factoren een oorzakelijk verband hebben met Deaf 
Effect: (1) wordt de boodschapper van de risico-waarschuwing gezien als meewerkend 
partner, die bijdraagt aan de resultaten, of wordt de boodschapper gezien als µWHJHQVWDQGHU¶
die de fouten van de projecteigenaar komt blootleggen. De internal auditor als 
µWHJHQVWDQGHU¶ZRUGWVRPVJHW\SHHUGDOVµSROLWLHPDQ¶ELQQHQGHRUJDQLVDWLH  LQZHONH
mate heeft de projecteigenaar de beleving dat hij zijn project onder controle heeft en 
invloed kan uitoefenen op de uitkomst van het project. Het gaat hier om de beleving van de 
projecteigenaar en niet om het feitelijke niveau van projectbeheersing. Eerdere ervaringen 
van de projecteigenaar met soortgelijke projecten kunnen in hoge mate van invloed zijn op 
de beleving die de projecteigenaar heeft; en (3) wordt de risico-waarschuwing positief of 
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negatief gepresenteerd, in termen van winst of verlies ten opzichte van een referentiepunt. 
Het betreft hier dus het verschil in de presentatie (zogenaamde Framing) bij dezelfde 
inhoud van de boodschap (het glas is half vol of half leeg). De theorieën die worden 
gehanteerd in dit onderzoek zijn respectievelijk Stewardship Theorie, Illusion of Control 
Theorie en Prospect Theorie. Door middel van drie experimenten en een aantal interviews 
met internal auditors dragen wij bij aan de kennis over Deaf Effect in de context van 
informatiserings-projecten. Daarnaast kunnen de resultaten van deze studie een bijdrage 
leveren aan de literatuur over de effectiviteit van internal auditors. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 Literatuur Review 
 
In dit hoofdstuk beschrijven wij eerst globaal de literatuur waarin theorieën en factoren 
worden getoetst ter verklaring van Escalation of Commitment, het fenomeen dat mensen 
geneigd zijn om te volharden in eerder gemaakte keuzes. Theorieën die daarbij naar voren 
komen zijn onder andere: Self-Justification Theory (je filtert onbewust de informatie die je 
keuze bevestigt) en Self-Presentation Theory (je wilt voor de omgeving geen 
gezichtsverlies lijden).  
 
Vervolgens gaan wij dieper in op de factoren die van invloed zijn op escalatie van 
informatiserings-projecten. Deze factoren worden gerubriceerd naar psychologische 
factoren (zoals begrensde rationaliteit), sociale factoren (bijv. groepsinvloeden en 
cultuurverschillen), organisatorische factoren (bijv. politiek gevoeligheid, afrekencultuur, 
financiële middelen) en project factoren (zoals projectcomplexiteit, betrokken partijen). 
 
Wij vervolgen de literatuurstudie met onderzoeken die van belang kunnen zijn voor het 
verklaren van Deaf Effect in de context van informatiserings-projecten. Daarin betrekken 
we zowel organisatie onderzoek als onderzoek naar hoe mensen informatie verwerken bij 
het nemen van beslissingen en de heuristieken die daarbij worden toegepast. 
 
De heuristieken die een rol spelen in dit onderzoek worden beschreven aan de hand van 
experimenten uit de literatuur. Daarbij gaat het bijvoorbeeld om het overschatten van 
winstkansen bij het werpen van een dobbelsteen.  
 
Tenslotte geven we in dit hoofdstuk een overzicht van de methodische invulling van 
studies in het onderzoeksgebied van escalerende informatiserings-projecten, zodat wij in 
onze empirische studies  zoveel mogelijk gebruik kunnen maken van beproefde methoden 
en instrumenten alsmede de ervaringen van andere onderzoekers.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 Onderzoeksontwerp 
 
In dit hoofdstuk beschrijven wij eerst de conceptuele structuur van ons onderzoek, 
namelijk welke begrippen en verbanden wij onderzoeken in ieder van de hoofdstukken: in 
feite de uiteenrafeling van onze onderzoeksvraag in deelvragen. Vervolgens geven wij een 
toelichting op het technische onderzoeksontwerp: welke methoden en technieken voor 
datacollectie en analyse hebben wij toegepast bij de beantwoording van deze 
onderzoeksvragen. De belangrijkste kenmerken van ons onderzoeksontwerp zijn 
opgenomen in tabel 3-5, welke onderstaand is weergegeven.  
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Conceptueel 
Onderzoeks 
Ontwerp 
Hoofdstuk 4 Hoofdstuk 5 Hoofdstuk 6 Hoofdstuk 7 
 
Onderzoeksvraag 
 
Verklarend 
 
Verklarend 
 
Verklarend/ 
Beschrijvend 
 
Verklarend/ 
Exploratief 
 
Effecten 
 
Hoofd 
Interactie 
Mediërend 
 
 
Hoofd 
Interactie 
Mediërend 
 
Hoofd 
Interactie 
 
Hoofd 
Interactie 
Afhankelijke 
Variabele 
Continue Continue Risico Perceptie Continue 
 
Onafhankelijke 
Variabelen 
Partner 
Winst/Verlies  
Frame 
Partner 
Perceived Control 
Kans 
Impact 
Rol 
Partner 
Condities 
 
Mediërende 
Variabelen 
 
Relevantie 
Risico Perceptie 
 
Relevantie 
Risico Perceptie 
 
  
Theorieën Prospect Theory 
Stewardship Theory 
Heuristic Analytic 
Theory 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
Stewardship Theory 
Heuristic Analytic 
Theory 
 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
Stewardship Theory 
Illusion of Control 
Theory 
Systems Theory 
Technisch 
Onderzoeks 
Ontwerp 
Hoofdstuk 4 Hoofdstuk 5 Hoofdstuk 6 Hoofdstuk 7 
Onderzoeks 
Strategie 
 
Laboratorium 
Experiment 
Laboratorium 
Experiment 
Situated  
Experiment 
Case Studie 
Methode 
 
Between Group Between Group Mixed Design Multi-Case Studie 
Deelnemers 
 
 
199 Studenten 134 Parttime-
Studenten 
70 Internal 
auditors 
32 Managers 
12 Internal Auditors 
Data Analyse 
 
 
Regressie 
PLS 
Regressie 
PLS 
Mixed Design 
ANOVA 
 
Data Validiteit 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA, Cronbach 
Alpha, AVE, 
Exploratory &  
Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis 
MANOVA, 
Cronbach Alpha, 
AVE, Exploratory 
& Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis 
Cronbach Alpha, 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis 
Case Study 
Protocol 
Case Study 
Database 
Chains of Evidence 
Hulpmiddelen SPSS rel 19 
smartPLS rel 2.0 
SPSS rel 19 
smartPLS rel 2.0 
SPSS rel 19 
 
nVivo rel 9 
Table 3-5 Raamwerk Onderzoeks Ontwerp 
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Hoofdstuk 4 Experiment Prospect Theorie en Stewardship Theorie 
 
In dit empirisch hoofdstuk beschrijven wij het ontwerp en de resultaten van het eerste 
experiment in deze studie. Omdat we een oorzakelijk verband willen onderzoeken kiezen 
we voor een experiment waarbij we omstandigheden zo goed mogelijk beheersen en een 
tweetal factoren beïnvloeden. De eerste factor die we in dit experiment manipuleren betreft 
de relatie met de boodschapper: wordt de boodschapper gezien als een partner (die komt 
helpen) of als een tegenstander (die fouten blootlegt en rapporteert). Deze factor hebben 
we Collab genoemd (Collaborative Partner). Volgens Stewardship Theorie zijn mensen 
eerder geneigd de waarschuwing op te volgen van een boodschapper die als partner wordt 
gezien. Als tweede factor manipuleren we in dit experiment of de risico-boodschap positief 
wordt gepresenteerd in termen van winnen of negatief wordt gepresenteerd in termen van 
verliezen. Deze presentatie wordt Framing genoemd en wordt gemanipuleerd door een 
ander referentiepunt te kiezen, op de volgende manier: Het project zou de organisatie 60 
miljoen euro opleveren volgens de business case. In het Verlies frame wordt vervolgens 
gesproken dat het project nog 1/3 kans heeft om dit te halen en 2/3 kans dat het resultaat 60 
milioen minder wordt dan de business case. In het Winst frame wordt dezelfde informatie 
alsvolgt gepresenteerd: het project heeft 1/3 kans om de 60 miljoen euro resultaat te halen  
en 2/3 kans dat er nul resultaat gehaald wordt. Volgens Prospect Theorie zijn mensen in de 
Verlies presentatie meer geneigd om risico-zoekende keuzes te maken. In ons experiment 
verwachten wij dus dat Deaf Effect meer optreedt als de boodschap wordt gepresenteerd in 
termen van verliezen. In dit experiment onderzoeken we of beide factoren afonderlijk van 
invloed zijn op Deaf Effect en of zij elkaars werking beïnvloeden (interactie-effect). 
'DDUQDDVWPHWHQZHHHQDDQWDOWXVVHQOLJJHQGHµPHGLDWLQJYDULDEHOHQLQGLWH[SHULPHQW 
 
Voor dit experiment is een scenario opgesteld dat (samen met het experiment in hoofdstuk 
5) in een 4-tal stappen is ontwikkeld en getest. Deelnemers (199 studenten uit Nederland 
HQ %HOJLs NUHJHQ DVHOHFW  YDQ GH  PRJHOLMNH VFHQDULR¶V YRRUJHOHJG ZDDULQ GH WZHH
factoren werden gemanipuleerd (boodschapper als Partner of Tegenstander; boodschap als 
winst of als verlies gepresenteerd). In dit experiment is het gebruik van studenten 
aanvaardbaar omdat de framing-manipulatie als winnen/verliezen niet gerelateerd is aan 
werkervaring en omdat studenten een homogene groep vormen. De resultaten werden 
geanalyseerd met regressie-analyse en PLS en getest op validiteit. De hoofdconclusies uit 
dit hoofdstuk worden toegelicht aan de hand van de  onderstaande figuur.  
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De variabele Continue (op de vertikale as) is gemeten op een schaal van 1 (zeker niet 
doorgaan met het project) tot 8 (zeker doorgaan met het project).  
 
Uit de grafiek blijkt dat deelnemers minder geneigd zijn om door te gaan met het project 
als de risico-ZDDUVFKXZLQJNRPWYDQHHQERRGVFKDSSHUGLHKRRJVFRRUWRSµSDUWQHUVFKDS¶
dan wanneer de boodschapper wordt gezien als tegenstander (die laag scoort op 
µSDUWQHUVFKDS¶%HLGHUHJUHVVLHOLMQHQGDOHQQDPHOLMN 
 
2RNEOLMNWXLWGHJUDILHNGDWELMGHSUHVHQWDWLHYDQGHULVLFRERRGVFKDSDOVµYHUOLH]HQ¶GH
donkere regressielijn), de deelnemers  meer geneigd zijn om met het project door te gaan, 
GDQ ZDQQHHU GH ERRGVFKDS ZRUGW JHSUHVHQWHHUG LQ WHUPHQ YDQ µZLQVWHQ¶ GH  OLFKWH
regressielijn). De donkere lijn (Loss Framing) ligt namelijk in zijn geheel boven de lichte 
lijn (Gain Framing); 
 
Tenslotte blijkt uit de grafiek dat er een interactie bestaat tussen de twee factoren, want de 
twee regressielijnen lopen niet parallel. De onderste regressielijn daalt sterker dan de 
ERYHQVWHUHJUHVVLHOLMQ'XVELMHHQERRGVFKDSGLHJHSUHVHQWHHUGLVDOVµZLQVWHQ¶ZRUGWGH
beslissing om door te gaan met het project sterker beïnvloed door de relatie met de 
boodschapper als partner of tegenstander. De deelnemers die de boodschap in termen van 
µYHUOLH]HQ¶ NUHJHQ JHSUHVHQWHHUG ODWHQ KXQ EHVOLVVLQJ RP GRRU WH JDDQ PHW KHW SURMHFW
minder afhangen van de relatie met de boodschapper als partner of tegenstander. De 
grafiek laat ook zien dat het bij een boodschapper die zeer sterk wordt gezien als 
tegenstander, het niet veel verschil maakt of de boodschap als winst of verlies wordt 
gepresenteerd. Bij een boodschapper die zeer sterk wordt gezien als partner, maakt het juist 
een groot verschil of de boodschap wordt gepresenteerd als winst of als verlies.   
 
Wij hebben  de deelnemers gevraagd om een schatting te geven van de kans dat zij het doel 
van het project (60 miljoen resultaat) gaan behalen bij de gegeven risico-waarschuwing. 
'HGHHOQHPHUVGLHGHERRGVFKDSNUHJHQ YDQ HHQSDUWQHU LQ WHUPHQ YDQ µZLQVWHQ¶JHYHQ
gemiddeld een schatting van de kans op succes van 33% hetgeen overeenkomt met de 1/3 
die in de  risico-waarschuwing is verstrekt. De deelnemers met een van de andere drie 
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VFHQDULR¶VJHYHQEHGXLGHQGKRJHUHVFKDWWLQJHQYDQKXQNDQVRSVXFFHVPHWHQ
52%.  
 
8LW DQDO\VH YDQ WXVVHQOLJJHQGH µPHGLsUHQGH¶ YDULDEHOHQ EOLMNW GDW GH LQYORHG YDQ GH
Winst/Verlies framing  op de beslissing van de deelnemers om te  stoppen of door te gaan 
met het project, grotendeels direct plaatsvindt en voor een gedeelte indirect via de 
³UHOHYDQWLH´GLHGHRQWYDQJHUDDQGHERRGVFKDSWRHNHQWHQYLD]LMQLQVFKDWWLQJYDQGH kans 
op succes. De relatie met de boodschapper (als partner of tegenstander) is grotendeels 
indirect van invloed op de beslissing om te stoppen en door te gaan met het project en 
ORRSWYRRUQDPHOLMNYLDGH³UHOHYDQWLH´GLHGHRQWYDQJHUWRHNHQWDDQGHERRGVchap.  
 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt tenslotte ingegaan op de consequenties van de onderzoeksresultaten 
vanuit diverse invalshoeken: de gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden en instrumenten, 
vervolgonderzoek, de bruikbaarheid van de resultaten in de praktijk van internal auditors 
(de boodschappers in onze studie) en besluitvorming over informatiserings-projecten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 Experiment  Illusion of Control  Theorie en Stewardship Theorie 
 
Het experiment dat wij in dit empirisch hoofdstuk beschrijven heeft een groot deel 
gemeenschappelijk met het experiment in het vorige hoofdstuk. Het scenario en de 
meetinstrumenten zijn dezelfde. Daardoor kunnen de gevonden resultaten uit beide 
experimenten elkaar versterken. In dit experiment worden ook twee factoren 
gemanipuleerd om vervolgens daarvan het effect te meten op de beslissing van 
respondenten om al dan niet door te gaan met het project. Ook in dit experiment hanteren 
wij de relatie met de boodschapper als beïnvloedende factor Collab: wordt de 
boodschapper gezien als een partner (die komt helpen) of als een tegenstander (die fouten 
blootlegt en rapporteert). Volgens Stewardship Theorie zijn mensen eerder geneigd de 
waarschuwing op te volgen van een boodschapper die als partner wordt gezien. Als tweede 
factor manipuleren we de deelnemers in de mate waarin zij als projecteigenaar de beleving 
(perceptie) hebben dat zij het project onder controle hebben en invloed kunnen uitoefenen 
op de uitkomst van het project. Deze factor wordt aangeduid met Perceived Control 
(PercContr). Uit experimenten in Illusion of Control theorie blijkt dat mensen met een 
hoog niveau van Perceived Control geneigd zijn hun kansen op succes hoger in te schatten 
dan dat deze objectief zijn (bijvoorbeeld bij het gooien van een dobbelsteen). In 
experimenten omtrent verkeersgedrag blijkt dat chauffeurs met een hoge perceived control 
PHHUJHQHLJG]LMQ WRWKHWQHPHQYDQULVLFR¶V5LVLFR-waarschuwingen achten zij niet van 
toepassing op zichzelf. Uit een survey (March&Shapira, 1987) blijkt dat ook managers 
geneigd zijn om gegeven risico-informatie niet op zichzelf te betrekken en tevens geneigd 
]LMQ RP GH]H WH ZLOOHQ YHUVODDQ µEHDW WKH RGGV¶ 8LW HHUGHUH µHVFDOHUHQG ,7-SURMHFW¶
experimenten met Perceived Control blijkt dat een hoge perceived control inderdaad leidt 
tot meer risicozoekend gedrag.  
 
In dit experiment onderzoeken wij of beide factoren afzonderlijk van invloed zijn op Deaf 
Effect en of zij elkaars werking beïnvloeden (interactie-effect). Daarnaast meten we een 
DDQWDO WXVVHQOLJJHQGH µPHGLDWLQJ YDULDEHOen in dit experiment. De 4 verschillende 
VFHQDULR¶V ]LMQ DVHOHFW WRHJHZH]HQ DDQ  GHHOWLMG ZHUNVWXGHQWHQ PHW UHOHYDQWH
werkervaring. Omdat Perceived Control gerelateerd is aan werkervaring hebben wij 
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gekozen voor deze groep deelnemers. De daarmee gepaard gaande heterogeniteit van de 
respondenten, was een van de uitdagingen bij het ontwikkelen en testen van het 
experiment-ontwerp. Het ontwikkelen en testen van het ontwerp (van beide experimenten) 
heeft in 4 stappen plaatsgevonden waarin ongeveer 200 deelnemers betrokken waren, 
voordat het experiment werd uitgevoerd met de groepen zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 
en in dit hoofdstuk.         
 
De meetresultaten van de 134 deelnemers zijn geanalyseerd met regressie-analyse en PLS 
en zijn getest op validiteit. De hoofdconclusies uit dit hoofdstuk worden toegelicht aan de 
hand van de onderstaande figuur.  
 
 
 
 
'H YDULDEHOH &RQWLQXH RS GH YHUWLNDOH DV LV JHPHWHQ RS HHQ VFKDDO YDQ  µ]HNHU QLHW
GRRUJDDQPHWKHWSURMHFW¶WRWµ]HNHUGRRUJDDQPHWKHWSURMHFW¶De middelste van de 
vijf regressielijnen heeft betrekking op de deelnemers die de gemiddelde score gaven op 
Perceived Control na de manipulaties in het scenario. De twee donkere lijnen daarboven 
hebben betrekking op de respondenten die 1 respectievelijk 2 standaarddeviaties hoger 
scoorden op hun Perceived Control. De onderste twee lichte lijnen betreffen deelnemers 
die juist een lagere Perceived Control rapporteerden (1 respectievelijk 2 standaarddeviaties 
onder het gemiddelde van de deelnemers).  
 
Uit de grafiek blijkt dat deelnemers minder geneigd zijn om door te gaan met het project 
als de risico-ZDDUVFKXZLQJNZDPYDQHHQERRGVFKDSSHUGLHKRRJVFRRUWRSµSDUWQHUVFKDS¶
dan wanneer de boodschapper werd gezien als tegenstander (die laag scoort op 
µSDUWQHUVFKDS¶$OOHUHJUHVVLHOLMQHQGDOHQQDPHOLMN 
 
Ook blijkt uit de grafiek dat bij een hoger niveau van Perceived Control de deelnemers  
meer geneigd zijn om met het project door te gaan, dan wanneer zij een lager niveau van 
Perceived Control hebben. De meest donkere lijn (respondenten met hoogste Perceived 
Control) ligt in zijn geheel boven de andere lijnen. De meest lichte lijn (respondenten met 
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de laagste Perceived Control), ligt in zijn geheel onder de andere lijnen. De tussenliggende 
lijnen zijn gerangschikt naar oplopende Perceived Control.  
 
Tenslotte blijkt uit de grafiek dat er een interactie bestaat tussen de twee factoren, want de 
vijf regressielijnen lopen niet parallel. De bovenste regressielijn daalt het sterkste. De 
onderste regressie lijn daalt het minst sterk. De deelnemers met een zeer lage Perceived 
Control zijn geneigd om de risico-waarschuwing op te volgen en laten zich daarbij, in hun 
hulpeloosheid,  minder leiden door de vraag of de boodschapper wordt gezien als partner 
of als tegenstander. De deelnemers met een zeer hoge Perceived Control zijn veel meer 
geneigd om het project voort te zetten en daarbij juist zeer gevoelig of de boodschapper 
gezien wordt als partner of als tegenstander. Als de boodschapper wordt gezien als 
WHJHQVWDQGHU µSROLWLHPDQ¶ ]LMQ GH GHHOQHPHUV H[WUD JHQHLJG RP GRRU WH JDDQ PHW KHW
SURMHFW HQ DOV KHW ZDUH GH FRPSHWLWLH DDQ WH JDDQ PHW GH ERRGVFKDSSHU µFRPSHWLWLYH
DURXVDO¶HQ]LFKDIWH]HWWHQWHJHQGHERRGVFKDS 
 
Ook deze deelnemers hebben wij gevraagd om een schatting te geven van de kans dat zij 
het doel van het project (60 miljoen resultaat) gaan behalen bij de gegeven risico-
waarschuwing, waarin de kans op succes van 1/3 was gegeven. Bij de groep deelnemers 
die het scenario kregen van een hoog perceived control met een boodschapper die een 
historie had als tegenstander, was de geschatte kans op succes gemiddeld 60%. De 
schatting van deze groep was daarmee beduidend hoger dan de 38%, 40% en 50% bij de 
GHHOQHPHUV GLH HHQ YDQ GH DQGHUH GULH VFHQDULR¶V KDGGHQ RQWYDQJHQ. Dit bevestigt de 
YRRUJDDQGH FRQFOXVLH GDW MXLVW LQ GH]H VLWXDWLH VSUDNH NDQ ]LMQ µFRPSHWLWLYH DURXVDO¶ HQ
Deaf Effect. 
 
8LWDQDO\VHYDQWXVVHQOLJJHQGHµPHGLsUHQGH¶YDULDEHOHQEOLMNWGDWGHLQYORHGYDQGHWZHH
genoemde factoren  op de beslissing van de deelnemers om te  stoppen of door te gaan met 
KHWSURMHFWJURWHQGHHOVGLUHFWSODDWVYLQGWHQLQPLQGHUHPDWHLQGLUHFWYLDGH³UHOHYDQWLH´
GLHGHRQWYDQJHUDDQGHERRGVFKDSWRHNHQWHQYLDGH³ULVLFRSHUFHSWLH´YDQGHRQWYDQJHU
na deze boodschap.  
 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt tenslotte ingegaan op de consequenties van deze 
onderzoeksresultaten vanuit diverse invalshoeken: de gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden en 
instrumenten, vervolgonderzoek, de bruikbaarheid van de resultaten in de praktijk van 
internal auditors (de boodschappers in onze studie) en besluitvorming over 
informatiserings-projecten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 Experiment Actor/Observer effect in Illusion of Control  Theorie 
 
Het experiment in hoofdstuk 5 liet zien dat Perceived Control van invloed is op het Deaf 
Effect bij een risico-waarschuwing. Deze invloed ORRSWYRRUHHQGHHOYLD³ULVLFR-SHUFHSWLH´
die de ontvanger heeft na deze boodschap. Onder risico-perceptie wordt verstaan: de eigen 
perceptie van iemand over de mate waarin hij/zij risico loopt in een specifieke situatie. Dit 
wordt deels bepaald door de ervaringen die iemand heeft opgebouwd en deels door de 
situatie zelf, bijvoorbeeld door de informatie die iemand ter beschikking heeft. In dit 
hoofdstuk beschrijven we een experiment dat met 104 medewerkers van een Nederlands 
financiele instelling is uitgevoerd. Daarbij gaan we na of de rol die mensen in hun 
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ZHUNRPJHYLQJ KHEEHQ DOV ³DFWRU´ RI ³REVHUYHU´ YDQ LQYORHG LV RS KXQ ULVLFR-perceptie 
nadat ze en risico-waarschuwing hebben ontvangen. Ook deze verwachting is gebaseerd op 
experimenten uit de eerder genoemde Illusion of Control Theorie. Daarin blijkt dat 
deelnemers die zelf een actie uitvoeren (een dobbelsteen werpen of een speelkaart trekken) 
de kans op success hoger inschatten dan deelnemers die een ander observeren. Ook uit 
experimenteel onderzoek naar risico-inschattingen in het verkeer, blijkt dat mensen in de 
ELMULMGHUVVWRHOLQGHUROYDQµREVHUYHU¶GHULVLFR¶VLQHHQYHUNHHUVVLWXDWLHKRJHULQVFKDWWHQ
dan wanneer zij aan het stuur zitten (in de rol als µDFWRU¶+HWH[SHULPHQWLQGLWKRRIGVWXN
heeft tot doel om na te gaan of na ontvangst van risico-waarschuwingen, dit actor/observer 
effect wordt bevestigd in de risico-perceptie van medewerkers die binnen de organisatie 
IXQFWLRQHUHQ LQ HHQ URO YDQ µDFWRU¶ RI LQ HHQ URO YDQ µREVHUYHU¶9RRUGH URO YDQ µDFWRU¶
hebben wij gekozen voor IS-managers  binnen het bedrijf,  die aan het stuur zitten, en in de 
positie zitten om acties te nemen op basis van gerapporteerde IS-ULVLFR¶V9RRUGHUROYDQ
µREVHUYHU¶KHEEHn wij gekozen voor internal auditors, die de bestuurder kunnen wijzen op 
IS-ULVLFR¶V PDDU QLHW ]HOI DDQ KHW VWXXU ]LWWHQ 2S EDVLV YDQ OLWHUDWXXU RQGHU]RHN ZRUGW
verwacht dat verschillen tussen beide groepen vooral betrekking hebben op de verwerking 
van dH NDQV LQIRUPDWLH 'RRU GH 3HUFHLYHG &RQWURO KHXULVWLHN GLH PDQDJHUV DOV µDFWRU¶
hebben ontwikkeld, zijn zij eerder geneigd om kans-informatie  niet op zichzelf van 
toepassing te verklaren en dus minder gevoelig te zijn voor deze informatie in een risico-
waarschuwing.  
 
Met het verstrekken van een negental risico-waarschuwingen met varierende kans 
informatie en impact informatie (laag, midden, hoog) beogen wij dit onderscheid zichtbaar 
te maken. Omdat heuristieken die verband houden met werkervaring zich in de loop der 
tijd ontwikkelen, hebben  wij binnen de totale groep in het bijzonder de vergelijking 
gemaakt tussen de ervaren internal auditors (in een Vice President functies) en de ervaren 
IS managers (eveneens in een Vice President functie). Omdat deelnemers uit dezelfde 
organisatie werkzaam kwamen, was dit een bruikbaar vergelijkings-criterium. Ook hebben 
wij zo veel mogelijk gebruik gemaakt van de rapportagevormen en definities van deze 
organisatie om zo goed mogelijk aan te sluiten bij hun werkomgeving en de ervaring en 
heuristieken die zij daar in hun rol hebben opgebouwd. De meetresultaten van de 104 
deelnemers (waarvan 42 in de VP-group) zijn geanalyseerd met behulp van Mixed Design 
ANOVA. De hoofdconclusies worden toegelicht aan de hand van de onderstaande figuur, 
die betrekking heeft op de 21 ervaren (VP) internal auditors en de 21 ervaren (VP) IS-
managers .  
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De grafiek links beschrijft de gemiddelde risico-perceptie van de deelnemers bij risico-
waarschuwingen met respectievelijk een kans-niveau 1, 2 of 3 in de definities van dit 
bedrijf. De grafiek rechts beschrijft de gemiddelde risico-perceptie van de deelnemers bij 
risico-waarschuwingen met respectievelijk een gegeven impact niveau van 1, 2 of 3 in de 
definities van dit bedrijf. Ieder punt op de donkere lijnen in deze grafieken is het 
gemiddelde van 63 metingen van risico-perceptie binnen de groep van internal auditors. 
Ieder punt op de lichte lijnen in deze grafieken is het gemiddelde van 63 metingen van de 
risicoperceptie, maar nu bij de ervaren IS-managers.  
 
In de linker grafiek is terug te zien dat de ervaren IS-managers ongevoelig zijn voor de 
kans-informatie in de risico-waarschuwing, want de lichte lijn stijgt nauwelijks. De 
donkere lijn in de linker grafiek geeft wel een stijging te zien. Daaruit is op te maken dat 
de ervaren internal auditors wél gevoelig zijn voor  de kans-informatie in de risico-
waarschuwingen. Bij een hogere kans-aanduiding geven ze ook een hogere risico-
perceptie. De resultaten komen overeen met de verwachtingen uit eerder onderzoek dat 
managers nauwelijks gewicht toekennen aan kans-informatie die zij ontvangen.  
 
In de rechter grafiek is terug te zien dat zowel de lichte als de donkere lijnen beduidend 
sterker stijgen dan in de linker grafiek. De risico-perceptiHYDQ]RZHOGHHUYDUHQµDFWRUV¶
DOVGHHUYDUHQµREVHUYHU¶ZRUGWYHHOVWHUNHUEHwQYORHGGRRUGHLPSDFW-informatie dan door 
de kans-informatie. In hun gevoeligheid voor impact-informatie zijn de onderlinge 
YHUVFKLOOHQ  WXVVHQGHHUYDUHQµDFWRUV¶ GH93,6-mDQDJHUHQGHHUYDUHQµREVHUYHUV¶GH
VP internal auditors) gering. 
 
Uit de statistische analyses komt tevens naar voren dat, de gemiddelde  risico-perceptie 
YDQ GH µREVHUYHUV¶ GH LQWHUQDO DXGLWRUV JHPLGGHOG KRJHU LV GDQ GH JHPLGGHOGH ULVLFR-
perceptie vaQ GH µDFWRUV¶ GH ,S-managers) bij de 9 risico-waarschuwingen die zij allen 
kregen. De resultaten uit dit experiment zijn overeenkomstig de verwachtingen op basis 
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van het actor/observer effect. Hoewel we in dit hoofdstuk niet het Deaf Effect hebben 
gemeten zoals in de eerdere hoofdstukken, draagt het toch bij aan de onderzoeksvraag met 
een duidelijk indicatie dat het Deaf Effect voor risico-waarschuwingen zich waarschijnlijk   
toespitst op de hier geconstateerde ongevoeligheid voor de kans-informatie in de 
boodschap. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 Multi-Case Studie van Deaf Effect situaties bij IT projecten 
 
In aanvulling op de experimenten zijn 11 interviews gehouden met senior internal auditors, 
waarin zij vertelden over een Deaf Effect situatie die zij in hun eigen praktijk hadden 
meegemaakt. Deze verkennende multi-casestudie had tot doel om een aantal factoren in 
beeld te krijgen en te structureren die  mogelijk van invloed kunnen zijn op Deaf Effect. 
Daarbij is in het bijzonder de aandacht gevestigd op de relatie tussen boodschapper en de 
ontvanger. Op basis van iteratief coderen van de teksten en het schrijven van analytische 
PHPR¶VLVRQGHUVWDDQGVFKHPDRSJHVWHOGZDDULQIDFWRUHQ]LMQJHFOXVWHUGGLHPRJHOLMNYDQ
invloed zijn op Deaf Effect. 
 
  
 
De factoren zijn toegelicht aan de hand van anekdotes uit de interviews en tevens is 
beschreven welke varianten werden aangetroffen in de verschillende interviews. In het 
schema wordt tevens zichtbaar gemaakt dat de relatie als Partner of als Tegenstander sterk 
kon veranderen voorafgaand aan de Deaf Effect situatie. Deze verandering kon inzichtelijk 
gemaakt worden aan de hand van gebeurtenissen die in de interviews werden genoemd. 
Naast de historie als Partner of als Tegenstander konden typische kenmerken van de risico-
boodschap van invloed zijn op deze relatie. Naast het reeds eerder in de experimenten 
genoemde Framing, werden vorm- en intensiteitseigenschappen van de boodschap 
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veelvuldig genoemd als relevant voor het Deaf Effect (formeel/ informeel, onverwacht/ 
verwacht, definitief/voorlopig, vertrouwelijk/wijdverspreid, rating, operationele/ 
strategische impact). Deze factoren werden in een aantal interviews tevens in verband 
gebracht met een verandering in de relatie als Partner of als Tegenstander. Vervolgens 
werden de interviews gedomineerd door actie- en interactiestragieën die sterk van invloed 
worden geacht op het Deaf Effect. De eerste categorie heeft betrekking op duidelijk 
herkenbare veranderingen in de communicatie (bijv. van informeel naar formeel, van 
inhoud naar vorm, van inhoud naar personen). Ook die worden in verband gebracht met 
een verschuiving in de richting van partners danwel tegenstanders. Verder komen 
duidelijke strategieën naar voren die er op gericht bleken om de eigen positie te versterken 
(bijvoorbeeld medestanders zoeken of autoriteit gebruiken) danwel de positie van de 
andere partij te verzwakken (de geloofwaardigheid van de boodschapper aantasten, de 
acties van de andere partij vertragen of anderszins frustereren). Deze interactie strategieën 
bleken van grote invloed op de relatie als partners of als tegenstanders. De strategieën die 
van weerszijde werden toegepast bleken de situatie richting een Deaf Effect te drijven, 
ofwel lieten een interventie zien (omschakeling van formeel naar informeel bijvoorbeeld, 
ingrijpen van hogerhand) die juist het Deaf Deaf deed voorkomen.  
 
Naast de genoemde factoren die van invloed werden geacht op Deaf Effect, leverden de 
interviews het inzicht dat (1) Deaf Effect zich laat beschrijven als een resultante van een 
reeks samenhangende factoren, gebeurtenissen en een wisselwerking tussen de 
boodschapper en de projecteigenaar; (2) deze gebeurtenissen en wisselwerking sterk 
geassocieerd worden met veranderingen in de relatie tussen beide partijen: deze gingen 
elkaar steeds nadrukkelijker als tegenstanders beschouwen in de beschreven Deaf Effect 
cases; (3) de respondenten als duidelijk herkenningspunt, en ook  onderscheidend tussen  
Deaf Effect situaties en niet Deaf Effect situaties, noemden dat de boodschap en/of de 
communicatie zich verplaatste van inhoudelijk naar persoonlijk, bijvoorbeeld doordat de 
projecteigenaar zich aangetast voelde in zijn imago, zijn ervaring miskend achtte, of zich 
in hoge mate persoonlijk associeerde met het project en de kritiek daarop; (4) de 
opeenvolging van interacties zoals beschreven in de interviews een patroon lieten zien dat 
VWHUNHJHOLMNHQLVYHUWRRQWPHW*ODVO¶VPRGHOGDW(VFDODWLHYDQ&RQIOLFWHQEHVFKULMIWZDDULQ
twee partijen (in dit geval de boodschapper en de projecteigenaar) een escalatie van 
commitment laten zien in hun eigen positie in dit conflict en elkaar stapsgewijs steeds 
nadrukkelijker als tegenstander gaan beschouwen; en (5) suggereerden de resultaten een 
interactie effect tussen enerzijds de relatie tussen boodschapper en  projecteigenaar als 
partners of als tegenstanders en anderzijds de autoriteit van de boodschapper. Als de 
autoriteit van de boodschapper zeer hoog was, dan leek het minder van belang voor Deaf 
Effect of de boodschap afkomstig was van een partner of van een tegenstander. Wij 
luisteren naar de politie omdat deze autoriteit heeft. Mocht de autoriteit van de 
boodschapper echter verminderen, dan wordt Deaf Effect sterker beïnvloed of de 
boodschap afkomstig is van een partner of een tegenstander. Deze interactie werd 
gesuggereerd op basis van de interviews en leent zich voor nader onderzoek; en tenslotte 
(6) werd een vergelijkbaar interactie effect gesuggereerd ten aanzien van de risk appetite 
van de organisatie. Bij het ontbreken van een duidelijke risk-appetite wordt Deaf Effect 
sterk beïnvloed door de relatie met de boodschapper. Bij een zeer duidelijke risk-appetite 
van de organisatie bleek Deaf Effect juist minder onderhevig aan de relatie met de 
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boodschapper. Deze interactie werd gesuggereerd op basis van de interviews en leent zich 
tevens voor nader onderzoek.  
 
Hoofdstuk 8 Conclusies  
 
In dit hoofdstuk worden de resultaten van de vier empirische studies  gecombineerd tot de 
beantwoording van de onderzoeksvraag. Daarbij geven wij een beschouwing van de 
gehanteerde randvoorwaarden en methoden, de bijdrage van dit onderzoek aan de 
wetenschappelijke literatuur over  escalerende IT-projecten en de wetenschappelijke 
literatuur over internal auditing, alsmede de consequenties van de onderzoeksresultaten 
voor de praktijk.  
 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag van dit onderzoek was erop gericht om inzicht te krijgen in 
mogelijke oorzaken van het Deaf Effect. Uit de onderzoeksresultaten blijkt het volgende: 
 
(1) Ieder van de drie onderzochte theorieën, Stewardship Theorie, Prospect Theorie en 
Illusion of Control Theorie levert een bijdrage aan de verklaring van het Deaf Effect; 
 
(2) Als we invloed van de drie theorieën vergelijken dan blijkt dat het Deaf Effect het 
sterkste wordt beïnvloed door de Perceived Control van de Project Eigenaar (Illusion of 
Control Theorie), in iets mindere mate door de relatie met de boodschapper als Partner of 
als Tegenstander (Stewardship Theorie) en in nog in iets mindere mate door de presentatie 
als winst/verlies die de boodschapper geeft aan de risico-waarschuwing (Prospect 
Theorie); 
 
(3) Er treden interactie effecten op tussen de genoemde drie factoren, waarvan het meest in 
het oog springen: 
x de presentatie als winst/verlies blijkt nauwelijks van invloed op het Deaf Effect 
als de boodschapper zeer sterk als tegenstander wordt gezien. Daarentegen is de 
presentatie van de boodschap van grote invloed als de boodschapper juist sterk als 
partner wordt gezien; 
x de projecteigenaar met een hoge mate van Perceived Control is zeer sterk geneigd 
tot het Deaf Effect als de boodschap afkomstig is van iemand die hij/zij 
nadrukkelijk ziet als tegenstander. De projecteigenaar met een lage Perceived 
Control is minder geneigd tot Deaf Effect en is er nauwelijks gevoelig voor of de 
boodschapper wordt gezien als partner of als tegenstander; 
x De kans-informatie in een risico-waarschuwing komt nagenoeg onvervormd over 
bij de projecteigenaar als de boodschap als winst wordt geformuleerd en 
afkomstig is van iemand die wordt gezien als meewerkend partner. 
(4) Medewerkers met ruime wHUNHUYDULQJ DOV µDFWRU¶ tonen na het ontvangen van een 
risico-waarschuwing gemiddeld een risico-SHUFHSWLHGLHDIZLMNWYDQKXQFROOHJD¶VGLHHHQ
YHUJHOLMNEDUHZHUNHUYDULQJKHEEHQ LQ HHQ µREVHUYHU¶ URO+HW YHUVFKLO EOLMNW YRRUDO LQ GH
gevoeligheid voor kans-informatie in een risico-waarschuwing. 
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Bij de vertaling van de onderzoeksresultaten naar de praktijk van internal auditors wordt 
ingegaan op het belang van strategisch partnerschap tussen internal auditor en managers en 
de kwetsbaarheid van partnerschap op operationeel niveau. Tevens benadrukken wij dat 
het voor internal auditors van nut is om te beschikken over kennis van begrensde 
rationaliteit ter voorkoming van onbedoelde effecten bij de communicatie van risico-
waarschuwingen. Vervolgens wordt ingegaan op het belang voor internal auditors om 
inzicht te hebben in de Perceived Control van de projecteigenaar. We geven enkele 
overwegingen bij de gangbare manier om risico-waarschuwingen met een negatieve 
framing te formuleren, namelijk als tekortkomingen ten opzichte van een norm. Tenslotte 
benadrukken wij het belang dat internal auditors kennis hebben van de conflict 
escalatiestappen zodat deze in de praktijk herkend kunnen worden. 
 
Bij de vertaling van onze onderzoeksresultaten naar de management-praktijk wordt 
ingegaan op het nut van heuristieken (opgebouwd door ervaring) voor projecteignaren van 
strategische IS-projecten. Tevens wordt ingegaan op het belang om de bijwerkingen van 
deze heuristieken, zoals in dit onderzoek naar voren zijn gekomen, te beheersen, 
bijvoorbeeld door een heterogene samenstelling van de groep mensen die de 
projecteigenaar omringt. Daarnaast gaan wij in op het effect van framing bij de 
besluitvorming te stoppen of door te gaan met een project. Onze resultaten suggereren dat 
een organisatie er niet bij gebaat is als een dergelijke beslissing wordt gepresenteerd als het 
kiezen tussen twee verliezen. Als het stoppen/bijstellen van een project tevens wordt 
beschouwd als een redelijke optie, die van waarde kan zijn en mogelijkheden creeert, zou  
de projectenportefeuille wellicht meer succesvol kunnen worden. Dit vraagt echter een 
aangepaste ]LHQVZLM]H RS GH EHKHHUVLQJ YDQ ULVLFR¶V HQ SUHVWDWLHV YDQ GH
projectenportfeuille. Tevens stellen wij voor dat het verminderen van de complexiteit van 
informatiseringsprojecten (en dus het verlagen van het ambitieniveau) de invloed van 
begrensde rationaliteit op de besluitvorming vermindert.   
 
Bij de vertaling van onze onderzoeksresultaten naar het maatschappelijk belang wordt 
ingegaan op het belang van IS-projecten zowel voor bedrijven als voor de overheid. De 
negatieve aandacht die IS-projecten doorgaans krijgen werkt hun falen misschien wel in de 
hand. De onderzoeksresultaten zijn wellicht ook van nut op andere terreinen waar sprake is 
van escalatie van commitment, zoals politieke besluitvorming, sport alsmede frauduleus 
handelen. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
 
 
Despite the use of advanced project management methods, still many examples can be 
found of prestigious Information Systems (IS) projects that are no longer approaching their 
goals and to which continued investments are no longer justified. These so-called 
Escalating IS-projects VHHP WR ³WDNH RQ D OLIH RI WKHLU RZQ´ DQG FRQWLQXH WR DEVRUE
valuable resources without ever reaching the objectives, they are difficult to stop, yet are in 
need of redirection or termination. While it is true that those projects are eventually 
terminated or significantly redirected, they are often allowed to continue for too long 
before appropriate action is taken 
 
Our study focuses on the so-called Deaf Effect of executive managers who are responsible 
for strategic IS-projects and who are often referred to as Project Owners. For reasons not 
well understood, these Project Owners may either consciously or unconsciously ignore, 
reject or not hear warnings, even when those who provided it were bold enough to transmit 
the message. Our study takes the position that a Project Owner would ignore,  overrule or 
not hear a Risk Warning that continuation of an IS-project is no longer viable and thus the 
project should be discontinued. This Risk Warning is provided by a credible source, who is 
assumed to make true assertions based upon thorough investigation. Given their standards 
and requirements of proficiency, independency and due professional care, we used internal 
auditors as the messenger of the Risk Warning.  
 
The objective of our research is phrased as follows: 
 
³&RQWULEXWHWRWKHH[SODQDWLRQof Why the Deaf Effect occurs in the field of escalating IS-
projectV´E\H[DPLQLQJPDLQFDXVDO effects and interaction effects  from following three 
perspectives: 
 
7KH³&ROODERUDWLYH3DUWQHUYV2SSRQHQW´Relationship between Internal Auditor (Bad 
News Messenger) and Project Owner (Decision Maker) ± based on Stewardship Theory; 
 
(2) Project OwneU¶VPerceived Control heuristic which might bring biased processing of 
WKHDXGLWRU¶VULVNZDUQLQJERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\± based on Illusion of Control Theory;  
 
(3) The presentation of the risk warning either with the focus on Gains or with the focus on 
Losses ± based on Prospect Theory. 
 
For our study we use the metaphor of a decision maker who is sitting at the driver-seat, 
while the internal auditor provides a Risk Warning sitting at the passenger-seat. We 
examine ZKHWKHU WKH GULYHU¶V 'HDI (IIHFW IRU WKH Risk Warning is influenced by (a) 
whether he/she sees the messenger as a collaborative partner or as an opponent who 
H[SRVHV WKH GULYHU¶V IDLOXUHV, (b) whether the driver perceives to be in control, and (c) 
whether the message is framed positive or negative.   
 
In two 2x2 laboratory experiments we asked participants to place themselves in the 
position of Project Owner and decide about continuation of an IS-project after they 
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received a Risk Warning from an internal auditor. In the first experiment we provided 
respondents with treatments of (1) the messenger seen as a Collaborative Partner or as an 
Opponent, and (2) the Risk Warning presented in terms of Gains or Losses. In the second 
experiment we provided respondents with treatments of (1) the messenger seen as a 
Collaborative Partner or as an Opponent, and (2) the Project Owner having a High or Low 
level of Perceived Control of the outcome of his/her IS-Project. 
 
In both experiments we find confirmed that decision makers are more likely to follow the 
Risk Warning if the comes from a Collaborative Partner. If the message comes from an 
Opponent who exposes management failures, then the decision makers are more likely to 
respond with the Deaf Effect to the Risk Warning. Our first experiment also shows that 
decision makers are more likely to respond with Deaf Effect if the Risk Warning is framed 
in terms of Losses instead of Gains. These results are consistent with expectations 
according to Prospect Theory. Our second experiment confirms that decision makers are 
more likely to respond with Deaf Effect if they have a High level of Perceived Control  
over the project outcome. These results are consistent with expectations according to 
Illusion of Control Theory. For each experiment we also find significant interaction effects 
where one factor attenuates or amplifies the influence of the other on the Deaf Effect. 
 
In our experiments we also measured mediating factors that provide more insight into how 
the Deaf Effect is influenced. We find that the influence on the Deaf Effect is partially 
PHGLDWHG E\  GHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶ ELDVHG SHUFHSWLRQV RI ULVN  DVVLJQLQJ OHVV RUPRUH
relevance to risk information and (3) biased estimations of probabilities to succeed/fail. 
These are all typical effects of bounded rationality LQWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VSURFHVVLQJRI
risk information.  
 
In a situated experiment that we performed in a Dutch/British organization, we assessed 
that employees with working experience as a manager ± in the role of an actor sitting at the 
µGULYHUVHDW¶± perceived risks differently than their colleagues with working experience as 
an internal auditor ± sitting at WKHµSDVVHQJHUVHDW¶ 
 
In the fourth ± exploratory - part of our study we interviewed executive internal auditors 
who have experienced the Deaf Effect for their Risk Warnings on large IS-projects. We 
asked them to describe factors and events that explain the Deaf Effect in that case. We find 
that all three factors that we involved in our experiments are mentioned in those 
interviews. The interviews provided us with a list of factors and events that are mentioned 
by the internal auditors in order to explain Deaf Effect in those specific cases. We 
clustered those factors into conditions referring to characteristics of the messenger, 
characteristics of the manager, characteristics of the organization and characteristics of the 
project. Furthermore, we clustered factors that were related to the properties of the Risk 
Warning. Finally, we grouped typical actions and interaction strategies that had been 
applied by the messengers and the decision makers and that had promoted the Deaf Effect 
according to our interviews.  
 
We conclude with a description of the contribution of our study to literature on Escalating 
IS-projects and Internal auditing, the practical implications of our study and our 
suggestions for further research. 
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l)DEAF EFFECT FOR RISK WARNINGS
A CAUSAL EXAMINATION APPLIED TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROJECTS
Escalation of commitment to a chosen course of action is a phenomenon that shows for
example when failing strategic Information Systems (IS) projects are continued for much
too long. With this study we contribute to the explanation of why managers (Project
Owners) respond with the Deaf Effect to Risk Warnings, even when these warnings are
provided by a credible messenger, such as an internal auditor. 
We examine whether the IS Project Owner’s Perceived Control is of influence on the
Deaf Effect. We also examine whether the Deaf Effect for the risk warning is affected by
the relationship with the messenger:  is the messenger seen as a collaborative partner
who is of help or is the messenger seen as an opponent who is exposing the Project
Owner’s failures. Furthermore, we assess whether the Deaf Effect is affected by the
presentation (framing) of the message in terms of Gains or in terms of Losses. Based on
experiments we analyze the main effects and the interaction effects of those three factors
to the Deaf Effect. In a multi-case study we explore other factors that can affect the Deaf
Effect and could be interesting for further study. We discuss the contribution of our study
to literature on escalating IS projects and to literature on internal auditing. Finally we
discuss the implications of our study to the practice of IS Projects and Internal Auditing
and to management practice in general.
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